Khartik Jasudass v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGCA 11

Case Details

• Citation: [2026] SGCA 11
• Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 10 March 2026
• Coram: Tay Yong Kwang JCA
• Case Number: Criminal Motion No 1 of 2026
• Hearing Date(s): 28 January 2026
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: Khartik Jasudass
• Respondent / Defendant: Public Prosecutor
• Counsel for Claimants: The applicant in person
• Counsel for Respondent: Anandan Bala, Marcus Foo and Sarah Siaw (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
• Practice Areas: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing; Criminal review; Permission for review

Summary

The judgment in [2026] SGCA 11 represents a definitive clarification of the statutory boundaries governing the criminal review process in Singapore, specifically concerning the finality of appellate decisions under the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) ("CPC"). The applicant, Khartik Jasudass, sought permission to review a previous decision of the Court of Appeal which had itself dismissed an earlier application for review. This "review of a review" application brought into sharp focus the operation of Section 394K(1) of the CPC, which imposes a strict "one-bite" rule on review applications in respect of any decision of an appellate court.

The dispute originated from the applicant's conviction for trafficking 26.21g of diamorphine, an offence under Section 5(1)(a) read with Section 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) ("MDA"). Having exhausted his primary appeal in 2016 and a subsequent review application in 2021, the applicant attempted to reopen the proceedings by alleging that the trial judge had failed to give sufficient weight to his statements regarding the ownership and weight of specific drug bundles. The Court of Appeal, sitting as a single judge, was tasked with determining whether such an application could even be entertained in light of the express statutory prohibitions against multiple review attempts.

The Court of Appeal held that the application was statutorily barred. Justice Tay Yong Kwang JCA emphasized that the legislative intent behind the criminal review framework was to provide a narrow, exceptional mechanism for correcting miscarriages of justice, not to facilitate an endless cycle of litigation. The court clarified that the statutory bar under Section 394K(1) extends not only to the substantive review application itself but also to the preliminary application for permission to move the court for such a review. Furthermore, the court found no basis to invoke its inherent power of review, as the applicant failed to present any "compelling" new material that could conclusively demonstrate a miscarriage of justice.

The broader significance of this decision lies in its reinforcement of the principle of finality in criminal litigation. By summarily dismissing the application, the Court of Appeal sent a clear signal to practitioners and litigants that the review process is not a "backdoor" for re-litigating facts already considered at trial and on appeal. The judgment underscores that the "miscarriage of justice" threshold is exceptionally high and cannot be met by repackaging old evidence or challenging the weight assigned to evidence by the trial judge. This case serves as a critical precedent for the interpretation of the "permission" stage under Section 394H of the CPC and the limitations of the court's inherent jurisdiction in the face of an express statutory scheme.

Timeline of Events

1. 27 August 2012: The applicant, Khartik Jasudass, and his co-accused, Puniyamurthy a/l Maruthai, rode into Singapore on a motorcycle. Central Narcotics Bureau ("CNB") officers intercepted them and discovered three bundles of drugs hidden within the vehicle.
2. 13 February 2013: A "Long Statement" was recorded from the applicant, in which he claimed that of the two bundles of drugs seized, one belonged to him and the other belonged to Puniyamurthy.
3. 2015: The applicant and Puniyamurthy stood trial in the High Court. The applicant was convicted of trafficking in 26.21g of diamorphine. The trial judge's decision was reported as [2015] SGHC 199. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane.
4. 9 September 2016: The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against conviction and sentence in CCA 26/2015.
5. 2020: The applicant filed Criminal Motion No 19 of 2020 ("CM 19"), seeking permission to review the decision in CCA 26/2015.
6. 25 February 2021: The Court of Appeal, in [2021] SGCA 13, dismissed CM 19 summarily.
7. 2026: The applicant filed the present application, Criminal Motion No 1 of 2026 ("CM 1"), seeking permission to review the decision in CM 19.
8. 28 January 2026: The substantive hearing for CM 1 took place before Tay Yong Kwang JCA.
9. 10 March 2026: The Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, summarily dismissing CM 1.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The factual matrix of this case began on 27 August 2012, when the applicant, Khartik Jasudass, and his co-accused, Puniyamurthy a/l Maruthai, entered Singapore via a motorcycle. Upon inspection by officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau, three bundles of drugs were found hidden in the motorcycle. Prior to their arrest, the pair had already delivered one bundle to a buyer and collected $2,500. The remaining two bundles, which formed the subject of the capital charge, were found to contain a total of 26.21g of diamorphine. The applicant and Puniyamurthy were subsequently charged with trafficking in these drugs in furtherance of their common intention under Section 5(1)(a) read with Section 5(2) of the MDA and Section 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed).

At the trial in [2015] SGHC 199, the prosecution's case rested on the physical possession of the drugs and the statutory presumptions of knowledge and purpose of trafficking. The applicant did not dispute that he was transporting the bundles but contended that he was unaware of the nature of the drugs. He claimed that a man named "Raja" had instructed him to deliver the items and that he believed they contained something other than controlled drugs. Specifically, the applicant raised a defense of duress, asserting that Raja had threatened him and his family, thereby compelling his participation in the drug delivery. The applicant also relied on a "Long Statement" recorded on 13 February 2013, where he stated that the two bundles were distinct: one belonged to him and the other to Puniyamurthy.

The trial judge, however, rejected these defenses. Regarding the knowledge of the drugs, the judge found that the applicant had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under Section 18(2) of the MDA. The judge observed that the applicant's conduct—including the clandestine nature of the delivery and the collection of a significant sum of money ($2,500)—was inconsistent with his claim of ignorance. The judge characterized the applicant's failure to inquire further into the contents of the bundles as wilful blindness. On the issue of duress, the judge found that the alleged threats by Raja did not meet the legal threshold. The court noted that the applicant was "out of Raja's reach" once he entered Singapore and had multiple opportunities to seek help from the authorities, yet chose to proceed with the delivery. Consequently, the applicant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane, the mandatory minimum for a non-capital trafficking charge where the alternative sentencing regime applies.

The applicant's subsequent procedural history was marked by repeated attempts to challenge this conviction. Following the dismissal of his primary appeal in 2016, he filed CM 19 in 2020. In that application, he sought to introduce "new" evidence or arguments to suggest that the trial judge had erred in her assessment of the facts. The Court of Appeal dismissed CM 19 in 2021, finding no merit in the application. Undeterred, the applicant filed the present motion, CM 1, in 2026. In CM 1, the applicant's primary argument was that the trial judge had failed to give proper weight to his Long Statement from 13 February 2013. He argued that if the bundles were treated as separate—one belonging to him and one to Puniyamurthy—the weight of diamorphine attributable to him personally would fall below the 15g threshold for a capital offence (or the relevant threshold for his specific sentence). He further reiterated his request for a lower sentence in an annex to his affidavit, effectively seeking a re-evaluation of the entire evidentiary basis of his conviction and the subsequent dismissal of his first review application.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The present application raised several critical legal issues concerning the interpretation of the criminal review framework introduced by the Criminal Justice Reform Act 2018. These issues required the court to balance the need for finality in criminal proceedings against the residual necessity to correct potential miscarriages of justice.

The primary legal issues were:

• The Statutory Bar under Section 394K(1) of the CPC: Whether the applicant was legally permitted to file a second application for permission to review a decision of the appellate court. This involved determining whether Section 394K(1), which states that an applicant "cannot make more than one review application in respect of any decision of an appellate court," applies to the preliminary "permission" stage under Section 394H.
• The Scope of the Court's Inherent Power of Review: Whether, notwithstanding any statutory bar, the Court of Appeal retained an inherent jurisdiction to review its own decisions to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This required an analysis of whether the statutory framework in Division 1B of Part 20 of the CPC was intended to be exhaustive or whether a residual power remained for truly exceptional cases.
• The "Compelling New Material" Threshold: Even if the court could entertain the application, whether the applicant had provided "sufficient material" (as defined in Section 394J(2) and Section 394J(3)) that was "new" and "compelling." The court had to decide if the applicant's reliance on his 2013 Long Statement—a document available since the trial—could satisfy the requirement of being "new" and whether it "conclusively" showed a miscarriage of justice.
• The Nature of the "Decision" being Reviewed: Whether the applicant was seeking to review the original conviction in CCA 26/2015 or the dismissal of the first review in CM 19. The court had to analyze how the statutory bar applied depending on which "decision" was the target of the review.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court of Appeal’s analysis began with a rigorous examination of the statutory framework governing criminal reviews. Justice Tay Yong Kwang JCA emphasized that the power of review is a "limited and exceptional" one, designed to be exercised only in the most stringent of circumstances. The court's reasoning proceeded in two main stages: the application of the statutory bar and the evaluation of the court's inherent powers.

1. The Statutory Bar under Section 394K(1)

The court first addressed the impact of Section 394K(1) of the CPC. The provision explicitly states:

"An applicant cannot make more than one review application in respect of any decision of an appellate court." (at [17])

The applicant argued that he was not making a second review application in respect of the same decision, but rather seeking permission to review the dismissal of his first review (CM 19). The court rejected this distinction. It held that CM 1 was essentially an attempt to re-litigate the same issues that were the subject of CM 19. The court relied on the authority of Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1127 ("Pausi"), which established that an applicant cannot circumvent the statutory bar by simply framing a second application as a challenge to a different decision if the underlying substance remains the same. At [17], the court noted that the statutory bar extends to the making of a second "permission application" under Section 394H(1).

The court reasoned that if an applicant were allowed to seek a review of a decision that dismissed a previous review application, it would create an "infinite regress" of applications, completely undermining the principle of finality. The court held that the "decision of an appellate court" referred to in Section 394K(1) includes the decision to dismiss a review application. Therefore, having had CM 19 dismissed, the applicant was statutorily prohibited from filing CM 1.

2. The Inherent Power of Review

The court then turned to whether it should exercise its inherent power to review the decision in CM 19, notwithstanding the statutory bar. The court acknowledged that while the CPC provides a comprehensive framework, the court retains an inherent power to prevent an abuse of process or to correct a clear miscarriage of justice. However, the court emphasized that the requirements for invoking this inherent power are "at least as strict" as those set out in the CPC. Referring to Moad Fadzir bin Mustaffa v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 814 ("Moad Fadzir"), the court noted that the inherent power is only triggered where there is a "miscarriage of justice on the face of the record."

The court identified the three cumulative requirements for the exercise of this power, as set out in Moad Fadzir at [25]:

• The material must be "sufficient" (meaning it must be "new" and "compelling");
• The material must show a "miscarriage of justice"; and
• The court must be satisfied that it is necessary to exercise the power to prevent such a miscarriage.

3. Evaluation of the "New" and "Compelling" Material

The core of the applicant's argument was that the trial judge in [2015] SGHC 199 had failed to give weight to his Long Statement of 13 February 2013. The applicant contended that this statement proved the drugs were split between him and Puniyamurthy, which would affect the sentencing threshold. The court found this argument entirely unconvincing for several reasons.

First, the court held that the Long Statement was not "new" material. Under Section 394J(3)(a) of the CPC, material is only "new" if it was not received by the court during the trial or appeal and could not have been adduced even with reasonable diligence. Since the Long Statement was the applicant's own statement recorded years before the trial and was part of the evidence considered by the trial judge, it failed the "newness" test. The court noted at [22] that the trial judge had specifically considered the statement but found its contents not "crucial" and gave it no weight.

Second, the court found the material was not "compelling." To be compelling under Section 394J(3)(b), the material must be "reliable, substantial and have a powerful probative value" such that it "conclusively" shows a miscarriage of justice. The court observed that the applicant's attempt to split the drug weight was legally irrelevant because he was charged and convicted based on "common intention" under Section 34 of the Penal Code. As stated in [2021] SGCA 10, where co-accused act with common intention, they are each liable for the entire quantity of drugs involved in the joint enterprise. Thus, even if the statement were true, it would not change the legal outcome of the conviction or the sentence. At [24], the court concluded that the applicant's argument was "merely an attempt to re-argue the merits of the case" by challenging the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

Finally, the court addressed the applicant's request for a lower sentence in Annex A of his affidavit. The court held that this was a "bare plea for leniency" which does not constitute a ground for review. The court reiterated that the review process is not a platform for "mercy" but for the correction of legal or factual errors that meet the high threshold of a miscarriage of justice.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed the application for permission to review. Justice Tay Yong Kwang JCA determined that the application failed both on statutory grounds and on the merits of the "new material" threshold. The court found that CM 1 was an impermissible attempt to seek a "review of a review," which is expressly forbidden by the finality provisions of the CPC.

The operative conclusion of the court was stated as follows:

"I dismiss CM 1 summarily without it being set down for hearing." (at [27])

The consequences of this dismissal are as follows:

• Conviction and Sentence Upheld: The applicant's conviction for trafficking in 26.21g of diamorphine stands. His sentence of life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane remains in effect.
• Summary Dismissal: The court exercised its power under Section 394H(7) of the CPC to dismiss the application without a full oral hearing, having determined that the application was "plainly without merit."
• Finality of CM 19: The decision in [2021] SGCA 13, which dismissed the applicant's first review application, is now final and cannot be further challenged through the review mechanism.
• Costs: No order as to costs was made, which is consistent with the general practice in criminal matters where the applicant is a self-represented prisoner.

The court's decision effectively exhausts the applicant's legal avenues for challenging his conviction within the Singapore judicial system. By dismissing the motion summarily, the court reaffirmed that the threshold for reopening a concluded criminal appeal is not merely a "second opinion" on the evidence but requires a fundamental breakdown in the justice process that was not present in this case.

Why Does This Case Matter?

The judgment in Khartik Jasudass v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGCA 11 is a significant pillar in the jurisprudence of criminal procedure in Singapore. It provides much-needed clarity on the "one-bite" rule and the limits of the court's inherent jurisdiction. For practitioners, the case matters for several doctrinal and practical reasons.

Firstly, it reinforces the absolute nature of the statutory bar in Section 394K(1) of the CPC. The court has made it clear that the "one-bite" rule is not a mere procedural guideline but a jurisdictional limit. Litigants cannot bypass this limit by "cascading" review applications—that is, by seeking to review the decision that dismissed their previous review. This prevents the "infinite regress" that would otherwise plague the appellate system and ensures that "finality" in criminal law is a reality rather than a theoretical concept. This aligns with the legislative intent of the 2018 reforms, which sought to consolidate the various "inherent power" applications into a streamlined, regulated statutory process.

Secondly, the case clarifies the relationship between the statutory review process and the court's inherent power. While the court technically retains an inherent power, this judgment confirms that such power cannot be used to "evade or circumvent" the requirements of the CPC. The court's statement that the requirements for the inherent power are "at least as strict" as the statutory requirements means that, in practice, the inherent power will rarely, if ever, provide a broader remedy than the CPC itself. This is a crucial takeaway for practitioners who might be tempted to frame applications under the court's inherent jurisdiction to avoid the "newness" or "compelling" requirements of Section 394J.

Thirdly, the judgment provides a stern reminder of the high threshold for "new" and "compelling" material. The court's refusal to treat the applicant's Long Statement as "new" material—despite his claim that the trial judge "ignored" it—emphasizes that "newness" is an objective standard based on the availability of the evidence at the time of the trial. If the evidence existed and was known to the parties, it is not "new," regardless of how it was treated by the trial judge. Furthermore, the court's analysis of the "compelling" requirement shows that the material must have "powerful probative value" that "conclusively" demonstrates a miscarriage of justice. A mere disagreement with the trial judge's weighing of evidence or a "bare plea for leniency" will never suffice.

Finally, the case highlights the application of common intention in drug trafficking. By referencing [2021] SGCA 10, the court reminded practitioners that in joint enterprise cases, the specific "ownership" of drug bundles is often legally irrelevant to the charge. This serves as a warning against raising factual arguments in review applications that, even if accepted, would not alter the legal basis of the conviction. In the Singapore legal landscape, this judgment serves as a gatekeeper, ensuring that the exceptional remedy of criminal review remains reserved for truly exceptional cases of injustice, thereby preserving the integrity and finality of the criminal justice system.

Practice Pointers

• Observe the "One-Bite" Rule: Practitioners must advise clients that they generally have only one opportunity to seek a review of an appellate decision. Attempting to review the dismissal of a prior review application (a "review of a review") is statutorily barred under Section 394K(1) of the CPC.
• Exhaust All Evidence at Trial: The "newness" requirement under Section 394J(3)(a) is strictly applied. Evidence that was available or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence at the time of the trial or appeal will not be considered "new," even if it was not given weight by the trial judge.
• Focus on "Conclusive" Proof: To satisfy the "compelling" requirement, the material must not just raise a doubt but must "conclusively" show a miscarriage of justice. Arguments that merely challenge the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility or the weighing of evidence are unlikely to succeed.
• Address Common Intention: In cases involving multiple accused, remember that under Section 34 of the Penal Code, each participant is liable for the entire quantity of drugs in the joint enterprise. Factual arguments about the "splitting" of drug bundles are often legally irrelevant to the conviction.
• Avoid Pleas for Leniency: The criminal review process is not a forum for seeking mercy or a reduction in sentence based on personal circumstances. A "bare plea for leniency" does not constitute a ground for review.
• Understand the Permission Stage: Under Section 394H, the court can dismiss an application summarily if it is "plainly without merit." Practitioners should ensure that the application for permission is robust and addresses all statutory criteria from the outset.
• Inherent Power is Not a "Backdoor": Do not rely on the court's inherent power to bypass statutory requirements. The court has signaled that the inherent power will only be exercised in cases of a "miscarriage of justice on the face of the record" and its requirements are as strict as the CPC.

Subsequent Treatment

As a 2026 decision, [2026] SGCA 11 stands as a contemporary authority on the finality of criminal reviews. It follows and reinforces the principles established in [2025] SGCA 22 and Moad Fadzir bin Mustaffa v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 814 regarding the "one-bite" rule and the high threshold for "compelling" material. The decision effectively closes the door on "cascading" review applications, and it is expected to be cited in future summary dismissals where applicants seek to re-litigate issues already addressed in prior review motions.

Legislation Referenced

• Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), Sections 394G(1), 394H, 394H(1), 394H(7), 394J, 394J(2), 394J(3)(a), 394J(3)(b), 394J(3)(c), 394J(7), 394K(1), 394K(5)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), Sections 5(1)(a), 5(2), 18(2)
• Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), Section 34

Cases Cited

• Applied: Moad Fadzir bin Mustaffa v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 814
• Referred to: [2025] SGCA 22
• Referred to: Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1127
• Referred to: [2021] SGCA 10
• Referred to: [2021] SGCA 13
• Referred to: [2015] SGHC 199
• Referred to: Dinesh Pillai a/l Raja Retnam v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 903
• Referred to: Moad Fadzir bin Mustaffa v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 677

Source Documents

• Original Judgment PDF
• eLitigation Case Link