Insolvency practitioners in Singapore hold a formidable investigative tool. Section 335 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA) lets the court compel not only a bankrupt but any third party who may hold relevant information, including family members, to appear for examination and to produce documents about the bankrupt's affairs, dealings and property. The power is deliberately broad and inquisitorial. But it is not unlimited. Singapore courts filter examination applications through a structured two-stage test, treat oral examination as more intrusive than document production, and recognise substantive limits, oppression, disproportion, privilege and the spectre of the "fishing expedition". This article sets out the statutory framework, the controlling test, and the realistic grounds on which a respondent can resist or narrow an examination.
The Statutory Power
Section 335 confers wide powers to summon and examine. Its key provisions read:
"335.—(1) Where a bankruptcy order has been made, the Court may, upon an application made by the Official Assignee at any time (whether before or after the discharge of the bankrupt), or upon an application made by a creditor (who has tendered a proof) at any time before the discharge of the bankrupt — (a) summon the bankrupt to appear before it ... and examine the bankrupt as to the bankrupt's affairs, dealings and property; and (b) summon any other person to appear before the Court ... and examine the person, if it appears to the Court that the person would be able to give information concerning the bankrupt or the bankrupt's affairs, dealings or property. ... (3) Without prejudice to subsection (2), the Court may at any time require any person mentioned in subsection (1)(b) to submit an affidavit to the Court containing an account of the person's dealings with the bankrupt or to produce any documents in the person's possession or under the person's control relating to the bankrupt or the bankrupt's affairs, dealings or property."
Three features stand out. The class of persons who may be summoned under section 335(1)(b) is "any other person", not merely those in a fiduciary or contractual relationship with the bankrupt; the only threshold is that it appears to the court the person can give relevant information. A relative of the bankrupt, such as a parent, plainly falls within that scope where they may hold relevant information. And section 335(3) operates without prejudice to subsection (2), allowing the court to require an affidavit account or the production of documents without necessarily ordering an oral examination. Applications may be brought by the Official Assignee at any time, before or after discharge, or by a creditor who has tendered a proof, but only before discharge. These points were confirmed in the leading recent authority, Jane Rebecca Ong v Lim Lie Hoa [2023] SGHC 33.
Borrowing the Companies Act Framework
Section 335 is comparatively new, and there was no reported local decision on its predecessor before 2023. To fill the gap, the High Court in Jane Rebecca Ong held that the principles governing examination orders under section 285 of the Companies Act 1967, which concerns examinations in company insolvencies, apply equally to section 335. The cross-application rests on comparative authority and shared purpose. The English High Court in In re Murjani (A Bankrupt) [1996] 1 WLR 1498 held that the principles applicable to company examinations under section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 apply equally to bankruptcy examinations under section 366. The Hong Kong Court of First Instance in Ip Pui Lam Arthur v Alan Chung Wah Tang [2015] HKCU 578 reasoned that the principles governing the bankruptcy and company provisions there must be "essentially the same" because:
"The functions of a trustee in bankruptcy and those of a liquidator in a company insolvency context are essentially the same. This is to put the affairs of the bankrupt or the insolvent company in order, as well as to administer the bankrupt's or the insolvent company's affairs in all aspects, including the getting in of any assets to pay creditors."
Both the corporate and personal-insolvency provisions of the IRDA serve the same object: arming the office-holder, as an officer of the court, with the investigative powers needed to examine the affairs of the bankrupt or insolvent company. That common purpose justifies applying the same principles to section 335.
The Two-Stage Celestial Test
The controlling test comes from the Court of Appeal in PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) [2015] 3 SLR 665, which Jane Rebecca Ong applied to section 335.
Stage one: reasonable basis and reasonable requirement
At the first stage, the applicant must show:
"there is some reasonable basis for his belief that the person who is the subject of the application can assist him in obtaining relevant information and/or documents, and that the information and/or documents are reasonably (but not absolutely) required."
The High Court stressed that the hurdle at this stage is "not high". There is a general predisposition in favour of the office-holder's view, because as an officer of the court he is presumed neutral, independent and acting in the estate's best interests, and he need show only that the material is reasonably, not absolutely, required to discharge his statutory functions. The low threshold makes stage one the weaker ground for a respondent to contest, though a respondent may still argue that there is no reasonable basis to think he can assist, or that what is sought is not reasonably required because it is irrelevant or already available elsewhere.
Stage two: balancing of conflicting interests
The second stage requires the court to balance the competing interests, and it is where most resistance arguments gain traction. Several factors recur.
Absence of a relationship is not a bar. The Court of Appeal in Celestial held:
"The absence of a fiduciary or contractual relationship with the company in the case of the third parties should not fetter the exercise of the power under s 285 of the Companies Act vis-a-vis those third parties so long as the third party is able to provide relevant information and/or documents. Indeed, there is no precondition for the exercise of such power under s 285."
A relative of the bankrupt therefore cannot resist merely by pointing to the lack of a formal contractual or fiduciary tie. The focus is on whether he can actually provide relevant information.
Oral examination is more oppressive than document production. This is the single most important distinction for a respondent. As Celestial put it, while section 285 does not itself differentiate between the two, "an order for oral examination of witnesses is likely to be more oppressive than an order for the production of documents." An order to produce documents merely advances the timing of discovery that would come in any event; an oral examination, by contrast, hands the office-holder a pre-trial deposition he would otherwise never obtain, taken on oath, whose answers can be used as evidence and as a springboard for later cross-examination. Document production is the less oppressive order and is correspondingly easier to obtain, which means a respondent facing an examination should press to confine it to documents.
Other stage-two factors include the risk that compliance would expose the respondent to criminal liability in the jurisdiction where the documents are situated (where the risk is real, the court will be slow to order production); whether the examination is being used to gain an unfair advantage in anticipated litigation against the respondent; the practical burden of compliance in time and expense; and the recognised, but limited, principle that it is oppressive to make a person suspected of serious wrongdoing prove the case against himself on oath before proceedings are even brought.
The High Court acknowledged that Singapore courts take a relatively expansive approach to section 285, invoking it to help an office-holder accumulate the facts, information and knowledge needed to discharge his functions, a point drawn from Liquidator of W&P Piling Pte Ltd v Chew Yin What [2004] 3 SLR(R) 164. Combined with the low first-stage threshold and the presumption in the applicant's favour, this means respondents generally face an uphill battle, and that the second-stage balancing is where any real traction lies.
The Fishing Expedition Doctrine
A "fishing expedition" is a broad, unfocused trawl for information without a reasonable basis for believing the person can provide specific relevant material. The doctrine reflects the principle that the examination power, though wide, is not unlimited, and that courts will resist orders amounting to mere information-gathering untethered to a legitimate investigative purpose.
The important practical caveat is that the doctrine is easier to state than to deploy. The memo underlying this analysis notes that Singapore courts have not produced a major reported decision setting aside an examination order primarily on "fishing expedition" grounds; the concept lives instead inside the requirement of a "reasonable basis" at stage one and the court's stated reluctance to grant orders that would be "wholly unreasonable, unnecessary, or oppressive to the defendant", as the High Court described the balancing exercise in Jane Rebecca Ong. The line between a legitimate broad investigation and impermissible fishing turns on whether there is some reasonable basis at the outset, whether the purpose is genuine investigation rather than harassment or the manufacture of litigation advantage, and whether the order sought is proportionate to the investigative need. English authority, from which the Singapore position derives, recognises the concept but applies it narrowly, and respondents there have not enjoyed a high success rate; courts consistently grant broad investigative powers to office-holders.
Grounds to Resist or Limit an Examination
Legal professional privilege
Legal professional privilege is recognised in Singapore and protects confidential lawyer-client communications made for the purpose of legal advice or litigation. A respondent cannot be compelled to answer questions or produce documents protected by privilege, but the privilege is his to claim over specific materials; it does not prevent the examination order from being made, and it cannot be wielded as a blanket shield. Factual information about the bankrupt's property, dealings and assets generally falls outside privilege even if it was at some point discussed with a lawyer. The disciplined course is to assert privilege only over genuine legal advice or litigation communications, ideally through a privilege log, and not over underlying facts.
Privilege against self-incrimination
In insolvency, the privilege against self-incrimination is significantly curtailed. A person under examination cannot simply refuse to answer on the ground that the answer might incriminate him, because the broad investigative functions the IRDA confers are understood to override the common-law privilege in most circumstances. What the court will weigh is a real risk that compliance would expose the respondent to criminal liability in the jurisdiction where the documents are situated. A respondent invoking this must be specific: identify the foreign jurisdiction, the criminal provision engaged, and the reality of the risk. A vague assertion will not do. (The memo notes that the IRDA contains no express statutory override of the privilege, and that direct Singapore authority on how it is balanced in personal insolvency is limited.)
Oppression, abuse of process and proportionality
Oppression is a stage-two factor rather than an absolute bar, and it carries the most weight in relation to oral examination for the reasons already given. Examination orders can also be resisted as an abuse of process where the applicant is pursuing a collateral purpose unrelated to investigating the bankrupt's affairs, such as gaining a tactical edge in litigation against the respondent, but this is a high bar given the presumption that the Official Assignee acts neutrally. On proportionality, although the word does not appear in the statute, the court will consider whether the scope and intrusiveness of the examination match the legitimate need, and it can impose conditions: confining the examination to defined topics or time periods, requiring documents instead of oral testimony, or narrowing the questions. A respondent should therefore ask for defined scope limitations at the application stage and, if an open-ended order is nonetheless made, object to specific irrelevant or oppressive lines of questioning during the examination itself.
What is not a defence
It bears repeating, because it is the most common misconception, that the absence of a fiduciary or contractual relationship with the bankrupt is not a defence. A relative with no formal link to the bankrupt cannot resist on that basis; what matters is whether he can provide relevant information.
Procedural Strategy
A respondent may apply to set aside or vary a summons before the examination takes place, distinct from any appeal of the substantive order. The grounds mirror the two-stage test: want of jurisdiction; failure to meet the stage-one threshold; that the order is wholly unreasonable, unnecessary or oppressive at stage two; or that the scope is so broad as to constitute an abuse of process or impermissible fishing. Such an application should be made promptly and supported by affidavit evidence, since delay may be treated as acceptance. Reported instances of successful pre-hearing challenges are uncommon, reflecting the court's broad discretion and the presumption favouring the applicant, but the set-aside application is the proper forum for contesting the order before submitting to examination.
During the examination, a respondent can object to specific questions on grounds of irrelevance, privilege or oppression, and objections should be recorded so that an adverse ruling can be challenged. Courts are less willing to reshape the scope of an order mid-examination, so scope limitations are best sought at the application stage. The burden of satisfying the two-stage test rests on the applicant; at stage one the respondent should challenge speculative or conclusory evidence, and at stage two he should affirmatively set out the factors against disclosure, the oppression of oral examination, the practical burden, the disproportion. As a discretionary decision, an examination order is reviewed on appeal deferentially, and an appellate court will not interfere absent an error of law or principle or a decision that is plainly wrong.
Costs discipline matters. In insolvency, costs generally follow the event, so a respondent who mounts a weak challenge and loses risks an adverse costs order that ultimately reduces recoveries for creditors. Courts are more receptive where genuine privilege issues or clear oppression are raised, and a respondent who secures a set-aside or meaningful scope limitation may recover costs or have them treated as costs in the cause. The practical counsel is not to contest an examination unless the grounds are genuinely compelling.
Comparative Position
Singapore has deliberately aligned its approach with the English framework, through In re Murjani, and Hong Kong, through Ip Pui Lam Arthur. In Ip Pui Lam, the Hong Kong court granted a document-discovery order because the material was reasonably required to enable the trustees to perform their functions, the respondents could provide it, and nothing suggested the order would be oppressive. The cross-border consensus is consistent: examination powers in bankruptcy and insolvency are broad and inquisitorial; the principles governing company examinations apply equally to personal insolvency; the respondent's relationship to the insolvent is no bar; proportionality and oppression are limiting factors but the threshold is high; and fishing-expedition arguments, though theoretically available, are difficult to establish. English and Hong Kong authorities can properly be cited in a Singapore court, but because Singapore courts have consistently upheld broad examination powers, foreign authority favouring a narrow reading is unlikely to prevail unless it raises a principle the local courts have not yet considered.
Practical Takeaways
- Section 335(3) reaches "any other person" who may hold relevant information, including a bankrupt's relatives; the absence of a fiduciary or contractual relationship with the bankrupt is not a defence.
- The Celestial test governs: stage one (a reasonable basis that the person can assist and that the material is reasonably required, a low hurdle) and stage two (balancing of interests, where resistance is most effective).
- Press to confine any order to document production. Oral examination is treated as more oppressive because it yields an on-oath, deposition-style account, and courts are more willing to restrict it.
- Assert legal professional privilege only over genuine legal advice or litigation communications, not over factual information about the bankrupt's affairs; prepare a privilege log.
- The privilege against self-incrimination is curtailed in insolvency; to gain traction, identify a real risk of criminal liability in the specific foreign jurisdiction where documents are situated, with the provision engaged.
- Seek defined scope limitations, by topic, time period and document class, at the application stage, and object to irrelevant or oppressive questions on the record during any examination.
- A summons can be set aside or varied before examination, but move promptly and on solid grounds; weak challenges risk adverse costs, and fishing-expedition arguments rarely succeed on their own.
Key Authorities
- Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018, section 335 — power to summon and examine the bankrupt and any other person who can give relevant information, and to require affidavits or document production. Source
- PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) [2015] 3 SLR 665 — the controlling two-stage test; oral examination is more oppressive than document production; absence of a relationship with the company is no bar.
- Jane Rebecca Ong v Lim Lie Hoa [2023] SGHC 33 — applies the section 285 / Celestial principles to section 335 IRDA examinations. Source
- In re Murjani (A Bankrupt) [1996] 1 WLR 1498 — English authority that company-examination principles apply equally to bankruptcy examinations.
- Ip Pui Lam Arthur v Alan Chung Wah Tang [2015] HKCU 578 — Hong Kong authority that the functions of a trustee in bankruptcy and a liquidator are essentially the same, so the same principles govern.
- Liquidator of W&P Piling Pte Ltd v Chew Yin What [2004] 3 SLR(R) 164 — Singapore's relatively expansive approach to examination powers as an aid to the office-holder's statutory functions.
This analysis reflects the law as at June 2026. It is published for general information and does not constitute legal advice.