Can a Co-Owner Force the Sale of Jointly Owned Property in Singapore?

Co-ownership of land works well until the co-owners fall out. When one wants to sell and another refuses, when the property sits idle while its costs mount, or when death or incapacity leaves a share stranded in the hands of someone who cannot or will not act, Singapore law provides an exit. A co-owner may ask the court to order a sale of the land in lieu of partition, and to distribute the proceeds. The power is discretionary and turns on whether a sale is "necessary or expedient", but it is real, and an uncooperative co-owner cannot block it. This article explains the statutory basis, the test the courts apply, and how the mechanism copes with two common complications: a co-owner who has died leaving an unadministered estate, and a co-owner who lacks mental capacity.

To make the doctrine concrete, consider a recurring pattern. A residential property is held by three co-owners in equal shares. One co-owner has died some years ago without any grant of probate or letters of administration having been taken out, because a beneficiary of that estate refuses to cooperate. A second co-owner has since lost mental capacity, for instance through dementia, and can no longer manage his own affairs. The third co-owner wishes to sell, cannot obtain the others' cooperation, and is left carrying the property's costs while a family dispute festers. Each strand of that hypothetical raises a distinct legal question, and Singapore law has an answer to each.

The Statutory Power to Order a Sale Instead of Partition

The court's power is conferred by statute. Section 18(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), read with paragraph 2 of the First Schedule, gives the General Division of the High Court:

"Power to partition land and to direct a sale instead of partition in any action for partition of land; and in any cause or matter relating to land, where it appears necessary or expedient, to order the land or any part of it to be sold, and to give all necessary and consequential directions."

This is a substantive power, not a mere procedural convenience. As the High Court explained in Sin Chiau Soon v Aitken Robert Bond [2025] SGHC 94, the provision contains two distinct limbs. Under the first, the court may direct a sale instead of partition "in any action for partition of land"; a co-owner may apply directly under this limb without needing a separate cause of action against the others. Under the second, the court may order a sale "in any cause or matter relating to land" where that is "necessary or expedient", typically for the purposes of pending proceedings. The power descends from the English Partition Acts 1868 and 1876, which first allowed courts to order sale in place of physical division, and whose exercise never depended on a separate underlying claim, a lineage traced in Sin Chiau Soon through Abu Bakar v Jawahir [1993] 1 SLR(R) 865.

The practical consequence is that a co-owner who wants out can commence an Originating Summons in the General Division of the High Court seeking an order for sale in lieu of partition, relying on the first limb, without having to construct some other legal grievance first.

The "Necessary or Expedient" Test

The leading statement of when a sale is "necessary or expedient" comes from the Court of Appeal in Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222, which distilled the following principles:

"(a) In deciding whether it is necessary or expedient for a sale to be ordered in lieu of partition, the court conducts a balancing exercise of various factors, including (i) the state of the relationship between the parties (which would be indicative of whether they are likely to be able to co-operate in the future); (ii) the state of the property; and (iii) the prospect of the relationship between the parties deteriorating if a sale was not granted such that a 'clean-break' would be preferable. (b) Regard should be had to the potential prejudice that the various co-owners might face in each of the possible scenarios, namely, if a sale is granted and if it is not granted. (c) A sale would not generally be ordered if to do so would violate a prior agreement between the co-owners concerning the manner in which the land may be disposed of."

These factors are guidelines applied flexibly to the facts, not a rigid checklist, as the High Court confirmed in Chee Yoh Chuang v Ooi Chhooi Ngoh [2020] SGHC 35. In practice, several considerations recur:

• Breakdown of the relationship. An irretrievable breakdown signals that future cooperation is impossible and that a clean break is desirable. In Sin Chiau Soon, where a co-owner had ceased contributing financially, rejected proposals to sell or rent, and remained obstructionist, the court found the relationship had clearly broken down and that a sale was expedient.
• Refusal to cooperate. A co-owner's refusal to assist with a sale or even with basic upkeep tells against them; the court reads such conduct as showing the relationship will not improve.
• Financial burden on the applicant. Where one co-owner is left to shoulder mortgage instalments, property tax and maintenance because the other will not contribute, that weighs heavily in favour of a sale.
• Risk of foreclosure. If non-payment exposes the property to foreclosure by a mortgagee, a sale may be necessary to preserve the parties' interests.
• Prejudice analysis. The court weighs the prejudice of ordering a sale against the prejudice of refusing one. As Abu Bakar v Jawahir makes clear, mere inconvenience or hardship to a co-owner resisting sale is not a good reason to deny the order where the applicant faces greater or disproportionate prejudice.
• Impracticality of partition. Where physical division is not feasible, for instance because it would breach minimum plot-size requirements, sale becomes the only viable remedy, a point illustrated in Tan Siew Kheng v Teo Kian Kian [2023] SGHC 268.

In the hypothetical, the applicant's position maps closely onto the settled test. Cooperation is impossible, one co-owner is carrying the costs, and the deadlock is preventing the property from being dealt with at all. The evidence a court will want is evidence of exactly those matters: the breakdown, the refusals, the financial burden and, where relevant, the impracticality of partition.

A Co-Owner Who Has Died Leaving an Unadministered Estate

Can a sale proceed when one co-owner is dead and no one has taken out a grant to administer the estate? The answer is yes. A deceased co-owner's interest is represented through the estate's personal representative, and the court can direct that the proceeds attributable to that share be distributed to the estate.

The clearest illustration is Tan Siew Kheng v Teo Kian Kian [2023] SGHC 268, where the High Court ordered the sale of a property co-owned by two persons who had both died. The property was held in equal shares; the claimant was the personal representative of one deceased co-owner's estate and the defendant the personal representative of the other's. Both personal representatives were parties to the partition action. The court ordered a sale and directed the proceeds to the two estates according to their respective shares. Death of a co-owner, and even death of every co-owner, does not defeat the power.

Where no administrator has yet been appointed, there are several routes. A beneficiary may apply for letters of administration; under Singapore practice an applicant for letters of administration must be at least 21 and must not lack mental capacity, and priority is generally ordered by the size of the beneficiary's entitlement. Alternatively, an administrator may be appointed as part of the sale proceedings themselves to represent the estate, a flexible course suited to complex estates. Failing that, a person with a sufficient interest in the estate, such as a co-owner whose own position is affected by the unadministered share, may bring the action and seek appropriate orders for representation.

The proceeds attributable to the deceased's share are then held and distributed according to the estate's beneficiaries. Where the deceased died intestate, distribution follows the Intestate Succession Act 1967; where a spouse and children survive, the estate is divided among them in the statutory proportions. Two points deserve emphasis. First, a long delay in taking out a grant does not bar a sale. In Tan Siew Kheng the court noted, by reference to Re Safiah binte Tahar [1940] SSLR 253, that where six years have elapsed since the death the court will want evidence explaining the delay and assurance that the estate is not being sold at an undervalue, but this regulates rather than prevents the sale. Second, a beneficiary who refuses to take out a grant cannot veto the outcome; uncooperative beneficiaries have no such power, and the court's order binds the estate, with the proceeds held until an administrator is in place.

A Co-Owner Who Lacks Mental Capacity

A person who lacks mental capacity cannot be a party to proceedings, or consent to a sale, without a representative. Singapore's Mental Capacity Act 2008 supplies the framework. A person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if, at the material time, they are unable to make a decision for themselves because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.

Two mechanisms allow the incapacitated co-owner to be represented:

• Deputyship under section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act. Where satisfied that a person lacks capacity, the court may make the decision on their behalf or appoint a deputy to do so. A deputy for property and affairs, subject to the supervision of the court and the Public Guardian and bound to act in the person's best interests, has authority to consent to and execute a sale. This is the more formal, ongoing solution, conferring general powers to manage the person's affairs.
• A litigation representative. For the specific partition proceedings, the court may instead appoint a litigation representative to conduct the litigation on the incapacitated person's behalf. This narrower appointment is confined to the action and is useful where the court wishes to move directly to a sale order without establishing a full deputyship.

Either way, medical evidence is essential. A specialist report, typically from a psychiatrist, neurologist or geriatrician rather than a general practitioner, ordinarily obtained within six months of the application, should give a clear opinion that the person lacks capacity in relation to the relevant matters, and should distinguish what the doctor observed on examination from what was merely reported to the doctor.

Critically, incapacity does not prevent a sale. The court retains its discretion to order a sale in lieu of partition even where a co-owner lacks capacity, provided the sale is in that person's best interests and is, in the circumstances, "obviously beneficial", and provided a proper representative is appointed to participate on their behalf. That heightened "obvious benefit" standard is protective: the court scrutinises the incapacitated person's position more closely than it would a sale between fully capable co-owners, asking whether their interests are genuinely better served by selling than by holding. Where the person's share of the proceeds can be secured for their care, where continued ownership merely bleeds costs, and where the property is a source of conflict, a sale will often meet the standard. This heightened-scrutiny principle draws on longstanding authority, including the English decision Porter v Porter (1888) LR 37 Ch D 420, that sales involving mentally incapacitated co-owners must be shown to be to their obvious advantage.

Obstruction Does Not Defeat a Sale

A co-owner who simply refuses to cooperate, disputes the others' entitlements, or drags out related estate matters cannot thereby prevent a sale. If anything, such conduct strengthens the applicant's case, because it evidences the very breakdown of relationship on which the "necessary or expedient" test turns. The courts do not reward obstruction; in Tan Siew Kheng the court treated an unexplained delay as a matter calling for scrutiny of the obstructive party, not a shield for them, and in Sin Chiau Soon obstructionist conduct pointed firmly towards a forced sale.

Two further points follow. First, disputes that are logically separate from the partition, for example an argument over the division of unrelated estate assets or insurance monies, do not bar an order for sale of the land; the proceeds referable to a contested share can be held pending resolution of the estate. Second, once a sale is ordered, the court's power to "give all necessary and consequential directions" lets it manage an uncooperative party without that party's assent. The court may grant sole conduct of the sale to the applicant, fix a reserve price and manner of sale, direct how the proceeds are held and distributed, and appoint an administrator for a deceased co-owner's estate. On sole conduct, Sin Chiau Soon and Tan Chor Hong v Ng Cheng Hock [2020] 5 SLR 1298 confirm that sole conduct may be given where cooperation between co-owners cannot realistically be expected. The court may also, in its discretion, offer a co-owner a right of first refusal to buy the others' shares, as discussed in Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard [2016] 5 SLR 302, or limit the marketing period and structure purchase options, as in Sun Yanyuan v Ng Yit Beng [2023] 3 SLR 1727.

Procedure, Parties and Orders

Jurisdiction lies with the General Division of the High Court, and the application is made by Originating Summons under the Rules of Court 2021, not by writ. All co-owners must be parties. Where one has died, the estate is joined through its personal representative (or the court is asked to provide for representation); it is the estate, not an individual beneficiary in a personal capacity, that is the relevant party. Where one lacks capacity, that co-owner appears through a deputy or litigation representative.

The applicant's supporting affidavit should set out the property and how it is held, the breakdown of the relationship, any attempts to sell or cooperate, the financial burden borne, the basis for saying a sale is necessary or expedient, and, ideally, a professional valuation. If a co-owner's incapacity is in issue, a specialist medical report should be filed, together with a proposed deputy's affidavit consenting to act (or a proposed litigation representative). If the court is satisfied, the orders available include an order for sale in lieu of partition, a direction as to who has conduct of the sale, directions on reserve price and manner of sale, the appointment of an administrator for a deceased co-owner's estate, directions for holding and distributing the proceeds, and provision for costs and expenses out of the proceeds.

Limits and Cautions

Three cautions temper the analysis. First, while the courts have ordered sales where a co-owner is deceased and, separately, where a co-owner lacks capacity, there is no reported Singapore decision addressing a single case combining a deceased co-owner with an unadministered estate, an incapacitated co-owner and a disputing beneficiary all at once; the frameworks apply, but the court will exercise its discretion on the specific facts. Second, a long delay in administering an estate, though not a bar, will prompt the court to require an explanation and to guard against a sale at an undervalue, and directions on estate administration may be needed before the deceased's share of the proceeds is released. Third, if the land is residential and any co-owner is a foreign person, the Residential Property Act 1976 may restrict dealings, so the citizenship and residency of all co-owners should be checked. Title and mortgage matters, and the apportionment of past and continuing costs among the shares, will also need to be worked out.

Practical Takeaways

• A co-owner may apply directly by Originating Summons in the General Division of the High Court for a sale in lieu of partition under paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the SCJA; no separate cause of action is required.
• The test is whether a sale is "necessary or expedient", assessed by the Su Emmanuel balancing exercise: the state of the relationship, the state of the property, the prospect of a clean break, and the comparative prejudice of selling versus not selling.
• A breakdown of relationship, refusal to cooperate and financial burden on the applicant all point towards a sale. Obstruction by another co-owner strengthens, rather than defeats, the application.
• A deceased co-owner's share is represented through the estate's personal representative; an administrator can be appointed within the sale proceedings, and proceeds are held and distributed to the estate. Delay in taking out a grant does not bar the sale.
• An incapacitated co-owner is represented by a deputy under section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act or by a litigation representative, supported by a recent specialist medical report. A sale can still be ordered if it is in that person's best interests and obviously beneficial.
• Once a sale is ordered, the court can grant sole conduct, fix the reserve price and manner of sale, and direct the holding and distribution of proceeds, all without the cooperation of a recalcitrant co-owner.
• Check the Residential Property Act position where any co-owner is a foreign person, and be ready to address estate-administration delay and the apportionment of costs.

Key Authorities

1. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), section 18(2) read with paragraph 2 of the First Schedule — power to direct a sale instead of partition and to give all necessary and consequential directions. Source
2. Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 — the Court of Appeal's statement of the "necessary or expedient" test and its balancing factors.
3. Sin Chiau Soon v Aitken Robert Bond [2025] SGHC 94 — paragraph 2 confers a substantive power exercisable without a separate cause of action; obstruction and financial default support a sale; sole conduct available where cooperation is unrealistic. Source
4. Abu Bakar v Jawahir [1993] 1 SLR(R) 865 — the power is broad; inconvenience or hardship to a resisting co-owner is not a good reason to refuse a sale where the applicant's prejudice is greater.
5. Chee Yoh Chuang v Ooi Chhooi Ngoh [2020] SGHC 35 — the statutory factors are flexible guidelines applied to the whole factual matrix. Source
6. Tan Siew Kheng v Teo Kian Kian [2023] SGHC 268 — a sale may be ordered where co-owners are deceased with unadministered estates; personal representatives are parties and proceeds are distributed to the estates; delay beyond six years requires explanation. Source
7. Tan Chor Hong v Ng Cheng Hock [2020] 5 SLR 1298 — sole conduct of a sale may be granted where cooperation between co-owners cannot realistically be expected.
8. Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard [2016] 5 SLR 302 — the right of first refusal to co-owners is a discretionary remedy.
9. Sun Yanyuan v Ng Yit Beng [2023] 3 SLR 1727 — discretionary orders including limiting the marketing period and offering purchase options to co-owners.
10. Mental Capacity Act 2008, sections 4 and 20 — definition of lack of capacity; appointment of a deputy or a decision by the court on behalf of a person lacking capacity. Source
11. Intestate Succession Act 1967 — rules of distribution governing a deceased co-owner's share where the estate is intestate.
12. Porter v Porter (1888) LR 37 Ch D 420 — sales of property involving mentally incapacitated co-owners must be shown to be to their obvious benefit.

This analysis reflects the law as at June 2026. It is published for general information and does not constitute legal advice.