Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 22
- Title: RAMDHAN BIN LAJIS v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
- Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Motion)
- Case Number: Criminal Motion No 9 of 2025
- Date of Judgment: 16 May 2025
- Date of Written Grounds / Publication: 20 May 2025
- Judge(s): Steven Chong JCA
- Applicant: Ramdhan bin Lajis
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Procedural Posture: Second application for permission to make a review application under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed)
- Underlying Conviction: Trafficking in not less than 29.51g of diamorphine
- Sentence: Mandatory death penalty
- Prior Appeal: Appeal against conviction and sentence dismissed on 1 March 2019 (CA/CCA 23/2018)
- First Review Application: Dismissed on 1 August 2024 (criminal motion CM 46/2023), with written grounds published in Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127
- Key Statutory Framework: Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), ss 394H, 394J, 394K (and related provisions on review and inherent power)
- Related Statutory Context: Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), s 5(1)(a) (charge provision)
- Length of Judgment: 16 pages, 3,980 words
- High Court Decision (for background): Public Prosecutor v Ramdhan bin Lajis and another [2018] SGHC 104
Summary
Ramdhan bin Lajis v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 22 concerns a prisoner’s attempt to obtain permission for a second “review application” after his conviction and death sentence for trafficking in diamorphine were upheld by the Court of Appeal. The applicant had already pursued one review application under the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), which was dismissed. He then filed a second application seeking leave to make another review application pursuant to s 394H(1) of the CPC.
The Court of Appeal (Steven Chong JCA) summarily dismissed the second application without a hearing. The court held that the statutory requirements for leave under s 394J were not met, and that the application was barred by s 394K of the CPC. In addition, the court found that there was no “new material” sufficient to justify the exercise of the court’s inherent power of review. The decision underscores the strict gatekeeping role of the CPC’s review regime, particularly in capital cases where finality and procedural discipline are strongly emphasised.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicant, Mr Ramdhan bin Lajis, was convicted in the High Court of trafficking in not less than 29.51g of diamorphine and sentenced to suffer death. The conviction arose from events on 19 March 2014. At about 1.05pm, CNB officers observed Mr Steve Crocker boarding a car driven by Mr Mohammad Firaza bin Ahmad. The applicant was seated in the front passenger seat.
Approximately five minutes after Mr Crocker boarded the car, he alighted and was arrested by a group of CNB officers. At the time of his arrest, officers found multiple items on Mr Crocker, including two bundles wrapped in black tape containing a total of not less than 29.51g of diamorphine (the “Drugs”), a golden metal box containing four packets of heroin totalling not less than 0.63g of diamorphine, and a brown envelope referred to as the “B1-PP1A envelope”. These items formed part of the evidential chain linking the applicant to the drugs.
At about 1.30pm, the CNB intercepted the car. The applicant was seen counting sums of money scattered on the floor mat of the front passenger seat during the interception. Items found in the car included: (a) a brown envelope (“A1 envelope”) containing cash totalling $4,600 bound with a rubber band, located on the floor mat of the front passenger seat; (b) scattered cash amounting to $4,600 on the same floor mat; and (c) a white envelope containing cash totalling $3,850 found in the front passenger door compartment. The total cash seized from the applicant was therefore $13,050.
At trial, the applicant claimed trial to one charge under s 5(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed). He was jointly tried with Mr Crocker. The prosecution’s case was that the applicant passed the Drugs to Mr Crocker in exchange for $9,200 while Mr Crocker was in the car. The applicant’s sole defence was that the alleged transaction never took place. The High Court found the prosecution’s evidence credible and sufficient to prove trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt, and it rejected the applicant’s denial.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issues in the present application were procedural and statutory: whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for leave to make a review application under s 394H(1) of the CPC, and whether his second application was barred by s 394K. The court also had to consider whether any “new material” existed that could warrant the exercise of its inherent power of review despite statutory constraints.
More specifically, the court had to evaluate whether the applicant’s proposed grounds—based on purportedly new evidence and alleged deficiencies in disclosure and proof at trial—could amount to a “legitimate basis” for review within the meaning of s 394J. The court further had to determine whether the applicant was attempting to re-litigate matters already raised or decided in the first review application, or whether he had genuinely identified material that could undermine the safety of the conviction.
Finally, the court had to address the applicant’s argument that he was unable to raise certain points during the first review hearing because of counsel’s conduct and discharge. This raised an issue about whether such circumstances could affect the statutory assessment of whether the second application should be permitted, and whether any resulting unfairness could be cured by allowing further review.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by setting out the procedural history. After his conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal on 1 March 2019, the applicant filed a first review application on 5 December 2023 seeking permission under s 394H(1). That motion was dismissed on 1 August 2024, with written reasons published in Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127. In Pausi, the court had addressed the broader issue of prisoners’ complaints about unauthorised forwarding of correspondence by the Singapore Prison Service, and it had also considered other arguments raised by applicants, including alleged failures of disclosure and wilful blindness. The court in the present case treated that earlier decision as an important reference point for assessing whether the applicant’s new attempt met the statutory threshold.
In the present second application, the applicant advanced multiple grounds. First, he relied on a CNB letter dated 23 June 2022 stating that cash totalling $13,050 had been forfeited as it was ascertained to be from “illegal debt collecting activities”. He argued that this supported his defence that he was merely a debt collector. Second, he contended that the prosecution failed to address the source of the $3,850 found in the white envelope and failed to explain why Mr Crocker gave him $9,200, though he appeared to accept that he received money from Mr Crocker. Third, he challenged the prosecution’s proof of possession and trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt, including by attacking Mr Crocker’s credibility and suggesting the Drugs were already in Mr Crocker’s possession before Mr Crocker boarded the car. Fourth, he alleged non-disclosure of statements of two witnesses material to his defence. Fifth, he challenged the propriety of the Public Prosecutor’s decision not to issue him a certificate of substantive assistance (“CSA”).
The court’s analysis proceeded under the CPC’s review framework. It held that the requirements in s 394J were not met. Although the excerpt provided is truncated, the court’s reasoning is clear in its conclusion: the applicant did not demonstrate the kind of legitimate basis required for leave to be granted. In practical terms, this means that the court did not accept that the proposed grounds, even if framed as “new”, were capable of establishing that the conviction or sentence might be unsafe or that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. The court treated the application as devoid of merit and suitable for summary dismissal.
Second, the court held that the application was statutorily barred by s 394K. This provision is designed to prevent repeated or serial review attempts that would undermine finality. The court’s finding indicates that the applicant’s second application fell within the category of applications that the CPC does not permit, absent exceptional circumstances. The court therefore did not treat the second application as a fresh opportunity to revisit issues already litigated or to introduce arguments that could have been raised earlier.
Third, the court addressed the applicant’s attempt to invoke the court’s inherent power of review. Even where statutory requirements are not met, courts may sometimes consider whether inherent powers should be exercised to prevent injustice. However, the court held that there was no new material which warranted such an exercise. This is significant because it shows that the court did not accept the CNB letter or the other criticisms of the trial record as “new material” of sufficient weight. The court’s approach reflects a high threshold: new material must be capable of materially affecting the safety of the conviction or revealing a miscarriage of justice, not merely offering an alternative narrative consistent with the applicant’s defence.
Finally, the court rejected the applicant’s explanation that he intended to raise certain arguments at the first review hearing but could not do so due to counsel’s failure and discharge. While the court acknowledged the procedural context, it did not treat this as a basis to circumvent the statutory bar. The court’s reasoning implies that the CPC’s leave and bar provisions operate independently of counsel’s performance, and that the applicant remained responsible for ensuring that his review grounds were properly advanced within the statutory framework.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s second application for permission to make a review application. The dismissal was summary and without a hearing, reflecting the court’s view that the application was clearly unmeritorious and procedurally barred.
In practical effect, the applicant’s conviction and death sentence remained undisturbed. The decision also confirms that, for prisoners seeking review under the CPC, the statutory gatekeeping requirements are strictly enforced, and second attempts are unlikely to succeed unless the applicant can satisfy both the leave requirements and the “new material” threshold.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is important for practitioners because it illustrates how the Court of Appeal applies the CPC’s review provisions in a capital context. The decision demonstrates that the court will not allow serial review applications to become a substitute for appeal or for repeated attempts to reframe previously rejected arguments. The statutory scheme in ss 394H, 394J and 394K is treated as a coherent system: leave is not granted merely because an applicant can identify some factual or evidential point, and the court will not override statutory bars without genuinely compelling new material.
From a doctrinal perspective, the case reinforces the limited role of inherent power of review. Even where an applicant argues that fairness requires further scrutiny, the court will require material that is both genuinely new and capable of affecting the safety of the conviction. The decision therefore provides guidance on what will not qualify as sufficient “new material”: documents or arguments that are consistent with a defence already considered, or that do not meaningfully undermine the evidential basis for conviction.
For lawyers advising clients on review strategy, the case highlights the need to present all viable grounds at the earliest permissible stage and to ensure that review applications are tightly aligned with the statutory requirements. It also suggests that complaints about counsel’s conduct, while potentially relevant in other contexts, will not necessarily overcome the CPC’s express procedural limitations. In short, RAMDHAN BIN LAJIS v Public Prosecutor is a cautionary authority on finality, procedural discipline, and the high threshold for reopening concluded criminal proceedings.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), s 394H(1) [CDN] [SSO]
- CPC, s 394J
- CPC, s 394K
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), s 5(1)(a) [CDN] [SSO]
- CPC, s 370(1)(a) (for forfeiture-related procedural context)
Cases Cited
- Public Prosecutor v Ramdhan bin Lajis and another [2018] SGHC 104
- Ramdhan bin Lajis v Public Prosecutor (CA/CCA 23/2018) (dismissed on 1 March 2019)
- Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127
- [2024] SGCA 34
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 22 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.