Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 4

Case Details

• Citation: [2025] SGCA 4
• Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 4 February 2025
• Coram: See Kee Oon JAD
• Case Number: Criminal Motion No 2 of 2025
• Hearing Date(s): 3 February 2025
• Appellants / Plaintiffs: Iskandar bin Rahmat
• Respondent / Defendant: Public Prosecutor
• Counsel for Appellant: The applicant in person
• Counsel for Respondent: Wong Woon Kwong SC, Ng Jun Chong (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
• Practice Areas: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Review; Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Stay of execution

Summary

The decision in [2025] SGCA 4 represents a definitive application of the statutory review mechanism under Section 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed). The applicant, Iskandar bin Rahmat, a prisoner awaiting capital punishment, sought leave to review his 2015 conviction for double murder under Section 300(a) of the Penal Code. This application, filed a mere two days before his scheduled execution, was predicated on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial misconduct during his original trial. The Court of Appeal, sitting as a single judge, dismissed the application summarily without an oral hearing, finding it to be an abuse of process intended to delay the execution of the death sentence.

The judgment reinforces the stringent "sufficient material" threshold required to reopen a concluded criminal appeal. The court emphasized that the review process is not a platform for re-litigating issues that were either previously raised or could have been raised with reasonable diligence during the original trial or the subsequent appeal. By dismissing the motion under Section 394H(7) of the CPC, the court signaled that the finality of the judicial process cannot be subverted by repetitive or meritless applications, even in capital cases where the stakes are at their highest. The court's refusal to grant a stay of execution further underscores the principle that such stays are only granted where there is a legitimate and triable issue that meets the high bar for review.

Doctrinally, the case clarifies the relationship between the court's inherent jurisdiction and the statutory framework provided by the CPC. The applicant's attempt to invoke inherent jurisdiction to bypass the requirements of Section 394H was rejected, with the court affirming that the statutory regime for review is exhaustive. The decision also highlights the court's intolerance for "last-minute" applications that lack new or compelling evidence, categorizing such maneuvers as an abuse of the court's process. This ruling serves as a critical precedent for practitioners regarding the limits of post-appeal litigation and the necessity of presenting truly "new" and "reliable" material to trigger the court's review powers.

Ultimately, the dismissal of Iskandar bin Rahmat's application confirms that the legal system provides robust protections through the trial and appellate stages, but once those avenues are exhausted, the threshold for reopening a case is exceptionally high. The judgment provides a clear roadmap of the procedural history of the applicant's various failed attempts to challenge his conviction, illustrating a pattern of litigation that the court deemed to be an attempt to frustrate the course of justice. This case is a stark reminder of the court's commitment to the finality of judgments and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Timeline of Events

1. 4 December 2015: Iskandar bin Rahmat is convicted after trial in HC/CC 50/2015 on two charges under Section 300(a) punishable under Section 302(1) of the Penal Code.
2. 3 February 2017: The Court of Appeal dismisses the applicant’s appeal in CCA 39/2015 against his conviction and sentence.
3. 20 March 2019: The applicant files a complaint against his trial lawyers under Section 85(1) of the Legal Profession Act.
4. 7 June 2019: The Law Society of Singapore dismisses the applicant's complaint against his trial lawyers.
5. 9 July 2019: The applicant files HC/OS 716/2019 seeking a review of the Law Society's decision.
6. 1 October 2020: The applicant files HC/OS 975/2020 regarding the alleged unauthorized disclosure of his correspondence by prison authorities.
7. 16 March 2021: The High Court dismisses OS 975.
8. 11 June 2021: The applicant files Criminal Motion No 21 of 2021 (CM 21) seeking leave to review his conviction.
9. 2 July 2021: The applicant and 12 other inmates file HC/OS 681/2021 seeking a declaration that the Attorney-General and the Singapore Prison Service acted unlawfully regarding prisoner correspondence.
10. 5 July 2021: The Court of Appeal dismisses the appeal in CA/CA 9/2020 (arising from OS 716).
11. 16 August 2021: The Court of Appeal dismisses CM 21.
12. 28 October 2021: OS 681 is withdrawn by the applicants.
13. 25 February 2022: The applicant and 12 other PACPs file HC/OS 188/2022 seeking a declaration regarding legal fees and access to justice.
14. 1 July 2022: The High Court dismisses OS 188.
15. 3 August 2022: The applicant and 23 other PACPs file HC/OA 382/2022 challenging the constitutionality of certain legal provisions.
16. 4 August 2022: OA 382 is struck out by the High Court.
17. 26 September 2023: The applicant and 35 other inmates file HC/OA 987/2023 challenging the constitutionality of Section 60G(7)(d) and Section 60G(8) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969.
18. 5 December 2023: OA 987 is struck out by the High Court.
19. 27 March 2024: The Court of Appeal dismisses the appeal in CA/CA 1/2024 (arising from OA 987).
20. 28 March 2024: The applicant and 35 other inmates file HC/OA 306/2024 seeking a declaration that the Attorney-General and the Singapore Prison Service acted unlawfully.
21. 20 May 2024: OA 306 is struck out by the High Court.
22. 9 September 2024: The applicant and 30 other PACPs file HC/OA 972/2024 challenging the constitutionality of the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022.
23. 19 September 2024: The Court of Appeal dismisses the appeal in CA/CA 38/2024 (arising from OA 306).
24. 20 January 2025: The applicant files HC/SUM 172/2025 in OA 972 seeking a stay of execution.
25. 22 January 2025: The President of the Republic of Singapore issues an order for the applicant's execution to be carried out on 5 February 2025.
26. 3 February 2025: The applicant files the present application (Criminal Motion No 2 of 2025) seeking leave to review and a stay of execution.
27. 4 February 2025: The Court of Appeal delivers its judgment dismissing the application.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The applicant, Iskandar bin Rahmat, was a former police officer who was convicted on 4 December 2015 of two counts of murder under Section 300(a) of the Penal Code. The convictions arose from a trial in the High Court (HC/CC 50/2015), where it was established that he had killed two individuals. The High Court's grounds of decision were detailed in [2015] SGHC 310. Following his conviction, he was sentenced to the mandatory death penalty as prescribed under Section 302(1) of the Penal Code. His subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal in CCA 39/2015 was dismissed on 3 February 2017, with the court's reasoning set out in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 505.

In the years following the dismissal of his primary appeal, the applicant engaged in an extensive series of post-appeal legal challenges. These included a complaint against his trial lawyers (Messrs Shashi Nathan, Tania Chin, and Jeremy Pereira) filed with the Law Society on 20 March 2019. He alleged that his counsel had failed to provide effective assistance during the trial. The Law Society dismissed this complaint on 7 June 2019. The applicant then sought a review of this dismissal via HC/OS 716/2019, which was dismissed by the High Court in [2020] SGHC 40. His appeal against this dismissal (CA/CA 9/2020) was also unsuccessful, with the Court of Appeal delivering its judgment on 5 July 2021 (reported at [2022] 1 SLR 590).

Parallel to the Law Society proceedings, the applicant filed HC/OS 975/2020 on 1 October 2020, alleging that prison authorities had unauthorizedly disclosed his correspondence to the Attorney-General's Chambers. This application was dismissed on 16 March 2021. Shortly thereafter, on 11 June 2021, he filed his first formal application for leave to review his conviction (Criminal Motion No 21 of 2021), which the Court of Appeal dismissed on 16 August 2021 (reported at [2021] 2 SLR 1151).

The applicant also joined several collective actions with other prisoners awaiting capital punishment (PACPs). These included HC/OS 681/2021 (filed 2 July 2021), HC/OS 188/2022 (filed 25 February 2022) regarding legal fees, and HC/OA 382/2022 (filed 3 August 2022) challenging the constitutionality of legal provisions. Furthermore, he was part of HC/OA 987/2023, which challenged the constitutionality of Section 60G(7)(d) and Section 60G(8) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969. This application was struck out on 5 December 2023, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414.

The most recent collective action, HC/OA 972/2024, filed on 9 September 2024, challenged the constitutionality of the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022. While this application was pending, the President issued an execution order on 22 January 2025, scheduling the applicant's execution for 5 February 2025. In response, the applicant filed the present motion on 3 February 2025, seeking leave to review his conviction and a stay of execution. He raised two primary grounds: first, that his trial lawyers provided ineffective assistance through ten specific failures; and second, that there was judicial misconduct during his trial, specifically alleging that the trial judge was biased or failed to ensure a fair trial.

The ten "failures" of counsel alleged by the applicant included:

• Failure to disclose all scene photographs to the applicant.
• Failure to appoint a defense psychiatrist and pathologist.
• Failure to follow the agreed defense strategy.
• Failure to cross-examine key witnesses effectively.
• Failure to object to the admission of certain evidence.
• Failure to call specific defense witnesses.
• Failure to properly advise the applicant on his testimony.
• Failure to highlight inconsistencies in the prosecution's case.
• Failure to adequately prepare for the trial.
• Failure to raise certain legal arguments during the trial.

The applicant contended that these failures, combined with the trial judge's alleged misconduct, resulted in a miscarriage of justice that warranted a review of his conviction under Section 394H of the CPC.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The present application raised two central legal issues for the Court of Appeal's determination:

• Whether the applicant should be granted leave to make a review application under Section 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010: This required the court to determine if the applicant had provided "sufficient material" to meet the threshold for a review. Under Section 394J(2) of the CPC, "sufficient material" is defined as material that was not available at the time of the original proceedings and which, if accepted, would show a "powerful probability" that the earlier decision was wrong. The court had to assess whether the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial misconduct constituted such material.
• Whether a stay of execution should be granted pending the determination of the review application: This issue was contingent on the first. The court had to decide whether the applicant had demonstrated a legitimate basis for a review that would justify halting the execution of the death sentence. The court also had to consider whether the application was an abuse of process intended solely to delay the execution, as contemplated by Section 394K of the CPC.

The framing of these issues was critical because they touched upon the finality of criminal judgments and the narrow exceptions allowed for post-appeal reviews. The applicant also attempted to invoke the court's "inherent jurisdiction" to review its own decisions, raising a subsidiary issue of whether such jurisdiction could exist independently of the statutory framework provided by the CPC. The court's analysis of these issues would determine whether the applicant's conviction could be reopened nearly a decade after the original trial.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court’s analysis began with the statutory framework for review applications. See Kee Oon JAD noted that under Section 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, an applicant must obtain leave from the appellate court before making a review application. The threshold for granting leave is high: the applicant must show "sufficient material" that was not available at the time of the earlier proceedings. The court referred to Mohammad Azwan bin Bohari v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1271 ("Azwan") and Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127, emphasizing that the material must be "reliable, substantial, and have a direct bearing on the correctness of the outcome" (at [27]).

The First Ground: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The applicant's first ground for review centered on the alleged ineffective assistance of his trial lawyers. He listed ten specific "failures," ranging from the failure to disclose scene photographs to the failure to appoint a defense psychiatrist. The court analyzed these allegations by looking at whether they constituted "new" material. The judge observed that all these allegations related to events that occurred during the trial in 2015 or the appeal in 2017. Consequently, they were known to the applicant at those times or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

The court pointed out that the applicant had already raised similar arguments in his complaint to the Law Society and in his previous review application (CM 21). The judge stated:

"The applicant’s arguments on this ground are essentially a rehash of his previous failed attempts to challenge the conduct of his trial lawyers. He has not provided any new material that meets the 'powerful probability' test required by s 394J of the CPC." (at [31])

The court further noted that the applicant's reliance on Roszaidi bin Osman v Public Prosecutor [2023] 1 SLR 222 was misplaced, as that case did not support his contentions regarding the standard for ineffective assistance in the context of a review application.

The Second Ground: Judicial Misconduct

The second ground involved allegations of judicial misconduct, where the applicant claimed the trial judge was biased and failed to ensure a fair trial. The applicant also argued that the court should exercise its "inherent jurisdiction" to review the earlier appellate decision, independent of the CPC. The court rejected this argument, affirming that the statutory regime in Sections 394F to 394K of the CPC is exhaustive. The judge held that the court's inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent the clear requirements and thresholds set by Parliament in the CPC.

Regarding the allegations of bias, the court found them to be entirely unsubstantiated. The judge noted that the applicant failed to provide any evidence of actual or apparent bias. The court observed that the trial judge's management of the proceedings and the subsequent appellate review had already addressed the fairness of the trial. The court held that:

"Bare assertions of judicial misconduct, without more, cannot constitute 'sufficient material' for the purposes of s 394H. To allow such claims to proceed would be to invite endless and meritless challenges to the finality of the judicial process." (at [35])

Abuse of Process and Summary Dismissal

A significant part of the court's analysis focused on whether the application was an abuse of process. The judge noted the timing of the application—filed just two days before the scheduled execution—and the fact that the grounds raised had been previously litigated or were available to be raised much earlier. The court referred to Section 394K(2)(b) of the CPC, which allows the court to dismiss an application if it is "an abuse of the process of the court."

The court concluded that the applicant was attempting to "frustrate the course of justice" by filing a repetitive and meritless application at the eleventh hour. The judge emphasized that the legal system cannot be used as a tool for indefinite delay. The court also considered the applicant's involvement in OA 972 and noted that the Court of Appeal in [2024] SGCA 40 had already held that the pendency of OA 972 did not provide a basis for a stay of execution in other cases.

The court's analysis culminated in the decision to dismiss the application summarily under Section 394H(7) of the CPC. This provision allows a single judge of the Court of Appeal to dismiss a leave application without an oral hearing if it is "plainly without merit." The judge found that the applicant's motion met this description, as it failed to provide any material that could even arguably meet the statutory threshold for review.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's motion for leave to review his conviction and his request for a stay of execution. The decision was rendered by See Kee Oon JAD, sitting as a single judge of the Court of Appeal, pursuant to the powers granted under the Criminal Procedure Code 2010. The court found that the application was "plainly without merit" and constituted an abuse of the court's process.

The operative paragraph of the judgment stated:

"I therefore dismiss this application summarily without the need for an oral hearing pursuant to s 394H(7) of the CPC." (at [48])

The court's orders were as follows:

• Dismissal of Leave to Review: The application for leave to make a review application under Section 394H of the CPC was denied. The court held that the applicant had failed to provide "sufficient material" as defined in Section 394J, and that the grounds raised were either a rehash of previous arguments or could have been raised earlier.
• Refusal of Stay of Execution: The request for a stay of execution of the death sentence, which was scheduled for 5 February 2025, was refused. The court found no legitimate basis to halt the execution, especially given the meritless nature of the underlying review application.
• Summary Disposition: The court exercised its power under Section 394H(7) to dispose of the matter without an oral hearing, reflecting the court's view that the application was an attempt to delay the execution through repetitive litigation.
• Costs: While the judgment does not detail a specific costs order against the applicant (who appeared in person), the dismissal was absolute and final within the context of the statutory review framework.

The court also addressed the applicant's pending summons in OA 972, noting that it had no bearing on the present application. The dismissal of the motion meant that all legal avenues for the applicant to challenge his conviction and sentence had been exhausted, and the execution order issued by the President remained in effect. The court's decision emphasized that the statutory review mechanism is a "narrow exception" to the principle of finality and cannot be used to perpetually litigate a case once the appellate process has concluded.

Why Does This Case Matter?

The judgment in [2025] SGCA 4 is a significant addition to Singapore's jurisprudence on post-appeal reviews and the management of capital cases. It reinforces the high threshold for reopening criminal cases and serves as a warning against the use of "last-minute" applications to frustrate the execution of sentences. The case is important for several reasons:

1. Affirmation of the Statutory Review Threshold: The court's strict adherence to the "sufficient material" and "powerful probability" tests from Azwan and Pausi clarifies that the review process is not a "second appeal." Practitioners must understand that merely identifying alleged errors in the original trial is insufficient; there must be new, reliable, and substantial material that was genuinely unavailable during the earlier proceedings. This case demonstrates that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, if based on facts known at the time of the trial, will not meet this threshold.

2. Exhaustiveness of the Statutory Regime: The court's rejection of the "inherent jurisdiction" argument is a crucial doctrinal point. By holding that Sections 394F to 394K of the CPC provide an exhaustive framework for reviews, the court has limited the ability of applicants to seek extra-statutory remedies. This ensures a predictable and structured process for post-appeal challenges, preventing the circumvention of legislative intent through appeals to the court's inherent powers.

3. Curbing Abuse of Process in Capital Cases: The summary dismissal of the application under Section 394H(7) highlights the court's proactive stance against litigation intended solely for delay. In capital cases, where the pressure to file last-minute motions is high, this judgment provides a clear signal that the court will not hesitate to dismiss meritless applications without a hearing. This is essential for maintaining the integrity of the judicial system and ensuring that the finality of judgments is respected.

4. Clarification on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The court's treatment of the ten "failures" alleged by the applicant provides guidance on how ineffective assistance claims are evaluated in the context of a review. The court emphasized that such claims must be supported by material that was not available earlier. This prevents applicants from using the review process to critique their former counsel's strategy long after the trial has ended.

5. Impact on Collective Actions by PACPs: The judgment's reference to the various collective actions (OS 188, OA 987, OA 972) illustrates the court's awareness of the broader litigation landscape involving prisoners awaiting capital punishment. By noting that the pendency of constitutional challenges (like OA 972) does not automatically entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, the court has narrowed the grounds upon which such stays can be sought.

For practitioners, this case underscores the importance of raising all relevant grounds of appeal during the initial appellate process. It also highlights the risks associated with filing repetitive or meritless applications, which may be characterized as an abuse of process. The decision serves as a reminder that while the court is committed to preventing miscarriages of justice, it is equally committed to the principle that there must be an end to litigation.

Practice Pointers

• Adhere to the "Sufficient Material" Test: When filing for leave to review under Section 394H of the CPC, ensure that the material presented is truly "new"—meaning it was not available at the time of the trial or appeal despite reasonable diligence. Bare assertions or rehashed arguments will lead to summary dismissal.
• Avoid Last-Minute Applications: Filing a review application or a stay of execution a few days before a scheduled execution, without a compelling and newly discovered basis, is likely to be viewed as an abuse of process. The court will scrutinize the timing and the procedural history of the case.
• Exhaustive Nature of the CPC: Do not rely on the court's "inherent jurisdiction" to bypass the statutory requirements of the CPC for review applications. The court has affirmed that the statutory regime is exhaustive.
• Ineffective Assistance Claims: If alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for review, practitioners must demonstrate how this constitutes "new material" that shows a "powerful probability" that the conviction was wrong. Criticisms of trial strategy that were known at the time of the trial will not suffice.
• Bias Allegations Must Be Evidenced: Allegations of judicial misconduct or bias must be supported by concrete evidence. Vague or unsubstantiated claims will be dismissed as "plainly without merit."
• Understand the Summary Dismissal Power: Be aware that under Section 394H(7), a single judge can dismiss a leave application without an oral hearing. This power is frequently used for applications that are deemed to be an abuse of process or clearly meritless.
• Stay of Execution Requirements: A stay of execution is not an automatic right upon filing a review application. It requires a showing of a legitimate and triable issue that meets the high bar for review.
• Review Procedural History: Before filing, practitioners should review all previous post-appeal applications made by the applicant to ensure the current motion does not inadvertently repeat failed arguments, which would trigger an "abuse of process" finding.

Subsequent Treatment

The decision in [2025] SGCA 4 reinforces the "powerful probability" threshold for review applications and the court's power to summarily dismiss applications that are an abuse of process. It follows the established ratio that the statutory review mechanism is a narrow exception to the finality of litigation and cannot be used to re-litigate issues that were previously decided or could have been raised earlier. The case has been cited in the context of capital cases to emphasize that the pendency of other constitutional challenges does not provide an automatic basis for a stay of execution.

Legislation Referenced

• Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), Sections 394F, 394G, 394H, 394H(3), 394H(6)(a), 394H(7), 394H(10), 394J, 394J(2), 394J(3)(a), 394J(3)(c), 394J(4), 394K, 394K(2)(b), 313(1)(f)
• Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), Sections 300(a), 302(1)
• Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), Section 85(1)
• Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), Section 60G(7), 60G(7)(d), 60G(8)
• Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (No. 41 of 2022), Section 2(b)

Cases Cited

• Referred to:
  • Public Prosecutor v Iskandar bin Rahmat [2015] SGHC 310
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 505
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2020] SGHC 40
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2022] 1 SLR 590
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 1151
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat and others v Attorney-General and another [2022] 2 SLR 1018
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat and others v Attorney-General [2024] 5 SLR 1290
  • Azwan and in Sulaiman bin Jumari v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGCA 40
  • Mohammad Azwan bin Bohari v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1271
  • Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127
  • Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney-General and another [2021] 4 SLR 698
  • Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney-General [2022] 5 SLR 93
  • Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney-General [2024] 2 SLR 588
  • Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 4 SLR 331
  • Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414
  • Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984
  • Mohammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2011] 3 SLR 1205
  • Roszaidi bin Osman v Public Prosecutor [2023] 1 SLR 222

Source Documents

• Original Judgment PDF (eLitigation)
• Case Details on eLitigation