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Singapore
By Sushant Shukla 14 min read

Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2025] SGHC 20

The court held that the Applicants lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the PACC Act Regime because they had not filed any applications subject to the Impugned Provisions at the time of commencing the action, rendering the challenge theoretical.

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Case Details

  • Citation: [2025] SGHC 20
  • Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Decision Date: 5 February 2025
  • Coram: Hoo Sheau Peng J
  • Case Number: Originating Application No 972 of 2024; Summons No 2898 of 2024
  • Hearing Date(s): 20 January 2025
  • Claimants / Plaintiffs: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad (and 30 others)
  • Respondent / Defendant: The Attorney-General
  • Counsel for Respondent: Chew Shi Jun James, Teo Meng Hui, Jocelyn and J Jayaletchmi (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
  • Practice Areas: Civil Procedure — Striking out; Constitutional Law — Standing; Fundamental Liberties

Summary

In [2025] SGHC 20, the General Division of the High Court addressed a significant constitutional challenge brought by 31 prisoners awaiting capital punishment (PACPs). The Applicants sought declarations that various provisions introduced by the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (the "PACC Act"), which amended the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA) and the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC), were unconstitutional. These "Impugned Provisions" established a new, stringent procedural regime for post-appeal applications in capital cases, intended to curb the trend of last-minute, unmeritorious legal maneuvers designed to delay the execution of death sentences. The Applicants contended that the PACC Act Regime violated their fundamental rights to a fair trial and equality before the law under Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.

The Attorney-General (AG) responded with a striking-out application under Order 9 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court 2021, asserting that the Applicants lacked the requisite standing (locus standi) to bring the challenge and that the claim was legally unsustainable. The core of the AG's argument was that none of the Applicants had actually filed an application under the PACC Act Regime at the time OA 972 was commenced, rendering their challenge purely theoretical and academic. Furthermore, the AG maintained that the legislative amendments were a valid exercise of parliamentary power aimed at protecting the integrity of the judicial process from abuse.

Hoo Sheau Peng J allowed the AG's application and struck out the challenge in its entirety. The Court's decision turned heavily on the doctrine of standing in constitutional litigation. The Court held that for an applicant to have standing, there must be a "real controversy" and a "real interest" in the relief sought. Because the Applicants had not yet been subjected to the PACC Act Regime's requirements, they could not demonstrate a violation of their personal rights. The Court emphasized that standing is assessed at the time the originating process is filed, and subsequent developments—such as four applicants later seeking permission under the regime—could not retroactively cure a lack of standing at the commencement of the suit.

Beyond the threshold issue of standing, the Court conducted a "deep dive" into the merits of the constitutional arguments to determine if they were "plainly and obviously unsustainable." Applying the "reasonable classification" test under Article 12, the Court found that the differentiation between PACPs and other litigants was based on an intelligible differentia rationally related to the legitimate state object of preventing the abuse of court processes. The Court also rejected the Article 9 challenge, ruling that the procedural safeguards within the PACC Act Regime, including the requirement for "reasonable prospects of success," did not infringe upon the right to a fair trial or access to justice. This judgment reinforces the high bar for challenging the constitutionality of procedural legislation and clarifies the strict application of standing rules in the Singapore context.

Timeline of Events

  1. 26 September 2023: 29 of the current Applicants, along with five other PACPs, filed HC/OA/987/2023 ("OA 987"), which was a previous attempt to challenge the legal framework surrounding capital punishment procedures.
  2. 5 December 2023: Hoo Sheau Peng J struck out OA 987. The reasons for this decision were subsequently published in Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 4 SLR 331 ("Masoud (HC)").
  3. 27 March 2024: The Court of Appeal, in Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414 ("Masoud (CA)"), affirmed the High Court's decision to strike out OA 987, confirming that the previous challenge lacked merit.
  4. 28 June 2024: The Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 and its associated "Impugned Provisions" officially came into force, amending the SCJA and the CPC to create the PACC Act Regime.
  5. 19 September 2024: The Applicants filed the present Originating Application, OA 972, seeking declarations that the Impugned Provisions are void for inconsistency with Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution.
  6. Post-19 September 2024: Following the commencement of OA 972, four of the Applicants sought permission from the Court of Appeal to make PACC applications in their respective capital cases under the new regime. These applications were subsequently dismissed with written decisions.
  7. 20 January 2025: The substantive hearing for the AG's striking-out application (SUM 2898) and the Applicants' OA 972 took place before Hoo Sheau Peng J.
  8. 5 February 2025: The High Court delivered its judgment in [2025] SGHC 20, allowing the AG's application and striking out OA 972 in its entirety.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The dispute in [2025] SGHC 20 centers on the "PACC Act Regime," a legislative framework introduced to govern post-appeal applications by prisoners awaiting capital punishment (PACPs). Historically, the Singapore legal system saw an increase in PACPs filing multiple, last-minute applications after their statutory appeals had been exhausted. These applications often sought to stay executions based on grounds that had already been litigated or were otherwise without merit. In response, Parliament enacted the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (the "PACC Act"), which introduced a specialized procedure within the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA) to filter these applications.

The "Impugned Provisions" identified by the 31 Applicants include sections 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6), and 60I(1) of the SCJA, as well as section 313(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC). Under the PACC Act Regime, a PACP must first obtain "PACC permission" from the Court of Appeal before they can file a "PACC application" (such as a review application under section 394H of the SCJA). The regime imposes several strict requirements:

  • Reasonable Prospect of Success: Under section 60G(7)(d) of the SCJA, the Court of Appeal must not grant permission unless the application has a "reasonable prospect of success."
  • Summary Dismissal: Section 60G(8) allows the Court of Appeal to summarily dismiss an application for permission without an oral hearing. Similarly, section 60I(1) allows for the summary dismissal of the substantive PACC application even after permission is granted, if the court remains unsatisfied of its merits.
  • Stay of Execution: Section 313(2) of the CPC stipulates that the execution of a death sentence shall not be stayed by the filing of a PACC application unless the Court of Appeal specifically orders otherwise.

The Applicants, all of whom are PACPs, argued that these provisions created an unconstitutional barrier to justice. They contended that the "reasonable prospect of success" threshold was too high and that the power of summary dismissal deprived them of a fair hearing. They further argued that the regime discriminated against PACPs as a class, subjecting them to procedural hurdles not faced by other criminal or civil litigants. The Applicants relied on an affidavit filed by Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad, which detailed their concerns regarding the impact of these laws on their ability to challenge their convictions or sentences.

The procedural history of the parties is relevant. Many of the Applicants had previously attempted to challenge the legal framework in OA 987, which was struck out in late 2023. When the PACC Act Regime officially came into force on 28 June 2024, the Applicants viewed it as a further erosion of their rights. However, a critical factual point noted by the Court was that at the time the Applicants filed OA 972 on 19 September 2024, none of them had actually initiated a PACC permission application. It was only after the commencement of OA 972 that four of the Applicants attempted to use the PACC Act Regime, and those attempts were unsuccessful.

The Attorney-General's application to strike out OA 972 was based on the premise that the Applicants were seeking a ruling on a "hypothetical" scenario. The AG argued that because the Applicants had not yet been "aggrieved" by the operation of the Impugned Provisions (i.e., they had not had an application dismissed under these specific sections), they lacked the standing to challenge them. The AG also defended the substance of the laws, stating they were necessary to prevent the "abuse of process" and "last-minute applications" that had become prevalent in capital cases, citing parliamentary debates from 29 November 2022 where SPS Rahayu Mahzam articulated these concerns.

The Court identified two primary issues that required determination in the context of the AG's striking-out application:

  • Issue 1: Standing (Locus Standi): Whether the Applicants met the threshold requirement of standing to bring the constitutional challenge. This involved determining whether the Applicants had a "sufficient interest" in the matter and whether there was a "real controversy" between the parties at the time the application was filed. The Court had to decide if the challenge was premature or theoretical given that the Applicants had not yet utilized the PACC Act Regime.
  • Issue 2: Viability of the Constitutional Claim: Whether there was a viable claim that the Impugned Provisions were inconsistent with Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution. This required an analysis of:
    • Article 9 (Right to Life and Liberty): Whether the PACC Act Regime's procedural requirements (like the "reasonable prospect of success" test and summary dismissal powers) violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice.
    • Article 12 (Equality before the Law): Whether the "reasonable classification" test was satisfied—specifically, whether the classification of PACPs was founded on an intelligible differentia and whether that differentia bore a rational relation to the object of the legislation.

These issues are central to Singapore's constitutional jurisprudence as they balance the individual's right to access the courts against the state's interest in finality and the prevention of procedural abuse in the most sensitive of legal contexts—capital punishment.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

Issue 1: Standing for the Application

The Court began its analysis by reiterating the established principles of standing in Singapore, primarily relying on the Court of Appeal's decisions in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 and Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd [2006] 1 SLR(R) 112. The Court noted that an applicant must have a "real interest" in bringing the action and that there must be a "real controversy" for the court to resolve (at [21]).

The Court emphasized that standing is not a matter of jurisdiction but of judicial discretion, ensuring that courts do not deal with purely academic or theoretical questions. Hoo Sheau Peng J observed that "sufficiency of interest is prima facie made out once there is a violation of constitutional rights" (at [21]). However, the Court found that the Applicants failed this test because, at the date of filing OA 972 (19 September 2024), none of them had made an application under the PACC Act Regime. Consequently, they were not "affected" by the Impugned Provisions. The Court stated:

"When OA 972 was commenced on 19 September 2024, none of the Applicants had made applications under the PACC Act Regime. They were not affected by any of the Impugned Provisions." (at [41])

The Applicants argued that they were "potential" victims and that the rules of standing should be relaxed for "public interest" litigation, citing Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345. The Court rejected this, noting that the "public interest" exception is rare and requires a breach of a public duty of "sufficient gravity" (at [30]). The Court held that the Applicants' situation did not meet this threshold. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the fact that four applicants later filed PACC applications did not cure the initial lack of standing, as standing must be determined as of the date the originating process is filed (at [41]).

Issue 2: Consistency with Articles 9 and 12

Despite the finding on standing, the Court proceeded to analyze the merits of the constitutional challenge to determine if the claim was "plainly and obviously unsustainable" for the purposes of striking out.

Article 12: The Reasonable Classification Test

The Court applied the two-limb "reasonable classification" test derived from Tan Seng Kee v Attorney-General and other appeals [2022] 1 SLR 1347 and Lim Meng Suang and another v Attorney-General and another appeal and another matter [2015] 1 SLR 26. The test requires:

  1. The classification is founded on an intelligible differentia (the "first limb"); and
  2. The differentia bears a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the provision (the "second limb").

Regarding the first limb, the Court found that PACPs constitute a distinct and identifiable group—prisoners who have exhausted their regular appeals and are awaiting execution. This classification was deemed "intelligible." Regarding the second limb, the Court identified the object of the PACC Act Regime as addressing the trend of "PACPs filing last-minute applications... after all avenues of appeal have been exhausted" (at [97]). The Court held that the Impugned Provisions, by introducing a filtering mechanism, were rationally related to this object. The differentiation was not arbitrary but targeted at a specific procedural problem unique to capital cases.

Article 9: Right to Fair Trial and Access to Justice

The Applicants argued that the "reasonable prospect of success" requirement in section 60G(7)(d) of the SCJA was an insurmountable bar that violated the right to a fair trial. The Court disagreed, noting that similar "filtering" mechanisms exist in other areas of law, such as applications for permission to appeal or judicial review. The Court cited Gobi a/l Avedian and another v Attorney-General and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 883 and Adeeb Ahmed Khan s/o Iqbal Ahmed Khan v Public Prosecutor [2022] 2 SLR 1197 to support the view that filtering unmeritorious applications is a standard feature of the judicial system (at [57]).

The Court also addressed the summary dismissal provisions (ss 60G(8) and 60I(1) of the SCJA). It held that the right to a fair trial does not mandate an oral hearing in every instance. The Court noted that the Court of Appeal retains the discretion to call for a hearing if it deems it necessary. The Court concluded that the PACC Act Regime provided sufficient procedural safeguards and did not "substantially raise the bar" to an unconstitutional level (at [41]).

Finally, regarding section 313(2) of the CPC (the stay of execution provision), the Court found that it did not remove the court's power to grant a stay but merely clarified that a stay is not automatic upon filing. This was consistent with the Court's previous observations in Panchalai a/p Supermaniam and another v Public Prosecutor [2022] 2 SLR 507.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court allowed the Attorney-General's application in SUM 2898 and ordered that OA 972 be struck out in its entirety. The operative conclusion of the Court was stated as follows:

"I allow the AG’s application. I thus strike out OA 972 in its entirety." (at [5])

The Court's orders were based on two primary grounds:

  1. Lack of Standing: The Applicants failed to demonstrate that they had the requisite standing at the time the application was filed. Their challenge was deemed theoretical and premature.
  2. Sustainability of the Claim: Even if standing had been established, the constitutional challenge was "plainly and obviously unsustainable." The Court found no merit in the arguments that the Impugned Provisions violated Articles 9 or 12 of the Constitution.

The Court did not award costs against the Applicants, following the general trend in such constitutional challenges involving PACPs where they are self-represented, although the judgment does not explicitly detail a specific costs quantum. The striking out of the application meant that the PACC Act Regime remains fully in force and applicable to all future post-appeal applications in capital cases.

Why Does This Case Matter?

The decision in [2025] SGHC 20 is a landmark ruling for several reasons, particularly for practitioners involved in constitutional law and criminal defense.

1. Clarification of Standing in Constitutional Challenges: The judgment provides a rigorous application of the standing rules first articulated in Tan Eng Hong. It serves as a stern reminder that constitutional challenges cannot be brought in a vacuum. Practitioners must ensure that their clients are "directly affected" by the law they seek to challenge at the moment the suit is filed. The Court's refusal to allow subsequent events (the four later applications) to "cure" the lack of standing at the outset reinforces a strict procedural approach to locus standi. This prevents the court from becoming a forum for academic debate on legislative policy.

2. Judicial Endorsement of the PACC Act Regime: By finding the Applicants' claims "plainly and obviously unsustainable," the High Court has effectively insulated the PACC Act Regime from basic constitutional challenges under Articles 9 and 12. The Court has affirmed that Parliament has the power to create specialized procedural tracks for specific classes of litigants (like PACPs) provided there is a rational basis for doing so. This sets a high threshold for any future litigant seeking to argue that procedural "filters" violate the right to a fair trial.

3. The "Reasonable Classification" Test in Practice: The case provides a clear example of how the "reasonable classification" test is applied to procedural law. The Court's acceptance of "preventing abuse of process" as a legitimate state object for the second limb of the test is significant. It suggests that the judiciary will grant Parliament considerable deference in designing court procedures intended to protect the efficiency and integrity of the legal system, even when those procedures apply only to a small, specific group of individuals.

4. Access to Justice vs. Finality: The judgment highlights the ongoing tension in Singapore law between the principle of access to justice and the principle of finality in litigation. The Court's reasoning suggests that "access to justice" is not an absolute right to an oral hearing or an automatic stay of execution, but rather a right to a process that is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. For practitioners, this means that challenges to procedural bars must focus on whether the bar is "arbitrary" or "disproportionate" rather than simply "onerous."

5. Impact on Capital Case Litigation: For lawyers representing PACPs, this case signals that the PACC Act Regime is here to stay. Future efforts to challenge the regime will likely need to focus on the application of the rules in specific cases (e.g., whether the Court of Appeal's refusal of permission in a specific instance was irrational) rather than a broad facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes themselves.

Practice Pointers

  • Timing of Standing: Always assess standing at the date of filing the originating process. Subsequent actions by the client to "engage" the impugned law will not retroactively provide standing if it was absent at the start.
  • Evidence of Grievance: When challenging the constitutionality of a statute, the applicant should ideally be someone who has already suffered a negative decision or a concrete disadvantage under that statute. Theoretical "potential" impact is rarely sufficient.
  • Article 12 Strategy: When arguing against a "classification," practitioners must be prepared to show that the differentia is either not "intelligible" or that there is no logical link between the classification and the legislative goal. Simply showing that the group is treated "differently" or "worse" is insufficient.
  • Article 9 and Procedural Filters: Recognize that "filtering" mechanisms (like leave requirements) are generally viewed by Singapore courts as constitutional. A successful challenge would likely require evidence that the filter is so high that it effectively functions as a total bar to any meaningful review.
  • Summary Dismissal: Advise clients that there is no constitutional "right" to an oral hearing in all circumstances. The focus should be on whether the written process allows for the "substance" of the case to be considered by the court.
  • Stay of Execution: Note that under section 313(2) of the CPC, a stay is not automatic. Practitioners must be prepared to file a formal application for a stay alongside any PACC permission application, demonstrating why a stay is necessary in the interests of justice.

Subsequent Treatment

[None recorded in extracted metadata]

Legislation Referenced

Cases Cited

Source Documents

Written by Sushant Shukla
Topics
Singapore SLW Case Law Singapore High Court Constitutional Law Civil Procedure reasonable classification test 2025 cases
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