On 2 October 2025, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi issued a final costs order in Nalani v Netty, directing the Defendant to pay AED 208,955.80—a figure representing 80% of the Claimant’s total legal spend. This order followed a protracted series of failed applications by the Defendant, including a jurisdictional challenge and a stay application, which the Court dismissed as a 'continuation of procedural obstruction.' The ruling marks the culmination of a year-long battle over the enforcement of a London-seated LCIA Partial Award, underscoring the Court's intolerance for tactical delays.
For arbitration counsel and cross-border litigators, this case serves as a stark reminder that the DIFC Courts will not permit the 'proceduralization' of enforcement proceedings to serve as a shield for non-compliance. By strictly applying the standard basis of assessment and exercising its discretion to penalize repetitive, meritless applications, the Court is signaling a shift toward a more robust, cost-conscious enforcement regime that prioritizes the overriding objective of judicial economy over the tactical maneuvering of recalcitrant debtors.
How Did the Dispute Between Nalani and Netty Arise?
The genesis of the conflict in Nalani v Netty lies in a sophisticated, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, attempt by an award debtor to exploit the taxonomic boundaries between procedural orders and arbitral awards in cross-border enforcement. At its core, the dispute originated from a fundamental disagreement over the legal characterization of a London-seated LCIA Partial Award and whether that instrument qualified for recognition and enforcement under the strictures of DIFC law. What began as a standard enforcement action rapidly devolved into a multi-front jurisdictional battle, testing the DIFC Courts' willingness to pierce formalistic defenses designed to delay the execution of foreign arbitral decisions.
The factual matrix traces back to the underlying arbitration proceedings seated in London under the auspices of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). The Claimant, Nalani, had successfully navigated the arbitral process to secure interim relief. On 20 September 2023, a Partial Award was rendered by the LCIA Tribunal in favour of the Claimant. Crucially, this Partial Award contained dispositive relief at paragraph 99(c), which explicitly granted the Claimant's Interim Measures Application in the exact terms specified in a prior Peremptory Order issued by the same Tribunal. Armed with this instrument, Nalani turned to the Dubai International Financial Centre as the jurisdiction for execution, relying on the DIFC's well-established pro-enforcement architecture.
The procedural machinery was formally activated late the following year. The Claimant initiated the enforcement process utilizing the standard ex parte mechanism afforded to award creditors under the DIFC Arbitration Law. On 19 December 2024, the Claimant applied ex parte to the DIFC Court for recognition and enforcement of the Partial Award pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 of DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008 concerning the Dubai International Financial Centre Arbitration Law (as amended) (“DIFC Arbitration Law”) DIFC ARB-027-2024, para 1.
The ex parte nature of the initial application is a hallmark of the DIFC's enforcement regime, designed to secure the award creditor's position swiftly before the debtor can dissipate assets. As established in prior jurisprudence such as ARB 009/2019 Ocie v Ortensia, the ex parte recognition process places the initial burden of full and frank disclosure on the applicant, but once the order is granted, the tactical burden shifts entirely to the defendant to articulate statutory grounds for set-aside or refusal.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi promptly reviewed the application and issued the Recognition and Enforcement Order for the Partial Award on 24 December 2024. Rather than capitulate, the Defendant, Netty, treated the Enforcement Order not as a final resolution, but as the opening salvo in a protracted campaign of procedural resistance. The initial enforcement order of 24 December 2024 triggered a cascade of challenges, beginning with an urgent application for a stay of the enforcement proceedings. When the Court rejected the Stay Application on 29 January 2025, Netty escalated its defensive strategy by attacking the foundational jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts.
The Defendant's architectural premise rested on a highly technical re-characterization of the LCIA Tribunal's output. Netty argued that the instrument Nalani sought to enforce was not, in legal reality, an "award" at all. Instead, the Defendant attempted to re-characterize the award as a mere procedural order to avoid DIFC jurisdiction entirely, contending that the DIFC Court lacked jurisdiction over the claim on the basis that the underlying relief sought by the Claimant was not the enforcement of an Arbitral Award within the meaning of Articles 42 and 43 of the DIFC Arbitration Law but rather the enforcement of a Peremptory Order issued by a London-seated tribunal under Section 41(5) of the English Arbitration Act DIFC ARB-027-2024, para 2.
This argument represents a classic maneuver in transnational arbitration enforcement. By attempting to sever the Peremptory Order from the Partial Award that incorporated it, Netty sought to exploit the jurisdictional limits of the DIFC Courts. The enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the DIFC is anchored in specific statutory gateways. If the instrument in question is merely a procedural directive under the English Arbitration Act, it arguably falls outside the definition of an "award" under Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. Consequently, Netty argued, such an instrument does not fall within the scope of Article 5(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law (JAL), which is the primary conduit for the DIFC Courts' jurisdiction over foreign arbitral awards.
The Defendant formalized this theory in a comprehensive filing the following month. On 6 February 2025, the Defendant filed the Jurisdictional Challenge & Strike Out Application, seeking, among other relief, an order striking out the Arbitration Claim and discharging the Enforcement Order DIFC ARB-027-2024, para 11.
The stakes of this Jurisdictional Challenge were absolute. Had Netty succeeded in convincing the Court that the Partial Award was merely a procedural phantom masquerading as dispositive relief, the entire enforcement action would have collapsed. The DIFC Courts' jurisdiction over foreign awards, famously cemented in ARB-003-2013: Banyan Tree Corporate PTE Ltd v Meydan Group LLC, requires a valid arbitral award as its jurisdictional anchor. Without it, the Court has no statutory basis to deploy its coercive powers against a defendant's assets.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi, however, refused to entertain this formalistic slicing of the arbitral tribunal's mandate. The Court recognized that an arbitral tribunal possesses the authority to elevate a peremptory order into a partial award precisely to ensure its cross-border enforceability under the New York Convention and corresponding domestic legislation like the DIFC Arbitration Law. The Court dismantled the Defendant's dichotomy, affirming the true nature of the instrument. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi found that jurisdiction was firmly established under Article 5(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law (the “JAL”), which confers jurisdiction upon the DIFC Courts to recognise and enforce arbitral awards, noting that while the law on jurisdiction had been updated, the JAL remained the relevant authority considering the dates of these proceedings DIFC ARB-027-2024, para 7.
The dismissal of the Jurisdictional Challenge & Strike Out Application did not end the dispute; it merely shifted the battleground from the enforcement of the award to the assessment of the costs generated by the Defendant's obstruction. The original Enforcement Order of 24 December 2024 had included a provision requiring Netty to pay Nalani's costs, to be assessed if not agreed. Acting on this, the Claimant filed a Notice of Commencement of Assessment of Bill of Costs on 21 March 2025.
True to its strategy of contesting every procedural step, Netty responded by filing the NoC Set Aside Application on 11 April 2025. The Defendant argued that the detailed assessment proceedings were premature. Netty's logic was circular but tactically disruptive: it claimed that because its own Jurisdictional Challenge was still pending at the time the Notice of Commencement was filed, the underlying enforcement proceedings were not yet final, and therefore the three-month window for commencing costs assessment under Rule 40.10 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) had not yet been triggered.
The Court viewed this final application as a continuation of the same obstructive pattern. The Defendant was
How Did the Case Move From Ex Parte Application to Final Hearing?
The trajectory of Nalani v Netty provides a textbook study in the anatomy of procedural obstruction. What began as a straightforward application to enforce a London-seated arbitral award rapidly devolved into a multi-front trench war, characterised by a 'death by a thousand cuts' strategy engineered by the Defendant. Rather than confronting the merits of the enforcement directly, the Defendant deployed a cascading series of procedural applications—a stay request, a jurisdictional challenge, a strike-out application, and a set-aside motion targeting costs—designed to fracture the timeline and exhaust the Claimant's resources. The DIFC Court’s handling of this barrage reveals a systematic dismantling of tactical delays, reinforcing the jurisdiction's reputation as a hostile environment for recalcitrant award debtors.
The genesis of the dispute lay in a London-seated LCIA arbitration, which culminated in a Partial Award in favour of the Claimant on 20 September 2023. Armed with this award, the Claimant initiated proceedings in the DIFC Courts at the close of the following year. The procedural machinery was set in motion with a standard, unilateral filing. On 19 December 2024, the Claimant applied ex parte to the DIFC Court for recognition and enforcement of the Partial Award pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 of DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008 concerning the Dubai International Financial Centre Arbitration Law (as amended) (“DIFC Arbitration Law”).
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi promptly issued the Recognition and Enforcement Order on 24 December 2024. Under the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), specifically RDC 43.70, the issuance of an ex parte enforcement order shifts the burden to the award debtor, who typically has 14 days from the date of service to apply to set the order aside. The Enforcement Order was deemed served on the Defendant on 9 January 2025. Instead of filing a substantive set-aside application within the statutory window, the Defendant initiated its first tactical maneuver on 29 January 2025, filing an application pursuant to RDC 23.77 to stay all proceedings and seeking a retrospective extension of time.
The Defendant’s rationale for the stay was predicated on an intended challenge to the Court's jurisdiction under RDC 12.4 and a strike-out application under RDC 4.16. The Defendant argued that the underlying decision being enforced was not a true arbitral award, but rather a peremptory order issued under Section 41(5) of the English Arbitration Act, masquerading as an award. Consequently, the Defendant asserted that the standard enforcement provisions of RDC 43.61 to 43.75 should not apply, and that it should not be compelled to file a set-aside application until the jurisdictional threshold was resolved.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi was entirely unpersuaded by this attempt to unilaterally pause the enforcement machinery. In a decisive order dated 26 February 2025, the Court rejected the stay application, noting that the Defendant had failed to provide any valid justification for missing the initial 14-day deadline or for seeking a retrospective extension. The Court's reasoning underscored a fundamental principle of DIFC procedural law: an intended jurisdictional challenge does not automatically operate as a stay of execution or relieve a party from complying with strict statutory deadlines. The Court noted that the Defendant had failed to pinpoint any compelling reason to accept the stay application, nor had it proven that retrospective extensions of time were applicable or appropriate on the circumstances.
Having failed to pinpoint any compelling reason to halt the proceedings, the Defendant was forced to advance its substantive attacks. On 6 February 2025, the Defendant formally filed its Jurisdictional Challenge & Strike Out Application. The core of the Defendant's argument rested on a highly technical reading of the LCIA Tribunal's output. The Defendant contended that the dispositive relief granted at paragraph 99(c) of the Partial Award—which enforced a prior Peremptory Order—lacked the finality and character required to constitute an enforceable award under Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. By extension, the Defendant argued that the DIFC Courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Article 5(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law (JAL).
The Court’s approach to this jurisdictional challenge was rooted in a robust, pro-enforcement interpretation of arbitral outputs. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi systematically dismantled the Defendant's attempt to look behind the formal designation of the Partial Award. The Court affirmed that the document issued by the LCIA Tribunal on 20 September 2023 fell squarely within the definition of an "award" under the DIFC Arbitration Law, regardless of whether it incorporated terms from a prior peremptory order. The Court firmly established its jurisdiction, relying on the clear mandate provided by the JAL to recognise and enforce arbitral awards.
This decisive rejection of the jurisdictional challenge mirrors the DIFC Courts' historical intolerance for semantic gamesmanship in enforcement proceedings, a stance heavily litigated and affirmed in cases such as Eava v Egan [2014] ARB 005, where the Court similarly penalised a defendant for deploying parallel challenges merely to buy time. In Nalani v Netty, the Defendant's strategy of fracturing the proceedings into discrete, sequential battles was failing to yield the desired delay.
Undeterred by the dismissal of its jurisdictional arguments, the Defendant opened a third front, this time targeting the assessment of costs. Following the initial Enforcement Order of 24 December 2024, which awarded costs to the Claimant to be assessed if not agreed, the Claimant filed a Notice of Commencement of Assessment of Bill of Costs on 21 March 2025. Under RDC 40.10, a party has a three-month window from the date of a final judgment to commence detailed assessment proceedings.
On 11 April 2025, the Defendant filed the NoC Set Aside Application, seeking to strike down the Claimant's cost assessment efforts. The Defendant's argument was a classic example of circular procedural logic: it contended that because its own Jurisdictional Challenge and Strike Out Application were still pending (or had been recently litigated), the recognition and enforcement proceedings were "ongoing." Therefore, the Defendant argued, the Enforcement Order of 24 December 2024 could not be considered a final judgment, rendering the Claimant's Notice of Commencement premature and invalid.
The Court’s resolution of this final tactical hurdle was swift and unequivocal. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi clarified the precise legal status of an ex parte enforcement order within the DIFC procedural
What Is the 'Enforceable Award' Standard Under DIFC Law?
The threshold question in Nalani v Netty struck at the heart of cross-border arbitration mechanics: what exactly constitutes an "award" capable of recognition and enforcement under the DIFC Arbitration Law? The Defendant, Netty, sought to exploit a perceived doctrinal gap between interim tribunal orders and final arbitral awards, arguing that the relief Nalani sought to enforce was structurally ineligible for recognition in the Dubai International Financial Centre.
The dispute originated from a Partial Award was rendered by an LCIA Tribunal seated in London on 20 September 2023. This Partial Award incorporated dispositive relief that granted Nalani's interim measures application, effectively mirroring the terms of a Peremptory Order previously issued by the tribunal. When Nalani applied ex parte to the DIFC Court on 19 December 2024 for recognition and enforcement under Articles 42 and 43 of DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008, Netty launched a jurisdictional challenge. The Defendant's strategy relied on a formalistic distinction between the supervisory powers of the arbitral seat and the enforcement jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts.
Netty's position was that the DIFC Court was overstepping its statutory bounds by treating a procedural directive as a final award. The Defendant articulated this objection forcefully in its application to strike out the claim:
The Defendant contends that the DIFC Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim on the basis that the underlying relief sought by the Claimant is not the enforcement of an Arbitral Award within the meaning of Articles 42 and 43 of the DIFC Arbitration Law but rather the enforcement of a Peremptory Order issued by a London-seated tribunal under Section 41(5) of the English Arbitration Act.
This argument presented a sophisticated, albeit ultimately flawed, interpretation of arbitral finality. Section 41(5) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 empowers a tribunal to issue a peremptory order to a party that fails to comply with a previous procedural direction. Netty's contention was that enforcing such an order is inherently a supervisory function reserved for the courts of the seat—in this case, London—rather than an enforcement function available in a secondary jurisdiction like the DIFC. By characterizing the Partial Award as merely a vehicle for a peremptory order, Netty attempted to strip the document of its status as an "award" under Article 42.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dismantled this formalistic defense, clarifying that the DIFC Courts prioritize the substantive finality of the relief granted over the nomenclature attached to the tribunal's directive. The Court established that jurisdiction is firmly established under Article 5(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law, which confers broad authority upon the DIFC Courts to recognize and enforce arbitral awards irrespective of the state in which they were made.
The critical analytical pivot in the Court's reasoning was the definition of finality. The Defendant's argument implicitly demanded that an award must resolve the entirety of the arbitral dispute to be enforceable. The Court rejected this maximalist interpretation of Article 42. Instead, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi ruled that the finality of an award for enforcement purposes does not require it to be the final award in the entire arbitration; it merely requires that the specific relief granted is final in nature and imposes definitive obligations.
In his subsequent September 2025 ruling dismissing Netty's permission to appeal, the Judge articulated this standard with absolute clarity:
The Award did not comprise merely interim or procedural directions but imposed definitive obligations which were binding on the parties. As the Respondent correctly notes, Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law does not require the Award to be the final award in the arbitration as a whole; it suffices that it contains relief that is final in nature.
This ruling aligns seamlessly with the DIFC's historically robust, pro-enforcement posture, echoing the foundational jurisdictional principles established in ARB-003-2013: Banyan Tree Corporate PTE Ltd v Meydan Group LLC. Just as Banyan Tree confirmed the DIFC Courts' willingness to act as a conduit jurisdiction without requiring a local nexus, Nalani v Netty confirms the Court's refusal to allow semantic gamesmanship to derail the enforcement of binding tribunal orders. If a tribunal packages definitive, binding obligations into a Partial Award, the DIFC Courts will treat it as an enforceable instrument under Article 42, regardless of whether the broader arbitration remains active.
Having established that the Partial Award was a valid target for enforcement, the Court then had to address the status of the Enforcement Order itself. On 24 December 2024, the Court issued the Enforcement Order, which not only recognized the Partial Award but also awarded costs to Nalani. Netty attempted to neutralize this order by filing a Jurisdictional Challenge and Strike Out Application on 6 February 2025, arguing that the mere existence of this challenge rendered the enforcement proceedings "ongoing" and suspended any subsequent procedural steps, particularly the assessment of costs.
The Court's response provided a vital clarification on the independent operative status of an Enforcement Order. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi ruled that an Enforcement Order is not a provisional document awaiting the exhaustion of all possible appellate or jurisdictional challenges; it is a final judgment of the DIFC Court.
The Enforcement Order represents a conclusive determination of the Claimant's right to enforce the Award under Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law, independent of the Defendant's subsequent objections. In the absence of a stay or set-aside order, the Enforcement Order remains operative and enforceable.
This distinction is critical for practitioners navigating post-award asset recovery. The Defendant's logic would have created a perverse incentive structure, allowing award debtors to unilaterally freeze enforcement and costs assessments simply by filing meritless jurisdictional objections. By confirming that the Enforcement Order of 24 December 2024 awarded costs and immediately triggered the procedural timelines under the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), the Judge closed off a common avenue for tactical delay.
Specifically, the Court addressed the mechanics of RDC 40.10, which governs the detailed assessment of costs. Nalani had filed a Notice of Commencement of Assessment of Bill of Costs on 21 March 2025. Netty sought to set this aside, arguing it was premature because the jurisdictional challenge was still pending. The Court dismissed this Set Aside Application entirely, noting that the Notice of Commencement filed by the Respondent on 21 March 2025 was valid and properly served. The three-month window for commencing detailed assessment under RDC 40.10 begins to run from the date of the judgment awarding costs—in this case, the 24 December 2024 Enforcement Order. The filing of a subsequent challenge does not toll this statutory period unless the Court explicitly grants a stay.
Netty's persistence in litigating this point bordered on the vexatious. After the Court dismissed the Jurisdictional Challenge and the Set Aside Application in May 2025, Netty filed a Permission to Appeal (PTA) Application and a separate Stay Application in June 2025. The Defendant argued that the Stay Application was procedurally independent from the earlier Set Aside Notice and was necessary to prevent the prejudice of a premature costs assessment.
The Court viewed these maneuvers as a transparent attempt to re-litigate settled issues. In his September 2025 Order, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi summarized the Defendant's repetitive strategy:
The central thrust of the Applicant’s challenge is that the Court erred in treating the Partial Award and the ensuing Enforcement Order as constituting final relief sufficient to trigger detailed assessment under Rule 40 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the "RDC").
By dismissing both the PTA and the Stay Application without a hearing, the Court reinforced a doctrine of procedural efficiency that mirrors the principles seen in ARB-005-2014: Eava v Egan [2014] ARB 005. The DIFC Courts will not permit the detailed assessment machinery to be held hostage by speculative appeals. The finality of the relief granted in the Partial Award translated directly into the finality of the Enforcement Order, which in turn mandated the strict application of RDC 40.10 timelines.
Ultimately, the Nalani v Netty jurisprudence provides a definitive answer to the 'enforceable award' standard under DIFC Law. It is a standard defined by substantive effect rather than procedural titles. Whether a tribunal labels its directive a peremptory order, an interim measure, or a partial award, the DIFC Courts will enforce it under Article 42 provided it imposes definitive, binding obligations on the parties. Furthermore, once recognized, the resulting enforcement order operates as a final judgment, immune to the suspensive effects of collateral jurisdictional attacks. For cross-border practitioners, the ruling is a clear directive: attempts to artificially segment arbitral proceedings to evade enforcement in the DIFC will be met with swift dismissal and heavy costs sanctions.
How Did Justice Al Sawalehi Reach the Decision on Costs?
The mechanics of costs recovery in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts require a delicate balancing act between compensating the successful litigant and preventing the weaponisation of legal fees. In Nalani v Netty, the transition from the substantive dismissal of the Defendant’s procedural challenges to the quantification of the Claimant’s financial recovery provides a textbook application of this balance. The costs phase was triggered directly by paragraph 3 of the underlying order, which dismissed the Defendant’s PTA Application and Stay Application on 22 September 2025. Following that dismissal, the Claimant was directed to quantify its financial expenditure incurred in defeating those applications.
On 10 September 2025, anticipating the Court's ruling, the Claimant filed its Statement of Costs, claiming a total of AED 261,194.75. For practitioners operating within the DIFC, the immediate question upon reviewing such a figure is whether the underlying hourly rates and staffing models align with the Court's increasingly stringent expectations for procedural efficiency. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi approached this quantification by first establishing a baseline of compliance before applying the Court's discretionary powers to trim the final award.
The threshold inquiry in any DIFC costs assessment is whether the legal team's billing structure conforms to the established market parameters. Justice Al Sawalehi explicitly confirmed that the rates applied by the Claimant’s counsel fell squarely within the market range permitted by Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023. This Direction serves as a critical guardrail in DIFC litigation, capping the recoverable hourly rates for practitioners based on their post-qualification experience. By anchoring the assessment in this Direction, the Court immediately neutralised any potential argument from the Defendant that the Claimant had deployed unnecessarily expensive counsel or engaged in top-heavy billing practices. The Court further validated the Claimant's approach by noting that the staffing structure was entirely proportionate to the complexity of defending against a jurisdictional challenge and a stay application.
However, establishing that hourly rates are compliant and staffing is logical does not automatically entitle a successful party to a 100% recovery of its claimed costs. The DIFC Courts operate under a regime that inherently scrutinises the aggregate total of the costs incurred, regardless of the validity of the individual line items. Justice Al Sawalehi pivoted from validating the Claimant's baseline metrics to exercising his broad discretionary powers to reduce the final figure. The legal mechanism for this reduction lies in the application of the standard basis of assessment, a standard which dictates that any doubt as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or reasonable in amount must be resolved in favour of the paying party.
However, in the exercise of my discretion under RDC 38.8 and RDC 38.23, and applying the standard basis of assessment, I consider that a reduction is warranted.
The invocation of Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) 38.8 and 38.23 is central to understanding the Court's methodology. RDC 38.8 mandates that costs must be proportionate to the matters in issue, while RDC 38.23 empowers the judge to make a summary assessment of costs at the conclusion of a hearing, bypassing the protracted and expensive machinery of a detailed assessment. By applying a 20% reduction to the claimed amount, Justice Al Sawalehi utilised a well-established heuristic within DIFC costs jurisprudence. A recovery rate of 80% on a standard basis assessment is widely regarded by commercial litigators as an excellent result, reflecting a judicial acknowledgement that while the successful party litigated efficiently, the inherent friction of legal billing inevitably produces some inefficiencies that the losing party should not be forced to underwrite.
This discretionary haircut serves a dual purpose. First, it enforces the overriding objective of the RDC by ensuring that the financial burden placed on the Defendant is strictly commensurate with the procedural demands of the applications. Defending a PTA and a Stay Application, while strategically vital, relies heavily on established principles of arbitration law and should not require reinventing the doctrinal wheel. Second, the summary reduction avoids the satellite litigation that often plagues costs disputes. If the Court were to demand a line-by-line justification of the AED 261,194.75 claim, the parties would incur further costs simply arguing over the costs, a scenario the DIFC Courts actively seek to prevent.
In the circumstances, I consider that AED 208,955.80 represents a fair, proportionate, and reasonable quantification of the Claimant’s recoverable costs, in accordance with the overriding objective and the principles of judicial economy.
The explicit reference to "judicial economy" in the final quantification is a vital doctrinal marker. Judicial economy is not merely an administrative preference; it is a substantive legal principle that dictates how the Court allocates its finite resources. By summarily assessing the costs at 80%, Justice Al Sawalehi ensured that the Court's time was not disproportionately consumed by the financial aftermath of the Defendant's failed applications. This approach aligns with the broader trajectory of DIFC arbitration enforcement, where the Courts have consistently demonstrated a low tolerance for procedural maneuvers that delay the execution of valid arbitral awards. The swift and summary imposition of costs acts as a necessary friction against tactical obstruction.
This dynamic echoes the principles explored in Eava v Egan [2014] ARB 005, where the DIFC Courts similarly grappled with the financial consequences of parallel challenges designed to frustrate enforcement. In both instances, the Court utilised its costs jurisdiction not merely to compensate the successful party, but to signal to the broader market that the DIFC will not allow its procedural rules to be exploited as instruments of delay. The 80% recovery awarded to the Claimant in Nalani v Netty strikes a precise balance: it is high enough to fully vindicate the Claimant's robust defense of the arbitral award, yet incorporates just enough of a reduction to satisfy the rigorous demands of the standard basis of assessment.
The mechanics of the final order further reinforce the Court's commitment to swift resolution. Having quantified the recoverable amount at AED 208,955.80, the Court imposed a strict 14-day deadline for payment, anchoring this timeline in RDC 38.40. To ensure compliance and penalise any further delay, Justice Al Sawalehi integrated the default penalty provisions of the Court's practice directions, ordering that interest shall accrue at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the order until full payment is achieved. This reliance on Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017 transforms the costs order from a static financial obligation into an actively compounding liability, providing the Defendant with a stark financial incentive to conclude the procedural skirmishing and satisfy the debt.
Ultimately, the costs assessment in Nalani v Netty provides a clear blueprint for how the DIFC Courts evaluate legal expenditure in the context of enforcement disputes. By strictly applying Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023 to validate the baseline rates, and subsequently leveraging RDC 38.8 and 38.23 to enforce proportionality, Justice Al Sawalehi delivered a ruling that is both commercially pragmatic and doctrinally sound. The decision reinforces the reality that while the DIFC Courts will robustly protect a successful party's right to recover its legal spend, that recovery will always be filtered through the uncompromising lenses of fairness, proportionality, and judicial economy.
How Does the DIFC Approach Compare to English High Court Practice?
The intersection of foreign-seated arbitral awards and domestic enforcement regimes frequently generates complex jurisdictional friction. In Nalani v Netty [2025] DIFC ARB 027, the Defendant attempted to exploit this friction by arguing that the specific procedural mechanics of the English Arbitration Act 1996 precluded enforcement within the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The resulting judgment from H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi provides a masterclass in how the DIFC Courts maintain a distinct, pro-enforcement stance that mirrors English principles but applies them with a laser focus on the DIFC's unique statutory framework.
The core of the dispute centered on the nature of the relief granted by the London-seated tribunal. The Claimant had secured a Partial Award that incorporated a Peremptory Order, a specific mechanism under English arbitration practice designed to compel compliance with tribunal directions. When the Claimant applied ex parte to the DIFC Court for recognition and enforcement, the Defendant mounted a jurisdictional challenge predicated on the argument that the DIFC Court was fundamentally mischaracterizing the English procedural instrument.
The Defendant’s strategy relied on drawing a hard line between a substantive arbitral award and a procedural order issued under the supervisory framework of the seat. The argument was framed explicitly around the limitations of the DIFC Arbitration Law. The Defendant contended that the DIFC Court lacked jurisdiction over the claim on the basis that the underlying relief sought by the Claimant was not the enforcement of an Arbitral Award within the meaning of Articles 42 and 43 of the DIFC Arbitration Law but rather the enforcement of a Peremptory Order issued by a London-seated tribunal under Section 41(5) of the English Arbitration Act [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250515.txt].
In the English High Court, the enforcement of peremptory orders is typically handled under Section 42 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which allows the court to make an order requiring a party to comply with a tribunal's peremptory order. However, when a tribunal crystallizes that peremptory order into a Partial Award, English practice generally recognizes it as an enforceable award under Section 66, provided it finally disposes of a specific issue in the arbitration.
The DIFC Court’s approach aligns perfectly with this English pro-enforcement philosophy, but it anchors its reasoning entirely within its own jurisdictional bedrock. Rather than engaging in a protracted analysis of Section 41(5) of the English Act, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi bypassed the foreign procedural debate by relying directly on the foundational statute of the DIFC Courts. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi found that jurisdiction was firmly established under Article 5(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law (the “JAL”), which confers jurisdiction upon the DIFC Courts to recognise and enforce arbitral awards, noting that while the law on jurisdiction had been updated, the JAL remained the relevant authority for these proceedings [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250515.txt].
This reliance on the Judicial Authority Law confirms the Court's unfettered jurisdiction over foreign-seated awards. By confirming that the Partial Award was rendered by an LCIA Tribunal and subsequently recognized by the DIFC Court, the judgment establishes that the DIFC will not allow foreign statutory nuances to defeat the clear mandate of Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. The Court firmly concluded that it was satisfied that the Partial Award constituted an enforceable arbitral award under DIFC law, and that the Enforcement Order dated 24 December 2024 was properly issued [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250515.txt].
This robust defense of the DIFC's enforcement jurisdiction echoes the Court's historical willingness to protect its institutional mandate. Much like the anti-suit injunctions utilized to defend the DIFC seat in ARB-010-2016: Hayri International Llc v (1) Hazim Telecom Private Limited (2) Hazim Telecom Limited [2016] DIFC AR, the ruling in Nalani v Netty demonstrates a refusal to let external procedural arguments erode the efficacy of the DIFC as a premier enforcement hub.
The comparative alignment between the DIFC and the English High Court becomes even more pronounced when examining the Court's handling of the Defendant's stay applications. On 6 February 2025, the Defendant filed a Jurisdictional Challenge & Strike Out Application, seeking to discharge the Enforcement Order. The Defendant operated under the assumption that the mere existence of a jurisdictional challenge should freeze the enforcement machinery.
In English commercial litigation, it is a well-established principle that a challenge to jurisdiction does not automatically stay enforcement proceedings. An award debtor seeking to halt enforcement must affirmatively apply for a stay, and the English courts will frequently require the provision of security as a condition of granting that stay, ensuring that the challenge is not merely a tactical delay. The DIFC Court adopted an identical posture, refusing to treat the Defendant's pending applications as a de facto injunction against the Claimant's rights. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi articulated this principle with absolute clarity, stating that the Enforcement Order represented a conclusive determination of the Claimant's right to enforce the Award under Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law, independent of the Defendant's subsequent objections, and that in the absence of a stay or set-aside order, the Enforcement Order remained operative and enforceable [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250515.txt].
This holding is critical for practitioners navigating cross-border enforcement in the UAE. It confirms that the DIFC Courts will not tolerate the weaponization of procedural applications to frustrate the execution of a valid arbitral award. The burden remains squarely on the award debtor to secure a formal stay; absent such an order, the enforcement order is a live, operative judgment.
The final area of comparative interest lies in the Court's application of the overriding objective to manage obstructive litigation, specifically regarding the assessment of costs. Following the initial Enforcement Order, the Claimant sought to recover its legal spend. The Defendant attempted to block the detailed assessment process, arguing that the costs proceedings were premature because the underlying jurisdiction of the Court was still being contested. The Defendant contended that the recognition and enforcement proceedings for the Partial Award remained ongoing due to its pending Jurisdictional Challenge and Strike Out Application, which directly contested the Court’s jurisdiction and the validity of the Enforcement Order [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250515.txt].
The English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) both empower judges to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. Under English practice, a costs order attached to a final judgment is immediately actionable unless specifically stayed. The DIFC Court applied this exact logic to RDC 40.10. The original Enforcement Order had directed the Defendant to pay costs, to be assessed if not agreed. The Court rejected the Defendant's attempt to artificially extend the timeline, holding that the Enforcement Order itself was the triggering event. In the present case, the Enforcement Order of 24 December 2024 awarded costs to the Claimant, thereby initiating the three-month period under RDC 40.10 [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250515.txt].
By confirming that the Enforcement Order was a final judgment [initiating the three-month period](https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250515.txt#:~:text=initiating%20the%2Dmonth%20period
Which Earlier DIFC Cases Frame This Decision?
The ruling by H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi in Nalani v Netty [2025] DIFC ARB 027 does not exist in a doctrinal vacuum. Instead, it sits within a mature and increasingly robust body of DIFC jurisprudence that systematically prioritizes the finality of arbitral awards over the tactical, iterative objections of losing parties. For cross-border practitioners and commercial litigators operating within the Dubai International Financial Centre, the decision serves as a sharp reminder of the Court’s historical trajectory regarding enforcement proceedings, conduit jurisdiction, and the strict interpretation of procedural rules designed to prevent the frustration of arbitral outcomes.
To understand the Court’s uncompromising stance in Nalani, one must look back to the foundational principles established over a decade ago in ARB-003-2013: Banyan Tree Corporate PTE Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2013] DIFC ARB 003. The Banyan Tree doctrine cemented the DIFC Courts' role as a conduit jurisdiction, affirming their statutory power to recognize and enforce arbitral awards irrespective of whether the award debtor possessed assets within the DIFC at the time of the application. This principle fundamentally altered the enforcement landscape in the Middle East, stripping award debtors of the ability to use geographical or nexus-based arguments to evade execution.
In Nalani, the Defendant attempted a modern variation of this evasion strategy. By launching a jurisdictional challenge against the enforcement of a London-seated LCIA Partial Award, the Defendant sought to manufacture a state of procedural limbo. The Defendant argued that because a jurisdictional challenge was extant, the proceedings remain ongoing given its extant jurisdictional challenge, rendering any detailed assessment of costs premature. This argument strikes at the heart of the conduit jurisdiction model. If an award debtor could unilaterally halt enforcement in the DIFC simply by filing a collateral jurisdictional objection, the efficacy of the DIFC as an enforcement hub would be severely compromised.
Justice Al Sawalehi’s rejection of this tactic was absolute, echoing the pro-enforcement philosophy that has defined the Court since Banyan Tree. The Court refused to allow the mere existence of a jurisdictional challenge to negate the finality of the enforcement orders.
The enforcement claim fell squarely within the Court’s jurisdiction, and the Applicant’s objections to jurisdiction were, and remain, misconceived.
This definitive dismissal reinforces the high bar for challenging the Court's jurisdiction in enforcement matters. Once an arbitral tribunal has issued an award, the DIFC Courts will treat the enforcement claim as falling squarely within their remit under the DIFC Arbitration Law, viewing subsequent jurisdictional objections with intense skepticism unless they align strictly with the narrow grounds for refusal set out in Article 44.
The Defendant’s strategy in Nalani also relied heavily on the procedural layering of applications. By filing a Permission to Appeal (PTA) Application against the earlier enforcement orders of 15 and 27 May 2025, and simultaneously filing a Stay Application to halt the detailed costs assessment, the Defendant attempted to weaponize the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) to delay the inevitable. The Defendant alleged that the earlier orders contained material errors of law and procedure that merited appellate review.
The core of the Defendant's legal argument hinged on a restrictive interpretation of what constitutes "final relief" under the RDC.
The central thrust of the Applicant’s challenge is that the Court erred in treating the Partial Award and the ensuing Enforcement Order as constituting final relief sufficient to trigger detailed assessment under Rule 40 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the "RDC").
The Defendant contended that the Court mischaracterised the structure of RDC 40.10, arguing that detailed assessment requires the absolute conclusion of all proceedings and the total absence of any pending issues concerning jurisdiction or the validity of the award. This argument fundamentally misunderstands the mechanics of modern international arbitration, where bifurcated proceedings and partial awards on liability or specific heads of damage are commonplace. If a partial award could not be enforced until the entire arbitration concluded, the utility of bifurcation would be destroyed.
Justice Al Sawalehi dismantled the Defendant's interpretation by returning to the statutory text of the DIFC Arbitration Law. The legal test is not whether the arbitration as a whole has concluded, but whether the specific relief granted in the award is final and binding.
The Award did not comprise merely interim or procedural directions but imposed definitive obligations which were binding on the parties. As the Respondent correctly notes, Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law does not require the Award to be the final award in the arbitration as a whole; it suffices that it contains relief that is final in nature.
This interpretation of Article 42 is critical for practitioners. It confirms that the DIFC Courts will look to the substance of the obligations imposed by the tribunal, rather than the nomenclature of the award. If a "Partial Award" imposes definitive, binding obligations, it triggers the full enforcement machinery of the DIFC Courts, including the mechanisms for detailed costs assessment under RDC 40. The Court will not permit a losing party to hide behind the "Partial" label to delay compliance.
Furthermore, the Defendant’s attempt to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the PTA Application reflects a broader tactical trend that the DIFC Courts have consistently sought to suppress. The Defendant argued that the Stay Application was procedurally independent from the earlier Set Aside Notice and was necessary to avoid duplication and potential futility if the appeal succeeded.
The Court’s historical intolerance for parallel proceedings designed to frustrate enforcement is well-documented. In cases such as ARB-004-2024: ARB 004/2024 Naqid v Najam, the DIFC Courts have demonstrated a willingness to enforce a remarkably high bar against collateral attacks on enforcement orders. The filing of a PTA Application does not operate as an automatic stay of execution or assessment proceedings. To grant a stay simply because an appeal has been filed would incentivize meritless appeals solely for their dilatory effect.
Justice Al Sawalehi evaluated the Defendant's dual applications and found them to be entirely without merit and should be dismissed without the need for a hearing. The Court recognized the applications not as genuine exercises of appellate rights, but as a continuation of procedural obstruction. By characterizing the Defendant's actions in these terms, the Court signals to the broader legal market that tactical delays will be met with swift dismissal and adverse costs orders. The Defendant was attempting to re-litigate issues that had already been definitively resolved in the 15 May and 27 May 2025 Orders, a practice the Court will not entertain.
The Nalani decision therefore operates as a crucial reaffirmation of the DIFC Courts' enforcement architecture. It bridges the foundational jurisdictional principles of Banyan Tree with the strict procedural discipline seen in contemporary cases like Naqid v Najam. For award creditors, the ruling provides assurance that the DIFC Courts will actively pierce through layers of procedural obfuscation to enforce binding arbitral obligations. For award debtors, it serves as a stark warning that the tactical deployment of jurisdictional challenges, meritless appeals, and stay applications will not only fail to halt enforcement but will actively compound their financial liabilities through punitive costs assessments. The finality of an arbitral award, even a partial one, remains paramount within the DIFC's legal framework.
What Does This Mean for Practitioners and Enforcement Strategy?
The resolution of Nalani v Netty signals a hardening of the judicial posture within the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts regarding tactical delays in arbitration enforcement. For practitioners navigating cross-border asset recovery, the sequence of orders issued by H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi provides a definitive roadmap for how the Court will treat repetitive, meritless applications designed to stall the execution of arbitral awards. The overarching strategic takeaway is clear: the DIFC Courts are increasingly willing to utilize robust costs orders as a punitive mechanism against parties who engage in procedural obstruction.
The financial sting of the 2 October 2025 Order is the most immediate metric of this judicial intolerance. By directing the Defendant to pay AED 208,955.80, the Court awarded the Claimant an exceptionally high 80% recovery rate on its total legal spend for defending the interim applications. While the assessment was formally conducted on the standard basis—where doubts regarding proportionality are typically resolved in favour of the paying party—the sheer volume of the recovery indicates that the Court viewed the Claimant’s defensive expenditures as entirely necessary to combat the Defendant's dilatory tactics.
In the circumstances, I consider that AED 208,955.80 represents a fair, proportionate, and reasonable quantification of the Claimant’s recoverable costs, in accordance with the overriding objective and the principles of judicial economy.
6.
This quantification did not occur in a vacuum. It was the direct consequence of the Defendant’s failed attempts to derail the enforcement of a London-seated LCIA Partial Award through a Permission to Appeal (PTA) Application and a parallel Stay Application. The Defendant’s strategy relied heavily on challenging the finality of the Partial Award, arguing that because the arbitration was technically ongoing, the resulting Enforcement Order could not trigger detailed assessment under Part 40 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC).
Claimants must be prepared to defend the finality of partial awards robustly, and Nalani v Netty provides the doctrinal ammunition to do so. Defendants frequently attempt to conflate interim procedural directions with partial awards that dispose of substantive rights or impose definitive financial obligations. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dismantled this conflation, affirming that the nomenclature of an award is secondary to its operative effect, noting that the Award did not comprise merely interim or procedural directions but imposed definitive obligations which were binding on the parties. As the Respondent correctly noted, Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law does not require the Award to be the final award in the arbitration as a whole; it suffices that it contains relief that is final in nature [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-027-2024_20250922.txt].
For enforcement strategy, this ruling confirms that once a partial award crystallizes a specific liability or orders specific performance, it is ripe for enforcement and subsequent costs assessments within the DIFC, regardless of whether the broader arbitral tribunal has yet to issue its final award on remaining quantum or liability issues. Practitioners representing award creditors should not hesitate to commence enforcement proceedings on partial awards, secure in the knowledge that the DIFC Courts will not entertain arguments that such enforcement is "premature" simply because the arbitration remains open.
Equally critical is the Court's treatment of the Defendant's persistent jurisdictional arguments. The Defendant attempted to leverage an extant jurisdictional challenge as a shield against the detailed assessment of costs. This is a common guerrilla tactic in international arbitration: maintaining a baseline objection to jurisdiction to cast a shadow of invalidity over all subsequent enforcement steps. However, Defendants should be cautioned that meritless jurisdictional challenges will likely result in adverse costs orders when deployed at the enforcement stage.
The Court was unequivocal in its dismissal of this tactic, noting that the enforcement claim fell squarely within its remit and that the Defendant's objections to jurisdiction were, and remain, misconceived. The strategic lesson here is profound. Once the DIFC Court has established its jurisdiction to recognize and enforce an award under Article 42 of the Arbitration Law, attempts to re-litigate that jurisdiction through the backdoor of a PTA or a stay application will be treated as an abuse of process. This aligns with a broader jurisprudential trend within the centre, as seen in cases like ARB-034-2025: ARB 034/2025 Ohtli v Onora, where the judiciary has consistently penalized parties who attempt to stretch procedural mechanisms beyond their intended purpose to frustrate award creditors.
Furthermore, the importance of adhering to the RDC timelines for set-aside applications cannot be overstated. The Defendant in Nalani v Netty sought a stay of detailed costs assessment proceedings on the premise that its pending PTA Application should automatically freeze the machinery of Part 40. The Court rejected this premise entirely, finding the applications without merit and should be dismissed. The RDC does not provide for an automatic stay of execution or assessment merely because an appeal has been filed. A party seeking a stay must demonstrate compelling reasons, typically involving a risk of irremediable prejudice or a strong likelihood of success on appeal. By failing to meet this threshold and instead relying on the mere existence of its PTA Application, the Defendant engaged in what the Court effectively deemed procedural obstruction.
When the matter progressed to the actual quantification of costs, the Claimant filed a Statement of Costs claiming a total of AED 261,194.75. The Court's approach to this figure is highly instructive for practitioners drafting costs submissions. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi explicitly validated the Claimant’s legal team structure and confirmed that the hourly rates charged fell within the market range permitted by Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023. This validation is crucial; it demonstrates that when a party is forced to defend against a barrage of unmeritorious applications, the Court will support the deployment of a sophisticated (and appropriately priced) legal team to handle the complexity of the procedural demands.
However, in the exercise of my discretion under RDC 38.8 and RDC 38.23, and applying the standard basis of assessment, I consider that a reduction is warranted.
While the Court did apply a 20% reduction, bringing the final award to AED 208,955.80, this reduction is standard practice when assessing costs on the standard basis, where the burden lies on the receiving party to prove proportionality. The fact that 80% of the costs survived this scrutiny is a testament to both the precise drafting of the Claimant's Statement of Costs and the Court's recognition of the heavy burden imposed by the Defendant's litigation strategy.
For enforcement strategy, the calculus for award debtors must fundamentally shift. The traditional approach of throwing every conceivable procedural hurdle—jurisdictional challenges, PTA applications, stay requests—at an enforcement action is no longer just ineffective; it is financially ruinous. The DIFC Courts have demonstrated a clear willingness to quantify the cost of these delays and transfer that financial burden directly onto the obstructing party. Award creditors, conversely, should be emboldened. By maintaining strict compliance with RDC Part 40 and robustly defending the finality of their awards, they can leverage the Court's costs jurisdiction to neutralize dilatory tactics and secure the full benefit of their arbitral victories.
What Issues Remain Unresolved in the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards?
The boundary between procedural orders and enforceable arbitral awards has long been a site of intense friction in cross-border litigation. Arbitral tribunals frequently issue peremptory orders to compel compliance from recalcitrant parties, yet these directives often lack the finality required to trigger enforcement mechanisms under the New York Convention architecture. When a tribunal attempts to cure this defect by wrapping a procedural directive in the formal clothing of a "Partial Award," enforcing courts are forced to determine whether they are dealing with a genuine final determination of rights or merely a procedural mechanism masquerading as one.
In Nalani v Netty, the DIFC Court was confronted directly with this tension. The underlying dispute involved a Partial Award was rendered by an LCIA Tribunal seated in London which incorporated dispositive relief granting the Claimant's interim measures application. The Defendant seized upon the origins of this relief, arguing that the instrument was fundamentally incapable of enforcement within the Dubai International Financial Centre. The Defendant's jurisdictional challenge rested on a strict, formalist interpretation of the English Arbitration Act 1996 and its interaction with DIFC law:
The Defendant contends that the DIFC Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim on the basis that the underlying relief sought by the Claimant is not the enforcement of an Arbitral Award within the meaning of Articles 42 and 43 of the DIFC Arbitration Law but rather the enforcement of a Peremptory Order issued by a London-seated tribunal under Section 41(5) of the English Arbitration Act.
This argument strikes at a vulnerability in international arbitration practice. Section 41(5) of the English Arbitration Act empowers a tribunal to issue peremptory orders to a party that fails to comply with previous directions. However, such orders are generally viewed as internal procedural tools rather than final awards on the merits. By arguing that the LCIA tribunal's decision was merely a Section 41(5) order, the Defendant attempted to strip the Partial Award of its status under Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law, which governs the recognition and enforcement of awards irrespective of the state or jurisdiction in which they were made.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi firmly rejected this form-over-substance approach. The Court's analysis pivoted away from the statutory origin of the tribunal's power and focused entirely on the substantive effect of the relief granted. The critical test applied by the Court was whether the instrument imposed definitive, binding obligations on the parties, rather than merely managing the procedural timetable of the arbitration.
The Award did not comprise merely interim or procedural directions but imposed definitive obligations which were binding on the parties. As the Respondent correctly notes, Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law does not require the Award to be the final award in the arbitration as a whole; it suffices that it contains relief that is final in nature.
By confirming that an award need not dispose of the entire arbitration to be enforceable, the Court provided vital clarity for practitioners seeking to execute interim or partial relief in the UAE. However, the ruling also guarantees that the precise threshold for what constitutes "definitive obligations" will remain a fertile ground for future litigation. Creative respondents will continue to test the limits of Article 42, particularly when foreign-seated tribunals issue hybrid instruments that blend procedural sanctions with substantive asset-preservation measures.
The complexities of enforcement are further compounded when parallel jurisdictional challenges are actively being litigated at the seat of arbitration. In Nalani v Netty, the Defendant attempted to leverage its ongoing challenges in London to paralyze the DIFC enforcement machinery. The Defendant argued that the detailed assessment of costs was premature because the underlying validity of the Partial Award was still contested. This tactic relies on the premise that an enforcing court should defer to the supervisory courts of the seat, pausing local proceedings until the primary jurisdictional battle is resolved.
The DIFC Court's response signals a highly robust, pro-enforcement posture that refuses to let foreign procedural maneuvers automatically dictate the pace of local execution. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi held that the Enforcement Order represents a conclusive determination of the Claimant's right to enforce the Award under Article 42, entirely independent of the Defendant's subsequent objections.
The Enforcement Order represents a conclusive determination of the Claimant's right to enforce the Award under Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law, independent of the Defendant's subsequent objections. In the absence of a stay or set-aside order, the Enforcement Order remains operative and enforceable.
This strict requirement for a formal stay or set-aside order from the seat—rather than mere evidence of an ongoing challenge—places a heavy burden on award debtors. It aligns with the Court's broader trajectory of aggressively protecting its supportive jurisdiction against tactical delays, a dynamic similarly observed in ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex, where the Court demonstrated its willingness to deploy anti-suit injunctions to neutralize parallel foreign proceedings designed to frustrate DIFC enforcement. The message to practitioners is unambiguous: the DIFC Court will not voluntarily suspend its enforcement processes based on the mere existence of a dispute at the seat.
The final unresolved frontier highlighted by the Nalani litigation concerns the mechanics of costs assessment in the face of relentless procedural obstruction. The Defendant sought to strike out the Claimant's Notice of Commencement of Assessment of Bill of Costs dated 21 March 2025, arguing that the three-month window under Rule 40.10 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) had not been validly triggered. RDC 40.10 requires detailed assessment proceedings to commence within three months of the judgment or order that finally concludes the proceedings. The Defendant's theory was that its own barrage of applications—including a Jurisdictional Challenge, a Strike Out Application, and a Permission to Appeal (PTA) Application—meant the proceedings were not "concluded."
The Court dismantled this circular logic. Allowing a party to indefinitely delay costs assessment by filing meritless appeals would fundamentally undermine the finality of the Enforcement Order. When the Defendant subsequently filed a PTA Application and a separate Stay Application to halt the costs assessment, the Court acted decisively. The PTA Application is dismissed without a hearing, with the Court characterizing the filings as a continuation of procedural obstruction.
Crucially, the Court's evolving approach to managing these tactical delays involves a sharp pivot toward summary assessment of costs. Rather than allowing the Defendant to drag the Claimant through a protracted detailed assessment procedure before the Registrar, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi utilized the Court's discretionary powers to truncate the process. The Court ordered the Claimant to file a Statement of Costs, not exceeding three pages in length, within five days of the September Order.
This aggressive use of page limits and tight deadlines for costs submissions represents a vital tool for the Court in policing the conduct of arbitration enforcement. By compressing the costs assessment timeline, the Court effectively neutralizes the economic leverage a well-resourced award debtor might otherwise gain through satellite litigation. For cross-border litigators, the Nalani saga serves as a stark warning: the DIFC Court will look past the formal labels attached to foreign arbitral orders, will refuse to pause enforcement without a formal stay from the seat, and will swiftly penalize procedural obstruction through summary costs mechanisms. The tension between foreign-seated peremptory orders and local enforcement will undoubtedly generate future disputes, but the doctrinal baseline established here heavily favors the swift execution of definitive arbitral relief.