On February 25, 2017, Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke sat in the DIFC Court of First Instance to address a blatant attempt to derail an arbitration agreement through foreign litigation. Faced with an ex parte application from Hayri International LLC, the Court issued an immediate anti-suit injunction against Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited, effectively halting proceedings in Pakistan that sought to declare the parties' Master Services Agreement null and void. The order, backed by a stern penal notice, marked the beginning of a series of rulings that would ultimately confirm the DIFC as the definitive seat of the arbitration.
For cross-border litigators and arbitration counsel, the Hayri-Hazim saga serves as a masterclass in the DIFC Court’s willingness to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to protect the integrity of the arbitral process. At a time when parties increasingly attempt to use foreign courts as a tactical tool to stall or frustrate arbitration, this case provides a clear, high-probability test for the grant of anti-suit injunctions, underscoring that the DIFC will not tolerate procedural obstructionism that ignores the clear intent of a contractually agreed-upon seat.
How Did the Dispute Between Hayri and Hazim Arise?
The conflict between Hayri International LLC and the Hazim corporate entities—Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited—did not emerge from a simple failure to perform commercial obligations. Rather, the dispute originated from a fundamental disagreement over the seat and governing rules of an arbitration clause, which the defendants attempted to exploit through parallel litigation. At the heart of the controversy was a Master Services Agreement dated 15 August 2014, a commercial contract designed to govern the telecommunications services and liabilities between the parties. Clause 14 of this agreement contained the arbitration mechanism intended to resolve any ensuing friction.
When substantive disagreements regarding the parties’ liabilities and obligations under the Master Services Agreement inevitably surfaced, the arbitration agreement itself became the primary battleground. Instead of submitting to the arbitral tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction—a bedrock principle of kompetenz-kompetenz—the defendants executed a calculated procedural maneuver. They sought to bypass the agreed dispute resolution mechanism entirely by dragging the conflict into a domestic forum where they presumably perceived a tactical advantage.
The timeline of filings reveals a high-stakes race to secure jurisdictional dominance. On 22 August 2016, Hayri International LLC took the first formal step to enforce the arbitration agreement, issuing an Arbitration Claim Form issued by the Claimant on 22 August 2016 in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts. This filing firmly planted the flag of the DIFC as the supervisory jurisdiction over the anticipated arbitration.
Exactly two days later, the defendants launched their counter-offensive. They initiated proceedings commenced by or on behalf of the Defendants against the Claimant in the courts of Pakistan on 24 August 2016. The relief sought in the Pakistani courts was explicitly designed to paralyze the arbitral process: the defendants demanded an anti-suit injunction against Hayri and a formal judicial declaration that Clause 14 of the Master Services Agreement was null and void.
This tactic of initiating parallel foreign litigation to torpedo an arbitration agreement is a well-documented strategy in cross-border commercial disputes. By seeking a declaration of invalidity in a foreign court, a recalcitrant party forces the claimant to fight a multi-front war, draining resources and delaying any substantive resolution of the underlying commercial claims. The DIFC Courts have historically viewed such maneuvers with intense skepticism, treating them not merely as breaches of contract, but as direct assaults on the integrity of the arbitral seat. The jurisprudence surrounding such defensive measures is robust, as seen in cases like ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex, where the DIFC Court's supportive jurisdiction was similarly tested by foreign parallel proceedings.
Faced with the prospect of being bogged down in the Pakistani courts, Hayri International LLC escalated its defensive posture in the DIFC. The claimant recognized that standard procedural timelines would be insufficient to halt the momentum of the foreign litigation. Consequently, Hayri filed an ex parte Application Notice ARB-010-2016/1 dated 23 February 2017, seeking immediate, unilateral intervention from the DIFC Court of First Instance to restrain the defendants from pursuing the Pakistani action.
The matter came before Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke during an urgent telephone hearing on 25 February 2017. The resulting order was uncompromising. Justice Cooke granted the anti-suit injunction, explicitly forbidding the defendants—along with their directors, officers, employees, or agents—from pursuing or assisting in the pursuit of the Pakistani proceedings, or any other proceedings relating to the dispute in any forum other than the DIFC Courts.
To ensure compliance, the order was armed with a severe Penal Notice. The DIFC Court made it unequivocally clear that corporate structures would not shield individuals from the consequences of defying the injunction. The notice warned that in the event of disobedience, the DIRECTORS MAY BE IMPRISONED, FINED OR HAVE THEIR ASSETS SEIZED. This piercing of the corporate veil for the purposes of contempt proceedings underscores the gravity with which the DIFC Court treats anti-suit injunctions. It transforms a breach of a court order from a mere corporate liability into a matter of personal liberty and financial ruin for the individuals directing the corporate entities.
However, the issuance of ex parte relief—where the respondent is entirely absent and unheard—requires a delicate balancing of equities. The court must protect the applicant from imminent harm while simultaneously safeguarding the absent respondent against the potential abuse of such draconian measures. To mitigate the inherent risks of an ex parte injunction, Justice Cooke required Hayri International LLC to provide a formal undertaking in damages, enshrined in the schedule to the order:
If the DIFC Courts later find that this Order has caused loss to the Defendants, and decides that the Defendants should be compensated for that loss, the Claimant will comply with any Order that the Court may make.
This undertaking serves as the financial anchor of the anti-suit injunction. Should the defendants later prove at an inter partes hearing that the injunction was improperly granted—perhaps by demonstrating that the arbitration agreement was indeed patently defective or that the DIFC lacked supervisory jurisdiction—Hayri would be strictly liable for any quantifiable losses the defendants suffered due to the forced suspension of their Pakistani litigation.
Furthermore, the ex parte nature of the order necessitated a mechanism for the defendants to challenge the injunction swiftly. The court scheduled a return date for 7 March 2017, ensuring the defendants would have their day in court within a fortnight. In the interim, the order provided a standard liberty to apply provision, allowing the defendants to seek an earlier variation or discharge of the injunction if circumstances demanded it:
Each party shall have permission to apply to vary the terms of this order, or at least 5 clear business days written notice to the other parties.
The logistical challenge of serving an injunction on foreign corporate entities actively engaged in evasive litigation was also addressed pragmatically by Justice Cooke. Traditional methods of service under the DIFC Court Rules can be cumbersome and slow, potentially defeating the purpose of an urgent injunction. To circumvent this, the court authorized alternative service via email to specific individuals associated with the defendants. The order explicitly dictated that transmission to these email addresses would constitute good and sufficient service of the document on the Defendants and the document shall be considered served, with strict deeming provisions based on the time of transmission relative to Gulf Standard Time.
By granting the anti-suit injunction, attaching a penal notice, and facilitating immediate electronic service, the DIFC Court effectively neutralized the defendants' attempt at procedural sabotage. The ruling preserved the status quo, protected the integrity of the disputed arbitration agreement, and forced the jurisdictional battle back to the DIFC, where the validity of Clause 14 would ultimately be tested under the rigorous scrutiny of the supervisory court rather than in a parallel foreign proceeding.
How Did the Case Move From Ex Parte Application to Final Hearing?
The trajectory of Hayri International LLC v Hazim Telecom Private Limited provides a masterclass in how the DIFC Courts handle defendants who attempt to game the procedural timetable after launching parallel foreign litigation. When a party seeks to bypass an arbitration agreement by initiating proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction, the supervisory court must act with immediate, decisive force. However, the true test of the court's authority lies not merely in granting emergency relief, but in how it manages the subsequent phases when the injuncted party attempts to stall. In this dispute, Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke demonstrated a profound intolerance for procedural sabotage, rapidly escalating an interim ex parte order into a final, permanent injunction when the defendants failed to meaningfully engage with the return date.
The catalyst for the court's intervention was a direct assault on the parties' arbitration agreement. On 24 August 2016, Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited (the Defendants) commenced proceedings in the courts of Pakistan, seeking an anti-suit injunction and a declaration that Clause 14 of their Master Services Agreement (MSA) was null and void. In response to this existential threat to the arbitral process, Hayri International LLC (the Claimant) approached the DIFC Court of First Instance on an urgent basis. On 25 February 2017, Justice Cooke reviewed the ex parte Application Notice ARB-010-2016/1 dated 23 February 2017 and granted an immediate interim anti-suit injunction.
The mechanics of the 25 February order were designed to ensure maximum compliance and rapid notice. The order was fortified with a severe penal notice, warning the Defendants' directors of potential imprisonment, fines, or asset seizure should they disobey the mandate to halt the Pakistani proceedings. Recognizing the cross-border nature of the dispute and the urgency of the situation, the court authorized alternative service, directing that the Claimant could serve the necessary documents by email to Mr Hurain and another specified representative.
To balance the draconian nature of ex parte relief, the court embedded standard safeguards within the order. The Claimant was required to provide a cross-undertaking in damages, ensuring that the Defendants would be compensated if the injunction was later found to be unjustified:
If the DIFC Courts later find that this Order has caused loss to the Defendants, and decides that the Defendants should be compensated for that loss, the Claimant will comply with any Order that the Court may make.
Furthermore, the court preserved the Defendants' right to challenge the interim measures, setting a clear mechanism for them to apply for a variation of the order prior to the scheduled return date:
Each party shall have permission to apply to vary the terms of this order, or at least 5 clear business days written notice to the other parties.
The court initially set the return date for 7 March 2017, later adjourned to 9 March 2017. The purpose of a return date is to allow the injuncted party an opportunity to present its case and argue why the interim relief should be discharged or varied. However, the Defendants' approach to this critical hearing was characterized by evasion and tactical delay. Despite having been served promptly following the 25 February order, the Defendants failed to prepare a substantive defense.
During the 9 March hearing, Justice Cooke scrutinized the timeline of notice and the Defendants' subsequent inaction. The court noted that the return date that was originally specified for the injunction was in fact Tuesday of that week, and that the Defendants had been given ample opportunity to instruct counsel and formulate their arguments:
In fact, there had been service and notice given from fairly shortly after the injunction was granted, on Saturday or perhaps just the Sunday of the week preceding this week.
Instead of engaging with the jurisdictional and contractual issues at stake, the Defendants instructed local counsel extremely late. Their representatives appeared at the initial return date merely to request a 21-day adjournment. Justice Cooke rightly identified this as a transparent stalling tactic. Granting a lengthy adjournment would have allowed the Pakistani proceedings to potentially advance while the DIFC supervisory process languished in an interim state. The judge deemed the 21-day request "grossly excessive," noting that the Defendants had already taken early advice from local lawyers but had withheld formal instructions until the last possible moment.
This judicial refusal to indulge procedural obstruction aligns with the DIFC Courts' broader doctrinal posture, as seen in cases like ARB-032-2025: ARB 032/2025 Oswin v (1) Otila (2) Ondray, where the court similarly defended the arbitral seat against parallel proceedings by rejecting delay tactics. Faced with a defendant that had adequate notice but refused to substantively participate, Justice Cooke took a definitive and aggressive procedural step. He determined that maintaining the injunction on an interim basis was no longer appropriate. Because the Defendants had effectively waived their opportunity to contest the injunction by failing to prepare for the return date, the court escalated the proceedings, deciding to treat this as the final hearing of the application:
In those circumstances, the right thing to do is to treat this as the final hearing of the application for an injunction and to grant an injunction in the terms that have been sought.
Before granting a final, permanent injunction, the court was required to solidify its jurisdictional foundation. An ex parte order requires only a "good arguable case," but a final injunction demands a higher threshold of certainty regarding the court's authority to act as the supervisory seat. Justice Cooke revisited his initial findings regarding the MSA's arbitration clause, confirming his earlier assessment:
I gave reasons at that time which have been transcribed in which I stated that in my judgment the Claimant could show to a high degree of probability that DIFC was the seat of arbitration.
The court also resolved an ambiguity in the drafting of Clause 14, which referred to the "Rules of the Arbitration of the DIFC." The judge had to determine whether this phrase incorporated the specific institutional rules of the DIFC-LCIA or merely referenced the general arbitration law of the DIFC. Looking at the clause as a whole—particularly its provision for the DIFC to select a third arbitrator if the parties failed to agree—Justice Cooke concluded that institutional administration was intended:
To my mind the only sensible conclusion when looking at the clause as a whole is to say that the DIFC-LCIA rules are incorporated and that DIFC-LCIA is the body responsible for administration of the arbitration.
Having confirmed that the DIFC-LCIA rules are incorporated and that DIFC-LCIA is the body responsible for the arbitration, the court possessed the requisite jurisdictional certainty to issue a final negative and mandatory injunction. This permanent order restrained the Defendants from pursuing the Pakistani proceedings or any other litigation relating to the dispute outside the DIFC Courts.
The escalation to a final hearing was accompanied by a severe costs sanction. The Claimant sought indemnity costs, arguing that the Defendants' initiation of the Pakistani proceedings constituted a direct breach of the arbitration agreement. Justice Cooke agreed, establishing a clear principle that the costs incurred in restraining a breach of an arbitration clause are recoverable on an indemnity basis, analogous to damages for breach of contract:
I am also asked to deal with issues of costs. In my judgment, it is right that indemnity costs should be awarded, both because the conduct in question amounts to a breach of the agreement to arbitrate in bringing proceedings in Pakistan and reasonable costs incurred would be recoverable as a matter of damages for breach of that obligation and by analogy are therefore recoverable as a matter of costs.
The court's approach to quantifying these costs further illustrates its pragmatic handling of the Defendants' default. Recognizing that indemnity costs should be awarded, both because the conduct in question amounts to a breach of the agreement, the judge applied a standard metric to the Claimant's schedule of costs:
It is the general rule that an order for indemnity costs results in recovery of about 80% of the figure sought, which in this case would be a figure of approximately USD 72,000.
To ensure immediate financial consequence for the Defendants' procedural misconduct, the court ordered a substantial interim payment pending final assessment:
As there must be a little give in that, the figure I award by way of interim payment is USD 65,000.
The rapid transition from the 25 February ex parte order to the 9 March final injunction serves as a critical precedent for practitioners navigating cross-border disputes in the region. It establishes that the DIFC Courts will not permit the return date mechanism to be weaponized as an instrument of delay. When a party is served with an anti-suit injunction and fails to mount a substantive defense, the court will not hesitate to convert the interim relief into a final, permanent order, backed by punitive costs. This decisive methodology reinforces the DIFC's reputation as a robust supervisory jurisdiction, echoing the principles of supportive intervention detailed in ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex, and ensuring that arbitration agreements are protected from foreign procedural sabotage with absolute finality.
What Is the 'High Probability of Success' Test and Why Does It Matter Here?
When Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke convened the ex parte hearing on 25 February 2017, he was confronted with a classic tactic of transnational procedural sabotage: a defendant launching parallel litigation in a foreign jurisdiction to derail an agreed arbitration. Hayri International LLC sought an immediate anti-suit injunction against Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited to halt proceedings in Pakistan. However, before the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts can deploy the draconian remedy of an anti-suit injunction, they must first establish their own jurisdictional mandate to intervene. This requires the claimant to satisfy a rigorous evidentiary threshold regarding the arbitral seat, known as the "high probability of success" test.
The test demands that a claimant seeking to restrain foreign proceedings must demonstrate to a high degree of probability that DIFC is the seat of the arbitration. This is not a mere "good arguable case" standard typical of standard interim injunctions; it is a deliberately elevated bar. Because an anti-suit injunction indirectly interferes with the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign court—in this instance, the courts of Pakistan—the supervisory court must be exceptionally confident that the parties contractually agreed to its exclusive supervisory jurisdiction.
Justice Cooke’s application of this test began with a forensic examination of the underlying contract. The jurisdictional battleground was Clause 14 of the parties' Master Services Agreement (MSA). The drafting of the clause was imperfect, creating an ambiguity that the defendants sought to exploit. It referenced both "Dubai UAE" and the "Rules of Arbitration of the DIFC." To satisfy the high probability test, Hayri International LLC had to prove that this specific combination of words legally anchored the arbitration within the DIFC, rather than onshore Dubai. Justice Cooke was satisfied that there was a high degree of probability that the Claimant would be entitled to the final relief it sought, noting that the starting point for this assessment was Clause 14 of the Master Services Agreement (MSA), which clearly evidenced an intention on both parties to arbitrate.
Establishing the intention to arbitrate was only the first step. The critical analytical leap required determining the curial law—the procedural law governing the arbitration itself. The defendants had previously argued that the reference to "Dubai UAE" meant non-DIFC Dubai, which would strip the DIFC Courts of their primary supervisory jurisdiction and subject the arbitration to the onshore UAE procedural regime. Justice Cooke dismantled this argument by focusing on the institutional rules selected by the parties.
The terms of the judgment make it clear at paragraph 2 that I applied the test for interlocutory injunctions and held that there was a high probability of success for the Claimant in showing that DIFC was the seat of the agreed arbitration and that the rules to be applied to it were those of DIFC-LCIA.
By explicitly referencing the DIFC's arbitration rules, the parties had inextricably linked the procedural framework of their dispute to the DIFC. Justice Cooke reasoned that whether the clause was interpreted as referring to the DIFC-LCIA rules or the broader Arbitration Law of the DIFC, the legal outcome remained identical: the curial law was that of the DIFC. This determination effectively neutralized the defendants' attempts to argue for a non-DIFC forum. Once the curial law is established as DIFC law, the natural and legally sound conclusion is that the DIFC is the seat. Consequently, the DIFC Court is the supervisory court and its jurisdiction to grant interim relief, including anti-suit injunctions, is activated.
The court further bolstered this conclusion by examining the mechanical provisions of Clause 14. The agreement stipulated a specific mechanism for the selection of a third arbitrator by the DIFC if the party-appointed arbitrators failed to reach a consensus. Justice Cooke found that this administrative function pointed directly to the DIFC-LCIA as the intended arbitral institution. When read in totality, the reference to "Dubai UAE" took on a different nuance, functioning merely as a geographic identifier that encompassed the DIFC, rather than a legal designation of the onshore courts.
Having secured the seat, Justice Cooke turned his attention to the competing jurisdictions proposed by the defendants. The parallel proceedings in Pakistan were exposed as a transparent tactical maneuver. The court noted that Pakistan could not possibly be the seat, nor did it have any real connection with the dispute beyond the mere fact that one of the parties was domiciled there. The governing law of the MSA was the Commonwealth of Virginia, USA, but in the absence of expert evidence on Virginia law, the court applied DIFC law by default. This left Pakistan as a completely alien forum to the contractual matrix, confirming that the litigation there was vexatious and oppressive.
The robustness of the "high probability" test was vindicated during the return date hearing on 9 March 2017. Despite having been served with the ex parte injunction and having consulted local DIFC counsel, the defendants failed to mount a substantive jurisdictional challenge. Instead, they dispatched counsel to request a 21-day adjournment—a delay tactic that Justice Cooke swiftly rejected as grossly excessive. The failure of the defendants to present any compelling argument against the DIFC's jurisdiction at the inter partes stage confirmed the accuracy of the court's initial ex parte assessment.
At this final hearing, Justice Cooke solidified his interpretation of the arbitration agreement, transforming the interim relief into a final mandatory and negative injunction.
I also referred to “the only sensible conclusion” as being that the DIFC-LCIA Rules were incorporated and that the DIFC-LCIA was the body responsible for the arbitration, to make it plain that there was only one form of arbitration for which the contract provided.
The significance of this ruling extends far beyond the immediate dispute between Hayri International LLC and Hazim Telecom. By strictly applying the "high probability of success" test, the DIFC Courts signaled to the international legal community that they will not allow poorly drafted arbitration clauses to be weaponized by recalcitrant respondents. The decision establishes a clear doctrinal pathway: where a contract references DIFC arbitral rules or institutions, the court will presume the DIFC is the seat and the curial law, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
This approach aligns with the DIFC's broader jurisprudential trajectory of fiercely protecting its arbitral jurisdiction. Much like the foundational principles established in ARB-003-2013: Banyan Tree Corporate PTE Ltd v Meydan Group LLC, where the court affirmed its jurisdiction to recognize and enforce arbitral awards irrespective of the award debtor's assets within the center, the Hayri v Hazim decision demonstrates a proactive defense of the arbitral process itself. Furthermore, it echoes the aggressive posture against procedural obstruction seen in cases like ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex, reinforcing the DIFC Court's willingness to issue anti-suit injunctions to preserve the integrity of the seat.
Ultimately, the "high probability" test serves a dual purpose. It acts as a jurisdictional safeguard, ensuring the DIFC Courts only intervene when their supervisory authority is clear, thereby respecting international comity. Simultaneously, it functions as a powerful sword against procedural sabotage. Once the high probability threshold is met, the court will act decisively, utilizing penal notices and indemnity costs to punish breaches of the arbitration agreement. In Hayri v Hazim, the rigorous application of this test ensured that the defendants' attempt to hijack the dispute through foreign litigation was not merely paused, but permanently dismantled.
How Did Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke Reach the Decision?
Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke’s resolution of the jurisdictional battle in Hayri International LLC v Hazim Telecom Private Limited hinged on a rigorous textual analysis of a poorly drafted arbitration agreement, coupled with a zero-tolerance approach to procedural gamesmanship. Faced with parallel proceedings initiated by the defendants in Pakistan, the court was required to untangle the ambiguities of Clause 14 of the parties' Master Services Agreement (MSA) to establish the definitive seat of the arbitration. The analytical heavy lifting began with the fundamental premise that the determination of an arbitration agreement's validity and scope is the exclusive prerogative of the supervisory court or the arbitral tribunal itself, not a foreign court seized in an apparent attempt to frustrate the arbitral process.
The central interpretive dilemma stemmed from the MSA's reference to both the DIFC and non-DIFC Dubai. To grant the ex parte interim anti-suit injunction on February 25, 2017, Justice Cooke had to be satisfied that the claimant possessed a high probability of success in proving that the DIFC was the agreed seat. The starting point must be the terms of Clause 14, which clearly evidenced a mutual intention to arbitrate. The court rejected the defendants' attempts to exploit the geographical ambiguity between the DIFC and onshore Dubai. Justice Cooke reasoned that the specific invocation of DIFC arbitration rules effectively neutralized any broader reference to Dubai, dictating the curial law and, by extension, the seat.
The reason for that essentially is that the reference to the rules of arbitration of DIFC in Clause 14 of the MSA one way or the other determined the curial law for the purpose of the arbitration.
Whether the clause was construed as referring strictly to the DIFC-LCIA Rules or more broadly to the arbitration law of the DIFC, the legal outcome remained identical. The reference to the selection of an arbitrator further cemented the interpretation that the parties intended to operate under the DIFC-LCIA framework. Consequently, the broader geographic reference to "Dubai UAE" took on a subordinate nuance, leading the court to the sensible and obvious conclusion that the parties intended the DIFC to serve as the seat throughout.
Having established the high probability of the DIFC as the seat, Justice Cooke seamlessly transitioned to the jurisdictional mechanics of the anti-suit injunction. The court relied on the established English common law principles articulated in Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 and AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AED UST-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] 1 WLR 1889 (SC). Under these principles, an anti-suit injunction restraining a breach of an arbitration agreement should be granted unless the respondent can demonstrate a "strong reason" not to do so. The defendants in this matter could offer no such reason. The court affirmed that the power to protect the arbitral process flows directly from the seat.
If the position is that the DIFC is the seat of the arbitration, then the DIFC Court is the supervisory court and its jurisdiction and power to grant the interim injunction is undoubted.
This robust defense of the supervisory jurisdiction aligns with the DIFC Courts' broader doctrinal trajectory regarding parallel proceedings. Much like the firm stance taken against onshore interference in ARB-032-2025: ARB 032/2025 Oswin v (1) Otila (2) Ondray, Justice Cooke recognized that allowing the Pakistan litigation to proceed would fatally undermine the parties' contractual bargain. The court noted that Pakistan cannot be said to have any real connection with the underlying commercial dispute, other than being the jurisdiction where one party happened to be resident or domiciled.
The court's analysis did not merely rest on dry contractual interpretation; it was heavily informed by the defendants' overt procedural sabotage. Justice Cooke identified a calculated strategy by Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited to derail the arbitration through attrition. The initiation of proceedings in Pakistan was not a legitimate challenge to jurisdiction, but a weaponized delay tactic. The court observed that the foreign litigation was adopted with the singular goal of stalling any progress with the arbitration and maximizing the claimant's burden. In his subsequent clarificatory ruling on May 23, 2017, Justice Cooke was unsparing in his assessment of this conduct.
I also found in paragraph 5, on overwhelming evidence, that the Defendant had been taking every opportunity to delay the hearing of the substantive dispute, with the commencement of proceedings in Pakistan in breach of what is now accepted to be an agreement to arbitrate and a series of adjournments obtained by them to prevent any hearing of the justification for the proceedings and the interim orders made which were in due course discharged.
The procedural history of the injunction itself further illustrated the defendants' evasive maneuvers. Following the initial ex parte order on February 25, the court set a return date for March 7, 2017. Despite having ample notice, the defendants appeared only to request more time to formulate their arguments against the injunction. Justice Cooke, balancing procedural fairness against the risk of further delay, granted a brief two-day adjournment to March 9, explicitly directing the defendants to instruct counsel to argue any points of construction regarding the arbitration agreement.
When the adjourned return date arrived, the defendants' strategy shifted from delay to outright abstention. The Defendant decided not to participate in the March 9 hearing, even though their legal representatives were physically present in the courtroom. By refusing to engage on the merits of the jurisdictional question, the defendants effectively conceded the field. Treating the hearing as the trial of the action for the injunction, Justice Cooke converted the interim measure into a permanent shield.
It was a final order which provided that the Defendant was not to pursue the Pakistan proceedings nor “any other proceedings relating to the Dispute in any court, tribunal or other dispute resolution forum other than arbitration in the DIFC or related proceedings in the DIFC Court.”
Despite the finality of the March 9 order, the defendants' continued recalcitrance necessitated a further clarificatory ruling in May 2017. The parties' legal representatives sought explicit confirmation regarding the precise basis of the court's jurisdiction to issue the injunction. The ambiguity arose because, in the initial February judgment, Justice Cooke had briefly noted that the DIFC Court possessed a supportive jurisdiction to grant anti-suit injunctions even if the seat were ultimately determined to be non-DIFC Dubai—though he cautioned that such jurisdiction would rarely be exercised.
To eliminate any lingering doubt that could be exploited in foreign enforcement proceedings, Justice Cooke used the May 23 clarificatory ruling to definitively anchor the injunction in the court's supervisory authority. The judge made it unequivocally clear that the primary driver of the decision was the finding of the DIFC as the arbitral seat, rather than a novel exercise of supportive powers over a foreign or onshore arbitration.
Although at paragraph 3 of the judgment I referred to the possibility of the Court exercising a supportive, as opposed to a supervisory, jurisdiction in making an anti-suit injunction, it is also clear that the basis of the injunction granted was that DIFC was the probable seat of the arbitration.
This clarification was vital for the long-term integrity of the arbitral process. By confirming that the injunction rested on a finding of a high degree of probability that the Claimant will be entitled to final relief based on the DIFC seat, Justice Cooke insulated the order from collateral attacks. The ruling sends a definitive message to commercial litigators: the DIFC Courts will aggressively interpret arbitration clauses to give effect to the parties' commercial intent, and will not hesitate to deploy penal-backed injunctions to neutralize foreign litigation designed to subvert that intent. Similar to the court's intolerance for tactical maneuvering observed in ARB-005-2014: Eava v Egan [2014] ARB 005, the Hayri International decision confirms that procedural sabotage will be met with swift, decisive, and permanent equitable relief.
How Does the DIFC Approach Compare to English High Court Standards?
The DIFC Court’s approach to anti-suit injunctions is fundamentally anchored in English common law principles, specifically the doctrine that an arbitration agreement operates as a negative covenant not to sue in foreign courts. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke, sitting in the DIFC Court of First Instance, explicitly imported the standards set by the English Court of Appeal in Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 and the UK Supreme Court in AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] 1 WLR 1889. By invoking these foundational English authorities, the DIFC Court signaled that its supportive jurisdiction operates with the exact same muscularity as the Commercial Court in London. The central tenet is straightforward: where commercial parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes, the supervisory court will enforce that bargain strictly, viewing foreign litigation not merely as a procedural inconvenience, but as a direct breach of contract requiring immediate equitable intervention.
The threshold for granting an anti-suit injunction in the DIFC, mirroring the English standard, places the burden heavily on the party attempting to litigate elsewhere. Once the applicant establishes a high degree of probability that a valid arbitration agreement exists and covers the underlying dispute, the court will issue the injunction unless the respondent can demonstrate exceptional circumstances that justify departing from the agreed forum. Justice Cooke articulated this presumption with absolute clarity, stating that an anti-suit injunction should be granted to prevent breach of an arbitration agreement unless there is a strong reason not to do so, thereby cementing the DIFC’s doctrinal alignment with the Angelic Grace framework (DIFC_ARB-010-2016_20170228.txt).
In Hayri International LLC v Hazim Telecom Private Limited, the defendants entirely failed to meet this heavy burden. Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited had initiated proceedings in Pakistan, a jurisdiction with no real connection with the dispute other than the domicile of one of the parties. Justice Cooke scrutinized the defendants' actions and found them devoid of any legitimate jurisdictional basis that could override the contractual agreement to arbitrate. The court recognized that the Pakistani proceedings were a tactical maneuver designed to frustrate the arbitral process, rather than a genuine pursuit of justice in an appropriate forum.
Here, there is no strong reason that can be put forward that I can see as to why the Defendant should not be compelled to adhere to the arbitration agreement.
The alignment with English standards extends to how the DIFC Court characterizes the anti-suit injunction itself. Rather than treating it as a draconian or extraordinary remedy reserved for rare abuses of process, the court views it as the standard, expected response to a breach of an arbitration clause. When a party initiates foreign litigation in defiance of an agreement to arbitrate, the injunction is the primary tool to hold them to their commercial bargain. Justice Cooke’s assessment of the facts led him to categorize the situation not as a borderline call requiring delicate balancing, but as the quintessential scenario for judicial intervention.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that this is not just an appropriate case but a paradigm case for the grant of an interim injunction to restrain the proceedings taken by the Defendants in Pakistan.
To exercise this power, the court first had to establish its supervisory jurisdiction, a step that required interpreting the Master Services Agreement's dispute resolution clause. Clause 14 of the MSA referenced the rules of arbitration of the DIFC, but the defendants had previously argued that the seat was non-DIFC Dubai. Applying English principles
Which Earlier DIFC Cases Frame This Decision?
The DIFC Court’s intervention in Hayri International LLC v Hazim Telecom Private Limited [2016] DIFC ARB 010 did not emerge in a vacuum. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke’s swift issuance of an anti-suit injunction against Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited rests on a well-established bedrock of pro-arbitration jurisprudence. The court’s approach to determining the seat of arbitration and its subsequent exercise of supervisory jurisdiction draws heavily on foundational precedents that have systematically insulated DIFC-seated arbitrations from foreign interference. By anchoring its authority in the Master Services Agreement, the court reaffirmed that the designation of the DIFC as an arbitral seat triggers a robust, uncompromising protective regime.
The jurisdictional heavy lifting in the Hayri v Hazim dispute centers on the identification of the DIFC as the seat, a methodology that directly mirrors the principles established in ARB-003-2013: Banyan Tree Corporate PTE Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2013] DIFC ARB 003. In Banyan Tree, the court clarified the expansive scope of its supervisory and supportive powers once the DIFC is recognized as the seat, effectively neutralizing attempts to challenge arbitral awards in parallel onshore Dubai courts. Justice Cooke applied this exact logic to the international sphere. Faced with ambiguous drafting in Clause 14 of the Master Services Agreement, which referenced both the DIFC-LCIA rules and "Dubai UAE," the court cut through the semantic fog to establish its primary jurisdiction.
Although at paragraph 3 of the judgment I referred to the possibility of the Court exercising a supportive, as opposed to a supervisory, jurisdiction in making an anti-suit injunction, it is also clear that the basis of the injunction granted was that DIFC was the probable seat of the arbitration.
The interpretative exercise undertaken by Justice Cooke provides a masterclass in salvaging poorly drafted arbitration clauses. Rather than allowing geographical ambiguity to defeat the agreement to arbitrate, the court applied a commercial, purposive construction. By identifying that the mechanism for selecting an arbitrator aligned with the DIFC-LCIA framework, the court concluded that the reference to "Dubai UAE" was merely imprecise drafting, intended to mean the DIFC. This pragmatic approach prevents parties from weaponizing their own poor drafting to escape arbitral jurisdiction. The court’s confidence in its supervisory mandate allowed it to bypass the defendants' attempts to obfuscate the venue. Justice Cooke noted that the reference to the rules of arbitration of DIFC inherently determined the curial law.
What, however, appears to me to be plain is that again the Claimant can show a high degree of probability that DIFC is the seat of the arbitration.
This doctrinal certainty is what empowers the DIFC Court to act decisively. When a party attempts to drag a dispute into a foreign forum—in this case, Pakistan—the court does not engage in a protracted comity analysis if the seat is clear. Instead, it deploys the anti-suit injunction as a primary weapon to enforce the negative covenant of the arbitration agreement. Interestingly, Justice Cooke explicitly addressed the dual nature of the court's jurisdiction. While the primary basis for the injunction was the DIFC's status as the probable seat, the court also noted its capacity for exercising a supportive, as opposed to a supervisory, jurisdiction even if the seat were determined to be non-DIFC Dubai. This signals that the DIFC Court views itself as a vital node in the broader UAE arbitral ecosystem, willing to deploy its injunctive powers to support arbitrations seated elsewhere in the Emirate if necessary, further deterring parties from exploiting perceived jurisdictional gaps.
The factual matrix of Hayri v Hazim also resonates strongly with the court's historical intolerance for procedural obstructionism, a stance prominently featured in ARB-005-2014: Eava v Egan [2014] ARB 005. In Eava v Egan, the court faced a party utilizing parallel arbitral challenges to delay enforcement and derail proceedings. The DIFC Court established a clear precedent that tactical delays masquerading as legitimate jurisdictional challenges would be swiftly dismissed. Hazim Telecom’s strategy of initiating litigation in Pakistan was a textbook escalation of this tactic. The defendants sought to exploit the geographical distance and the distinct legal system of Pakistan to stall any progress with the arbitration.
The severity of Hazim Telecom’s conduct cannot be overstated. The defendants did not merely initiate parallel proceedings; they actively weaponized the foreign court to paralyze the arbitration. Prior to the DIFC Court's intervention, the defendants had managed to secure an ex parte injunction in Pakistan restraining Hayri International LLC from pursuing the arbitration. They then engaged in a protracted campaign of procedural attrition, securing a series of adjournments over five months to prevent the claimant from challenging the Pakistan injunction. Justice Cooke’s assessment of this calculated abuse of process was unequivocal.
I also found in paragraph 5, on overwhelming evidence, that the Defendant had been taking every opportunity to delay the hearing of the substantive dispute, with the commencement of proceedings in Pakistan in breach of what is now accepted to be an agreement to arbitrate and a series of adjournments obtained by them to prevent any hearing of the justification for the proceedings and the interim orders made which were in due course discharged.
The court recognized that the Pakistan proceedings lacked any genuine connection to the dispute, given that the governing law was that of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the agreed arbitral framework was the DIFC-LCIA. The foreign litigation was entirely manufactured to frustrate the claimant. By classifying the dispute as a definitive standard for intervention, the court sent a clear message to future litigants.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that this is not just an appropriate case but a paradigm case for the grant of an interim injunction to restrain the proceedings taken by the Defendants in Pakistan.
To counter this sabotage, the court utilized its procedural agility, granting an ex parte interim injunction and permitting service by email to ensure immediate effect. This reflects the DIFC Court's broader philosophy: procedural rules must facilitate, not hinder, the enforcement of substantive rights. When faced with a defendant actively evading the arbitral process, the court will adapt its mechanisms to deliver effective relief. The transition from the interim order on February 25, 2017, to the final injunction on March 9, 2017, illustrates this commitment. Despite having ample notice, the defendants chose not to participate in the final hearing, prompting the court to crystallize its protective measures.
It was a final order which provided that the Defendant was not to pursue the Pakistan proceedings nor “any other proceedings relating to the Dispute in any court, tribunal or other dispute resolution forum other than arbitration in the DIFC or related proceedings in the DIFC Court.”
The Hayri v Hazim rulings collectively reinforce the architecture of DIFC arbitration law. By explicitly linking the power to grant an anti-suit injunction to the determination of the seat, the court provides commercial parties with a predictable and secure dispute resolution environment. The decision serves as a stark warning to recalcitrant respondents: the DIFC Court will not hesitate to issue a final injunction to protect its jurisdiction. The alignment with Banyan Tree and Eava v Egan confirms that the DIFC's approach to arbitration is systematically designed to preempt and neutralize procedural sabotage at every turn, ensuring that agreements to arbitrate are strictly enforced against those who seek to undermine them through foreign litigation.
What Does This Mean for Practitioners and Enforcement?
The transition from interim relief to final enforcement in Hayri International LLC v (1) Hazim Telecom Private Limited (2) Hazim Telecom Limited [2016] DIFC ARB 010 establishes a severe baseline for parties attempting to derail arbitration. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke’s ruling operates as a definitive statement on how the DIFC Courts handle bad-faith litigation tactics. When a party initiates foreign proceedings—in this instance, in Pakistan—to bypass an agreed arbitration framework, the court will deploy its full coercive and financial arsenal. The immediate conversion of an ex parte order into a final injunction, coupled with punitive costs, sends a clear message to the regional legal market: procedural sabotage will be met with overwhelming judicial force.
Securing an anti-suit injunction requires the applicant to meet a stringent evidentiary threshold from the outset. Practitioners approaching the DIFC Court on an ex parte basis must be prepared to establish their jurisdictional foundation unequivocally. The standard is not merely a superficial showing of a dispute; the applicant must prove the seat and the governing rules with robust certainty. Justice Cooke required the claimant to demonstrate a high probability of succeeding on the merits of the seat and the applicable rules before granting the initial relief.
I gave reasons at that time which have been transcribed in which I stated that in my judgment the Claimant could show to a high degree of probability that DIFC was the seat of arbitration.
The court's analysis of the arbitration clause required interpreting ambiguous drafting, a common vulnerability in cross-border commercial agreements. The Master Services Agreement referred to the "Rules of the Arbitration of the DIFC." Rather than allowing this imprecision to serve as a loophole for the defendants to escape arbitration, the court took a commercially pragmatic approach. Justice Cooke determined that the only sensible conclusion was that the DIFC-LCIA rules were incorporated, rather than interpreting the phrase as a reference to the general body of DIFC Law. This interpretation aligns with the DIFC's broader pro-arbitration stance, ensuring that poorly drafted clauses do not automatically frustrate the parties' underlying intent to arbitrate. It places the burden on the party seeking to avoid arbitration to prove that the clause is entirely unworkable, a high bar in the DIFC.
The procedural history of the return date hearing provides a masterclass in judicial intolerance for delay. Following the initial ex parte order on 25 February 2017, the court scheduled a rapid return date. The defendants, Hazim Telecom Private Limited and Hazim Telecom Limited, attempted to stall the proceedings. They appeared by local counsel and requested a 21-day adjournment to prepare their arguments. Justice Cooke dismissed this request as grossly excessive, noting that the defendants had already received adequate notice and had even taken early advice from local lawyers.
In fact, there had been service and notice given from fairly shortly after the injunction was granted, on Saturday or perhaps just the Sunday of the week preceding this week.
When defendants fail to engage substantively after being given a reasonable, albeit tight, window to respond, the DIFC Court will not hesitate to crystallize interim measures into final orders. The refusal to grant the 21-day extension forced the issue. Because the defendants chose not to mount a substantive defense at the adjourned hearing, Justice Cooke moved decisively to shut down the parallel litigation in Pakistan permanently.
In those circumstances, the right thing to do is to treat this as the final hearing of the application for an injunction and to grant an injunction in the terms that have been sought.
This conversion from an interim holding pattern to a final negative and mandatory injunction is a critical procedural risk for recalcitrant respondents. Practitioners advising clients who are subject to DIFC ex parte orders must understand that ignoring the return date or showing up merely to request lengthy adjournments will likely result in immediate, final judgment against them. The court views such tactics not as legitimate requests for preparation time, but as extensions of the very procedural sabotage the injunction was designed to stop. The mandatory element of the injunction is particularly potent, as it requires the defendants to take active steps to discontinue the foreign proceedings, placing them in direct contempt of the DIFC Court if they fail to comply.
The most punitive aspect of the ruling, however, lies in the court's approach to costs. The analytical framework applied by Justice Cooke establishes that indemnity costs are the standard, expected consequence for parties who breach an arbitration agreement by initiating parallel foreign litigation. The reasoning bridges the gap between contract law and procedural sanctions, creating a powerful deterrent against forum shopping.
I am also asked to deal with issues of costs. In my judgment, it is right that indemnity costs should be awarded, both because the conduct in question amounts to a breach of the agreement to arbitrate in bringing proceedings in Pakistan and reasonable costs incurred would be recoverable as a matter of damages for breach of that obligation and by analogy are therefore recoverable as a matter of costs.
By framing the costs not merely as a procedural penalty but as an analogue to contractual damages for breach, the court solidifies the financial risk of anti-suit behavior. A party suing in Pakistan in defiance of a DIFC arbitration clause is actively breaching a contract. The legal fees incurred by the innocent party to stop that breach via an anti-suit injunction are the direct, foreseeable damages of that breach. Therefore, awarding costs on the standard basis would leave the innocent party out of pocket, failing to make them whole for a breach of contract. Indemnity costs correct this imbalance, shifting the entire financial burden of the enforcement action onto the breaching party.
The quantification of these costs further illustrates the financial peril. Justice Cooke applied the general rule that an order for indemnity costs typically results in the recovery of approximately 80% of the claimed figure. In this specific application, the claimant sought a substantial sum for the urgent injunction work.
It is the general rule that an order for indemnity costs results in recovery of about 80% of the figure sought, which in this case would be a figure of approximately USD 72,000.
To ensure immediate financial consequence, the court did not wait for a protracted detailed assessment process. Instead, Justice Cooke ordered an immediate interim payment. Recognizing that there must be a little give in the final calculation, he awarded an interim payment of USD 65,000. This immediate liquidity transfer punishes the breaching party instantly, funding the innocent party's ongoing arbitration efforts and severely degrading the economic viability of the defendant's disruptive strategy.
The aggressive posture taken in Hayri International aligns with a broader jurisprudential trend within the DIFC Courts to fiercely protect their supervisory jurisdiction. As explored in ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex, the DIFC Court views parallel proceedings not merely as an inconvenience, but as a direct assault on the arbitral seat. The willingness to issue mandatory injunctions compelling parties to discontinue foreign actions is a powerful tool. Similarly, the strict enforcement mechanisms echo the principles seen in ARB-032-2025: ARB 032/2025 Oswin v (1) Otila (2) Ondray, where the court defended the seat against parallel proceedings with robust contempt sanctions.
Furthermore, the decision reinforces the necessity of precise drafting in arbitration clauses. While the court ultimately saved the clause by interpreting "Rules of the Arbitration of the DIFC" as the DIFC-LCIA rules, the initial ambiguity provided the defendants with the pretext to launch their disruptive litigation in Pakistan. Had the clause explicitly named the DIFC-LCIA, the jurisdictional battle might have been avoided entirely. Practitioners drafting commercial agreements must ensure absolute clarity regarding both the seat and the institutional rules to prevent giving hostile counterparties any jurisdictional foothold. The court will enforce the agreement, but relying on judicial interpretation of the form of words adopted is an unnecessary risk.
The legacy of Justice Cooke's ruling is a clear, uncompromising framework for dealing with procedural sabotage. If a party attempts to bypass a DIFC arbitration agreement through foreign courts, the DIFC Court will grant ex parte relief provided a high probability of success is shown. If the breaching party fails to mount a serious defense at the return date, that relief will become final. And crucially, the financial burden of this enforcement will fall squarely on the breaching party through indemnity costs, calculated as damages for the breach of the arbitration agreement itself. This creates a highly predictable, highly punitive environment for bad-faith litigants, cementing the DIFC's reputation as a safe harbor for commercial arbitration.
What Issues Remain Unresolved in the Wake of Hayri-Hazim?
The decisive intervention by Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke in Hayri International LLC v (1) Hazim Telecom Private Limited (2) Hazim Telecom Limited [2016] DIFC ARB 010 cemented the jurisdiction of the Dubai International Financial Centre, but the practical aftermath of the ruling exposes a persistent vulnerability in cross-border arbitration. While the court successfully deployed an anti-suit injunction to protect the arbitral seat, the reality of enforcing such equitable remedies against foreign entities with no local assets remains a formidable hurdle. The DIFC Courts possess the authority to issue stern penal notices and mandatory orders, but when the target is domiciled in Pakistan and actively litigating there, the coercive power of the DIFC is tested at its geographical limits.
The core of the enforcement dilemma lies in the nature of the anti-suit injunction itself. It acts in personam, binding the defendants rather than the foreign court. Justice Cooke made it unequivocally clear that the defendants were prohibited from pursuing the parallel litigation, issuing a final order which provided that the Defendant was not to pursue the Pakistan proceedings. The court's directive was comprehensive:
It was a final order which provided that the Defendant was not to pursue the Pakistan proceedings nor “any other proceedings relating to the Dispute in any court, tribunal or other dispute resolution forum other than arbitration in the DIFC or related proceedings in the DIFC Court.”
Yet, a final order is only as effective as the consequences of breaching it. In cases like ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex, the DIFC Courts have grappled with similar supportive jurisdiction issues, attempting to rein in extraterritorial breaches of arbitration agreements. If Hazim Telecom Private Limited simply ignores the injunction and continues its action in Pakistan, Hayri International LLC is left with a contempt of court finding in Dubai that may not easily translate into asset seizure in South Asia.
The procedural history of the return date hearing perfectly illustrates the tactical impunity often felt by foreign defendants. After being served with the ex parte injunction, the defendants instructed local counsel who appeared merely to request a 21-day adjournment to prepare their arguments—a delay tactic that Justice Cooke swiftly rejected as grossly excessive. When the court granted only a two-day adjournment to allow for proper instruction, the defendants' response was telling: The Defendant decided not to participate in the final hearing on 9 March 2017, despite their legal representatives being present in the courtroom.
To penalise this procedural recalcitrance, Justice Cooke turned to the mechanism of indemnity costs. The court recognised that the commencement of proceedings in Pakistan was not merely a procedural misstep, but a direct and actionable breach of the underlying contract.
I am also asked to deal with issues of costs. In my judgment, it is right that indemnity costs should be awarded, both because the conduct in question amounts to a breach of the agreement to arbitrate in bringing proceedings in Pakistan and reasonable costs incurred would be recoverable as a matter of damages for breach of that obligation and by analogy are therefore recoverable as a matter of costs.
The financial penalty was quantified swiftly. Justice Cooke noted the general rule that an indemnity costs order typically results in the recovery of about 80% of the figure sought, which in this instance amounted to approximately USD 72,000. He subsequently ordered an interim payment of USD 65,000. However, the long-term effectiveness of such cost awards as a deterrent remains highly questionable. For a well-resourced corporate defendant determined to derail an arbitration, a USD 65,000 interim cost order might be viewed merely as the price of doing business—a tactical toll paid to inflict maximum delay and financial attrition on the claimant.
The claimant's defensive posture further underscores the burden placed on parties facing procedural sabotage. Because the arbitration clause was ambiguously drafted, Hayri International LLC was forced to initiate parallel protective measures. As Justice Cooke noted in his clarificatory ruling, an ad hoc arbitration, commenced in case the Court should find that there was no binding agreement under the DIFC-LCIA Rules, had to be brought under the umbrella of the injunction as well. This multi-front defensive strategy drives up costs and complexity for the innocent party.
The court itself seemed acutely aware of the defendants' overarching strategy. The record shows a pattern of obstruction, from the initial breach of the arbitration agreement to a series of calculated adjournments designed to prevent any substantive hearing on the merits. Justice Cooke observed this behaviour with judicial frustration:
This now appears to be a continuing feature of the Defendant’s conduct in DIFC.
This "continuing feature" raises a broader jurisprudential question for the DIFC Courts: when financial penalties and in personam injunctions fail to secure compliance from an absent foreign party, what further tools can the court deploy? The Banyan Tree doctrine established the DIFC's willingness to act as a conduit jurisdiction for enforcement, but Hayri-Hazim tests the limits of its supervisory and supportive powers when the recalcitrant party is entirely offshore. The claimant is ultimately forced to play a multi-jurisdictional game of whack-a-mole, seeking recognition of the DIFC injunction in the very foreign courts where the defendant is attempting to sabotage the arbitration.
Beyond the immediate enforcement challenges, the Hayri-Hazim dispute also leaves open questions regarding the interpretation of institutional rules amidst potential legislative changes. A central point of contention in the ex parte and return date hearings was the precise construction of the arbitration clause, which referred ambiguously to the "Rules of the Arbitration of the DIFC". Justice Cooke had to determine whether this pointed to the specific institutional rules of the DIFC-LCIA or merely to the general arbitration law of the DIFC. Ultimately, the court found a high probability of success for the Claimant in establishing that the institutional rules applied.
To my mind the only sensible conclusion when looking at the clause as a whole is to say that the DIFC-LCIA rules are incorporated and that DIFC-LCIA is the body responsible for administration of the arbitration.
While this pragmatic interpretation saved the arbitration agreement in 2017, the interplay between such contractual language and the evolving institutional landscape of the UAE remains a critical point of interest. With the subsequent abolition of the DIFC-LCIA by Decree No. 34 of 2021 and the transfer of its caseload to the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), clauses drafted with similar ambiguity now face an entirely new layer of jurisdictional scrutiny. If a party today attempts to rely on a legacy clause citing the "Rules of the Arbitration of the DIFC", the resulting satellite litigation over institutional succession could provide exactly the sort of procedural loophole that recalcitrant defendants like Hazim Telecom seek to exploit.
The legacy of Hayri International v Hazim Telecom is therefore dual-natured. On the doctrinal front, it stands as a robust defence of the arbitral seat, confirming that the DIFC Courts will not hesitate to issue final, mandatory anti-suit injunctions to restrain foreign proceedings that breach an arbitration agreement. Yet, on the practical front, it serves as a cautionary tale for commercial practitioners. Securing an injunction is only the first step; the true battle lies in enforcing that order against a party willing to absorb indemnity costs and ignore the DIFC's jurisdiction entirely. Until cross-border enforcement mechanisms for equitable remedies become as seamless as the enforcement of final arbitral awards under the New York Convention, the anti-suit injunction will remain a powerful shield that is nonetheless difficult to wield across borders.