On 24 March 2026, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi issued a final assessment of costs in Ohtli v Onora, ordering the Claimant to pay USD 14,080—a fraction of the requested sum—following a protracted battle over an interim anti-suit injunction. This order capped a series of judicial interventions that began in December 2025, when the Court discharged an injunction against the Defendant after the underlying onshore proceedings were withdrawn. The final tally, following a failed permission to appeal (PTA) application, underscores the Court’s rigorous application of proportionality in the assessment of legal fees.
For arbitration counsel and cross-border litigators, the Ohtli v Onora saga serves as a masterclass in the risks of pursuing 'protective' anti-suit relief after the commercial reality of a dispute has shifted. What began as a standard application for an interim anti-suit injunction (ASI) morphed into a cautionary tale regarding the 'event' of litigation, the high threshold for appealing discretionary costs orders, and the Court’s willingness to apply a 'moderate reduction' to legal bills to ensure proportionality. The case confirms that the DIFC Courts will not tolerate the use of coercive interim measures once the agreed arbitral mechanism is fully engaged, and that the price of such procedural persistence is often borne by the applicant in the form of adverse, albeit carefully assessed, costs orders.
How Did the Dispute Between Ohtli and Onora Arise?
The jurisdictional architecture of Dubai relies on a delicate equilibrium between the onshore civil law courts and the offshore common law jurisdiction of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). When commercial actors deliberately contract into the latter, any attempt to litigate in the former is not merely a procedural misstep; it is a breach of the negative stipulation inherent in every arbitration agreement. The dispute in Ohtli v Onora exposes the raw friction at this boundary, illustrating how quickly a standard commercial disagreement can mutate into a high-stakes battle over forum primacy and the limits of equitable relief.
The foundation of the parties’ relationship was entirely conventional for entities operating within the Emirate’s commercial ecosystem. The commercial engagement was governed by a specific set of contractual provisions that explicitly allocated jurisdictional risk. As H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi observed, the parties’ underlying dispute arose from trading terms dated 17 January 2025, which contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration under the rules of DIAC with the DIFC as the seat.
By selecting the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) rules and designating the DIFC as the arbitral seat, Ohtli and Onora actively opted out of the onshore litigation framework. The DIFC seat designation is critical: it vests the DIFC Courts with supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration, including the power to issue supportive interim measures under the Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008) and the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC).
Despite this unambiguous trading terms dated 17 January 2025 agreement, Onora commenced proceedings in the onshore Dubai courts. The motivations for such a maneuver are familiar to cross-border litigators: onshore proceedings can be deployed tactically to secure local attachments, pressure a counterparty through parallel litigation costs, or exploit perceived advantages in a civil law forum. For Ohtli, the onshore filing represented an immediate existential threat to the agreed dispute resolution mechanism. In response, Ohtli moved swiftly to invoke the supervisory powers of the DIFC Court.
On 9 September 2025, Ohtli filed an urgent application seeking interim anti-suit relief under Part 25 of the RDC. The objective was clear: Ohtli sought ASI relief under Part 25 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts to restrain the Defendant from pursuing proceedings in the Dubai onshore courts in relation to a commercial dispute. The DIFC Court, acting to protect the integrity of the arbitral seat, granted the interim ASI ex parte on 12 September 2025, temporarily halting Onora’s onshore advance and preserving the status quo pending a full inter partes return date hearing.
The issuance of an ex parte ASI is a powerful, coercive exercise of judicial authority, designed to freeze a breach of contract in its tracks. However, the landscape of the dispute shifted dramatically before the parties returned to court. Facing the coercive weight of the DIFC Court's injunction, Onora executed a tactical retreat. By the time the return date hearing convened on 26 November 2025, Onora had withdrawn the offending onshore action and submitted to the DIAC arbitration. The Court explicitly noted that the onshore Dubai Court proceedings that gave rise to the interim order were no longer being pursued.
At this juncture, standard commercial litigation strategy might dictate that the claimant declare victory, allow the interim injunction to lapse, and proceed to the merits of the arbitration. Ohtli, however, adopted a maximalist posture. Rather than accepting the withdrawal of the onshore proceedings as a cure for the jurisdictional breach, Ohtli pressed for the interim ASI to be converted into a final, permanent injunction. The Claimant’s legal theory rested on the premise that a breach of an arbitration agreement is a completed wrong that permanently taints the breaching party, requiring ongoing judicial restraint.
Ohtli argued that there was a binding arbitration agreement, that the Defendant breached that agreement by commencing proceedings in the Dubai courts, and that discontinuance of those proceedings did not undo the breach.
Ohtli further submitted that there remains a real risk of future proceedings being commenced outside the agreed arbitral forum in the absence of a continuing injunction, and that final anti-suit relief is required to protect the parties’ bargain and the integrity of the arbitration agreement. This argument attempts to stretch the equitable jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts beyond its traditional boundaries. An injunction is fundamentally a forward-looking remedy, grounded in necessity and proportionality. It is not a punitive sanction for past misconduct.
Onora, having filed a Set Aside Application on 25 November 2025, capitalized on Ohtli's overreach. The Defendant argued that any asserted risk of future proceedings was speculative and insufficient to justify the continuation of coercive relief, particularly where the relief would operate only in a preventative or punitive manner. Onora effectively shifted the burden back to Ohtli, demanding that the Claimant prove a "real and present need" for an injunction when the parties were already actively engaged in the DIAC arbitration.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi’s analysis of this standoff provides a masterclass in the disciplined application of equitable remedies. The Court refused to be drawn into issuing a permanent injunction based on theoretical future breaches. The judicial focus remained strictly on the present reality of the procedural landscape.
While the Claimant expressed concern about the possibility of future proceedings, I am not persuaded that such concern justifies the continuation of an injunction where the conduct complained of has ceased and the agreed arbitral mechanism is now engaged.
The ruling reinforces a critical doctrinal boundary: the DIFC Courts will act decisively to protect a DIFC-seated arbitration, but they will not maintain coercive orders once the threat has evaporated. The Court's reasoning aligns with the broader trajectory of DIFC jurisprudence regarding supportive jurisdiction. As explored in Nashrah v Najem, the DIFC Courts are acutely aware of their role as a supervisory, rather than an interventionist, forum. The power to enjoin proceedings in a sister court within the same Emirate is exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary to prevent the immediate subversion of an arbitration agreement. When the conduct complained of has ceased, the jurisdictional justification for the ASI evaporates alongside it.
Ohtli’s insistence on pursuing a final injunction transformed a successful defensive maneuver into an expensive procedural failure. By refusing to recognize that the interim ASI had already achieved its primary objective—forcing Onora out of the onshore courts and into the DIAC arbitration—Ohtli forced an unnecessary contested hearing. The Court’s response was unequivocal, discharging the ASI Order with immediate effect and granting Onora’s Set Aside Application.
The financial consequences of this procedural overreach were immediate and severe. The Court utilized its costs jurisdiction to penalize the Claimant's insistence on maintaining an obsolete injunction:
The Court ordered that the Claimant pay the Defendant its costs of the Set Aside Application on the standard basis, and directed the Defendant to submit a Statement of Costs not exceeding three pages within 5 days of the Order.
This costs order serves as a stark warning to practitioners navigating the complex interface between onshore and offshore jurisdictions in Dubai. While the DIFC Courts remain a robust protector of arbitral agreements, their equitable powers cannot be weaponized to punish past breaches or guard against purely speculative future risks. The dispute between Ohtli and Onora ultimately reveals that securing an interim anti-suit injunction is only half the battle; knowing when to relinquish it is equally vital to effective commercial advocacy.
Why Did the Court Discharge the Interim Anti-Suit Injunction?
The procedural trajectory of Ohtli v Onora [2025] DIFC ARB 034 provides a masterclass in the temporal limits of equitable relief within the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). When a party breaches an arbitration agreement by initiating parallel litigation, an anti-suit injunction (ASI) is the standard, immediate remedy to protect the arbitral seat. However, the DIFC Courts treat the ASI as a functional shield, not a punitive sword. Once the immediate threat to the arbitration agreement dissipates, the justification for coercive judicial intervention evaporates alongside it. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi’s decision to discharge the interim ASI rests on a clear doctrinal premise: the Court prioritizes the actual, present engagement of the arbitral mechanism over a claimant’s speculative fears of future parallel proceedings.
The dispute originated from a commercial relationship governed by trading terms dated 17 January 2025, which mandated that any disputes be resolved via arbitration under the rules of the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), with the DIFC designated as the arbitral seat. Despite this clear forum selection clause, Onora initiated proceedings in the onshore Dubai courts. In response, Ohtli moved swiftly under Part 25 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), securing an ex parte ASI Order dated 12 September 2025 to halt the onshore litigation.
At the time of the initial ex parte application, the necessity for the injunction was absolute. The onshore proceedings represented a live, active breach of the arbitration agreement, threatening to usurp the jurisdiction of the DIAC tribunal and undermine the DIFC seat. However, the landscape shifted dramatically in the weeks that followed. By the time the parties convened for the Return Date Hearing held on 26 November 2025, Onora had retreated. The onshore Dubai court proceedings that prompted the ASI Order were no longer being pursued, and the parties had formally commenced the DIAC arbitration.
Faced with a cured breach, Ohtli nevertheless adopted a hardline stance, demanding that the interim ASI be converted into a final, permanent order. Ohtli’s legal strategy hinged on the argument that a historical breach of contract cannot be erased simply by the offending party’s subsequent compliance. The Claimant’s position was rooted in a strict contractual interpretation:
It argued that there is a binding arbitration agreement, that the Defendant breached that agreement by commencing proceedings in the Dubai courts, and that discontinuance of those proceedings does not undo the breach.
Ohtli’s insistence on a final order was driven by a recognizable commercial anxiety. Without the looming threat of a penal notice attached to a formal DIFC Court injunction, what was to stop Onora from simply re-filing the onshore claim the moment the interim order was lifted? Ohtli argued that the Court had a duty to permanently lock the jurisdictional door:
The Claimant further submitted that there remains a real risk of future proceedings being commenced outside the agreed arbitral forum in the absence of a continuing injunction, and that final anti-suit relief is required to protect the parties’ bargain and the integrity of the arbitration agreement.
This argument fundamentally misapprehends the nature of injunctive relief within the DIFC’s equitable jurisdiction. An anti-suit injunction is an exceptional, coercive remedy. While it operates in personam against the injuncted party rather than against the foreign court itself, it inevitably creates friction between judicial systems—a sensitivity that is particularly acute when the competing forum is the onshore Dubai court system. Consequently, the DIFC Courts will only deploy and maintain such relief when there is a real, present, and unavoidable need to protect the arbitral process.
Onora’s defense capitalized on this doctrinal threshold. The Defendant argued that the continuation of the injunction would serve no legitimate protective purpose, characterizing Ohtli’s fears as legally insufficient to sustain a coercive order:
The Defendant argued that any asserted risk of future proceedings was speculative and insufficient to justify the continuation of coercive relief, particularly where the relief would operate only in a preventative or punitive manner.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi decisively rejected Ohtli’s demand for a permanent injunction, aligning the Court’s reasoning with the pragmatic realities of the dispute’s current status. The Court noted that the dispute is now being progressed through arbitration, exactly as the parties had originally contracted. The arbitral mechanism was fully engaged, and the DIAC tribunal was now the primary forum for resolving the substantive issues between the parties.
The Court’s refusal to maintain the ASI underscores a critical boundary in DIFC arbitration jurisprudence: the Court will not issue "just in case" injunctions based on the mere possibility of future bad faith. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi articulated this limitation clearly:
While the Claimant expressed concern about the possibility of future proceedings, I am not persuaded that such concern justifies the continuation of an injunction where the conduct complained of has ceased and the agreed arbitral mechanism is now engaged.
This ruling provides a sharp contrast to earlier DIFC authorities where the threat to the arbitral seat remained active. For instance, in ARB-010-2016: Hayri International Llc v (1) Hazim Telecom Private Limited (2) Hazim Telecom Limited [2016] DIFC AR, H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke maintained a robust anti-suit injunction precisely because the foreign proceedings were live and the defendant showed a continuing intent to bypass the DIFC seat. In Hayri, the injunction was a necessary shield against an ongoing assault on the arbitration agreement. In Ohtli v Onora, the assault had already been repelled, the invading forces had retreated, and the arbitration was safely underway. Maintaining the shield in the absence of an attack transforms a protective measure into an unnecessary, punitive encumbrance.
The distinction is vital for practitioners advising clients on the lifespan of interim relief. An interim ASI obtained ex parte is inherently fragile; its survival at the return date depends entirely on the facts on the ground at that specific moment. If the respondent cures the breach by withdrawing the offending parallel proceedings, the jurisdictional foundation for the injunction crumbles. The DIFC Courts do not view the historical fact of a breach as sufficient grounds to maintain coercive relief. The remedy for a past breach of an arbitration agreement—if that breach caused quantifiable financial loss, such as the legal costs incurred in fighting the onshore proceedings—lies in a claim for damages for breach of contract before the arbitral tribunal, not in the perpetuation of an obsolete injunction by the supervisory court.
By discharging the ASI and ordering that the Defendant’s Set Aside Application is granted, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi reinforced the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitration. Once the arbitral tribunal is seized of the matter and parallel litigation has ceased, the supervisory court must step back. Ohtli’s attempt to keep the DIFC Court actively policing Onora’s future conduct via a permanent injunction was a procedural overreach. It demanded that the Court expend judicial resources guarding against a phantom threat, ignoring the fact that the DIAC tribunal was now fully capable of managing the dispute. The Court’s decisive discharge of the order serves as a binding reminder that equitable relief in the DIFC is strictly tethered to present necessity, and speculative anxieties cannot sustain the heavy machinery of an anti-suit injunction.
How Did the Court Quantify the Initial Costs Award?
The procedural genesis of the costs assessment in Ohtli v Onora traces back to the immediate aftermath of the Court’s decision to dismantle the Claimant’s primary tactical maneuver. On 22 December 2025, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi issued an order by which the interim anti-suit injunction, originally granted ex parte on 12 September 2025, was formally discharged and the Defendant’s Set Aside Application was granted. That substantive victory for the Defendant triggered an automatic entitlement to costs, shifting the battleground from jurisdictional primacy to the quantification of legal expenditures. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of that December order, the Claimant was directed to pay the Defendant’s costs on the standard basis, setting the stage for a rigorous judicial review of the financial toll exacted by the injunction proceedings.
The Defendant moved swiftly to crystallize its financial recovery. As documented in the judgment, the Defendant submitted a comprehensive accounting of the resources deployed to defeat the injunction, filing its Statement of Costs on 29 December 2025, claiming a total sum of USD 47,372.12, comprising legal fees and disbursements [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-034-2025_20260128.txt#:~:text=The%20Defendant%20filed%20its%20Statement%20of%20Costs%20on%2029%20December%202025%2C%20claiming%20a%20total%20sum%20of%20USD%2047%2C372.12%2C%20comprising%20legal%20fees%20and%20disbursements].
At first glance, a claim of USD 47,372.12 to set aside an interim anti-suit injunction in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts appears entirely conventional. Anti-suit litigation is inherently front-loaded, requiring rapid mobilization of legal teams, urgent drafting of witness evidence, and intensive preparation for return date hearings. The urgency dictated by an ex parte injunction often precludes the lean staffing models typical of slower-moving commercial disputes. The Court acknowledged this reality, examining the specific deployment of personnel to the file. The judgment notes that the submitted costs reflected work undertaken by two fee earners who were responsible for the preparation of the Set Aside Application and subsequent attendance at the Return Date hearing.
Staffing a complex injunction challenge with only two fee earners suggests a degree of internal efficiency on the part of the Defendant's legal representatives. Furthermore, the Court scrutinized the specific hourly rates charged by these practitioners to ensure they aligned with the prevailing market expectations codified by the DIFC Courts. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi found no fault with the baseline metrics of the Defendant's claim, stating that he was satisfied that the work undertaken was reasonably incurred and that the hourly rates applied were broadly consistent with the guidance set out in Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023 [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-034-2025_20260128.txt#:~:text=I%20am%20satisfied%20that%20the%20work%20undertaken%20was%20reasonably%20incurred%20and%20that%20the%20hourly%20rates%20applied%20are%20broadly%20consistent%20with%20the%20guidance%20set%20out%20in%20Registrar%E2%80%99s%20Direction%20No.%201%20of%202023].
This explicit validation of the hourly rates against Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023 is a critical doctrinal marker. The Registrar's Direction establishes maximum recoverable hourly rates for different bands of practitioners, serving as a hard ceiling for standard basis assessments. By confirming that the Defendant's rates were "broadly consistent" with this guidance, the Court eliminated rate inflation as a ground for reduction. Furthermore, the Court's satisfaction that the work was "reasonably incurred" confirms that the Defendant did not engage in unnecessary tactical skirmishes or duplicate efforts.
However, the analytical crux of the judgment lies in the Court's subsequent pivot. Establishing that work was reasonably incurred and billed at permissible rates is necessary, but not sufficient, for full recovery under the standard basis. The Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) impose a dual requirement: costs must be both reasonable and proportionate. The Court explicitly invoked this dual mandate, applying the standard basis of assessment under RDC 38.8 and RDC 38.23.
Under RDC 38.8, the Court will only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue, and will resolve any doubt as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or reasonable and proportionate in amount in favor of the paying party. This creates a structural headwind for the receiving party. Even if every hour billed was genuinely necessary to defeat the injunction, the aggregate total must still survive the proportionality filter. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi, exercising my discretion to allow only such costs as are reasonable and proportionate, determined that the total sum of USD 47,372.12 exceeded that threshold.
The application of a "moderate reduction" in standard basis assessments is a well-established mechanism within DIFC jurisprudence to account for the inherent inefficiencies of litigation that cannot be precisely quantified line-by-line. Rather than engaging in a granular, item-by-item taxation of the costs schedule—a process that would consume disproportionate judicial resources—the Court applied a broad-brush percentage reduction, awarding the Defendant 80% of the costs claimed, namely USD 37,897.70, as a fair, reasonable, and proportionate quantification of the Defendant’s recoverable costs [https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-034-2025_20260128.txt#:~:text=I%20therefore%20award%20the%20Defendant%2080%25%20of%20the%20costs%20claimed%2C%20namely%20USD%2037%2C897.70%2C%20as%20a%20fair%2C%20reasonable%2C%20and%20proportionate%20quantification%20of%20the%20Defendant%E2%80%99s%20recoverable%20costs].
The 20% haircut applied here is highly representative of the DIFC Courts' approach to standard basis assessments in interim applications. It serves as a structural buffer, ensuring that the losing party is not penalized for the winning party's internal inefficiencies or the premium associated with urgent legal work, unless the Court has explicitly ordered costs on the indemnity basis. This approach mirrors the rigorous proportionality analysis seen in other recent arbitration-related enforcement disputes. For instance, in ARB-027-2024: ARB 027/2024 Nalani v Netty, the Court similarly penalized procedural obstruction while maintaining strict boundaries on the quantum of recoverable costs, reinforcing that victory on the merits does not equate to a blank cheque for legal fees. Likewise, the high-stakes anti-suit context analyzed in ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex demonstrates how quickly costs can escalate when jurisdictional primacy is contested, making the Court's role as a gatekeeper of proportionality essential.
Having quantified the principal sum at USD 37,897.70, the Court established a strict timeline for compliance, backed by the coercive mechanism of post-judgment interest. The Order mandated that the Costs Award be paid within 14 days, pursuant to RDC 38.40. To ensure the Claimant could not tactically delay payment, the Court invoked Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017, directing that [interest shall accrue at the rate of 9% per annum](https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments
What Was the Basis for the Claimant’s Failed Permission to Appeal?
Following the discharge of the interim anti-suit injunction, the Claimant faced a substantial costs liability. Rather than accept the financial consequences of the discharged relief, the Claimant launched a targeted appellate strike aimed exclusively at the costs order. The procedural vehicle was a Permission to Appeal (PTA) application under Part 44 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC). The strategic objective was to sever the costs liability from the substantive defeat, arguing that the Court’s exercise of discretion at first instance was fundamentally flawed.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi framed the procedural posture of the challenge in precise terms:
This is a PTA Application made by the Claimant pursuant to RDC 44.6, seeking permission to appeal in respect of costs only, namely paragraph 3 of the December Order, by which the Claimant was ordered to pay the Defendant’s costs of the Application to set aside the interim anti-suit injunction (the “Set-Aside Application”) on the standard basis.
The financial stakes of this specific appellate maneuver were crystallized in a subsequent assessment. The Court had already finalized the quantification of the Defendant’s recoverable costs in the amount of USD 37,897.70, a figure the Claimant sought to entirely unwind. To do so, the Claimant had to navigate the notoriously narrow appellate gateway of RDC 44.19, which requires an applicant to demonstrate either a "real prospect of success" or "some other compelling reason" for the appeal to be heard.
Crucially, the Claimant attempted to ring-fence the PTA, explicitly avoiding a direct challenge to the substantive discharge of the injunction. The tactical framing was designed to avoid the heavy burden of proving the Court erred in its primary jurisdictional or equitable findings regarding the anti-suit relief. As the Court noted:
The Claimant submits that the PTA Application is confined to costs. The Claimant expressly states that it does not, at this stage, seek to re-open the substantive decision to discharge the interim anti-suit relief, save to the limited extent that it contends the earlier interim relief and related matters are material to the exercise of the Court’s costs discretion.
Despite this narrow framing, the Claimant deployed a scattergun approach to the grounds of appeal. The Claimant advances five grounds, in substance contending that: (i) the Court failed to address alleged procedural default and prejudice; (ii) the “event” was wrongly identified; (iii) insufficient account was taken of the interim order and alleged breach of the arbitration agreement; (iv) reserved costs were not determined; and (v) reasons were inadequate and the outcome procedurally unfair.
The analytical core of the Claimant’s failure lies in Ground (ii)—the identification of the "event." Under the general rule in RDC 38.7, costs follow the event. In complex, multi-stage injunction litigation, identifying the definitive "event" can sometimes be contested. The Claimant submits that the Court wrongly identified the “event” as the Defendant’s success on the Set-Aside Application, contending that the Claimant’s earlier interim success should have driven the costs outcome.
This argument represents a fundamental misunderstanding of interim equitable relief. An ex parte or interim injunction is inherently provisional. It is granted on the basis of a preliminary assessment of the merits and the balance of convenience, often before the respondent has had a full opportunity to present their case. When that injunction is subsequently discharged upon a full inter partes hearing—the Set-Aside Application—the provisional "success" of obtaining the initial order is entirely superseded. The true "event" is the final determination of the application, which in this case was the Defendant successfully dismantling the injunction.
The Claimant relies on the fact that interim anti-suit relief was granted and on the Claimant’s contentions regarding the Defendant’s conduct, arguing these should have materially affected the costs outcome. By attempting to elevate the provisional grant of the injunction to the status of a costs-bearing "event," the Claimant sought to rewrite the procedural history of the dispute. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi firmly rejected this doctrinal distortion. The Court recognized that entertaining such an argument would effectively reward a party for obtaining an injunction that was ultimately deemed unwarranted. The Judge characterized the tactic accurately: The Claimant’s argument is an invitation to re-balance the discretionary factors and to substitute a different view as to what the “event” should be.
Appellate courts in the DIFC, much like their counterparts in the English Commercial Court, are highly deferential to first-instance costs decisions. A judge managing a case has a unique vantage point on the conduct of the parties, the proportionality of the applications, and the overall flow of the litigation. To succeed on a PTA against a costs order, an applicant must show that the judge exceeded the generous margin of appreciation afforded to them—typically by acting on a wrong principle, taking into account irrelevant matters, or reaching a conclusion that is plainly perverse.
The Claimant’s reliance on alleged procedural defaults by the Defendant (Ground i) fell squarely into the trap of confusing case management with appellate error. The Claimant contends that the Set-Aside Application and/or supporting materials were filed or served late and in a manner said to have caused prejudice, and that this was not addressed in the Costs Order. Late filings are a routine friction point in expedited injunction proceedings. While a court may penalize late filings in costs, it is rarely obligated to do so, especially if the late filing did not materially alter the substantive outcome or cause quantifiable wasted costs.
The Court dismissed this ground with prejudice, stating: The Claimant does not demonstrate that any alleged procedural default was of such a nature or degree as to compel a different costs outcome, or that my conclusion fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Nor does the Claimant identify any concrete prejudice in the conduct of the hearing that renders the costs decision unjust.
This strict approach to procedural complaints aligns with broader DIFC jurisprudence regarding appellate interference. As explored in ARB-027-2024: ARB 027/2024 Nalani v Netty, the DIFC Courts consistently penalize parties who attempt to weaponize minor procedural infractions to overturn substantive or costs-related outcomes. An appellate challenge must be anchored in a genuine error of law, not a lingering grievance over the first-instance judge's case management tolerances. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi made this boundary explicit: I reject the submission that this ground establishes a real prospect of success. The complaint is, in substance, a disagreement with how case-management and procedural matters were handled.
The remaining grounds suffered a similar fate. The Claimant’s assertion that reserved costs were not determined (Ground iv) and that the reasons were inadequate (Ground v) failed to gain any traction. The Claimant submits that costs said to have been reserved in earlier orders were not determined. However, the failure to explicitly itemize every reserved cost in a global assessment does not automatically render the assessment unjust or subject to appeal, provided the overall figure falls within the bounds of reasonable discretion.
Ultimately, the PTA application was a transparent attempt to relitigate the discretionary weighting of the December Order. The Claimant sought to substitute its own view of fairness—heavily weighted toward its initial, temporary success—for the objective assessment of the Court. By dismissing the application, the Court reinforced the finality of first-instance costs assessments and the high threshold required to disturb them.
The immediate consequence for the Claimant was not just the failure to escape the initial USD 37,897.70 liability, but the incurrence of further adverse costs. Having failed to establish a real prospect of success, the Claimant was ordered to bear the costs of the PTA application itself. The Court directed that the Respondent shall submit their statement of costs not exceeding 2 pages within 5 days of this Order. This final directive serves as a stark reminder of the compounding financial risks associated with pursuing unmeritorious appeals against discretionary costs orders in the DIFC Courts.
How Does the DIFC Approach to Costs Assessment Compare to Other Jurisdictions?
The assessment of recoverable legal costs remains one of the most heavily contested battlegrounds in international commercial litigation. Across major arbitral hubs, jurisdictions generally fall into two distinct camps. Onshore Middle Eastern courts, including the onshore Dubai courts operating under Federal Decree-Law No. 42 of 2022 on Civil Procedures, traditionally restrict recoverable costs to nominal, statutorily capped advocacy fees, leaving successful litigants to bear the vast majority of their actual legal spend. Conversely, the English High Court operates under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), which allows for the recovery of actual legal fees but frequently subjects them to a labyrinthine process of detailed assessment before a specialized Costs Judge—a procedure that often spawns expensive, protracted satellite litigation.
The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts chart a distinct, pragmatic middle course. While the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) Part 38 heavily mirrors English principles—specifically the distinction between the standard and indemnity bases of assessment—the DIFC judiciary consistently exercises a broad, summary discretion to bypass the granular line-item taxation that plagues London proceedings. In Ohtli v Onora [2026] DIFC ARB 034, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi provided a masterclass in this methodology, utilizing a robust proportionality test to swiftly quantify costs following the discharge of an interim anti-suit injunction.
The procedural posture in Ohtli v Onora required the Court to assess the Defendant’s costs after successfully setting aside an interim anti-suit injunction in December 2025. The Defendant submitted a Statement of Costs claiming a total sum of USD 47,372.12, encompassing the legal fees and disbursements generated by two fee earners preparing for and attending the return date hearing. Under a strict English detailed assessment, such a sum might trigger points of dispute, replies, and a dedicated hearing to scrutinize individual time entries. H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi, however, deployed the DIFC’s preferred mechanism of summary assessment to achieve immediate finality.
The Court first anchored its analysis in the objective predictability of the DIFC’s fee guidelines, noting that the hourly rates applied by the Defendant’s counsel were broadly consistent with the guidance set out in Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023. This reliance on the Registrar’s Direction is a critical feature of DIFC costs jurisprudence. It provides international practitioners with a reliable baseline for what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate in complex arbitration claims, preventing the unchecked fee inflation often observed in other offshore jurisdictions. Yet, establishing that the hourly rates are reasonable is only the first hurdle under the standard basis of assessment.
Under RDC 38.8, the Court must resolve any doubt as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred in favor of the paying party. Rather than dissecting the narrative of every time entry to find that doubt, the Court applied a holistic reduction:
However, applying the standard basis of assessment under RDC 38.8 and RDC 38.23, and exercising my discretion to allow only such costs as are reasonable and proportionate, I consider that a moderate reduction is appropriate.
This "moderate reduction" materialized as a flat 20% discount on the claimed amount. The resulting figure bypassed the mathematical exactitude of a spreadsheet in favor of commercial equity:
I therefore award the Defendant 80% of the costs claimed, namely USD 37,897.70, as a fair, reasonable, and proportionate quantification of the Defendant’s recoverable costs.
The 80% heuristic is a well-established feature of DIFC standard basis assessments. It serves as a judicial acknowledgment that while a successful party is entitled to be made whole, the inherent inefficiencies of litigation—duplication of effort, internal conferencing, and over-lawyering—should not be passed onto the losing party. By applying this broad-brush reduction, the DIFC Courts maintain the compensatory nature of the costs-follow-the-event rule without allowing it to mutate into a punitive tool.
The Claimant’s subsequent attempt to appeal this assessment further illuminates the DIFC’s rigorous defense of judicial discretion in costs matters. In its Permission to Appeal (PTA) Application, the Claimant sought to unravel the Costs Order by attacking the Court’s identification of the "event." Because the Claimant had initially succeeded in obtaining the ex parte anti-suit injunction before it was ultimately discharged, the Claimant argued that the Court wrongly identified the “event” as the Defendant’s success on the set-aside application. The Claimant essentially demanded that its earlier, temporary victory should offset the costs of its ultimate defeat on the return date.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi firmly rejected this premise, characterizing the Claimant’s argument as an invitation to re-balance the discretionary factors and substitute a different view of the litigation's outcome. The DIFC approach isolates discrete procedural phases. The "event" in question was the Defendant's Set-Aside Application; the Defendant won that application, and therefore the Defendant was entitled to the costs of that specific battle. Conflating the ex parte phase with the inter partes return date would undermine the fundamental risk allocation of interim injunctive relief. If a party obtains an injunction without notice, they bear the costs risk if that injunction is later deemed unjustified upon full adversarial briefing.
The Claimant also attempted to challenge the Costs Order on the grounds of procedural unfairness, arguing that the Court failed to address alleged procedural default and prejudice regarding the late filing of the Defendant's supporting materials. In many jurisdictions, allegations of procedural default can trigger a microscopic review of the litigation timeline to determine if costs should be docked. The DIFC Courts, however, require a high threshold of actual prejudice before interfering with a discretionary costs order. Dismissing this ground, the Court held:
The Claimant does not demonstrate that any alleged procedural default was of such a nature or degree as to compel a different costs outcome, or that my conclusion fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Nor does the Claimant identify any concrete prejudice in the conduct of the hearing that renders the costs decision unjust.
This ruling aligns seamlessly with the broader DIFC jurisprudence regarding the finality of costs and case management decisions, echoing the strict appellate boundaries seen in cases like ARB 027/2024 Nalani v Netty. An appellate tribunal in the DIFC will not interfere with a first-instance judge's costs assessment unless there is a demonstrable error of principle or a conclusion that falls entirely outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. Disagreement over the handling of late filings or the precise percentage of a standard basis reduction does not meet the RDC 44.19 threshold for a real prospect of success on appeal.
Furthermore, the Court’s handling of the interest on the costs award illustrates a nuanced balancing of party rights. Under Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017, judgment debts in the DIFC accrue interest at a formidable rate of 9% per annum. When the Claimant filed its PTA Application, it concurrently sought a stay of the payment obligation. While H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dismissed the PTA Application entirely, he granted a partial stay on the accrual of the 9% interest from the date the appeal notice was filed until the date of the final PTA order. This pragmatic compromise ensured that the Claimant was not financially penalized via statutory interest merely for exercising its procedural right to seek permission to appeal, while simultaneously confirming the Defendant's absolute entitlement to the underlying USD 37,897.70 principal.
Ultimately, the costs assessment in Ohtli v Onora encapsulates why the DIFC remains a highly attractive forum for complex arbitration-related litigation. By combining the compensatory framework of the English standard basis with the swift, discretionary summary assessments favored by commercial judges, the DIFC avoids the twin pitfalls of onshore under-compensation and offshore over-litigation. The reliance on Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023 provides necessary predictability, while the robust application of the 80% proportionality rule ensures that the costs tail never wags the litigation dog. For practitioners, the message is unequivocal: while the DIFC Courts will enforce the costs-follow-the-event principle to protect successful parties, attempts to relitigate the minutiae of fee statements or appeal discretionary reductions will be met with swift, definitive dismissal.
Which DIFC Precedents Frame This Decision?
The trajectory of Ohtli v Onora [2026] DIFC ARB 034 establishes a definitive boundary regarding the temporal and equitable limits of the DIFC Courts’ supportive jurisdiction in arbitration matters. While the Dubai International Financial Centre has long championed its role as a robust conduit for arbitral enforcement and protection, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi’s rulings in December 2025 and February 2026 articulate a clear doctrine of restraint. Once an offending parallel litigation has been abandoned and the agreed arbitral mechanism is actively engaged, the Court’s coercive jurisdiction recedes. The refusal to maintain an anti-suit injunction (ASI) under such circumstances, coupled with the severe costs consequences imposed on the party attempting to prolong the injunction, signals a maturation in the Court’s approach to equitable relief and procedural proportionality.
The substantive dispute originated when Ohtli (the Claimant) sought ASI relief under Part 25 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) to restrain Onora (the Defendant) from
What Does This Mean for Practitioners Seeking Interim Relief?
The strategic calculus for seeking interim relief in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts requires a rigorous assessment of the endgame. Securing an ex parte or interim anti-suit injunction (ASI) is often viewed as a decisive tactical victory, yet the procedural tail of such applications can quickly become a financial liability if the underlying dispute dynamics shift. Counsel must ensure that interim relief applications remain strictly necessary at every stage of the proceedings, and crucially, that any subsequent costs statements are prepared with the expectation of a moderate reduction. The protracted costs battle in Ohtli v Onora [2026] DIFC ARB 034 serves as a stark warning against procedural overreach and the dangers of litigating costs long after the substantive need for relief has evaporated.
A persistent trap for practitioners is the assumption that securing an initial interim order provides a protective shield against adverse costs if that order is later discharged. In Ohtli, the Claimant successfully obtained interim anti-suit relief, but the injunction was subsequently set aside after the underlying onshore proceedings were withdrawn. Rather than accepting the costs consequences of the discharge, the Claimant launched a PTA Application made by the Claimant pursuant to RDC 44.6, seeking permission to appeal solely on the issue of costs. The Claimant’s primary argument rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the DIFC Courts identify the successful party in interim applications.
The Claimant submits that the Court wrongly identified the “event” as the Defendant’s success on the Set-Aside Application, contending that the Claimant’s earlier interim success should have driven the costs outcome.
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi firmly rejected this premise. The Court will scrutinize the specific "event" of the application before it with granular precision. Do not assume that partial success in the past guarantees a favorable costs outcome in the present. The relevant event was the Defendant’s success in setting aside the injunction, not the Claimant’s historical victory in obtaining it ex parte. By attempting to leverage the initial interim order to avoid paying the costs of the set-aside application, the Claimant presented an invitation to re-balance the discretionary factors that the Court had already weighed. The DIFC Courts consistently refuse to rewrite the history of an application merely because the losing party feels their earlier conduct was justified.
Counsel must avoid pursuing 'protective' applications or appeals when the underlying offending conduct has already ceased. Once the onshore proceedings were withdrawn, the substantive battle over the ASI was effectively moot. By launching a PTA application limited solely to costs, the Claimant engaged in a procedural exercise that offered minimal strategic value but carried significant financial risk. The Claimant expressly states that it does not, at this stage, seek to re-open the substantive decision to discharge the interim relief, yet still sought to overturn the discretionary costs order attached to that discharge. To achieve this, the Claimant deployed a scattergun approach to the appeal grounds:
The Claimant advances five grounds, in substance contending that: (i) the Court failed to address alleged procedural default and prejudice; (ii) the “event” was wrongly identified; (iii) insufficient account was taken of the interim order and alleged breach of the arbitration agreement; (iv) reserved costs were not determined; and (v) reasons were inadequate and the outcome procedurally unfair.
This exhaustive list of grievances highlights the difficulty of appealing a discretionary costs order. The threshold for such an appeal is notoriously high, requiring the applicant to demonstrate a clear error of principle or a decision that falls outside the generous ambit of reasonable outcomes. Justice Al Sawalehi categorized the Claimant's arguments as a mere disagreement with how case-management and procedural matters were handled. When practitioners attempt to elevate routine case management frustrations into grounds for appeal, they inevitably invite further adverse costs orders.
The broader doctrinal landscape of the DIFC Courts reinforces this strict approach to interim relief. As analyzed in ARB-010-2024: ARB 010/2024 Neven v Nole, parties utilizing the Court's supervisory jurisdiction to police arbitration agreements face a high threshold. When relief is granted, it is often heavily conditioned; when it is discharged, the costs consequences are swift and severe. The supervisory jurisdiction is not a sandbox for consequence-free tactical maneuvering. If an ASI is no longer strictly necessary, maintaining the procedural fight over the remnants of the application is a fast track to compounding financial liabilities.
This compounding effect was evident in the Claimant's parallel attempt to delay payment. Alongside the PTA Application, the Claimant filed an application seeking a stay of the payment obligation under the Costs Order until the appeal was determined. While the Court granted a brief suspension of interest, it dismissed the PTA Application entirely, leaving the Claimant liable not only for the original USD 37,897.70 costs order but also for the costs of the failed appeal.
Even for the successful party, the final assessment phase requires strategic restraint. Success on an application does not guarantee a complete recovery of professional fees on the standard basis. The Defendant in Ohtli successfully defended the PTA Application and submitted a Statement of Costs claiming a total sum of USD 17,600, comprising professional fees incurred in responding to the appeal and the related stay application. However, practitioners must prepare costs statements with the expectation of a moderate reduction, as the Court will aggressively trim any perceived excess to ensure compliance with the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC).
While the Defendant was the successful party in the PTA Application, I consider it appropriate, in the exercise of my discretion, to allow recovery of 80% of the total costs claimed, reflecting the nature of the application and the need to ensure proportionality in the costs awarded.
The 20% haircut applied by Justice Al Sawalehi was not a penalty for misconduct, but a strict application of the proportionality principle. In assessing the costs, the Court had specific regard to RDC 38.7, 38.8 and 38.23. Under the standard basis of assessment, the Court will resolve any doubts as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred in favor of the paying party. A PTA application limited to costs is, by its nature, a narrow procedural dispute. It does not require expansive legal drafting or partner-heavy billing. The final award of USD 14,080 serves as a clear benchmark for what the Court views as proportionate for defending a discrete, costs-only appeal.
For cross-border partners and DIFC litigators, the takeaways are unambiguous. First, do not litigate costs for the sake of costs. If an interim injunction is discharged because the offending conduct has ceased, accept the costs consequences of the discharge rather than compounding them with a doomed PTA application. Second, understand the "event" fallacy. The Court will isolate the specific application before it; past victories in obtaining ex parte relief do not immunize a party from paying the costs of a subsequent set-aside application if the relief is no longer justified. Finally, when drafting costs submissions, pad them at your peril. The DIFC Courts are increasingly willing to apply a standard 20% to 30% reduction to ensure proportionality, even when the receiving party's conduct is beyond reproach. Counsel must align their billing practices with the Court's rigorous expectations, ensuring that every line item can withstand the scrutiny of RDC Part 38.
What Issues Remain Unresolved in the Ohtli v Onora Saga?
The final assessment of costs in Ohtli v Onora [2026] DIFC ARB 034 brings a nominal close to the immediate dispute, but the underlying jurisprudence leaves several critical questions unanswered for practitioners navigating the DIFC Courts. Chief among these unresolved issues is the precise extent to which a party’s "procedural default" can influence a discretionary costs order when there is no definitive, adjudicated breach of the underlying arbitration agreement. The Claimant’s attempt to appeal the December 2025 costs order hinged heavily on the Defendant’s alleged procedural missteps during the set-aside application. However, H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi’s dismissal of the Permission to Appeal (PTA) application reveals a judicial reluctance to let procedural grievances override the substantive outcome of a hearing, establishing a high and inherently subjective threshold for proving procedural unfairness.
The Claimant advanced five grounds, in substance contending that the Court failed to address procedural default and prejudice, wrongly identified the successful "event," and ignored the initial interim order. The core of the Claimant's grievance was that the Defendant had filed and served materials late during the set-aside application, conduct that the Claimant argued should have materially altered the allocation of costs. The Court’s response, however, firmly rejected the notion that administrative tardiness automatically translates to a costs penalty.
The Claimant does not demonstrate that any alleged procedural default was of such a nature or degree as to compel a different costs outcome, or that my conclusion fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Nor does the Claimant identify any concrete prejudice in the conduct of the hearing that renders the costs decision unjust.
This ruling confirms that mere procedural friction will not suffice to alter a standard-basis costs award unless it manifests as "concrete prejudice." For commercial litigators, this creates an ambiguous standard. What constitutes concrete prejudice in the context of an interim hearing? The judgment implies that tactical complaints about late filings must be tethered to demonstrable harm—such as an inability to instruct counsel, a forced adjournment, or the exclusion of vital evidence—rather than deployed as a generalized equitable shield against adverse costs. The Court categorized the Claimant’s grievances as a mere disagreement with how case-management and procedural matters were handled. This approach reinforces the broad discretion afforded to DIFC judges under RDC 44.19, effectively insulating case management decisions from appellate scrutiny unless they fall entirely outside the bounds of reason. Yet, it leaves open the question of how egregious a procedural default must be before the Court will penalize a successful party in costs.
A related unresolved issue is the precise identification of the "event" in complex, multi-stage interim applications, highlighting an ongoing tension between party autonomy and the Court’s case management discretion. The Claimant argued that because it initially secured the interim anti-suit injunction to protect its arbitration rights, that early success should have driven the costs outcome, even after the injunction was later discharged. The Court rejected this framework, viewing the Claimant’s argument as an invitation to re-balance the discretionary factors and substitute a different view of what the event should be.
When the underlying onshore proceedings were withdrawn, the anti-suit injunction lost its utility, making the Defendant the successful party on the specific application to set it aside. The refusal to apportion costs based on the initial, temporary success suggests that DIFC Courts will look strictly to the final disposition of the specific application at hand, rather than the historical merits of the ex parte phase. This creates a strategic dilemma for parties seeking urgent interim relief: a party may rightfully obtain an injunction to protect its autonomy and enforce an arbitration agreement, but if the opposing party cures the breach (e.g., by withdrawing competing proceedings) and successfully applies to discharge the injunction, the original applicant may still bear the costs of the discharge hearing. The jurisprudence has yet to fully reconcile how to protect a party's right to seek necessary interim relief without exposing them to punitive costs if the relief becomes moot through the opponent's subsequent actions.
Another doctrinal wrinkle introduced by the 27 February 2026 order is the interaction between interest suspension and the finality of costs awards. The Claimant filed a Stayed Costs Application, seeking to halt the payment obligation of the USD 37,897.70 costs order pending the outcome of the PTA. While the Court dismissed the PTA entirely on its merits, it surprisingly granted a partial stay, ordering that interest on the costs awarded by the December Order be suspended from 12 January 2026 until the date of the 27 February order.
This creates a highly nuanced precedent: a party may fail entirely to establish a real prospect of success on appeal, yet still secure a financial reprieve on statutory interest during the deliberative period. Future litigants will likely seize on this mechanism to argue that any arguable PTA application should automatically toll the accrual of interest under Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017. This proposition requires urgent clarification in future cases to prevent routine, tactical appeals designed solely to delay payment and freeze interest accrual. If a PTA is deemed wholly without merit, it is conceptually difficult to justify why the successful party should be deprived of interest for the period they were kept out of their money.
The saga concluded with the 24 March 2026 order, where the Court assessed the costs of the failed PTA application itself. The Defendant claimed USD 17,600, comprising professional fees incurred in responding to the PTA and the related stay application. Here, H.E. Justice Al Sawalehi exercised his discretion to apply a significant haircut, reducing the recovery to 80%.
While the Defendant was the successful party in the PTA Application, I consider it appropriate, in the exercise of my discretion, to allow recovery of 80% of the total costs claimed, reflecting the nature of the application and the need to ensure proportionality in the costs awarded.
The reduction to USD 14,080 underscores the Court’s rigorous application of RDC 38.23, which mandates that costs assessed on the standard basis be both reasonable and proportionate. Even when a party is entirely successful in defeating an appeal, the Court will not rubber-stamp the resulting legal fees. The subsequent assessment and quantification of costs in DIFC arbitration matters frequently involves this type of discretionary trimming, serving as a vital check on aggressive billing practices.
This approach aligns with broader DIFC jurisprudence aimed at curbing excessive litigation costs, as seen in cases like ARB-009-2023: ARB 009/2023 Mirifa v (1) Mahur (2) Meison (3) Mepur, where the Court similarly penalized procedural duplication and insisted on strict proportionality in fee recovery. The 20% reduction in Ohtli v Onora serves as a clear warning that the "nature of the application"—in this case, a relatively straightforward opposition to a PTA—dictates the absolute ceiling for recoverable fees, regardless of the actual hours billed by counsel. The Court explicitly reinforced the strict timeline and financial consequences for non-compliance in its final order:
In the event that the Claimant fails to pay the Costs Award within 14 days of the date of this Order, interest shall accrue at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of this Order until payment in full, in accordance with Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017.
Ultimately, the Ohtli v Onora dispute leaves practitioners with a complex matrix for predicting costs outcomes in aborted anti-suit injunctions. The Court’s refusal to let alleged procedural defaults override the substantive success of the set-aside application establishes a clear hierarchy of factors in discretionary costs assessments. However, the willingness to suspend interest during the PTA phase, combined with the aggressive application of proportionality to the final bill, ensures that neither party walks away with a total victory. The tension between a party’s right to seek interim protection and the Court’s mandate to manage cases efficiently remains a fertile ground for future disputes, particularly where the underlying arbitration agreement’s breach is alleged but never definitively adjudicated on the merits. Until the Court of Appeal provides definitive guidance on the exact threshold for "concrete prejudice" and the mechanics of interest suspension during meritless appeals, parties must navigate these interim applications with the understanding that procedural missteps by an opponent will rarely provide a safe harbor from adverse costs.