Vietnam National Industry – Energy Group v Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) [2025] SGHC 180

Case Details

• Citation: [2025] SGHC 180
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 8 September 2025
• Coram: Chua Lee Ming J
• Case Number: Originating Application No 520 of 2025
• Hearing Date(s): 25 August 2025
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: Vietnam National Industry – Energy Group (PVN)
• Respondent / Defendant: Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) (PM)
• Counsel for Claimants: Dr Colin Ong Yee Cheng KC, Koh Choon Guan Daniel, Wong Hui Yi Genevieve (Eldan Law LLP)
• Counsel for Respondent: Kronenburg Edmund Jerome, Sim Wei Min Stephanie, Chan Yu Jie (Braddell Brothers LLP)
• Practice Areas: Arbitration; Enforcement; Singapore award; Anti-enforcement injunction

Summary

In Vietnam National Industry – Energy Group v Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) [2025] SGHC 180, the High Court of Singapore addressed a novel and significant application for a worldwide anti-enforcement injunction. The claimant, Vietnam National Industry – Energy Group ("PVN"), sought to restrain the defendant, Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) ("PM"), from enforcing an arbitral award in any jurisdiction globally while supervisory proceedings remained pending in the Singapore courts. This application arose following a complex procedural history where the Singapore court had previously found a breach of the fair hearing rule in the original award but elected to remit the matter to the tribunal rather than setting the award aside.

The core of the dispute lay in the tension between the supervisory jurisdiction of the seat court (Singapore) and the independent discretion of enforcement courts in foreign jurisdictions under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"). PVN argued that because the parties had chosen Singapore as the seat of arbitration, they had contractually agreed to be bound by the Singapore court's decisions regarding the validity and status of the award. PVN contended that since the Singapore court had suspended the enforcement of the award within Singapore, this suspension should have a reflexive, worldwide effect, enforceable by an injunction against the award creditor.

The High Court, presided over by Chua Lee Ming J, dismissed the application in its entirety. The court's decision provides a robust affirmation of the principle that the "suspension" of an award at the seat does not automatically create a contractual or legal right to prevent a party from seeking enforcement elsewhere. The judgment clarifies that Article 36(1)(a)(v) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration ("Model Law"), which deals with the grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement, does not have the force of law in Singapore and, even if it did, it does not confer a right to an anti-enforcement injunction. The court emphasized that enforcement courts under the New York Convention retain the ultimate discretion to decide whether to recognize an award, even if it has been set aside or suspended by the seat court.

This decision is a critical contribution to the doctrinal landscape of international arbitration. It reinforces the "pro-enforcement" bias of the Singapore legal system and respects the sovereignty of foreign enforcement courts. For practitioners, the case serves as a stark reminder that obtaining a stay or suspension of an award at the seat does not provide a "global shield" against enforcement actions. The judgment also underscores the high threshold required for "ends of justice" arguments when seeking to interfere with a party's right to approach foreign courts for the recognition of an arbitral debt.

Timeline of Events

1. 2 February 2024: PM filed an application with the Moscow City Arbitrazh Court (the “Moscow Court”) for the recognition and enforcement of the Final Award issued in SIAC Arbitration No 274 of 2019.
2. 13 February 2024: The Singapore High Court granted PM leave to enforce the Final Award against PVN within Singapore.
3. 10 April 2024: PVN filed HC/SUM 988/2024 to set aside the Singapore court's order granting leave to enforce.
4. 15 April 2024: PVN filed HC/OA 346/2024 to set aside the Final Award itself.
5. 23 July 2024: Chua Lee Ming J delivered a decision finding that the Tribunal’s reasoning in Para 548 of the Final Award breached the fair hearing rule. However, the court declined to set aside Para 548 and instead exercised its discretion under Art 34(4) of the Model Law to suspend the setting-aside proceedings and remit the issue to the Tribunal.
6. 14 August 2024: The Singapore court ordered that PM may not take any steps to enforce the Final Award in Singapore pending the determination of the setting-aside applications.
7. 20 September 2024: The Moscow Court refused PVN’s application to postpone the Russian enforcement proceedings.
8. 21 October 2024: The Moscow Court issued an order recognizing and enforcing the Final Award in Russia.
9. 12 March 2025: The Tribunal issued the "Remission Award" after hearing the parties on the remitted issue, maintaining its original position on Para 548.
10. 28 April 2025: PVN filed HC/OA 444/2025 to set aside the Remission Award.
11. 15 May 2025: PVN filed the present application (HC/OA 520/2025) seeking a worldwide anti-enforcement injunction.
12. 25 August 2025: Substantive hearing of OA 520/2025 before Chua Lee Ming J.
13. 8 September 2025: The High Court delivered its judgment dismissing PVN's application.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The dispute originated from SIAC Arbitration No 274 of 2019, which resulted in a Final Award in favor of the defendant, Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) ("PM"), against the claimant, Vietnam National Industry – Energy Group ("PVN"). Following the issuance of the Final Award, PM sought to monetize its success by initiating enforcement proceedings in multiple jurisdictions, most notably in Russia and Singapore. In Russia, PM applied to the Moscow City Arbitrazh Court on 2 February 2024. In Singapore, PM obtained leave to enforce the award on 13 February 2024.

PVN challenged the Final Award in Singapore, the seat of the arbitration. PVN's primary contention was that a specific portion of the award—Paragraph 548—was reached in breach of the fair hearing rule. On 23 July 2024, the Singapore High Court, in a judgment later cited as [2024] SGHC 244, agreed with PVN that the Tribunal’s chain of reasoning in Para 548 constituted a procedural breach. However, rather than taking the drastic step of setting aside the award, the court utilized the curative mechanism provided by Article 34(4) of the Model Law. The court suspended the setting-aside proceedings (OA 346/2024) and remitted the specific issue to the Tribunal to allow it an opportunity to eliminate the grounds for setting aside.

Crucially, on 14 August 2024, the Singapore court ordered that PM "may not take any steps to enforce the Final Award" pending the final determination of the setting-aside applications. This order was understood by the court to apply to enforcement actions within the Singapore jurisdiction. However, PM continued its efforts in Russia. PVN attempted to use the Singapore court's findings to stay the Russian proceedings, but the Moscow Court was unmoved. On 20 September 2024, the Moscow Court refused to postpone the case, and on 21 October 2024, it recognized and enforced the Final Award. PVN’s subsequent appeals in the Russian court system were unsuccessful.

Back in the arbitral forum, the Tribunal reconsidered the remitted issue but ultimately issued a "Remission Award" on 12 March 2025 that did not alter the original findings in Para 548. PVN then launched a fresh challenge in Singapore (OA 444/2025) to set aside the Remission Award. Facing the reality of the Russian enforcement and the potential for PM to seek enforcement in other jurisdictions, PVN filed OA 520/2025. PVN sought an injunction to restrain PM from "enforcing or taking any steps to enforce" both the Final Award and the Remission Award (collectively, the "Awards") in any jurisdiction worldwide until the Singapore court proceedings (including any appeals to the Court of Appeal) were fully concluded.

PVN’s application was built on four pillars: (a) a purported contractual right under Article 36(1)(a)(v) of the Model Law; (b) an argument that foreign enforcement ousted the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts as the seat; (c) an allegation that PM was in breach of the Singapore court's 23 July 2024 order; and (d) a general appeal to the "ends of justice." PM resisted the application, arguing that there was no legal basis for such a sweeping injunction and that it would improperly interfere with the rights of foreign courts to apply their own laws and the New York Convention.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issue was whether the Singapore High Court had the power, and if so, whether it should exercise that power, to grant a worldwide anti-enforcement injunction against an award creditor when the award was subject to ongoing supervisory proceedings at the seat.

This broad issue was broken down into several specific sub-issues:

• The Article 36(1)(a)(v) Argument: Does Article 36(1)(a)(v) of the Model Law, which allows an enforcement court to refuse enforcement if an award has been suspended by a competent authority of the seat, create a contractual right for the award debtor to prevent the creditor from seeking enforcement worldwide? This involved an analysis of whether Chapter VIII of the Model Law has the force of law in Singapore under Section 3(1) of the International Arbitration Act (IAA).
• The Ouster of Jurisdiction Argument: Does the act of enforcing an award in a foreign jurisdiction while seat proceedings are pending constitute an impermissible ouster of the seat court's supervisory jurisdiction? PVN argued there was an implied term in the arbitration agreement to this effect.
• The Breach of Court Order Argument: Did PM’s continued enforcement actions in Russia or potential actions elsewhere violate the Singapore court's order of 23 July 2024 (and the subsequent order of 14 August 2024) which stayed enforcement "pending the determination" of the setting-aside applications?
• The Ends of Justice Argument: Even in the absence of a specific contractual or statutory right, did the "ends of justice" require the court to restrain PM from enforcing the Awards globally to protect the integrity of the Singapore court's eventual decision on the validity of the Awards?

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court’s analysis was a systematic rejection of each of PVN's arguments, grounded in a strict interpretation of the International Arbitration Act and the principles of international comity.

1. The Article 36(1)(a)(v) Argument

PVN’s primary argument was that by choosing Singapore as the seat, the parties had incorporated Singapore law as the curial law. PVN contended that under Art 36(1)(a)(v) of the Model Law, it had a contractual right to rely on the fact that the Final Award was "suspended" by the Singapore court. PVN argued this meant PM was contractually prohibited from enforcing the award anywhere else.

The court rejected this on two levels. First, as a matter of statutory law, Chua Lee Ming J noted that Chapter VIII of the Model Law (which includes Art 36) has not been given the force of law in Singapore. Section 3(1) of the IAA explicitly excludes Chapter VIII. The court observed at [24]:

"Chapter VIII of the Model Law (which includes Art 36) has not been given the force of law in Singapore: see s 3(1) of the IAA."

Second, even if Art 36(1)(a)(v) were applicable, the court held it does not create a right to an injunction. Art 36(1)(a)(v) is a shield for the award debtor to use in an enforcement court to ask that court to refuse recognition. It does not provide a sword to the award debtor to restrain the creditor from approaching that enforcement court in the first place. The court emphasized that the New York Convention and the IAA (specifically Section 31(2)(f)) use the word "may," indicating that the enforcement court has the discretion to enforce an award even if it has been set aside or suspended at the seat.

2. The Ouster of Jurisdiction Argument

PVN argued that PM’s enforcement in Russia ousted the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. The court found this argument "plainly wrong" (at [31]). The Singapore court's jurisdiction is to determine the validity of the award under Singapore law as the seat. A foreign court's decision to recognize that award under its own domestic laws or the New York Convention does not prevent the Singapore court from performing its supervisory role. If the Singapore court eventually sets aside the award, that judgment can be presented to the foreign court, which will then decide what effect to give it. The court noted that the "ouster" argument misunderstood the "double exequatur" system which the New York Convention sought to abolish.

3. The Breach of the Order of 23 July 2024

PVN contended that PM breached the court's order by continuing enforcement in Russia. The court clarified that its orders staying enforcement were intended to apply only to enforcement within Singapore. The court held that it did not have the power (or at least did not intend) to issue an order with extraterritorial effect on foreign court proceedings unless specifically asked to do so via an injunction application, which PVN had not done at that time. Therefore, PM’s actions in Russia were not a breach of any Singapore court order.

4. The Ends of Justice Argument

Finally, PVN argued that the "ends of justice" required an injunction to prevent PM from "mooting" the Singapore proceedings by recovering the money in Russia or elsewhere before the Singapore court could rule on the setting-aside application. The court was entirely unpersuaded. Chua Lee Ming J relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG [2024] 1 SLR 56. The court noted that the New York Convention specifically contemplates that an enforcement court may proceed even if an application to set aside is pending at the seat (Art VI of the Convention). At [38], the court quoted Deutsche Telekom:

"On a plain reading, Art V(1)(e) of the New York Convention is worded permissively with the use of the word “may”. It permits, but does not require, an enforcement court to abide by a seat court’s decision to set aside an arbitral award, when deciding whether to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award …"

The court concluded that it would be improper to grant an injunction that effectively dictates to a foreign court how it should exercise its discretion under the New York Convention. The "ends of justice" do not require a seat court to interfere with the enforcement process in other jurisdictions, as the New York Convention provides its own balance of interests (e.g., the power of an enforcement court to stay its own proceedings or require security under Art VI).

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court dismissed PVN's application for a worldwide anti-enforcement injunction in its entirety. The court found no contractual, statutory, or equitable basis to restrain PM from seeking to enforce the Awards in foreign jurisdictions. The operative conclusion of the court was stated succinctly at [2]:

"I dismissed the application for the reasons set out below."

Regarding costs, the court ordered PVN to pay PM's costs fixed at $25,000 (inclusive of disbursements). PM had sought indemnity costs, arguing that PVN’s application was "hopeless" and "unprecedented." While the court agreed the application was devoid of legal basis, it applied the standard set in [2021] SGCA 36, which requires more than just a "hopeless" case to warrant indemnity costs. The court noted at [43]:

"I agreed with PM that PVN’s application was unprecedented and devoid of legal basis (see Tecnomar & Associates Pte Ltd v SBM Offshore NV [2021] SGCA 36 at [29]). On balance, I decided that indemnity costs were not warranted."

The result of the judgment is that PM remains free to pursue enforcement of the Awards in any jurisdiction outside of Singapore, subject only to the domestic laws of those jurisdictions and their interpretation of the New York Convention. The suspension of enforcement in Singapore remains in place only for the Singapore jurisdiction, pending the final resolution of the setting-aside applications regarding the Final Award and the Remission Award.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This judgment is a landmark clarification on the limits of a seat court's power to control the international life of an arbitral award. It addresses a recurring strategic question in international arbitration: can a party that has successfully "stayed" an award at the seat stop the other party from collecting money elsewhere? The Singapore High Court's answer is a firm "no," absent very exceptional circumstances.

First, the case clarifies the status of the Model Law in Singapore. By confirming that Chapter VIII (Articles 35 and 36) does not have the force of law, the court reminds practitioners that the enforcement of awards in Singapore is governed by the IAA, not the Model Law. This distinction is crucial because while the Model Law provides a framework, the IAA is the definitive statutory instrument in Singapore.

Second, the judgment reinforces the "permissive" nature of the New York Convention. It aligns Singapore with the international consensus that an enforcement court is not a mere rubber stamp for the seat court. The use of the word "may" in Article V(1)(e) of the Convention (and Section 31(2)(f) of the IAA) is a deliberate grant of discretion. By refusing the injunction, the Singapore court respected the sovereign right of foreign courts (like the Moscow Court) to decide for themselves whether to recognize an award that the seat court has found to be procedurally flawed.

Third, the decision protects the efficiency of international arbitration. If anti-enforcement injunctions were easily obtained, every setting-aside application at the seat would automatically become a global freeze on the award. This would encourage dilatory tactics by losing parties. The court’s insistence on a high threshold—and its rejection of the "implied term" and "ouster" arguments—ensures that the winning party’s right to seek enforcement is not unduly hampered by the mere existence of a challenge at the seat.

Finally, for the Singapore legal landscape, this case demonstrates the court's commitment to judicial restraint. Even when the court itself has found a breach of the fair hearing rule (as Chua Lee Ming J did regarding Para 548), it recognizes that its role is supervisory, not dictatorial. The court will correct the award within its jurisdiction but will not reach out to restrain the parties' conduct in the global arena unless there is a clear contractual or legal right to do so.

Practice Pointers

• Do Not Rely on Seat Suspension for Global Protection: Practitioners must advise clients that obtaining a stay of enforcement or a suspension of an award in Singapore (the seat) does not automatically prevent the creditor from enforcing the award in other New York Convention jurisdictions.
• Understand the Limits of the Model Law: Be aware that Chapter VIII of the Model Law (Articles 35 and 36) does not have the force of law in Singapore. Arguments regarding recognition and enforcement must be grounded in the International Arbitration Act.
• Parallel Enforcement Strategy: Award creditors should consider initiating enforcement in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously if there is a risk of the award debtor seeking a stay at the seat. As this case shows, a foreign court may proceed even if the seat court has found a procedural defect.
• Drafting Injunction Applications: If a party intends to seek a worldwide restraint, they must apply for a specific injunction with extraterritorial effect. General "stays of enforcement" issued by the seat court are typically interpreted as having only local effect.
• Cost Risks of Novel Applications: While the court did not award indemnity costs in this instance, it characterized the application as "devoid of legal basis." Practitioners should be cautious when bringing "unprecedented" applications that contradict the discretionary framework of the New York Convention.
• Article VI of the New York Convention: When facing enforcement in a foreign court while a seat challenge is pending, the correct procedural route is usually to ask the enforcement court for a stay under Article VI of the Convention, rather than asking the seat court for an anti-enforcement injunction.

Subsequent Treatment

As a recent 2025 decision, the ratio of this case—that there is no contractual or legal basis under Singapore law for a worldwide anti-enforcement injunction based on the suspension of an award at the seat—stands as current authority. It follows the trajectory of The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG [2024] 1 SLR 56 in emphasizing the permissive nature of enforcement discretion under the New York Convention.

Legislation Referenced

• International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed), s 3(1), s 31(2)(f)
• UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Art 34(4), Art 36(1)(a)(v)
• Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)

Cases Cited

• Applied:
  • The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG [2024] 1 SLR 56
• Referred to:
  • Tecnomar & Associates Pte Ltd v SBM Offshore NV [2021] SGCA 36
  • Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) v Vietnam Oil and Gas Group [2024] SGHC 244

Source Documents

• Original Judgment (PDF)
• eLitigation Case Summary