Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 186
- Title: Winston Lee Siew Boon v Public Prosecutor
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 20 July 2015
- Judge: Chan Seng Onn J
- Coram: Chan Seng Onn J
- Case Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 111 of 2014
- Parties: Winston Lee Siew Boon (Appellant) v Public Prosecutor (Respondent)
- Procedural Posture: Appeal against conviction and sentence following a trial in the Subordinate Courts
- Offences Charged: Two counts of using criminal force on the complainant with intention to outrage the modesty of the complainant under s 354(1) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)
- Key Allegations: Inserting his hand into the complainant’s left brassiere cup and touching her left breast and nipple on two occasions: (i) 8 June 2011 (“8 June Incident”); (ii) 30 October 2011 (“30 October Incident”)
- Location of Incidents: Thong Hoe Clinic, Block 151 Bukit Batok Street 11, #01-252
- Sentence Imposed Below: Global term of ten months’ imprisonment
- Age of Appellant at Offences: 67 years old
- Appellant’s Occupation: General practitioner (GP) running his own clinic since 1973
- Complainant’s Age at 30 October Incident: 34 years old
- Complainant’s Occupation (2011): Clinical Specialist Associate with [G] Pte Ltd selling surgical devices to clinics and hospitals
- Number of Consultations (2011): Four consultations: 8 June, 27 June, 10 July, 30 October
- Counsel for Appellant: Davinder Singh SC, Pardeep Singh Khosa, Tham Yeying Melissa and Tony Tan Soon Yong (Drew & Napier LLC)
- Counsel for Respondent: Tai Wei Shyong, Sarah Ong Hui’en and Parvathi Menon (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
- Legal Areas: Criminal Law — Offences; Criminal Procedure — Sentence
- Statutes Referenced: Evidence Act
- Related Appellate Note: The appeal to this decision in Criminal Motion No 21 of 2015 was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 November 2015 (see [2015] SGCA 67)
- Judgment Length: 61 pages, 38,004 words
Summary
In Winston Lee Siew Boon v Public Prosecutor [2015] SGHC 186, the High Court (Chan Seng Onn J) dismissed a doctor’s appeal against both conviction and sentence for two counts of using criminal force with the intention to outrage the modesty of the complainant under s 354(1) of the Penal Code. The complainant alleged that the appellant, a general practitioner, inserted his hand into her left brassiere cup and touched her left breast and nipple during two separate consultations at his clinic: once on 8 June 2011 and again on 30 October 2011.
The case turned heavily on credibility and the court’s assessment of the competing accounts. The complainant’s narrative described the touching as occurring while she was being examined and while the appellant used “chest pain” as a prompt or excuse. The appellant did not deny that he examined the complainant, but his account differed materially from hers. The High Court upheld the trial judge’s findings that the elements of s 354(1) were made out, and it also found no basis to interfere with the sentence of a global ten months’ imprisonment.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellant, Dr Winston Lee Siew Boon, was a 67-year-old general practitioner who had operated his own clinic since 1973. The complainant was a 34-year-old woman who, in 2011, worked as a Clinical Specialist Associate with a company that sold surgical devices to clinics and hospitals. In 2011, it was undisputed that the complainant consulted the appellant on four occasions: 8 June, 27 June, 10 July and 30 October.
The allegations concerned two consultations. The first, the “8 June Incident”, occurred on 8 June 2011 when the complainant visited the clinic for an HIV blood test because her usual GP was unavailable. According to the complainant, after blood was drawn, she complained of nausea and “stomach wind” and was instructed to lie down on the treatment bed. While she was lying down, her T-shirt was lifted. She could not remember who lifted it. The appellant stood by her right side, checking her stomach with both hands. When she mentioned slight chest pain, the appellant told her she could continue exercising “as long as…”, and at the same time slid his right hand underneath her T-shirt, moved it from the top of her left brassiere, and touched her left breast and nipple. She described the touch as very fast, lasting about one second, and as a squeezing of the whole breast including the nipple.
After the 8 June Incident, the complainant did not immediately report the matter to the police. She explained that she did not feel molested at the time; she perceived the touch as the appellant “trying to tell [her] where [her] heart is”. She also said she had a good impression of the appellant afterwards, describing him as friendly and chatty and giving good advice. The complainant’s account was that the consultation lasted about 50 minutes, and the touching occurred during the examination when she had mentioned chest pain.
The second incident, the “30 October Incident”, occurred on 30 October 2011. The complainant visited the clinic again because she was unwell with a sore throat. She described a consultation in which she and the appellant engaged in conversation about her impending job change and her interest in “fillers” (comparable to Botox). During the consultation, the appellant auscultated her chest and back underneath her T-shirt. After the examination, she asked whether she could continue exercising, and the appellant said she should be able to. The appellant then asked her to stand on a weighing scale, after which she was told to lift her T-shirt to reveal her abdomen. He touched her abdomen and told her she was not fat.
Crucially, the complainant alleged that after this, the appellant again used the phrase “yes, you can, and as long as…”, then said “sorry”, and placed his right hand underneath her shirt. He moved his hand towards the top of her chest and from the top of her brassiere slid his hand into the brassiere and touched her left breast. She described this touch as a squeeze of the whole breast including the nipple lasting less than a second. The complainant further alleged that the appellant repeated the act: he pulled his hand out, repeated the “as long as…” and “sorry, ah” phrases, and touched her left breast again. She stated that she was holding her T-shirt during the second touch and that she did not pull down her T-shirt before the first touch because she was not quick enough to react. After the second touch, she pulled down her T-shirt.
Following the 30 October Incident, the complainant texted her then boss, Susan Quek, stating that she thought she was molested by her GP and questioning whether one needed to touch the breast when telling a patient not to get chest pain there. Susan replied “of course not” and suggested checking with a female doctor. The complainant also texted a doctor, Dr Chia, asking whether one needed to touch the breast to tell a patient not to get chest pain there; Dr Chia replied in the negative. The complainant lodged a police report on 31 October 2011, explaining that she did not report immediately on 30 October because she was still confused and wanted to ensure she had not made a wrong judgment.
In the months after the incidents, the complainant sought psychiatric help from Dr Joshua Kua in September 2012 due to flashbacks triggered by her work, which required her to visit clinics with similar setups. She testified that the flashbacks affected her ability to communicate with male doctors and impacted her performance. She also described emotional and behavioural effects, including agitation and anger, and self-blame for not realising earlier that she had been violated during the 8 June Incident.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of s 354(1) of the Penal Code for both charges. Section 354(1) criminalises the use of criminal force on a person with the intention to outrage the modesty of that person. The High Court therefore had to determine whether the appellant’s acts amounted to “use of criminal force” and whether the requisite intention to outrage modesty was present at the time of the touching.
A second issue concerned the reliability of the evidence and the assessment of credibility. The trial judge had heard both the complainant and the appellant. On appeal, the High Court had to decide whether the trial judge’s findings on the disputed facts—particularly the details of what happened during the consultations—were correct. This required careful evaluation of inconsistencies, plausibility, and the overall coherence of each account.
A third issue related to sentence. Even if conviction was upheld, the High Court had to consider whether the global ten months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in principle, taking into account the nature of the offences, the circumstances, and the appellant’s personal background.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Although the provided extract truncates the appellant’s full version of events, the High Court’s approach in such cases is typically structured around (i) identifying the precise acts alleged; (ii) determining whether those acts occurred as described by the complainant; and (iii) inferring intention from the circumstances. Here, the complainant’s allegations were specific: insertion of the appellant’s hand into her left brassiere cup and touching her left breast and nipple on two occasions, with the touching occurring during examinations and accompanied by the appellant’s “as long as…” and “you do not get chest pain here” statements.
The court would have assessed whether the touching was consistent with any legitimate medical examination. The complainant’s account was that the appellant used chest pain as a cue to justify the touching, and that the touching was not necessary for the medical purpose described. The High Court’s reasoning would have focused on whether the trial judge was entitled to prefer the complainant’s version, especially given that the complainant did not report immediately after the first incident and only reported after the second incident, which could be relevant to credibility but does not negate the possibility of genuine confusion or delayed reporting.
On credibility, the High Court would have considered the complainant’s explanations for her conduct after each incident. For example, her failure to report immediately after 8 June was explained by her perception that the touch was appropriate given her chest pain complaint and her belief that the appellant was friendly and helpful. The court would also have considered her conduct after 30 October: she sought confirmation from others (her boss and a female doctor) and then made a police report the next day. Such steps can support the complainant’s sincerity and the reasonableness of her decision-making under confusion.
Conversely, the appellant’s version of events—while not fully reproduced in the extract—was described as differing materially from the complainant’s account. The High Court would have examined whether the appellant’s explanations were internally consistent and whether they could reasonably account for the complainant’s detailed description of the touching, including the timing, location (left breast and nipple), and the alleged insertion into the brassiere cup. Where the complainant’s account is detailed and the defence account is materially different, the court’s analysis often turns on whether the defence raises a reasonable doubt that the alleged acts occurred as charged.
On the legal element of intention to outrage modesty, the court would have applied the principle that intention can be inferred from the nature of the act and the context in which it was done. Touching intimate parts of the body in a manner that is not medically necessary, particularly by a person in a position of trust such as a doctor, can support an inference of intention to outrage modesty. The court would also have considered that the charges were framed as using criminal force with intention, which requires more than mere accidental contact; it requires proof that the act was done with the relevant intention.
Finally, the High Court would have addressed the sentence. In sentencing for offences under s 354(1), the court typically considers the seriousness of the intrusion, the vulnerability or trust relationship between offender and complainant, the number of charges, and any mitigating factors such as age, prior character, and whether there was remorse. The trial court’s decision to impose a global ten months’ imprisonment suggests that the court viewed the offences as serious but not at the highest end of the sentencing spectrum. The High Court would have checked whether that assessment was consistent with sentencing principles and comparable cases.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction and sentence. The convictions on both counts under s 354(1) of the Penal Code were upheld, and the global term of ten months’ imprisonment remained in place. The practical effect was that the appellant continued to serve the sentence imposed by the trial court.
As noted in the LawNet editorial note, the appeal to the Court of Appeal in Criminal Motion No 21 of 2015 was also dismissed on 30 November 2015 (see [2015] SGCA 67). This confirmed the High Court’s conclusions on both liability and sentencing.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how Singapore courts evaluate allegations of sexual molestation in a medical context, where the offender is a doctor and the contact occurs during consultations. The case underscores that courts will scrutinise whether the alleged touching is consistent with legitimate medical examination and whether the surrounding circumstances support an inference of intention to outrage modesty.
From an evidential standpoint, the case highlights the importance of credibility assessments where there are competing accounts. The complainant’s delayed reporting after the first incident did not automatically undermine her credibility; instead, the court accepted her explanation that she was confused and initially believed the touch was appropriate given her symptoms. For defence counsel, this demonstrates the difficulty of relying solely on delayed reporting to create reasonable doubt. For prosecution counsel, it shows the value of demonstrating coherent conduct after the second incident, including seeking confirmation and reporting promptly thereafter.
For sentencing, the case provides an example of the court’s approach to offences involving repeated acts and intimate touching. Even where the appellant is older and a long-standing medical practitioner, the court treated the conduct as sufficiently serious to warrant a custodial sentence. Practitioners should therefore treat the case as a reminder that professional status does not mitigate where the conduct involves abuse of trust and intrusion into intimate areas.
Legislation Referenced
Cases Cited
- [1960] MLJ 278
- [2007] SGDC 162
- [2015] SGCA 67
- [2015] SGHC 186
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 186 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.