The National University of Singapore v Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie [2023] SGHC 191

Case Details

• Citation: [2023] SGHC 191
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 13 July 2023
• Coram: Kwek Mean Luck J
• Case Number: Originating Application No 21 of 2023
• Hearing Date(s): 4 July 2023
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: The National University of Singapore
• Respondent / Defendant: Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie
• Counsel for Claimants: Chia Voon Jiet, Charlene Wong Su-Yi, Grace Lim Si Rui and Tay Jia Yi Pesdy (Drew & Napier LLC)
• Counsel for Respondent: Defendant in person
• Practice Areas: Courts and Jurisdiction; Vexatious litigants; Civil Procedure

Summary

In The National University of Singapore v Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie [2023] SGHC 191, the General Division of the High Court addressed the threshold for granting an extended civil restraint order ("ECRO") under the recently enacted Section 73C of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969. The application was brought by the National University of Singapore ("NUS") against a former student, Ms. Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie, following a decade of litigation stemming from the termination of her candidature for a Master of Arts (Architecture) degree. The core of the dispute lay in Ms. Ten’s refusal to accept the finality of a 2018 judgment that dismissed her claims against the university, leading her to initiate a series of applications and new actions that the Court ultimately characterized as a persistent attempt to relitigate settled issues through collateral attacks and meritless allegations of perjury.

The judgment is particularly significant for its adoption and application of the principles set out by the English Court of Appeal in Sartipy (aka Hamila Sartipy) v Tigris Industries Inc [2019] 1 WLR 589. Kwek Mean Luck J clarified that for an ECRO to be granted, the Court must be satisfied that a litigant has "persistently" commenced actions or made applications that are "totally without merit." The Court established that "persistence" generally requires at least three such meritless proceedings, and that an action is "totally without merit" if it is bound to fail, regardless of whether the litigant’s conduct is characterized by subjective malice or merely an objective lack of legal foundation. Crucially, the Court affirmed its power to retrospectively adjudge previous actions as meritless, even if they were not so certified at the time of their disposal.

The Court’s decision to grant a two-year ECRO against Ms. Ten underscores the judiciary's commitment to protecting the integrity of the legal process and the resources of both the state and private defendants from the "scourge" of vexatious litigation. While acknowledging the constitutional importance of access to justice, the Court held that such access is not absolute and must be balanced against the need for finality in litigation. The ruling provides a clear roadmap for practitioners on the evidentiary and legal requirements for seeking restraint orders against litigants who abuse the court's process by repeatedly filing claims that have no rational basis for success.

Ultimately, the case serves as a stern reminder of the doctrine of res judicata and the Court's inherent and statutory powers to curb abusive conduct. By detailing the specific failures of Ms. Ten's various applications—ranging from attempts to set aside judgments based on "fresh evidence" that was neither fresh nor relevant, to initiating new suits that were near-verbatim copies of dismissed claims—the judgment provides a comprehensive analysis of what constitutes "totally without merit" in the context of persistent litigation.

Timeline of Events

1. January 2002: Ms. Ten commences her candidature for a Master of Arts (Architecture) degree at the NUS School of Design and Environment.
2. 4 September 2006: NUS terminates Ms. Ten’s candidature after determining she failed to comply with requirements for the award of the degree.
3. 8 August 2012: Ms. Ten commences HC/S 667/2012 ("S 667") against NUS, seeking the award of the degree and damages for breach of contract and various torts.
4. 9 July 2018: Woo Bih Li J dismisses S 667 in its entirety (see [2018] SGHC 158).
5. 2 October 2018: The Court of Appeal dismisses Ms. Ten’s appeal against the S 667 judgment.
6. 27 December 2019: Ms. Ten files HC/OS 1618/2019 ("OS 1618") seeking to set aside the S 667 judgment.
7. 9 January 2020: OS 1618 is dismissed by the High Court.
8. 11 August 2020: Ms. Ten files HC/OS 784/2020 ("OS 784") for a declaration that the S 667 judgment was obtained by fraud.
9. 30 October 2020: OS 784 is dismissed by the High Court.
10. 10 November 2020: Ms. Ten files HC/OS 1121/2020 ("OS 1121") seeking to set aside the S 667 judgment.
11. 16 November 2020: OS 1121 is dismissed by the High Court.
12. 8 December 2020: Ms. Ten files HC/OS 1225/2020 ("OS 1225") seeking to set aside the S 667 judgment.
13. 25 January 2021: OS 1225 is dismissed by the High Court.
14. 15 February 2021: Ms. Ten files HC/OS 161/2021 ("OS 161") seeking to set aside the S 667 judgment.
15. 10 March 2021: OS 161 is dismissed by the High Court.
16. 8 April 2021: Ms. Ten files HC/OS 356/2021 ("OS 356") seeking to set aside the S 667 judgment.
17. 17 November 2021: OS 356 is dismissed by the High Court.
18. 14 February 2022: Ms. Ten files HC/RA 47/2022 ("RA 47") appealing the dismissal of OS 356.
19. 16 December 2022: RA 47 is dismissed by the High Court (see [2022] SGHC 247).
20. 11 January 2023: NUS files HC/OA 21/2023 ("OA 21") seeking an ECRO against Ms. Ten.
21. 6 March 2023: Ms. Ten files HC/OC 328/2023 ("OC 328") against NUS, essentially relitigating S 667.
22. 4 July 2023: Substantive hearing for the ECRO application (OA 21).
23. 13 July 2023: Judgment delivered granting the ECRO for a period of two years.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The genesis of this protracted legal battle dates back to January 2002, when Ms. Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie enrolled in the Master of Arts (Architecture) program at NUS. Her candidature was fraught with difficulties regarding the fulfillment of academic requirements, leading NUS to terminate her candidature on 4 September 2006. Ms. Ten did not receive the degree, a fact that became the central grievance of her subsequent legal actions.

On 8 August 2012, Ms. Ten initiated HC/S 667/2012 ("S 667") against NUS. In that suit, she sought a mandatory injunction requiring NUS to award her the degree, along with damages for breach of contract, the tort of misfeasance in public office, the tort of intimidation, and the tort of negligence. The trial was extensive, involving multiple witnesses and a deep dive into the university's internal processes and academic regulations. On 9 July 2018, Woo Bih Li J issued a comprehensive judgment (see [2018] SGHC 158) dismissing all of Ms. Ten’s claims. The Court found that NUS had acted within its rights and that Ms. Ten had failed to prove the necessary elements of the torts alleged. Her subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 2 October 2018.

Despite the finality of the S 667 judgment, Ms. Ten embarked on a series of attempts to reopen the case. These attempts were primarily characterized by allegations that NUS witnesses had committed perjury during the S 667 trial. Between 2019 and 2021, she filed at least six Originating Summonses (OS 1618/2019, OS 784/2020, OS 1121/2020, OS 1225/2020, OS 161/2021, and OS 356/2021), all aimed at setting aside the S 667 judgment or obtaining declarations of fraud. Each of these was dismissed by the High Court, often with the Court noting that the applications were attempts to relitigate issues already decided.

The procedural history further included Ms. Ten’s involvement in bankruptcy proceedings (HC/OSB 3/2020) initiated by NUS to recover costs awarded in S 667. In those proceedings, Ms. Ten attempted to raise the same allegations of fraud and perjury as a defense against the debt. This was rejected by the Assistant Registrar and subsequently by the High Court on appeal. Furthermore, in HC/RA 351/2022 (arising from RA 47/2022), Ms. Ten sought to adduce "fresh evidence" to support her claims of perjury. Valerie Thean J dismissed this application, noting that the evidence was neither fresh nor relevant to the issues at hand (see [2022] SGHC 247).

The final catalyst for the ECRO application was the filing of HC/OC 328/2023 ("OC 328") by Ms. Ten on 6 March 2023. This new action was found by the Court to be a near-verbatim reproduction of the claims in S 667, once again alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct by NUS in relation to her degree. NUS argued that this persistent pattern of meritless litigation necessitated the intervention of the Court under Section 73C of the SCJA to prevent further abuse of process and to protect the university from the ongoing burden of defending against baseless claims.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issue was whether the requirements for granting an extended civil restraint order (ECRO) under Section 73C(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 had been met. This required the Court to interpret and apply several sub-issues:

• The Meaning of "Totally Without Merit": What is the legal standard for determining that an action or application is "totally without merit"? Does it require a finding of subjective bad faith, or is an objective lack of legal or factual basis sufficient?
• The Meaning of "Persistently": How many meritless actions or applications must a litigant commence to be considered "persistent"? Is there a strict quantitative threshold (e.g., the "rule of three"), or is it a qualitative assessment of the litigant's overall conduct?
• Retrospective Assessment: Can a court hearing an ECRO application retrospectively determine that previous proceedings were "totally without merit," even if the judges who heard those proceedings did not make such a formal certification at the time?
• The Scope of the Order: If the criteria are met, what is the appropriate duration and scope of the ECRO to ensure it is proportionate to the risk of future abuse while respecting the litigant's right of access to the courts?
• Inclusion of Existing Actions: Should the ECRO extend to existing actions that are currently pending, such as OC 328?

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court began its analysis by examining the statutory framework of Section 73C(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969, which provides that a court may make an ECRO if satisfied that a party has "persistently commenced actions or made applications that are totally without merit." Kwek Mean Luck J noted that this provision was part of a "graduated response" to vexatious litigation, as identified in Courtman v Ludlam [2009] EWHC 2067.

The "Totally Without Merit" Standard

The Court adopted the definition of "totally without merit" (TWM) from the English Court of Appeal in Sartipy. An action or application is TWM if it is "bound to fail" and has "no rational basis" for success. The Court emphasized that this is an objective test. It does not require the litigant to have acted with a "vexatious" or "malicious" state of mind. As Kwek J noted, a litigant who is "sincere but misguided" can still be subject to an ECRO if their actions are objectively meritless. The Court also referred to Perry v Brundle [2015] EWHC 2737, which held that a court hearing an ECRO application can retrospectively adjudge an action to be TWM.

The "Persistence" Requirement

On the issue of persistence, the Court followed the Sartipy guideline that a litigant must have commenced or made at least three actions or applications that are TWM. While NUS pointed to Joseph Clement Louis Arokiasamy v Singapore Airlines Ltd and another matter [2020] 5 SLR 869, where Maniam JC did not impose a strict quantitative requirement, Kwek J found the Sartipy approach to be a helpful rule of thumb for the "persistence" threshold under the SCJA. The Court also noted Panton and another v Vale of White Horse District Council and another [2020] EWHC 167 (Ch), which suggested that multiple appeals within the same litigation could be aggregated or viewed as a single persistent course of conduct.

Retrospective Analysis of Ms. Ten's Litigation

The Court then conducted a detailed retrospective review of Ms. Ten's post-2018 proceedings to determine if they met the TWM standard:

"The litigant must have commenced or made at least three actions or applications which are totally without merit in order to be taken to have ‘persistently’ commenced such actions or applications." (at [4], citing Sartipy)

1. OS 25/2021 (and related OSs): The Court found that Ms. Ten’s repeated attempts to set aside the S 667 judgment were TWM. These applications were based on allegations of perjury that had already been considered and rejected. The Court noted that Ms. Ten was essentially attempting to relitigate the same issues under the guise of "fraud," which is a classic hallmark of meritless litigation.
2. OSB 3/2020 (Bankruptcy Proceedings): Ms. Ten’s attempts to challenge the costs order from S 667 by alleging fraud were also deemed TWM. The Court held that bankruptcy proceedings are not the appropriate forum to relitigate the merits of the underlying judgment debt, especially when those merits had already been affirmed on appeal.
3. RA 316/2021 and RA 351/2022: These appeals and applications for fresh evidence were found to be TWM. In RA 351, Ms. Ten sought to adduce evidence that was either already available at the time of the trial or was irrelevant to the findings of Woo Bih Li J. The Court cited Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR(R) 673 to emphasize that the requirements for fresh evidence are strict and were nowhere near met in Ms. Ten's case.
4. OC 328/2023: The Court found this new action to be "plainly and obviously" TWM. It was a near-verbatim copy of the S 667 claim. The Court held that initiating a new action to relitigate a dismissed claim is a clear abuse of process and falls squarely within the TWM definition.

Balancing Access to Justice

Kwek J addressed the potential concern that an ECRO might infringe upon the constitutional right of access to the courts. He reasoned that the ECRO does not bar access entirely; rather, it requires the litigant to seek permission from a judge before filing. This ensures that only claims with some modicum of merit proceed, thereby protecting the court's resources and other parties from harassment. The Court concluded that Ms. Ten’s conduct demonstrated a "persistent refusal to accept the finality of the court’s decisions," which justified the restraint.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court granted the application by NUS and made an extended civil restraint order (ECRO) against Ms. Ten for a period of two years. The order was made pursuant to Section 73C(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969. The operative terms of the order, as set out in the judgment, are as follows:

"Accordingly, I grant order in terms of the NUS’ prayers as set out under prayers (a) to (c) of OA 21, including its application to include OC 328 in the ECRO." (at [62])

The specific effects of the ECRO are:

• Ms. Ten is restrained from commencing any action or making any application in the General Division of the High Court or any other court against NUS concerning any matter involving or relating to the subject matter of S 667 without first obtaining the permission of the Court.
• The restraint specifically includes the ongoing action OC 328/2023.
• If Ms. Ten attempts to commence an action or make an application without such permission, the action or application will be automatically stayed or dismissed without further order of the Court.
• The ECRO is to remain in force for a period of two years from the date of the order, which the Court considered to be "proportionate in the circumstances."

Regarding costs, the Court did not make an immediate award. Instead, it reserved the issue and directed the parties to file written submissions:

"Parties are to file their written submissions on costs, of not more than seven pages, within seven days of this Judgment." (at [65])

The Court also noted that Ms. Ten has the right to apply to the Court to vary or discharge the ECRO under Section 73C(5) of the SCJA, providing a procedural safeguard should her circumstances or the nature of her claims change significantly.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is a landmark decision in Singapore’s "vexatious litigant" jurisprudence, providing the first detailed judicial analysis of the ECRO regime introduced in the 2020 revisions to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969. Its significance lies in several key areas:

1. Adoption of the Sartipy Framework

By expressly adopting the principles from the English Court of Appeal in Sartipy, the Singapore High Court has aligned its approach with a well-established international standard. This provides practitioners with a predictable framework: the "rule of three" for persistence and the "bound to fail" test for merit. This alignment is crucial for maintaining consistency in how Singapore courts handle cross-jurisdictional litigation principles.

2. Clarification of "Totally Without Merit"

The judgment clarifies that TWM is an objective standard. This is a vital distinction for practitioners. It means that a lawyer’s duty is to advise clients based on the objective legal viability of a claim, rather than the client's subjective belief in their cause. The Court’s willingness to retrospectively label past applications as TWM—even if they weren't so labeled at the time—gives the ECRO regime "teeth," allowing the Court to look at the totality of a litigant's history rather than being limited by previous procedural technicalities.

3. Protection of Judicial Resources and Finality

The decision reinforces the principle of res judicata and the importance of finality in litigation. In an era where "lawfare" and persistent relitigation can be used as a tool of harassment, the ECRO serves as a necessary shield. The Court’s reasoning emphasizes that the right of access to justice is a right to meaningful access, not a license to clog the system with repetitive and baseless claims. This protects not only the specific defendant (in this case, a public university) but also the broader public interest in an efficient judicial system.

4. Guidance for Unrepresented Litigants

While the order was made against an unrepresented litigant, the judgment serves as a clear warning to all litigants that persistence in meritless claims will have consequences. The Court demonstrated patience with Ms. Ten’s status as a litigant-in-person but ultimately held her to the same objective standard of merit as any other party. This balances the court's duty to assist unrepresented parties with its duty to prevent the abuse of its own processes.

5. Proportionality in Restraint

The Court’s decision to limit the ECRO to two years and to specific subject matter (related to S 667) demonstrates a commitment to proportionality. It shows that ECROs are not intended to be "lifetime bans" but are targeted interventions designed to address specific patterns of abuse. This nuanced approach helps ensure the ECRO regime remains a legitimate tool of case management rather than an instrument of exclusion.

Practice Pointers

• Documenting Meritlessness: When defending against a potentially vexatious litigant, practitioners should seek to have meritless applications formally certified as "totally without merit" at the time of dismissal. While Ten Leu Jiun allows for retrospective assessment, a contemporaneous certification provides much stronger evidence for a subsequent ECRO application.
• The "Rule of Three": Before advising a client to seek an ECRO, ensure there are at least three distinct actions or applications that can be objectively characterized as TWM. While not an absolute rule, it is the primary threshold adopted by the Court.
• Focus on Objective Merit: In ECRO applications, focus your submissions on why the claims are "bound to fail" as a matter of law or fact, rather than focusing solely on the opponent's "vexatious" intent. The objective lack of a rational basis for the claim is the primary legal hook.
• Aggregation of Proceedings: Note that the Court may aggregate multiple appeals within a single litigation or related originating summonses to satisfy the "persistence" requirement. Practitioners should present the litigation history as a cohesive narrative of abuse.
• Proportionality in Relief: When drafting the prayers for an ECRO, tailor the scope and duration to the specific abuse. A request for a blanket, indefinite ban is less likely to succeed than a targeted two-year restraint related to the specific subject matter of the dispute.
• Res Judicata as a Shield: Use the doctrine of res judicata and the prohibition against collateral attacks aggressively when a litigant attempts to reopen settled issues through fraud or perjury allegations that lack a new, independent evidentiary basis.
• Advising Litigants-in-Person: If representing a party against a litigant-in-person, maintain a rigorous record of all meritless filings. The Court will take the litigant's status into account but will not allow it to excuse a persistent pattern of TWM applications.

Subsequent Treatment

As of the date of this analysis, The National University of Singapore v Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie [2023] SGHC 191 stands as a leading authority on the application of Section 73C of the SCJA. It has established the Sartipy framework as the standard for ECROs in Singapore. While the judgment itself is relatively recent, its clear adoption of the "totally without merit" and "persistence" tests provides a stable foundation for future cases involving vexatious litigants. There are no recorded instances in the extracted metadata of this case being overruled or significantly distinguished in subsequent High Court or Court of Appeal decisions.

Legislation Referenced

• Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), Section 73C, Section 73C(1), Section 73C(2), Section 73C(2)(a), Section 73C(4), Section 73C(5)
• Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), Section 73B, Section 73B(2)(a)
• Rules of Court, Order 57 Rule 4, Order 3 Rule 1

Cases Cited

• Considered: Sartipy (aka Hamila Sartipy) v Tigris Industries Inc [2019] 1 WLR 589
• Referred to: Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie v National University of Singapore [2018] SGHC 158
• Referred to: Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie v National University of Singapore [2022] SGHC 247
• Referred to: Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR(R) 673
• Referred to: Joseph Clement Louis Arokiasamy v Singapore Airlines Ltd and another matter [2020] 5 SLR 869
• Referred to: Perry v Brundle [2015] EWHC 2737
• Referred to: Panton and another v Vale of White Horse District Council and another [2020] EWHC 167 (Ch)
• Referred to: Courtman v Ludlam [2009] EWHC 2067

Source Documents

• Original Judgment PDF (eLitigation)
• Case Details on eLitigation