Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen [2025] SGHCR 33

Case Details

• Citation: [2025] SGHCR 33
• Court: General Division of the High Court (Assistant Registrar)
• Decision Date: 29 September 2025
• Coram: AR Tan Yu Qing
• Case Number: Originating Claim No 125 of 2025; Summons No 1240 of 2025
• Hearing Date(s): 4 June 2025, 22–23, 31 July 2025
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul; Mohamed Ghouse s/o Tajudin
• Respondent / Defendant: Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen
• Counsel for Claimants: Lalwani Anil Mangan (DL Law Corporation)
• Counsel for Respondent: Umar Abdullah bin Mazeli (Adel Law LLC)
• Practice Areas: Civil Procedure; Costs; Artificial Intelligence; Legal Profession

Summary

The decision in Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen [2025] SGHCR 33 represents a seminal moment in Singapore’s judicial response to the integration of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in legal practice. The case primarily concerned the imposition of a personal costs order against an advocate and solicitor who cited a fictitious, AI-generated legal authority in written submissions. While the underlying interlocutory application involved a summons to set aside a default judgment, the proceedings were overshadowed by the discovery that a case cited by the Claimants’ counsel (CC) to rebut a potential defence under the Moneylenders Act did not exist in any law report or database.

The Court, presided over by AR Tan Yu Qing, conducted a rigorous inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the citation of the "Fictitious Authority." The judgment clarifies that the duty of an advocate as an officer of the court is non-delegable and remains absolute regardless of the technological tools employed in legal research. By applying the established three-stage test for personal costs orders, the Court determined that the conduct of CC—Lalwani Anil Mangan—met the thresholds of being improper, unreasonable, and negligent. The Court emphasized that the citation of non-existent authorities strikes at the heart of the stare decisis system and the administration of justice.

Ultimately, the Court ordered CC to personally pay the Defendant costs in the sum of $800, specifically to compensate for the costs incidental to the citation of the Fictitious Authority. This decision serves as a stern warning to the legal profession that while technology may assist in research, the responsibility for the accuracy and existence of cited materials rests solely with the human practitioner. The judgment aligns Singapore with international trends in the UK, US, and Australia, where courts have similarly penalized "AI hallucinations" in legal filings.

Beyond the immediate costs order, the judgment provides a comprehensive framework for how Singapore courts will treat AI-related misconduct. It reaffirms that the "truth-seeking" function of the court cannot be compromised by the convenience of automated drafting. The case underscores that the privilege of being an officer of the court carries a "solemn duty" to ensure that every authority placed before the bench is authentic and relevant, a duty that cannot be outsourced to a machine.

Timeline of Events

1. 8 January 2025: Originating Claim No 125 of 2025 (OC 125) is commenced by the Claimants against the Defendant.
2. 15 April 2024: [Date noted in metadata regarding prior procedural context, though OC 125 was filed in 2025].
3. 31 May 2025: The Claimants’ Counsel (CC) prepares written submissions for the upcoming summons hearing.
4. 1 June 2025: The Claimants file their Written Submissions (CWS) for Summons No 1240 of 2025 (SUM 1240). These submissions contain the citation of the Fictitious Authority.
5. 2 June 2025: The Claimants file their Bundle of Authorities (BOA). The Defendant’s Counsel (DC) notices that the Fictitious Authority cited in the CWS is missing from the BOA.
6. 4 June 2025: The first hearing for SUM 1240 takes place. DC informs the Court and CC that the Fictitious Authority cannot be located. CC initially characterizes the issue as a "typographical error."
7. 5 June 2025: CC sends a letter to the Court and DC, maintaining that the error was typographical and providing a "replacement" authority.
8. 18 July 2025: CC files Amended Written Submissions (AWS) without prior leave of the Court, substituting the Fictitious Authority with a real case.
9. 21 July 2025: The Court directs CC to provide a full explanation regarding the origin of the Fictitious Authority.
10. 22–23 July 2025: Further hearings are conducted. CC admits that the Fictitious Authority was generated by a GenAI tool and that he failed to verify its existence.
11. 31 July 2025: The Court dismisses the Defendant’s application in SUM 1240 on its merits but reserves judgment on the issue of personal costs.
12. 6 August 2025: [Date noted in metadata regarding subsequent procedural filings].
13. 29 September 2025: The Court delivers its judgment, ordering CC to pay $800 in personal costs to the Defendant.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The dispute originated from Originating Claim No 125 of 2025 (OC 125), where the Claimants, Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and Mohamed Ghouse s/o Tajudin, sought legal remedies against the Defendant, Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen. In the course of the proceedings, a default judgment (HC/JUD 143/2025) was entered against the Defendant. The Defendant subsequently filed Summons No 1240 of 2025 (SUM 1240) to set aside this default judgment, asserting that she had a prima facie defence to the Claimants’ claims.

One of the potential defences raised by the Defendant involved the Moneylenders Act 2008. The Defendant contended that the underlying transaction might be unenforceable due to non-compliance with the Act. In response, the Claimants filed their Written Submissions (CWS) on 1 June 2025. To counter the illegality argument, the CWS cited a purported case—the "Fictitious Authority"—which allegedly stood for the proposition that "isolated or ad hoc loans between acquaintances do not constitute ‘moneylending’ under the Moneylenders Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed) unless there is a systematic business of lending for profit" (at [8]).

The discrepancy came to light when the Claimants filed their Bundle of Authorities (BOA) on 2 June 2025. The Defendant’s counsel, Umar Abdullah bin Mazeli, observed that the Fictitious Authority, despite being a central pillar of the Claimants' argument on the Moneylenders Act, was missing from the BOA. DC conducted extensive searches across multiple legal databases but was unable to find any record of the case. At the hearing on 4 June 2025, DC alerted the Court to the missing authority. CC, Lalwani Anil Mangan, initially dismissed the concern, suggesting it was a mere "typographical error" and that the wrong case name had been inserted.

Following the hearing, CC attempted to rectify the situation by filing Amended Written Submissions (AWS) on 18 July 2025, which replaced the Fictitious Authority with a legitimate case. However, this was done without the Court's leave. The Court, recognizing the gravity of citing a non-existent authority, demanded a detailed explanation. CC eventually admitted that he had used a GenAI tool to assist in drafting the CWS. The tool had "hallucinated" the case name and the legal proposition. CC confessed that he had not independently verified the citation, the case facts, or the ratio decidendi before including it in the formal court filing.

The Court noted that the Fictitious Authority was not just a minor citation but was used to support a substantive legal argument intended to defeat the Defendant's application. The Defendant's counsel had spent significant time and resources trying to locate the case, including searching the LawNet database and other repositories. The Defendant eventually decided not to pursue the Moneylenders Act defence, but the issue of CC’s conduct remained a matter of judicial concern. The Court proceeded to determine whether CC’s reliance on an AI-generated hallucination warranted a personal costs order under the Court's inherent jurisdiction and the Legal Profession Act 1966.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether a personal costs order should be made against the Claimants’ counsel for the citation of a fictitious legal authority. This required the Court to address several sub-issues:

• The Standard of Conduct: What is the extent of an advocate and solicitor’s duty to verify the authenticity of legal authorities cited to the Court, particularly when using GenAI tools?
• The Application of the Ridehalgh Test: Did the conduct of CC in this instance meet the three-stage criteria for a personal costs order as set out in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 and endorsed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576?
• Causation and Necessity: Did the citation of the Fictitious Authority cause the Defendant to incur unnecessary costs?
• The Propriety of GenAI in Legal Practice: To what extent can a solicitor delegate research tasks to AI, and what are the consequences of failing to supervise such "delegation"?
• The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court: Does the Court have the power to penalize conduct that, while perhaps not malicious, tends to defeat the administration of justice and waste judicial resources?

These issues were framed against the backdrop of Section 82(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966, which designates advocates and solicitors as officers of the court, and the broader principle of stare decisis, which relies on the accuracy of cited precedents.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court’s analysis began with a fundamental restatement of the role of the advocate. Citing Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2017] 4 SLR 1369 at [104], the Court emphasized that every solicitor is an officer of the court "entrusted with the solemn duty of assisting the court in the administration of justice" (at [1]). This duty is paramount and overrides the duty to the client. The Court noted that the citation of a fictitious authority is a direct violation of this duty, as it misleads the Court and undermines the integrity of the legal system.

The Court then turned to the legal framework for personal costs orders. It applied the three-stage test from Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205, which was endorsed in Singapore in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 at [71]. The three stages are:

"(a) Whether the advocate and solicitor acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently; (b) whether such conduct caused unnecessary costs to be incurred; and (c) whether it is just in all the circumstances to order the advocate and solicitor to pay those costs personally" (at [47]).

Stage 1: Improper, Unreasonable, or Negligent Conduct

The Court analyzed whether CC’s conduct fell into any of these three categories. "Improper" conduct includes any conduct which would be a breach of professional duty. "Unreasonable" conduct is that which has no reasonable explanation. "Negligent" conduct involves a failure to act with the competence reasonably expected of ordinary members of the profession (at [48]-[50]).

The Court found that CC’s conduct was improper, unreasonable, and negligent. The Court rejected CC’s initial characterization of the error as a "typographical" one. The Court observed that a typographical error involves a slip of the pen, whereas citing a non-existent case with a specific (but false) legal proposition is a substantive failure of research and verification. The Court held that CC had a "professional, non-delegable duty to ensure that all materials placed before the court exist and are accurate" (at [52]). By failing to check the Fictitious Authority against a reliable database, CC breached the standard of competence expected of a solicitor.

Stage 2: Causation of Unnecessary Costs

The Court examined whether the Defendant had incurred unnecessary costs. DC had to spend time searching for the Fictitious Authority, corresponding with CC about its absence, and bringing the matter to the Court's attention during the hearing. The Court noted that "the citation of the Fictitious Authority in the CWS was the sine qua non of the costs incurred by the Defendant in relation to the Fictitious Authority" (at [63]). Had the authority not been cited, the Defendant would not have had to expend resources investigating its existence.

Stage 3: Whether it is Just to Order Personal Costs

The Court considered the discretionary nature of the power. It noted that the inquiry is not a sentencing exercise but a principled assessment of the specific facts (citing Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 377 at [66]). The Court found that it was just to make the order to compensate the Defendant for the wasted costs and to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The Court emphasized that the stare decisis system relies on the "truth" of the authorities cited (at [76]). Citing fictitious cases "pollutes the stream of justice" and creates a risk that a court might inadvertently rely on a non-existent principle.

The Impact of GenAI

A significant portion of the analysis dealt with the use of GenAI. The Court acknowledged that while GenAI can be a useful tool, it is prone to "hallucinations"—the generation of plausible-sounding but false information. The Court cited international precedents, including Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 and Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26, where foreign courts had dealt with similar AI-generated fictitious authorities. The Court concluded that the use of GenAI does not absolve a solicitor of their personal responsibility. If a solicitor chooses to use such tools, they must implement rigorous "human-in-the-loop" verification processes. The failure to do so is a breach of the solicitor's duty to the Court.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court dismissed the Defendant’s underlying application in SUM 1240 on its merits, finding that the Defendant had not established a prima facie defence sufficient to set aside the default judgment. However, on the specific issue of the Fictitious Authority, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to impose a personal costs order against the Claimants’ counsel.

The operative order of the Court was as follows:

"I ordered CC to personally pay the Defendant costs in the sum of $800, being the costs of and incidental to his citation of the Fictitious Authority in the CWS, within 14 days of my decision." (at [99])

In determining the quantum of $800, the Court adopted a "broad-brush approach," considering the time DC likely spent searching for the case and the additional correspondence required. The Court also ordered that both CC and DC must provide a copy of the judgment to their respective clients to ensure transparency regarding the conduct that led to the costs order. The Court declined to refer the matter to the Law Society for disciplinary proceedings at this stage, noting that the personal costs order and the public nature of the judgment were sufficient to address the misconduct in this specific instance.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it establishes the first clear judicial precedent in Singapore regarding the misuse of Generative AI in legal submissions. It serves as a foundational authority for the "non-delegable duty" of advocates to verify AI-generated content. As legal practice increasingly incorporates automated tools, this judgment draws a "red line" that technology cannot cross: the solicitor’s personal accountability for the veracity of the law presented to the Court.

The decision is significant for its application of the Ridehalgh test to modern technological failures. It demonstrates that the existing legal framework is robust enough to handle novel issues like AI hallucinations without the need for new legislation. By categorizing the failure to verify AI output as "improper, unreasonable, and negligent," the Court has set a high bar for professional competence in the digital age. Practitioners can no longer plead "technological ignorance" or "clerical error" when their software produces fictitious results.

Furthermore, the judgment reinforces the integrity of the stare decisis system. The Court’s discussion of how fictitious authorities "pollute the stream of justice" (at [76]) highlights the systemic risk posed by AI. If courts were to inadvertently adopt "hallucinated" ratios, the predictability and reliability of the common law would be compromised. This case ensures that the "truth-seeking" function of the Singapore judiciary remains protected from the risks of automated misinformation.

For the broader legal community, the case is a reminder of the "solemn duty" of the advocate. It places the Singapore General Division of the High Court in alignment with other leading common law jurisdictions, such as the UK and Australia, in taking a firm stance against AI-related misconduct. The $800 costs order, while modest in quantum, carries significant reputational weight and serves as a deterrent against the reckless use of GenAI tools. It signals that the Court will not hesitate to use its inherent powers to protect the administration of justice from the pitfalls of unverified technology.

Practice Pointers

• Non-Delegable Duty: Advocates and solicitors have a professional, non-delegable duty to ensure that all materials placed before the court exist and are accurate. This duty cannot be shifted to junior staff or AI tools.
• Verification of AI Output: It is impermissible to delegate tasks such as conducting legal research and drafting written submissions to GenAI tools without independently verifying the output against reliable legal databases like LawNet.
• Human-in-the-Loop: Practitioners must maintain a "human-in-the-loop" approach. Every citation, factual assertion, and legal proposition generated by AI must be reviewed by a qualified solicitor.
• Candour with the Court: If an error is discovered, counsel must be forthright. Characterizing a "hallucination" as a "typographical error" is misleading and may aggravate the court's view of the conduct.
• Bundle of Authorities: The absence of a cited case from the Bundle of Authorities is a major "red flag." Practitioners should use the BOA preparation process as a final check on the existence of their cited precedents.
• Personal Liability: Solicitors should be aware that they can be held personally liable for costs incurred by the opposing party due to the citation of fictitious authorities, regardless of whether the misconduct was intentional or merely negligent.
• Client Transparency: Courts may order that a judgment detailing counsel's misconduct be served directly on the client, which has significant implications for the solicitor-client relationship.

Subsequent Treatment

As a recent decision from September 2025, Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen [2025] SGHCR 33 stands as the primary Singapore authority on AI-generated fictitious authorities. Its ratio—that the failure to verify AI-generated citations constitutes improper and negligent conduct warranting personal costs—is expected to be followed in subsequent cases involving technological misconduct in the General Division and the Court of Appeal.

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed), Section 82(1)
• Moneylenders Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed)
• Rules of Court 2021, Order 21 Rule 6

Cases Cited

• Applied / Followed:
  • Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew and another and other appeals [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576
  • Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205
• Referred to:
  • Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2017] 4 SLR 1369
  • Zhou Tong and others v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 534
  • Tan King Hiang v United Engineers (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R) 529
  • Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 377
  • Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866
  • Toh Siew Kee v Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd and others [2013] 3 SLR 284
  • Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26
  • Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin)
  • Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1040 (Admin)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment (PDF)
• eLitigation Case Record