Case Details
- Citation: [2007] SGHC 4
- Court: High Court
- Decision Date: 15 January 2007
- Coram: Tay Yong Kwang J
- Case Number: Criminal Case No 25 of 2006 (CC 25/2006)
- Claimants / Plaintiffs: Public Prosecutor
- Respondent / Defendant: Lee Chez Kee
- Counsel for Prosecution: Lee Cheow Han and Tan Wee Soon (Deputy Public Prosecutors)
- Counsel for Respondent: Rupert Seah Eng Chee (Rupert Seah & Co); Wendell Wong (Drew & Napier LLC)
- Practice Areas: Criminal Law; Evidence; Admissibility of Hearsay; Common Intention
Summary
In Public Prosecutor v Lee Chez Kee [2007] SGHC 4, the High Court of Singapore addressed a critical and complex intersection of criminal procedure and the law of evidence, specifically concerning the admissibility of out-of-court confessions made by co-accused persons who were not parties to the immediate proceedings. The case arose from the 1993 murder of Lee Kok Cheong, a 54-year-old man, during a robbery at his residence. While two other accomplices, Too Yin Sheong ("Too") and Ng Chek Siong ("Ng"), had been apprehended and dealt with by the courts years earlier, the accused, Lee Chez Kee, remained at large until his eventual arrest and trial in 2006.
The central doctrinal contribution of this judgment lies in its exhaustive interpretation of Section 378(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) ("CPC"). The Prosecution sought to admit several out-of-court statements made by Too, who had already been executed for the crime and was thus unavailable to testify. These statements directly implicated Lee Chez Kee in the planning and execution of the robbery-murder. The Defence challenged the admissibility of these statements, characterizing them as inadmissible hearsay that fell outside the traditional exceptions found in the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed).
Tay Yong Kwang J held that Section 378 of the CPC created a distinct and broad statutory exception to the hearsay rule. By analyzing the legislative history and the specific wording of the provision, the Court determined that voluntary out-of-court confessions of a person not party to the proceedings are admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein. This decision marked a significant departure from a strict adherence to the common law hearsay prohibition, signaling a judicial preference for the admission of "valuable" evidence to assist the court in its truth-seeking function, provided the threshold of voluntariness is satisfied.
Beyond the evidentiary ruling, the case is a profound application of the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). The Court had to determine whether Lee Chez Kee, even if he did not strike the fatal blow, shared a common intention with Too and Ng to commit a robbery that involved the infliction of injuries likely to cause death. The judgment meticulously reconstructs the events of December 1993 through circumstantial evidence, witness testimony, and the now-admitted hearsay statements, ultimately resulting in the conviction of the accused and the imposition of the mandatory death penalty.
Timeline of Events
- 12 December 1993: Lee Kok Fatt (the deceased's brother) and his family visit the deceased, Lee Kok Cheong, at 20 Greenleaf Place. The deceased mentions he is expecting friends later that evening.
- 13 December 1993: A series of transactions are made using the deceased's Cash-On-Line (COL) card at various retail outlets in Parkway Parade Shopping Centre, including purchases of $1,000, $200, and $2,000.
- 14 December 1993: The body of Lee Kok Cheong is discovered in the master bedroom of his house at 20 Greenleaf Place. The deceased is found supine, hands and feet bound, with a black electrical cord around his neck and a stab wound.
- 1994: Too Yin Sheong and Ng Chek Siong are dealt with by the authorities. Too is subsequently sentenced to death, while Ng receives a term of imprisonment and caning.
- 18 February 2006: Lee Chez Kee is apprehended and provides a cautioned statement under Section 122(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
- 21 February 2006: The accused provides further statements to the police regarding his involvement and the events of 1993.
- 4 September 2006: The trial of Lee Chez Kee commences in the High Court.
- 15 January 2007: Tay Yong Kwang J delivers the judgment, convicting the accused of murder.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The deceased, Lee Kok Cheong, was a 54-year-old man residing at 20 Greenleaf Place, Singapore. On 14 December 1993, his body was discovered in the master bedroom of his home. The scene was grim: the deceased was lying in a supine position on the floor, his hands tied above his head with a necktie and a piece of cloth, and his feet bound at the ankles with another necktie. A pillow covered his face, and a black electrical cord was found across the front of his neck. Forensic examination by pathologist Dr Paul Chui revealed a 2.5cm stab wound on the left side of the neck, which had penetrated the jugular vein, and signs of ligature strangulation. The cause of death was determined to be a combination of the neck injury and strangulation.
The investigation revealed that the deceased’s house had been ransacked. Several items were missing, including a Cash-On-Line (COL) card. On 13 December 1993, the day before the body was found, this COL card was used to make several high-value purchases at Parkway Parade. These included transactions at a jewelry store and a watch shop for amounts such as $2,000, $1,000, and $1,500. A sales assistant, Ms. Lim, later identified the accused, Lee Chez Kee, as one of the three men who had used the card. She specifically noted that Lee Chez Kee was the one who handed over the card and entered the PIN.
The Prosecution's case was that Lee Chez Kee, acting in furtherance of a common intention with Too Yin Sheong and Ng Chek Siong, had entered the deceased's home to commit robbery. During the course of the robbery, the deceased was restrained, stabbed, and strangled. Too and Ng had been tried years earlier. Too was convicted of murder and executed, while Ng was convicted of a lesser charge of robbery with hurt and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment and 12 strikes of the cane. Lee Chez Kee had fled Singapore and was only brought to justice in 2006.
At the crime scene, police recovered several weapons, including a bent knife (Exhibit P154) with an 18cm blade and a chopper (Exhibit P153) found under papers on a study table. The Prosecution relied heavily on the out-of-court confessions made by Too Yin Sheong before his execution. In these statements, Too detailed how the trio had planned the robbery, how they had entered the house, and how the deceased was subdued. Crucially, Too’s statements alleged that Lee Chez Kee was actively involved in restraining the deceased and was present when the violence was inflicted.
The accused, in his own statements to the police in 2006, admitted to being at the scene but attempted to minimize his role. He claimed he was merely a lookout or that he was shocked by the violence initiated by Too. He admitted to receiving a share of the proceeds from the stolen items but denied having the intention to kill or cause serious injury to the deceased. The Defence argued that the Prosecution had failed to prove the specific common intention required for a murder conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The adjudication of this case turned on two primary legal pillars: the technical admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Criminal Procedure Code and the substantive requirements of the doctrine of common intention.
- Admissibility of Out-of-Court Confessions: The foremost issue was whether the statements made by Too Yin Sheong (a co-accused not party to the current proceedings) were admissible against Lee Chez Kee. This required the Court to interpret Section 378(1)(b)(i) of the CPC and determine if it overrode the general common law prohibition against hearsay. The Court had to decide if the phrase "subject to... the rules of law governing the admissibility of confessions" in Section 378(1) referred only to the requirement of voluntariness or if it incorporated the restrictive rules found in Section 30 of the Evidence Act.
- The Scope of Common Intention under Section 34 of the Penal Code: The second issue was whether the Prosecution had established that the murder was committed in furtherance of a common intention shared by all three men. This involved determining whether the "criminal act" referred to in Section 34 was the robbery itself or the specific act of murder, and whether it was necessary for the Prosecution to prove that Lee Chez Kee intended the death of the victim.
- The Weight of Circumstantial Evidence and Adverse Inferences: The Court also had to consider the weight to be given to the identification evidence by Ms. Lim and whether an adverse inference should be drawn under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from the accused's failure to provide a consistent or believable account of his actions.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
1. The Admissibility of Too’s Statements
The Court began by acknowledging that under the Evidence Act, Too’s statements would likely be inadmissible. Section 30 of the Evidence Act only allows the confession of one person to be used against another if they are being tried jointly for the same offence. Since Too had already been executed, there was no joint trial. Furthermore, the statements did not fall neatly into the "dying declaration" or "statement against interest" exceptions in Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
However, the Prosecution relied on Section 378(1) of the CPC, which states:
"In any criminal proceedings a statement made, whether orally or in a document or otherwise, by any person shall, subject to this section and section 379 and to the rules of law governing the admissibility of confessions, be admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein..."
The Court noted that Section 378(1)(b)(i) specifically allows such statements if the person who made them is dead. The Defence argued that the proviso regarding "rules of law governing the admissibility of confessions" meant that the restrictive common law and statutory rules (like Section 30 of the Evidence Act) still applied.
Tay Yong Kwang J rejected this narrow interpretation. He conducted a deep dive into the 1975 Parliamentary debates, noting the Minister’s statement that the Bill sought to "admit all hearsay evidence likely to be valuable to the greatest extent possible without undue complication or delay" (at [42]). The Court concluded that the "rules of law" referred to in the proviso were those relating to voluntariness—ensuring the statement was not obtained by threat, inducement, or promise—rather than the rules governing the relationship between the maker and the accused. The Court held:
"s 378(1) was indeed capable of rendering admissible voluntary out-of-court confessions that would otherwise have been inadmissible by virtue of the hearsay rule." (at [45])
2. Application of Section 34 of the Penal Code
On the issue of common intention, the Court applied the established tests from Too Yin Sheong v PP [1999] 1 SLR 682 and PP v Gerardine Andrew [1998] 3 SLR 736. The Court emphasized that Section 34 does not require each participant to have the same intention as the actual doer of the act, but rather a "common intention" to commit a criminal act which results in the offence charged.
The Court found that the three men had a common intention to commit robbery and to use whatever force was necessary to subdue the deceased. The evidence of the deceased being bound and gagged, combined with the use of a knife and an electrical cord, indicated a coordinated effort. The Court held that even if Lee Chez Kee did not personally stab or strangle the deceased, the acts were done in furtherance of their shared goal. The Court distinguished the English cases of R v Turner and R v Blastland, noting that the Singapore statutory framework under the CPC provided a wider gateway for hearsay than the English common law at the time.
3. Presumptions and the Accused’s Conduct
The Court invoked Section 116 of the Evidence Act, which allows the court to presume the existence of facts it thinks likely to have happened. The Court noted that Lee Chez Kee’s presence at the scene, his possession of the stolen COL card, and his flight from the country for over a decade were facts that required a credible explanation. His failure to provide one, or his provision of an inconsistent one, allowed the Court to draw an adverse inference regarding his guilty mind. The Court cited Indian authorities on Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act (in pari materia with Singapore's Section 116) to support the use of such presumptions in establishing the "totality of the circumstances."
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court found that the Prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court accepted the out-of-court statements of Too Yin Sheong as admissible and credible, finding they were made voluntarily. These statements, when combined with the circumstantial evidence of the COL card transactions, the identification by Ms. Lim, and the accused's own partial admissions, formed a "compelling and irresistible" case for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
The Court's final disposition was recorded as follows:
"For all the foregoing reasons, I held that the accused was guilty of the offence as charged. Accordingly, I convicted him and passed the mandatory death sentence on him." (at [74])
The accused, Lee Chez Kee, was convicted of the murder of Lee Kok Cheong and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty. No orders as to costs were made, as is standard in capital criminal proceedings in the High Court. The Court's decision effectively closed a case that had remained partially unresolved for thirteen years.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Public Prosecutor v Lee Chez Kee is a landmark decision in Singapore’s evidentiary landscape for several reasons. First, it provides the definitive interpretation of the hearsay exceptions found in the Criminal Procedure Code. By clarifying that Section 378 CPC operates independently of the Evidence Act's joint-trial requirement, the Court opened a significant door for the Prosecution to use statements from deceased or unavailable accomplices. This is particularly relevant in cases involving organized crime or multi-party offences where participants may be dealt with at different times.
Second, the judgment reinforces the "truth-seeking" philosophy of the Singapore courts. Tay Yong Kwang J’s reliance on Parliamentary intent signals a move away from technical exclusionary rules toward a system where the court evaluates the weight of evidence rather than its mere admissibility. This approach ensures that highly relevant evidence—such as a detailed confession by a co-conspirator—is not excluded on a technicality, provided its reliability (voluntariness) is established.
Third, the case serves as a masterclass in the application of Section 34 of the Penal Code. It clarifies that in the context of a violent robbery, a participant cannot easily escape liability for murder by claiming they did not personally strike the fatal blow. If the common intention was to commit a crime that naturally or likely involved the level of violence that led to death, all participants are equally liable. This has significant implications for how "common intention" is pleaded and proved in capital cases.
Finally, the case highlights the power of circumstantial evidence and the judicial use of presumptions under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The Court’s willingness to draw inferences from the accused’s flight and his possession of stolen property shortly after the murder underscores the difficulty an accused faces when they choose to remain silent or provide an implausible defense in the face of strong circumstantial links to a crime.
Practice Pointers
- Hearsay Strategy: Practitioners must look beyond the Evidence Act when considering the admissibility of out-of-court statements. Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides a much wider gateway for hearsay, especially when the declarant is dead or unavailable.
- Voluntariness is Key: When challenging the admission of a co-accused's statement under Section 378 CPC, the primary battleground is voluntariness. Defence counsel should focus on the circumstances under which the statement was taken rather than the hearsay nature of the evidence itself.
- Common Intention Risks: In multi-defendant robbery cases, counsel must advise clients that any participation in the restraint or subduing of a victim can lead to a murder conviction under Section 34 of the Penal Code, even if the client was not the primary aggressor.
- Managing Presumptions: Where the Prosecution relies on Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the Defence must proactively provide a "consistent and believable" alternative explanation for the accused's conduct (e.g., flight or possession of stolen goods) to prevent an adverse inference.
- Identification Evidence: The case demonstrates that even a single witness identification (like Ms. Lim's) can carry significant weight if it is corroborated by other circumstantial factors like electronic transaction records.
- Legislative History: This judgment underscores the importance of using Hansard and Parliamentary debates to interpret ambiguous or broad statutory provisions in the CPC.
Subsequent Treatment
The ratio in Lee Chez Kee regarding the admissibility of hearsay under the CPC has been consistently cited in subsequent Singapore criminal trials. It established that the CPC's hearsay provisions are not merely procedural but substantive exceptions that can override the Evidence Act's limitations. Later cases have refined the "voluntariness" requirement, but the core holding—that Section 378 CPC allows for the admission of "valuable" hearsay—remains a cornerstone of Singapore's criminal evidence law.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed), ss 378, 378(1), 378(1)(b)(i), 378(2), 379, 121, 122(5), 122(6)
- Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), ss 10, 30, 32, 116
- Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed), ss 34, 302
- Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 114
- Evidence Act 1950 (Malaysia), s 114
Cases Cited
- Considered: R v Bryan James Turner and others (1975) 61 Cr. App. R. 67
- Referred to: Public Prosecutor v Too Yin Sheong [1998] SGHC 286
- Referred to: Too Yin Sheong v Public Prosecutor [1999] 1 SLR 682
- Referred to: PP v Gerardine Andrew [1998] 3 SLR 736
- Referred to: PP v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR 582
- Referred to: Shaiful Edham bin Adam and another v PP [1999] 2 SLR 57
- Referred to: R v Blastland [1986] AC 41
- Referred to: R v Vincent Banka [1936] MLJ 53
- Referred to: Re Madgula Jermiah (1957) AIR Andhra Pradesh 611