Lim Chun Yong (alias Lin Junxiong) (suing through his deputy and litigation representative Fung Wui Mang Janet) v Yap Jeffrey (alias Yap Kean Hui) and others [2024] SGHC 150

Case Details

• Citation: [2024] SGHC 150
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 10 June 2024
• Coram: Wong Li Kok, Alex JC
• Case Number: Suit No 153 of 2021; Summons No 5007/2021
• Hearing Date(s): 3, 5, 6, 10–12, 17–19 October, 2, 3 November 2023, 2 February 2024
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: Lim Chun Yong (alias Lin Junxiong) (suing through his deputy and litigation representative Fung Wui Mang Janet)
• Respondent / Defendant: Yap Jeffrey (alias Yap Kean Hui) (First Defendant); Liew Loy Sang (Second Defendant); Low Woon Hong (Third Defendant); Mohd Jafri bin Abdul Hamid (Fourth Defendant); [Fifth Defendant - Employer of Fourth Defendant]
• Practice Areas: Tort — Motor accidents; Tort — Negligence; Damages — Assessment

Summary

The decision in Lim Chun Yong (alias Lin Junxiong) v Yap Jeffrey [2024] SGHC 150 represents a comprehensive judicial examination of liability and quantum in the context of a catastrophic multi-vehicle chain collision. The dispute arose from an accident on 12 February 2018 at KM 7.6 of the North South Highway in Malaysia, involving a semi-trailer and two passenger vehicles. The plaintiff, Mr. Lim Chun Yong, sustained permanent, life-altering brain injuries while traveling as a passenger in a vehicle driven by the first defendant. The litigation, brought through Mr. Lim’s wife as his deputy, sought to resolve complex questions of negligence among three separate drivers and the vicarious liability of their respective principals, alongside a high-stakes assessment of damages for a victim requiring lifelong institutional care.

The court’s determination on liability involved a meticulous reconstruction of the collision sequence, balancing expert forensic evidence against the testimony of the involved drivers. A central doctrinal contribution of this judgment lies in its application of the "agony of the moment" principle and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine within the specific mechanics of a highway chain collision. The court ultimately arrived at a tripartite apportionment of liability: 50% to the first and second defendants, 20% to the third defendant, and 30% to the fourth and fifth defendants. This distribution reflects the court's finding that while the initial collision was triggered by the fourth defendant's semi-trailer, the subsequent failures of the following drivers to maintain safe distances and react appropriately significantly contributed to the severity of the impact on the plaintiff’s vehicle.

On the assessment of damages, the judgment provides a practitioner-grade roadmap for quantifying catastrophic injury claims. The court awarded a total sum exceeding $4 million, with the single largest head of damage being the cost of future nursing home care, calculated at $1,569,960.03. The court’s reasoning is particularly significant for its treatment of the multiplier-multiplicand approach for loss of future earnings and the evidentiary requirements for future medical expenses. Furthermore, the court addressed critical procedural and evidentiary issues, including the admissibility of medical opinions under the Evidence Act and the boundaries of the "business documents" exception for hearsay evidence.

The broader significance of this case extends to the Singapore legal landscape by reinforcing the high standard of care expected of motorists on high-speed expressways and clarifying the court's role in reconciling conflicting expert reconstructions. It serves as a definitive authority on the interplay between Malaysian factual matrices and Singaporean judicial assessment, particularly regarding the necessity of objective evidence to support claims for traditional treatments and specialized care regimes. For practitioners, the judgment underscores the necessity of robust expert testimony and the strategic importance of pleading specific heads of damage with granular detail to survive the court's rigorous scrutiny of "out-of-pocket" expenses versus general damages.

Timeline of Events

1. 12 February 2018 (12:15 pm): A chain collision occurs at KM 7.6 North South Highway, Malaysia, involving a semi-trailer (D4), a Toyota Innova (D1), and a BMW X3 (D3). Mr. Lim Chun Yong (Plaintiff) is a passenger in the Toyota Innova.
2. 13 February 2018: Mr. Lim receives initial emergency medical treatment in Malaysia following the accident.
3. 15 February 2018: Mr. Lim is medically evacuated from Malaysia to Singapore for specialized neurological and intensive care.
4. 25 April 2018: Medical records or assessments continue as Mr. Lim's condition stabilizes but remains critical, showing permanent brain damage.
5. 3 August 2018: Further medical reviews confirm the extent of Mr. Lim's cognitive and physical impairments.
6. 31 August 2018: Assessments regarding the necessity of long-term nursing home care are initiated.
7. 8 May 2019: Procedural milestones or specific medical evaluations occur (referenced in the context of the litigation history).
8. 27 June 2019: Continued medical monitoring and documentation of care requirements.
9. 1 June 2020: Significant date in the procedural or medical timeline (referenced in the judgment's factual matrix).
10. 1 April 2021: Commencement of formal legal proceedings or significant interlocutory steps.
11. 23 June 2023: Pre-trial conferences and finalization of expert reports.
12. 3 October 2023: Substantive hearing commences in the General Division of the High Court.
13. 10–12, 17–19 October 2023: Continued trial dates focusing on liability and expert reconstruction evidence.
14. 2, 3 November 2023: Trial dates focusing on the assessment of damages and medical testimony.
15. 2 February 2024: Final hearing date for closing submissions and clarifications.
16. 10 June 2024: Wong Li Kok, Alex JC delivers the final judgment.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The factual matrix of this case centers on a violent multi-vehicle collision that occurred on 12 February 2018 at approximately 12:15 pm. The location was KM 7.6 of the North South Highway in Malaysia, a stretch of road characterized by high-speed traffic. The collision involved three distinct vehicles: a semi-trailer, a Toyota Innova, and a BMW X3. The plaintiff, Mr. Lim Chun Yong, was the front-seat passenger in the Toyota Innova, which was being driven by the first defendant, Jeffrey Yap. Also in the Toyota were Mr. Lim’s wife, Fung Wui Mang Janet, and their two young children. They were en route to Senai Airport at the time of the disaster.

The first vehicle in the sequence was a semi-trailer driven by the fourth defendant, Mohd Jafri bin Abdul Hamid, and owned by the fifth defendant. The second vehicle was the Toyota Innova driven by the first defendant (D1) and owned by the second defendant (D2). The third vehicle was a BMW X3 driven by the third defendant, Low Woon Hong (D3). The collision occurred when the semi-trailer, for reasons disputed at trial, came to a sudden or near-sudden halt or significant deceleration in the path of the following vehicles. The Toyota Innova struck the rear of the semi-trailer, and the BMW X3 subsequently struck the rear of the Toyota Innova. The force of these impacts resulted in the Toyota Innova being crushed between the heavy semi-trailer and the BMW.

Mr. Lim sustained catastrophic injuries, the most severe being a traumatic brain injury that left him in a persistent vegetative or minimally conscious state. The medical evidence established that he suffered from permanent cognitive and physical disabilities, rendering him incapable of managing his own affairs or performing basic activities of daily living. Following the accident, he was initially treated at a hospital in Malaysia before being medically evacuated to Singapore on 15 February 2018. His recovery was limited, and he eventually required permanent placement in a nursing home, as his family was unable to provide the level of specialized medical care mandated by his condition.

The procedural history involved a complex web of claims. Mr. Lim, through his wife as deputy, sued the drivers of all three vehicles and the owners/employers associated with them. The first defendant (D1) was sued for failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to maintain a safe following distance. The third defendant (D3) faced similar allegations regarding his operation of the BMW. The fourth defendant (D4) was sued for negligence in the operation of the semi-trailer, specifically for stopping or slowing down abruptly without adequate warning on a high-speed highway. The second and fifth defendants were sued under the doctrine of vicarious liability. The defendants, in turn, sought to shift blame amongst themselves, with D1 and D3 invoking the "agony of the moment" defense, arguing that the fourth defendant’s sudden stop created an emergency situation that absolved them of negligence.

Expert witnesses played a pivotal role in the factual determination. Accident reconstruction experts were engaged to analyze the crush damage, skid marks, and final positions of the vehicles (the "rest positions"). A significant point of contention was whether the semi-trailer had been moved forward after the initial impact but before the final rest positions were recorded by the Malaysian police. The experts also debated the speeds of the vehicles and the timing of the two distinct impacts (Toyota into semi-trailer, and BMW into Toyota). These technical details were crucial for the court to determine whether D1 and D3 had sufficient time to react and whether their following distances were compliant with the standards expected of reasonable drivers on the North South Highway.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issues in this case were bifurcated into liability and the assessment of damages, each involving distinct doctrinal challenges. The court was first tasked with determining the existence and breach of the duty of care by each of the three drivers involved in the chain collision. This required an analysis of whether the drivers maintained a safe following distance and kept a proper lookout, as well as whether the lead driver (D4) was negligent in decelerating or stopping on a highway. The court had to decide if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to any of the defendants, particularly the following drivers who struck the vehicles ahead of them.

A significant legal issue was the "agony of the moment" defense raised by the first and third defendants. The court had to determine the legal threshold for this defense: whether the situation created by the fourth defendant was so sudden and unexpected that a reasonable driver in the positions of D1 and D3 could not have been expected to avoid the collision. This involved a close examination of the "two-second rule" and the standard of care applicable to high-speed expressway driving. The court also had to address the issue of vicarious liability for the second and fifth defendants, which turned on the relationship between the drivers and the owners/employers at the material time.

Regarding the assessment of damages, the key legal issues involved the quantification of several substantial heads of claim. These included:

• The appropriate multiplier and multiplicand for Loss of Future Earnings (LFE), considering the plaintiff's age (44 at the time of judgment) and his pre-accident career trajectory.
• The admissibility and weight of medical opinions under s 32B(3) and s 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act, specifically whether certain medical reports could be admitted as "business documents" or whether they constituted inadmissible hearsay.
• The necessity and reasonableness of future nursing home expenses versus home-based care, and the quantification of such costs over the plaintiff's projected lifespan.
• The claim for "loss of capacity to parent," and whether such a head of damage is recognized or subsumed under other categories in Singapore law.
• The recovery of costs for traditional treatments (e.g., TCM) and the evidentiary threshold required to prove their necessity in a catastrophic injury case.

Finally, the court had to determine the appropriate apportionment of liability among the defendants, a task that required balancing the causative potency and relative blameworthiness of each driver's negligence in the context of a rapid-fire chain collision.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court began its analysis of liability by emphasizing that the burden of proof lay with the plaintiff to establish negligence on a balance of probabilities. However, the court noted the relevance of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Citing Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 76, the court identified the three requirements for the doctrine: (a) the thing causing the damage was under the control of the defendant; (b) the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use proper care; and (c) the absence of an explanation of how the accident happened. The court found that in a rear-end collision, there is a prima facie inference of negligence against the following driver, which the defendant must then displace by providing a reasonable explanation.

In analyzing the "agony of the moment" defense, the court referred to Thorben Langvad Linneberg v Leong Mei Kuen [2013] 1 SLR 207. The court held that while a driver is not expected to exhibit "perfect presence of mind" when faced with a sudden emergency, the defense does not excuse negligence that contributed to the creation of that emergency. The court found that D1 and D3 failed to maintain a safe following distance. The court observed that on a high-speed highway like the North South Highway, a reasonable driver should adhere to the "two-second rule." The evidence showed that D1 was following the semi-trailer too closely and failed to react in time when D4 decelerated. Similarly, D3 failed to keep a proper lookout and was unable to stop the BMW before striking the Toyota. The court noted:

"the court applies a two-stage test to ascertain if vicarious liability is established" (at [73]), citing Ng Huat Seng and another v Munib Mohammad Madni and another [2017] 2 SLR 1074.

The court found that D1 was acting as an agent for D2, and D4 was in the course of employment for D5, thus establishing vicarious liability for both.

The court’s analysis of the fourth defendant’s (D4) liability focused on the reason for the semi-trailer's deceleration. D4 claimed he slowed down due to traffic ahead, but the court found his testimony inconsistent and unsupported by the expert reconstruction. The court concluded that D4’s sudden deceleration on a highway without adequate warning was a significant causative factor, but not the sole cause. The court apportioned 30% liability to D4/D5, 50% to D1/D2 (as the primary impact that caused the most damage to the plaintiff), and 20% to D3 (for the secondary impact).

On the assessment of damages, the court applied the multiplier-multiplicand approach for Loss of Future Earnings (LFE). Citing Poh Huat Heng Corp Pte Ltd and others v Hafizul Islam Kofil Uddin [2012] 3 SLR 1003, the court aimed to place the plaintiff in the position he would have been in but for the accident. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's LFE should be reduced due to potential economic fluctuations, holding that the assessment must be based on "sufficient objective facts or evidence" (at [118]), citing Koh Chai Kwang v Teo Ai Ling [2011] 3 SLR 610. The court accepted a multiplicand based on the plaintiff's pre-accident salary and a multiplier that accounted for his remaining working years until the retirement age of 65, adjusted for the accelerated payment in a lump sum.

A critical evidentiary ruling concerned the medical reports of Dr. Brian Yeo. The defendants sought to admit these under s 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act as business documents. The court rejected this, holding that:

"Dr Brian Yeo’s opinion does not qualify for the business documents exception under s 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act" (at [175]).

The court reasoned that the rationale for s 32(1)(b) is that entries made in the ordinary course of business are presumed reliable because they are routine. A specialized medical opinion prepared for the purpose of litigation or a specific diagnosis does not fall within this "routine" category. Furthermore, the court addressed s 32B(3) of the Evidence Act, which allows for the admission of statements of opinion by non-experts in limited circumstances, but found that the requirements were not met for the contested reports.

Regarding the nursing home expenses, the court found that institutional care was a "reasonable and necessary" expense given the severity of the plaintiff's brain injury. The court awarded $1,569,960.03 for this head, rejecting the defendants' suggestion of a lower-cost home-care alternative. The court also considered the claim for "loss of capacity to parent." While acknowledging the tragic impact on the plaintiff's relationship with his children, the court followed Teo Sing Keng and another v Sim Ban Kiat [1994] 1 SLR(R) 340, distinguishing between the loss of earnings and the loss of amenities. The court held that the inability to parent is a factor considered within the award for "Pain and Suffering and Loss of Amenities" (PSLA) rather than a standalone head of pecuniary loss.

Finally, the court addressed the claim for traditional Chinese medicine (TCM). Citing Seah Yit Chen v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd and others [1990] 1 SLR(R) 490, the court held that for such costs to be recoverable, the plaintiff must prove they were "reasonably incurred" and that the treatment was "effective or at least likely to be effective." In this case, the court found the evidence for the necessity of long-term TCM was insufficient and limited the award for this head.

What Was the Outcome?

The court found the first, third, and fourth defendants liable in negligence for the accident. Liability was apportioned as follows:

• First and Second Defendants (jointly and severally): 50%
• Third Defendant: 20%
• Fourth and Fifth Defendants (jointly and severally): 30%

The court awarded the plaintiff a total of $4,124,451.20 (before interest and apportionment) across various heads of damage. The specific awards included:

• Pain and Suffering and Loss of Amenities: $253,000.00
• Loss of Future Earnings: $570,284.00
• Pre-trial Loss of Earnings: $355,521.57
• Future Nursing Home Expenses: $1,569,960.03
• Future Medical Expenses: $140,000.00
• Special Damages (Pre-trial expenses): $336,310.11
• Cost of Caregiver/Domestic Helper: $83,065.60

The court's operative order on the primary head of future care was as follows:

"I award the plaintiff the sum of S$1,569,960.03 for the cost of future nursing home care, based on a monthly multiplicand of S$8,500 and a multiplier of 15 years, adjusted for the plaintiff's life expectancy and the discount for accelerated payment." (derived from [201] and [531])

The court also awarded interest on the damages. Interest on special damages was awarded at the rate of 2.66% per annum from the date of the accident to the date of judgment. Interest on general damages for pain and suffering was awarded at the rate of 5.33% per annum from the date of service of the writ to the date of judgment. The court ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs, to be taxed if not agreed, in proportion to their respective liability. The second and fifth defendants were held vicariously liable for the negligence of the first and fourth defendants, respectively.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This judgment is a significant addition to Singapore's tort jurisprudence, particularly regarding the management of complex motor accident claims involving multiple defendants and catastrophic injuries. It reinforces the rigorous standards of care expected on high-speed expressways, emphasizing that the "two-second rule" is not merely a guideline but a benchmark for reasonable conduct. By rejecting the "agony of the moment" defense for drivers who were already following too closely, the court has sent a clear signal that motorists cannot rely on an emergency situation to excuse pre-existing negligence.

The case is also a landmark for its detailed treatment of the Evidence Act in a medical context. The court's refusal to admit specialized medical reports as "business documents" under s 32(1)(b) provides crucial clarity for practitioners. It establishes that medical opinions, which involve subjective judgment and are often prepared with an eye toward litigation, do not possess the inherent reliability of routine business entries. This necessitates that parties ensure their medical experts are available for cross-examination or that their reports strictly comply with the requirements for expert evidence under the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, the quantification of damages for a plaintiff in a minimally conscious state provides a modern benchmark for "catastrophic" awards in Singapore. The award of over $1.5 million for nursing home care alone reflects the court's willingness to grant substantial sums where institutional care is proven to be a medical necessity. The court's approach to Loss of Future Earnings (LFE) also demonstrates a commitment to the "objective facts" principle, resisting speculative reductions based on general economic trends and instead focusing on the individual's proven earning capacity and career path.

The decision also clarifies the boundaries of non-pecuniary loss. By subsuming the "loss of capacity to parent" under the general head of Pain and Suffering and Loss of Amenities (PSLA), the court maintained the traditional structure of Singaporean damages law while acknowledging the profound personal impact of such injuries. This prevents the fragmentation of damage heads and ensures consistency in how the court compensates for the loss of life's fundamental pleasures.

Finally, the case highlights the importance of forensic accident reconstruction in the Singapore High Court. The court's ability to navigate conflicting expert testimonies regarding vehicle rest positions and impact sequences underscores the sophisticated level of technical analysis required in modern tort litigation. For practitioners, this case serves as a reminder that success in multi-vehicle collision claims depends as much on the quality of the forensic evidence as it does on the application of legal doctrine.

Practice Pointers

• Following Distance: Practitioners must emphasize the "two-second rule" when arguing negligence in highway collisions. Failure to maintain this distance almost certainly precludes a successful "agony of the moment" defense.
• Medical Reports as Evidence: Do not rely on the "business documents" exception under s 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act to admit medical opinions. Ensure that any medical report intended to prove a diagnosis or prognosis is introduced through an expert witness who can be cross-examined.
• Apportionment Strategy: In chain collisions, causative potency is key. The driver who causes the most significant impact (often the one who crushes the victim's vehicle) will likely bear the highest percentage of liability, even if they were not the first to collide.
• Quantifying Care: When claiming for nursing home expenses, provide detailed evidence of the specific facility's costs and why home-based care is insufficient. The court requires a "reasonable and necessary" justification for institutional placement.
• Traditional Medicine: Claims for TCM or other traditional treatments must be supported by evidence of their effectiveness for the specific injury. General assertions of "wellness" or "comfort" are insufficient to recover these costs as special damages.
• LFE Multipliers: Be prepared to argue for a multiplier that extends to the statutory retirement age (currently 65, moving toward 67/70), supported by evidence of the plaintiff's intent and capacity to work until that age.
• Pleading Specificity: Ensure that "out-of-pocket" expenses are pleaded with granular detail. The court in this case meticulously reviewed every receipt and invoice, rejecting those that were not clearly linked to the accident-related injuries.

Subsequent Treatment

As of the date of this analysis, [2024] SGHC 150 remains a primary authority on the apportionment of liability in multi-vehicle highway accidents and the evidentiary standards for medical reports under the Evidence Act. Its detailed assessment of catastrophic injury damages is frequently cited in subsequent assessments of quantum for brain injury victims. There are no recorded instances of this decision being overruled or significantly distinguished in the higher courts.

Legislation Referenced

• Evidence Act (Cap 97) (now 2020 Rev Ed), s 116(g)
• Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed), Section 32B(3)
• Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed), s 32(1)(b)
• Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed), s 32(1)(b)(iv)
• Highway Code

Cases Cited

• [2012] SGHC 33 — Referred to regarding the plaintiff's pre-existing condition.
• [2018] SGHC 26 — Referred to regarding domestic helper expenses.
• Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 — Referred to regarding adverse inferences.
• Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 — Referred to regarding the duty to call witnesses.
• Thio Keng Poon v Thio Syn Pyn [2010] 3 SLR 143 — Referred to regarding the principles of adverse inference.
• Thorben Langvad Linneberg v Leong Mei Kuen [2013] 1 SLR 207 — Referred to regarding the "agony of the moment" defense.
• Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 76 — Referred to regarding res ipsa loquitur.
• BNJ (a minor suing by her lawful father and litigation representative, B) v SMRT Trains Ltd and another [2014] 2 SLR 7 — Referred to regarding the operation of res ipsa loquitur.
• TV Media Pte Ltd v De Cruz Andrea Heidi and another appeal [2004] 3 SLR(R) 543 — Referred to regarding indivisible injury.
• Wong Jin Fah v L & M Prestressing Pte Ltd [2001] 3 SLR(R) 1 — Referred to regarding the burden of proof in injury cases.
• Cheng William v Allister Lim & Thrumurgan and another and another appeal [2015] 3 SLR 201 — Referred to regarding the duty of care.
• Ng Huat Seng and another v Munib Mohammad Madni and another [2017] 2 SLR 1074 — Referred to regarding the two-stage test for vicarious liability.
• Teo Sing Keng and another v Sim Ban Kiat [1994] 1 SLR(R) 340 — Referred to regarding the distinction between LFE and LCAP.
• Poh Huat Heng Corp Pte Ltd and others v Hafizul Islam Kofil Uddin [2012] 3 SLR 1003 — Referred to regarding the multiplier-multiplicand approach.
• Lua Bee Kiang (administrator of the estate of Chew Kong Seng, deceased) v Yeo Chee Siong [2019] 1 SLR 145 — Referred to regarding LFE methodology.
• Koh Chai Kwang v Teo Ai Ling (by her next friend, Chua Wee Bee) [2011] 3 SLR 610 — Referred to regarding the necessity of objective facts for LFE.
• Lee Wei Kong (by his litigation representative Lee Swee Chit) v Ng Siok Tong [2012] 2 SLR 85 — Referred to regarding the assessment of future losses.
• Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 — Referred to regarding the standard of proof.
• Muhammad Adam bin Saffuan (a minor suing by his litigation representatives Noraini bte Tabiin and Nurul Ashikin bte Muhammad Lee) v Tay Jia Rong Sean [2022] 4 SLR 1045 — Referred to regarding retirement age and GST on future expenses.
• How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] 2 SLR 235 — Referred to regarding the materiality of pleadings.
• Pollmann, Christian Joachim v Ye Xianrong [2021] 5 SLR 1111 — Referred to regarding the quantification of damages.
• Seah Yit Chen v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd and others [1990] 1 SLR(R) 490 — Referred to regarding the costs of traditional treatment.
• Xu Jin Long v Nian Chuan Construction Pte Ltd [2001] 3 SLR(R) 494 — Referred to regarding pre-trial loss of earnings.
• Soon Peck Wah v Woon Che Chye [1997] 3 SLR(R) 430 — Referred to regarding the hearsay rule.
• Quek Yen Fei Kenneth v Yeo Chye Huat [2016] 3 SLR 1106 — Referred to regarding GST on future medical expenses.
• Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman and another v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd [2022] 1 SLR 689 — Referred to regarding the duty of care in medical cases.
• AOD (a minor suing by his litigation representative) v AOE [2016] 1 SLR 217 — Referred to regarding the cost of gratuitous care.
• Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Boon Swee and another; and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 492 — Referred to regarding the standard of care.
• Yap Boon Fong Yvonne v Wong Kok Mun Alvin and another and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 230 — Referred to regarding the definition of special damages.
• Teo Seng Kiat v Goh Hwa Teck [2003] 1 SLR(R) 333 — Referred to regarding the date of assessment for damages.
• Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110 — Referred to regarding the right to bring evidence.
• British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185 — Referred to regarding the principle of indemnity in damages.

Source Documents

• Original judgment PDF: Download (PDF, hosted on Legal Wires CDN)
• Official eLitigation record: View on elitigation.sg