LEONG SZE HIAN v LEE HSIEN LOONG

Sushant Shukla

Case Details

Citation: [2019] SGCA 53
Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
Decision Date: 27 September 2019
Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, Judith Prakash JA
Case Number: Civil Appeal No 61 of 2019
Hearing Date(s): 27 September 2019
Appellant: Leong Sze Hian
Respondent: Lee Hsien Loong
Counsel for Appellant: Lim Tean (Carson Law Chambers)
Counsel for Respondent: Davinder Singh s/o Amar Singh SC, Lin Xianyang Timothy, Fong Cheng Yee, David, Darveenia Rajula Rajah and Shannon Valencia Peh (Davinder Singh Chambers LLC)
Practice Areas: Civil Procedure; Striking out; Tort of Abuse of Process

In Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong [2019] SGCA 53, the Court of Appeal of Singapore delivered an ex tempore judgment that decisively reaffirmed the non-existence of the tort of abuse of process within the Singapore legal landscape. The appeal arose from a defamation action initiated by the Respondent, the Prime Minister of Singapore, against the Appellant, following the latter’s sharing of a link to a defamatory article on social media. The Appellant sought to mount a counterclaim premised on the tort of abuse of process, alleging that the Respondent was utilizing the "machinery of the state" to silence political critics. This attempt to introduce a standalone cause of action for abuse of process was met with a striking-out order in the High Court, which the Appellant subsequently challenged before the apex court.

The Court of Appeal, presided over by Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, and Judith Prakash JA, dismissed the appeal in its entirety. The Court held that the Appellant’s claim was fundamentally foreclosed by the landmark decision in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866. In that case, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal had explicitly ruled that the tort of abuse of process is not a recognized tort under Singapore law. The Court in the present instance found no principled basis to depart from this recent and authoritative precedent, nor did it find merit in the Appellant’s attempt to "carve out" an exception based on the Respondent’s public office or alleged political motivations.

The judgment serves as a critical reminder of the Singapore judiciary's commitment to procedural finality and its resistance to "satellite litigation." By refusing to recognize a standalone tort of abuse of process, the Court emphasized that the legal system provides alternative, sufficient mechanisms—such as the power to strike out abusive pleadings and the discretionary award of costs—to address instances where the process of the court is invoked for improper purposes. The decision reinforces the principle that the inconvenience and stress of litigation are historically managed through costs rather than through the creation of new, potentially expansive tortious liabilities that could deter genuine litigants from seeking judicial redress.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal’s decision underscores the high threshold required to displace established precedents, particularly those concerning the fundamental structure of tortious liability and civil procedure. The dismissal of the appeal, accompanied by a significant costs award of $20,000 against the Appellant, signals the Court’s dim view of attempts to circumvent settled law through novel but unprincipled legal arguments. For practitioners, the case clarifies that the "abuse of process" doctrine remains a procedural shield or a ground for striking out, rather than a sword that can be wielded as an independent cause of action for damages.

Timeline of Events

November 2018 (Approximate): The Appellant, Leong Sze Hian, shares a link on his Facebook page to an article published on a Malaysian website. The article alleges "secret deals" between the Prime Ministers of Singapore and Malaysia regarding 1MDB and the Singapore–Malaysia High-Speed Rail.
Late 2018: The Respondent, Lee Hsien Loong, commences a defamation action against the Appellant in the High Court of Singapore.
December 2018 – early 2019: The Appellant files his defence, refusing to concede the falsity of the article. Simultaneously, the Appellant files a counterclaim against the Respondent, pleading the tort of abuse of process.
2019: The Respondent files an application to strike out the Appellant’s counterclaim on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action.
2019: The Appellant files a cross-application to strike out the Respondent’s defamation claim, alleging it is an abuse of process.
2019 (High Court Proceedings): The High Court Judge strikes out the Appellant’s counterclaim and dismisses the Appellant’s application to strike out the Respondent’s defamation claim.
2019: The Appellant files Civil Appeal No 61 of 2019, appealing only against the High Court’s decision to strike out his counterclaim.
27 September 2019: The Court of Appeal hears the substantive appeal.
27 September 2019: The Court of Appeal delivers its ex tempore judgment, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the Respondent.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The dispute originated from a social media post made by the Appellant, Leong Sze Hian. The Appellant had shared a link to an article published on a Malaysian website. This article contained serious allegations concerning the Respondent, Lee Hsien Loong, who is the Prime Minister of Singapore. Specifically, the article suggested that there were "secret deals" involving "corrupted Prime Ministers" of Singapore and Malaysia. The narrative within the article linked these alleged deals to the ongoing investigations into 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) and suggested that the Respondent had entered into "unfair agreements" with the former Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, including the agreement for the Singapore–Malaysia High-Speed Rail.

In response to the publication, the Respondent commenced a defamation action against the Appellant. The Respondent’s position was that the article and the sharing of the link constituted a defamatory publication that harmed his reputation. The Appellant, in his defence, did not concede that the contents of the article were false. He maintained that he was entitled to defend the claim on its merits. However, the Appellant went further than merely defending the suit; he initiated a counterclaim against the Respondent. This counterclaim was framed as a cause of action in the tort of abuse of process. The Appellant’s primary contention was that the Respondent’s act of bringing the defamation suit was itself an abuse of the court’s process, intended to silence him as a critic of the government.

The Appellant’s legal strategy was two-fold. First, he sought to strike out the Respondent’s defamation claim on the grounds that it was an abuse of process. Second, he sought damages through his counterclaim, arguing that the tort of abuse of process should be recognized as a valid cause of action in Singapore. The Appellant’s counsel, Mr. Lim Tean, argued that the Respondent was acting in his public capacity and was using the "machinery of the state" to suppress dissent. To support this, the Appellant pointed to statements made by the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and other government agencies regarding the article in question.

The Respondent, represented by Mr. Davinder Singh SC, moved to strike out the counterclaim. The Respondent’s argument was straightforward: Singapore law does not recognize the tort of abuse of process. This position was based on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lee Tat Development. The High Court Judge agreed with the Respondent, striking out the counterclaim while dismissing the Appellant’s separate application to strike out the defamation claim. The Appellant chose to appeal only the striking out of his counterclaim, bringing the matter before the Court of Appeal. The factual matrix before the Court of Appeal was thus narrowed to the legal viability of the counterclaim in light of the Respondent’s status and the alleged use of state resources.

During the hearing, the Court of Appeal scrutinized the Appellant’s claim that state machinery was being used. The Court noted that the defamation suit was brought by the Respondent in his personal capacity, using private solicitors (Davinder Singh Chambers LLC). The only "organ of state" directly involved in the litigation was the judiciary. The Appellant’s counsel eventually clarified that the "machinery of state" argument referred to actions by agencies like the IMDA, rather than the court itself. However, the Court found that these external actions were not relevant to the legal validity of a counterclaim for abuse of process within the specific defamation proceedings.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the tort of abuse of process is a recognized cause of action under Singapore law. This required the Court to determine if a defendant in a civil suit could mount a counterclaim for damages based on the allegation that the plaintiff’s commencement of the action was an abuse of process. The issue was not merely procedural but substantive, as it touched upon the boundaries of tortious liability in the jurisdiction.

A secondary, but equally critical, issue was whether an exception to the general rule against the recognition of this tort should be "carved out" in cases involving public figures or the alleged use of state machinery. The Appellant argued that even if the tort was generally not recognized, the specific circumstances of this case—where the Prime Minister was the plaintiff and was allegedly using his position to silence critics—warranted a different approach. This issue required the Court to consider whether the policy reasons underlying the non-recognition of the tort could be displaced by the identity of the parties or the political context of the litigation.

Finally, the Court had to address the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis in relation to its previous decision in Lee Tat Development. The issue was whether there were any compelling reasons or changes in the legal landscape that would justify the Court departing from a unanimous decision delivered by a five-judge panel only a year prior. This involved a deep dive into the policy considerations of finality, the prevention of satellite litigation, and the adequacy of existing procedural remedies for abusive conduct in litigation.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court of Appeal’s analysis began by defining the narrow scope of the appeal. Sundaresh Menon CJ, delivering the judgment ex tempore, emphasized that the Court would not comment on the merits of the Appellant’s defences to the defamation claim, as those were not the subject of the appeal. The sole focus was the Appellant’s contention that he was entitled to "sue the respondent and mount a cause of action in abuse of process" (at [3]).

The Court first addressed the novelty of the Appellant’s position. It noted that the Appellant’s counsel had failed to cite any authority, either from Singapore or other jurisdictions, that supported the recognition of such a claim in the context of a defamation suit. The Court observed:

"It seems to us improbable that a person can publish what is potentially defamatory of another and then sue that other person for attempting to protect his interests by bringing an action in defamation, on the basis that the very act of bringing the action is an abuse of process." (at [3])

The Court then turned to the Appellant’s argument regarding the "machinery of the state." The Appellant had argued that the Respondent, as Prime Minister, was using state resources to silence critics. The Court dismantled this premise by observing that the Respondent had brought the action in his own capacity and had engaged private solicitors. The Court noted that the only organ of state involved was the judiciary, and the Appellant’s counsel had clarified that he was not suggesting the court itself was part of the "machinery" being misused. The Court found that statements by the IMDA or other agencies were irrelevant to the Respondent’s right to bring a private defamation action (at [4]-[5]).

The core of the Court’s reasoning rested on the application of Lee Tat Development. The Court noted that Lee Tat Development was a "recent decision," "fully and carefully reasoned," and reflected the "unanimous views of a five-judge panel of this court" (at [6]). In that case, the Court had held that the tort of abuse of process is not recognized in Singapore. The Court in the present case reiterated the four primary policy reasons for this non-recognition:

Undermining Finality: Recognizing the tort would encourage "satellite litigation," where the same facts are litigated twice—once in the original suit and again in a suit for abuse of process. This would prolong disputes and undermine the finality of judicial decisions.
Floodgates: It would open the floodgates to a "variety of claims," as almost any unsuccessful litigant could potentially be sued for "abusive" commencement of proceedings.
Deterrence: It could deter "genuine litigants with potentially valid claims" from seeking access to the courts for fear of being met with a retaliatory tort claim.
Adequacy of Existing Remedies: The Court emphasized that the law already provides "adequate means" to deal with abuses of process through procedural rules (such as striking out) and the court’s discretion in awarding costs.

The Court rejected the Appellant’s plea to "carve out" an exception. It reasoned that the policy considerations identified in Lee Tat Development remained valid and were not displaced by the Respondent’s status as a public official. The Court noted that the common law has historically addressed the "inconvenience, stress, pain and other suffering" of litigation through the award of costs, rather than through the creation of new torts (at [7]). The Court concluded that there was "no reason or basis for departing from Lee Tat Development" (at [8]).

What Was the Outcome?

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court’s decision to strike out the Appellant’s counterclaim. The Court’s order was concise and definitive:

"In the circumstances, we dismiss the appeal." (at [8])

As a consequence of the dismissal, the Appellant was unable to proceed with his claim for damages based on the tort of abuse of process. The underlying defamation action brought by the Respondent was allowed to continue, but without the "satellite" issue of the counterclaim. The Court also addressed the issue of costs, ordering the Appellant to pay the Respondent’s costs for the appeal. The costs were fixed at $20,000, inclusive of disbursements. The Court also made the "usual order for the payment out of the security for costs," ensuring that the Respondent would be partially indemnified for the legal expenses incurred in defending the appeal (at [9]).

The outcome solidified the procedural status of the "abuse of process" doctrine in Singapore. It remains a ground for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to stay or strike out proceedings, but it cannot form the basis of an independent claim for damages. The Appellant’s attempt to use the counterclaim as a strategic tool in the defamation suit was thus effectively neutralized by the Court’s adherence to the Lee Tat Development precedent.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is of significant importance to Singaporean jurisprudence for several reasons. First, it provides a robust confirmation of the principles laid down in Lee Tat Development. By applying a decision from a five-judge panel so soon after it was delivered, the Court of Appeal has signaled that the non-recognition of the tort of abuse of process is a settled and fundamental aspect of Singapore’s civil procedure and tort law. This provides much-needed certainty for practitioners and litigants alike.

Second, the case clarifies that the identity of the parties—even when one party is the Prime Minister or a high-ranking public official—does not justify a departure from established legal principles regarding the recognition of torts. The Court’s rejection of the "public capacity" and "machinery of state" arguments reinforces the principle of equality before the law. It demonstrates that the policy reasons against recognizing the tort of abuse of process (such as finality and the prevention of satellite litigation) apply universally, regardless of the political context of the dispute.

Third, the decision underscores the Court’s preference for procedural remedies over the expansion of tortious liability. By pointing to the adequacy of striking-out mechanisms and costs awards, the Court has directed practitioners to use existing tools within the Rules of Court to address abusive litigation. This approach maintains the efficiency of the legal system and prevents the "weaponization" of the tort of abuse of process as a means of intimidating plaintiffs.

Finally, the case serves as a cautionary tale for practitioners regarding the limits of novel legal arguments in the face of clear precedent. The Court’s ex tempore dismissal and the substantial costs award highlight the risks of pursuing appeals that seek to challenge recently settled law without a strong, principled basis for doing so. For the broader legal landscape, the case reinforces the judiciary's role in protecting the integrity of the court process while ensuring that the doors of justice remain open to all litigants without the fear of retaliatory tort claims.

Practice Pointers

Do Not Plead the Tort of Abuse of Process: Practitioners must accept that the tort of abuse of process is not recognized in Singapore. Any attempt to plead it as a standalone cause of action or counterclaim is highly likely to be struck out.
Utilize Procedural Remedies: If a client believes that an opponent’s suit is abusive, the correct strategy is to apply to strike out the claim under the Rules of Court or invoke the court’s inherent jurisdiction to stay the proceedings.
Focus on Costs: Practitioners should advise clients that the primary remedy for being subjected to abusive or meritless litigation is the recovery of costs at the conclusion of the matter.
Respect Stare Decisis: When a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal has recently and unanimously decided a point of law (as in Lee Tat Development), the threshold for persuading a subsequent panel to depart from that decision is extremely high.
Distinguish Personal and Public Capacity: In defamation suits involving public figures, practitioners should carefully distinguish between the individual’s right to protect their personal reputation and any actions taken by state agencies, as the latter may be irrelevant to the legal merits of the suit.
Avoid Satellite Litigation: The Court of Appeal is strongly opposed to "satellite litigation" that prolongs disputes. Practitioners should avoid strategies that involve mounting counterclaims that essentially re-litigate the same facts as the main claim.

Subsequent Treatment

The decision in Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong [2019] SGCA 53 has served to entrench the ratio of Lee Tat Development. It is frequently cited in subsequent striking-out applications to demonstrate that any claim framed as a "tort of abuse of process" is legally unsustainable and discloses no reasonable cause of action. The case has effectively closed the door on attempts to circumvent the non-recognition of this tort by alleging special circumstances or public-interest exceptions.