Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGCA 36
- Title: Lee Zheng Da Eddie v Public Prosecutor and another appeal
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 2023-11-03
- Judges: Judith Prakash JCA, Tay Yong Kwang JCA and Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA
- Appellant (CA/CCA 29/2022): Lee Zheng Da Eddie (“Lee”)
- Appellant (CA/CCA 30/2022): Yap Peng Keong Darren (“Yap”)
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor (“PP”)
- Procedural posture: Appeals against conviction and sentence (Lee) and sentence only (Yap) following a decision of the High Court
- High Court decision: Public Prosecutor v Lee Zheng Da Eddie and another [2022] SGHC 199
- Criminal appeal numbers: CA/CCA 29/2022 and CA/CCA 30/2022
- Legal areas: Criminal Law — Statutory offences
- Statutes referenced: Criminal Procedure Code; First Schedule to the Misuse of Drugs Act; Misuse of Drugs Act
- Key statutory provisions (as reflected in the extract): Misuse of Drugs Act ss 5(1)(a), 5(2), 18(2), 33(1), 33B(1), 33B(2)
- Judgment length: 39 pages, 10,852 words
- Cases cited (as provided): [2022] SGHC 199; [2023] SGCA 36
Summary
In Lee Zheng Da Eddie v Public Prosecutor and another appeal, the Court of Appeal considered two connected appeals arising from a joint trial for drug trafficking offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act (the “MDA”). Lee and Yap were convicted for trafficking in three packets containing not less than 1352.8g of granular/powdery substance, which was analysed to contain not less than 24.21g of diamorphine (the “Three Bundles”). The trial judge (“Judge”) found that the elements of the trafficking charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt for both accused.
The appeals turned on distinct issues. Lee challenged his conviction and sentence, including whether he proved an “Oversupply Defence” (that he received twice the amount of heroin he had ordered) and whether the Judge erred in assessing his credibility and drawing an adverse inference from his failure to mention the defence earlier in his cautioned statement. Yap, whose appeal was against sentence only, argued that he had rebutted the statutory presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA and also raised an argument relating to prosecutorial discretion to prefer a capital charge.
The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the sentencing outcomes. It affirmed the trial judge’s approach to the evidential burden on the accused, the evaluation of credibility, and the treatment of omissions in earlier statements. The Court also addressed the scope of prosecutorial discretion in relation to the capital charge regime and confirmed the mandatory sentencing consequences where the statutory conditions for the alternative sentencing regime were not satisfied.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The prosecution’s case was that Lee and Yap were involved in a coordinated drug transaction on 4 July 2018. Lee, who consumed drugs and trafficked drugs to earn income, sourced drugs from suppliers located in Malaysia. He would retain some drugs for personal consumption and sell the rest to customers in Singapore. Yap was identified as one of Lee’s customers and had access to a car through his employment as a private hire driver.
On the day of the offence, Lee checked into room 2613 at the Pan Pacific Singapore hotel (the “Hotel”). He was accompanied by his girlfriend, Nomsutham Passara (“Passara”). Lee then arranged for Yap to collect drugs that evening. At about 5.21pm, Lee sent Yap a Telegram message containing a screenshot of a WhatsApp conversation with a person recorded in Lee’s phone as “Kelvin Mama Ws” (referred to as “Kelvin”). The screenshot showed a signboard for “METALL-TREAT INDUSTRIES PTE LTD” at “28/30 Gul Avenue”. Lee did not dispute that this name corresponded to his Malaysian drug supplier, and it was also undisputed that Yap did not know this supplier personally.
Yap understood the Telegram message as an instruction to proceed to 28/30 Gul Avenue to collect drugs. Further Telegram messages were exchanged in which Yap sought confirmation of the collection time and Lee instructed Yap to collect the drugs at 8.30pm that night at 28/30 Gul Avenue. Before the collection, Yap and Lee met at the Hotel so that Yap could collect $16,000 in cash from Lee. Lee instructed Yap to hand the cash to the person who would pass him the drugs at 28/30 Gul Avenue.
At about 7.22pm, Lee met Yap at the lift lobby of the Hotel and they went to the room. Lee gave Yap the cash in a sealed green bag and also gave Yap a green bag intended for the drugs to be collected later. Yap then left the Hotel and drove to 28/30 Gul Avenue, where he waited in his car. An unidentified motorcyclist arrived, Yap passed the cash to the motorcyclist, and the motorcyclist threw three bundles of heroin and two blocks of cannabis onto the front passenger seat. Yap placed the drugs into the green bag and returned to the Hotel.
At around 9.51pm, Yap arrived at the Hotel, parked his car, placed one block of cannabis under the front passenger seat, and then went up to the room with the remaining drugs in the green bag. The agreed facts indicated that once in the room, Yap took out the Three Bundles and the remaining block of cannabis, removed the newspaper wrapping around each heroin bundle, and weighed the Three Bundles using a weighing scale on the table. Shortly thereafter, CNB officers entered, arrested Lee, Yap and Passara, and seized the Three Bundles and the cannabis block. Forensic analysis later showed that multiple spoons and weighing scales in the room were stained with diamorphine and methamphetamine.
CNB also searched Yap’s car and seized the other block of cannabis. A white envelope labelled “$5,000” containing $800 was recovered. Various electronic devices were seized from both Lee and Yap and were forensically analysed. The trafficking charges were framed on the basis that Lee was in possession of the Three Bundles for the purpose of trafficking, while Yap was involved in trafficking by delivering the Three Bundles to Lee.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
For Lee, the Court of Appeal had to determine whether the trial judge was correct in finding that Lee did not prove the “Oversupply Defence” on the required standard. Lee’s defence was that he had been mistakenly supplied with twice the amount of heroin as he had ordered, and that this affected the quantity of diamorphine that he intended to traffic. The legal question therefore involved both the evidential burden and the credibility of Lee’s account.
Lee also challenged the trial judge’s assessment of his credibility. In particular, the Court had to consider whether the Judge erred in how he evaluated Lee’s testimony and supporting evidence, including the reliability of Lee’s explanation for how the oversupply occurred and the consistency of his narrative with the surrounding circumstances.
Additionally, Lee argued that the Judge was not justified in drawing an adverse inference against him for omitting the Oversupply Defence from his cautioned statement recorded under s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code (the “CPC”). This raised an important issue about how omissions in earlier statements may be treated in assessing whether an accused’s later defence is credible and whether it should be given weight.
For Yap, the key issues were different. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether Yap had rebutted the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA. That presumption typically arises from the accused’s possession or control of drugs in certain circumstances, shifting the evidential burden to the accused to explain or rebut the presumption. Yap also raised an argument that Article 12(1) of the Constitution was engaged by prosecutorial discretion to prefer a capital charge against him, and the Court had to address whether that constitutional argument could succeed on the facts.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal approached Lee’s appeal by focusing on the trial judge’s findings on the Oversupply Defence and the evidential burden. The Court noted that Lee’s knowing possession of the Three Bundles and his knowledge of the nature of the drug (diamorphine) were not in dispute. The controversy lay in whether Lee could show that he had been supplied with more heroin than he intended to traffic, such that the quantity relevant to the charge should be reduced.
On the Oversupply Defence, the Court examined whether Lee proved the defence on a balance of probabilities. The trial judge had found that Lee’s account lacked credibility and that Lee’s evidence about calling Kelvin to inform him of the oversupply, as well as the purported missed call from Kelvin, could not be believed. The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s reasoning that the defence was not supported by reliable evidence and that the narrative did not withstand scrutiny when tested against the totality of the circumstances.
Crucially, the Court also considered the omission of the Oversupply Defence from Lee’s cautioned statement. The trial judge had drawn an adverse inference because Lee did not raise the Oversupply Defence at the earliest opportunity when his cautioned statement was recorded under s 23 of the CPC, and he only raised it later in the Case for Defence. The Court of Appeal analysed whether such an omission was properly treated as undermining the credibility of the defence. It accepted that while an accused is not required to disclose every possible defence at the cautioned statement stage, the failure to mention a central feature of the defence—particularly where it is later advanced as a key explanation for the quantity—could legitimately affect the weight to be given to the defence.
In evaluating credibility, the Court of Appeal also addressed Lee’s argument that the trial judge placed too much weight on the fact that Yap’s evidence did not support the Oversupply Defence. The Court’s analysis reflected a common appellate theme in MDA cases: the trial judge is entitled to consider whether the defence is corroborated by other evidence, including the co-accused’s testimony, and whether the defence is internally coherent. Where the defence depends on a specific factual occurrence (oversupply by a supplier and communication about it), the absence of corroboration can be significant. The Court did not treat Yap’s lack of support as determinative by itself, but rather as part of the overall assessment of whether Lee’s defence was credible and sufficiently proved.
On Yap’s appeal, the Court of Appeal’s analysis centred on the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA. The Court considered whether Yap had rebutted the presumption. This required an assessment of whether Yap’s explanation (as to his role and knowledge) was credible and sufficient to raise reasonable doubt or otherwise satisfy the evidential burden imposed by the statutory framework. The Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that Yap did not rebut the presumption, meaning that the statutory consequences followed.
Yap further argued that Article 12(1) was engaged by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to prefer a capital charge. The Court of Appeal examined the constitutional argument in light of established principles governing prosecutorial discretion in capital drug cases. The Court’s reasoning, as reflected in the issues framed, indicates that the constitutional challenge could not displace the statutory sentencing scheme where the accused did not qualify for the alternative sentencing regime. In other words, the Court treated the prosecutorial decision to prefer a capital charge as within lawful discretion and not as an actionable breach of constitutional equality on the facts presented.
Finally, the Court addressed mandatory sentencing consequences. For Lee, the trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of death because Lee did not qualify for sentencing under the alternative regime in ss 33B(1) and 33B(2) of the MDA. For Yap, the trial judge imposed life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane under the alternative regime, with the life sentence backdated to 4 July 2018. The Court of Appeal’s confirmation of these outcomes underscores the strict statutory structure: eligibility for the alternative regime is fact-sensitive and depends on whether the accused satisfies the statutory conditions.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Lee’s appeal against conviction and sentence. It affirmed the trial judge’s conclusion that Lee failed to prove the Oversupply Defence on a balance of probabilities, and it upheld the adverse inference drawn from Lee’s omission of that defence from his cautioned statement. The Court also rejected Lee’s credibility-based arguments and his contention that the trial judge over-weighted Yap’s evidence.
As for Yap, the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal against sentence. It upheld the trial judge’s finding that Yap did not rebut the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA and rejected the constitutional argument relating to prosecutorial discretion to prefer a capital charge. The practical effect was that Lee’s mandatory sentence and Yap’s alternative sentencing outcome remained unchanged.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it reinforces the evidential and credibility standards applied to drug trafficking defences under the MDA. The Court of Appeal’s treatment of the Oversupply Defence illustrates that where a defence depends on a specific factual narrative—such as a supplier’s mistake and subsequent communication—courts will scrutinise the defence for internal coherence and evidential support. The case therefore serves as a cautionary example for defence counsel: a later-advanced explanation for quantity must be supported by reliable evidence and must be consistent with earlier statements.
The Court’s discussion of adverse inferences from omissions in cautioned statements is also practically important. While the CPC framework does not require an accused to lay out every defence at the earliest stage, the Court’s endorsement of the trial judge’s approach signals that omissions of central factual matters can undermine credibility. For lawyers, this highlights the need for careful and accurate preparation of an accused’s account at the cautioned statement stage, particularly where the defence is likely to be central to the accused’s case at trial.
For sentencing strategy, the case underscores the strict statutory eligibility requirements for the alternative sentencing regime under ss 33B(1) and 33B(2). Even where an accused is otherwise involved in the same transaction, eligibility turns on the statutory criteria and the court’s findings on the relevant factual issues. The decision also confirms that constitutional arguments against prosecutorial discretion in capital charge selection face substantial hurdles where the statutory sentencing framework applies.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), including:First Schedule (Class ‘A’ controlled drug listing)
- Section 5(1)(a)
- Section 5(2)
- Section 18(2) (presumption)
- Section 33(1) (mandatory punishment framework)
- Section 33B(1) and Section 33B(2) (alternative sentencing regime)
Cases Cited
- Public Prosecutor v Lee Zheng Da Eddie and another [2022] SGHC 199
- [2023] SGCA 36
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGCA 36 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.