Forbes Monaco APAC v Kawajiri Seiji [2026] SGHC 16

Case Details

• Citation: [2026] SGHC 16
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 21 January 2026
• Coram: Tan Siong Thye SJ
• Case Number: Originating Claim No 747 of 2025; Summonses Nos 2841, 2992 and 3072 of 2025
• Hearing Date(s): 10 November 2025
• Claimant: Forbes Monaco APAC
• Respondent / Defendant: Kawajiri Seiji
• Counsel for Respondent: Tan Kai Liang, Afzal Ali, Joshua Foo and Matthew Soo (Allen & Gledhill LLP)
• Practice Areas: Civil Procedure; Mareva injunctions; Abuse of Process

Summary

The decision in Forbes Monaco APAC v Kawajiri Seiji [2026] SGHC 16 represents a significant judicial rebuke of the misuse of the court’s coercive powers, specifically the ex parte Mareva injunction. The dispute arose from a claim for a staggering €93,000,000 (part of a larger €124,913,014 figure), which the claimant, Forbes Monaco APAC, alleged was a receivable extinguished by the defendant, Kawajiri Seiji. The claimant asserted that the defendant had unilaterally altered the founders' register of an entity known as Forbes Private Bank Monaco SA (FPBM) to remove the claimant, thereby causing the loss of the substantial debt. To secure this claim, the claimant obtained an ex parte freezing order (ORC 5600) against the defendant's assets.

The High Court, presided over by Tan Siong Thye SJ, set aside the freezing order in its entirety upon finding that the claimant had failed to satisfy any of the requisite legal thresholds for such relief. Central to the court's reasoning was the total absence of a "good arguable case." The court found that the claimant, an entity registered in Singapore by one David Max Pierre Mezhrahid ("David") just months before the litigation, had no legitimate standing or evidence to support the existence of the alleged €93 million debt. The court further determined that there was no real risk of asset dissipation, as the claimant’s evidence consisted of nothing more than the defendant’s ordinary business activities and unsubstantiated assertions of dishonesty.

Beyond the failure to meet the Bouvier criteria, the judgment is notable for its findings on the breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure and the finding of an abuse of process. The court discovered that David had registered the claimant as a partnership with the defendant without the defendant's knowledge or consent, a fact suppressed during the ex parte application. Most egregiously, the claimant’s supporting affidavits included citations to fictitious legal authorities, including a case titled “Mentari Capital v Noor [2020] SGHC 205,” which the court identified as a fabrication. The court concluded that the litigation was not a bona fide pursuit of legal rights but a personal vendetta orchestrated by David using the claimant as his "alter ego."

The doctrinal contribution of this case lies in its reinforcement of the "duty of candour" in ex parte proceedings and the court's willingness to pierce the corporate veil for the purpose of costs. Given the "egregious" conduct of David, the court took the rare step of ordering him to personally pay $30,000 in costs to the defendant. This case serves as a stark warning to practitioners and litigants alike regarding the consequences of misleading the court and the high evidentiary bar required to maintain a Mareva injunction in the face of a challenge.

Timeline of Events

1. 31 January 1974: Date associated with David Max Pierre Mezhrahid (referenced in the judgment context).
2. 1 November 2018: A date relevant to the historical dealings between the parties.
3. 21 January 2020: A date cited in the factual matrix regarding the parties' interactions.
4. 23 December 2020: The date on which the claimant alleged the founders' register of FPBM was unilaterally altered to remove the claimant and extinguish the €93 million receivable.
5. 6 April 2022: A date relevant to the ongoing dispute between David and the defendant.
6. 11 April 2022: Further relevant date in the parties' timeline of interactions.
7. 10 March 2025: David registers "Forbes Monaco APAC" with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) as a partnership, naming himself and the defendant as partners.
8. 10 September 2025: A date immediately preceding the commencement of legal action.
9. 11 September 2025: David causes the claimant to file HC/OC 747/2025 and an ex parte application for a Mareva injunction.
10. 19 September 2025: Date of the transcript of the ex parte hearing where the injunction was initially granted.
11. 29 September 2025: A procedural milestone following the grant of the injunction.
12. 9 October 2025: The defendant begins filing summonses to challenge the injunction and the claimant's standing.
13. 10 October 2025: Further procedural filings by the parties.
14. 13 October 2025: Relevant date in the interlocutory phase.
15. 14 October 2025: Relevant date in the interlocutory phase.
16. 17 October 2025: Relevant date in the interlocutory phase.
17. 22 October 2025: Relevant date in the interlocutory phase.
18. 23 October 2025: Relevant date in the interlocutory phase.
19. 3 November 2025: Date of a hearing or filing in the lead-up to the substantive set-aside hearing.
20. 6 November 2025: Further procedural date.
21. 8 November 2025: Further procedural date.
22. 10 November 2025: Substantive hearing of the summonses to set aside the Mareva injunction and for personal costs.
23. 24 November 2025: A date following the hearing, likely for further submissions or clarifications.
24. 21 January 2026: The High Court delivers judgment setting aside the injunction and ordering personal costs against David.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The litigation was initiated by Forbes Monaco APAC (the "claimant"), an entity registered in Singapore on 10 March 2025. The registration was performed by David Max Pierre Mezhrahid ("David") under the Business Names Registration Act 2014. In the ACRA filing, David listed himself and the defendant, Kawajiri Seiji, as partners. However, the defendant was entirely unaware of this registration and had never consented to being a partner in such an entity. David later admitted that he used the name "Forbes Monaco APAC" because the name "Forbes Monaco" was unavailable, and he claimed it was an administrative recognition of a Monaco-based société civile particulière called "Forbes Monaco" (Forbes Monaco SCP).

The core of the claimant's substantive claim involved a staggering sum of €93,000,000. David alleged that the claimant was a founder of Forbes Private Bank Monaco SA (FPBM), a company incorporated under the International Business Companies Act 2014 of Mwali. According to the Statement of Claim, FPBM had a paid-up capital of €93 million. David asserted that on 23 December 2020, the defendant unilaterally altered the founders' register of FPBM to remove the claimant. This removal allegedly extinguished a receivable of €93 million owed to the claimant. The claimant sought the recovery of this sum, along with other amounts, bringing the total alleged debt to approximately €124,913,014. This total included a sum of €31,913,014 and other smaller amounts such as €62,000 and €40,000.

On 11 September 2025, the claimant commenced HC/OC 747/2025 and successfully obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction (ORC 5600) against the defendant. To support the application, David filed affidavits claiming that there was a real risk the defendant would dissipate his assets. He pointed to the defendant’s involvement in various international business ventures and alleged that the defendant had acted dishonestly in the FPBM matter. David also cited several legal authorities to persuade the court of the merits of his case.

The defendant subsequently applied to set aside the injunction. In the ensuing proceedings, it was revealed that the claimant’s case was built on a series of misrepresentations. First, the defendant produced evidence that FPBM was not a partnership and that the claimant had no recorded interest in it. Documents showed that FPBM was a company with a share capital structure, and the claimant (or Forbes Monaco SCP) held no shares. Second, the defendant demonstrated that David had no authority to register him as a partner in the Singapore entity. Third, the defendant’s counsel identified that one of the primary legal authorities cited by David in his first affidavit—"Mentari Capital v Noor [2020] SGHC 205"—was entirely fictitious. While the citation [2020] SGHC 205 exists in the Singapore Law Reports, it refers to an entirely different case (RCMA Asia Pte Ltd v Sun Electric Power Pte Ltd) and contains no such parties or legal propositions as David had claimed.

Furthermore, the defendant argued that David had a history of litigation misconduct and was using the Singapore courts to pursue a personal vendetta. The defendant pointed out that David had failed to disclose that the Monaco courts had already dealt with similar issues and that David’s claims had been rejected. The defendant also highlighted that David had failed to provide any evidence of a "real risk of dissipation" beyond the defendant’s ordinary business dealings, which included the management of assets worth approximately €130m.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issue was whether the ex parte Mareva injunction (ORC 5600) should be set aside. Under the established framework in Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar v Accent Delight International Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 558, this required the court to determine:

• Whether the claimant had established a "good arguable case" on the merits of its claim for the €93 million receivable.
• Whether there was a "real risk" that the defendant would dissipate his assets to frustrate the enforcement of an anticipated judgment.

In addition to the Bouvier criteria, the court had to address several procedural and ethical issues that arose from the claimant's conduct:

• Breach of the Duty of Full and Frank Disclosure: Whether the claimant had failed to disclose material facts during the ex parte application, specifically regarding the defendant's lack of consent to the ACRA registration and the prior history of the dispute in other jurisdictions.
• Abuse of Process: Whether the claimant had commenced the proceedings for a collateral purpose (a personal vendetta) and whether the citation of fictitious legal authorities constituted an abuse of the court's process.
• Personal Liability for Costs: Whether the conduct of David was sufficiently egregious to warrant an order for costs against him personally, rather than against the corporate claimant, thereby piercing the corporate veil for the purpose of costs.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court’s analysis was a systematic deconstruction of the claimant’s case, beginning with the requirement of a "good arguable case."

No Good Arguable Case

The court applied the definition of a partnership under s 1(1) of the Partnership Act 1890, which requires "a business in common with a view of profit." The court noted that whether an entity meets this definition depends on the contract giving rise to the relationship (citing Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR(R) 655). The claimant relied on a "2017 Deed," but the court found that this document did not establish a partnership between David and the defendant. Furthermore, the court observed that the claimant provided no evidence that FPBM was a partnership. On the contrary, the defendant produced company documents showing FPBM was a company incorporated under the International Business Companies Act 2014 of Mwali, with a share capital of €93,000 (not €93 million) and that the claimant held no shares in it.

The court found David’s claim for the €93 million receivable to be "fanciful." The claimant’s assertion that its removal from a "founders' register" extinguished a debt was unsupported by any legal principle or evidence. The court held:

"David, through the claimant, provided no evidence to show that FPBM was a partnership... the company documents of FPBM showed that it was a company with a share capital of €93,000... there was no evidence of any €93m receivable." (at [27]–[28])

No Real Risk of Dissipation

On the second Bouvier limb, the court held that the claimant failed to show a real risk of dissipation. The court reiterated that the risk must be established by "solid evidence" and not mere "unsubstantiated assertions" (citing Continental Shipping Line Pte Ltd v Jonathan John Shipping Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 1191). The claimant’s reliance on the defendant’s business activities and the alleged dishonesty in the underlying claim was insufficient. The court noted that the defendant’s assets were substantial (approximately €130m) and that his ordinary business dealings did not constitute a risk of dissipation. The court also noted that the claimant's application for a receivership order was made without any evidence of post-injunction circumstances showing an increased risk.

Breach of Full and Frank Disclosure

The court found the claimant’s breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure to be "material and egregious." Under the principles in Tay Long Kee Impex Pte Ltd v Tan Beng Huwah [2000] 1 SLR(R) 786, a claimant in an ex parte application must disclose all facts material to the judge's decision. The claimant failed to disclose that the defendant had not consented to the ACRA registration and that the claimant was essentially a "shell" created for the litigation. The court also found that David had misled the court about the nature of the €93 million, which was actually the share capital of FPBM and not a debt owed to the claimant.

Abuse of Process

The court’s most severe criticism was reserved for the claimant’s abuse of process. Following the categories in CIX v DGN [2025] 1 SLR 272, the court found that David had used the legal process for a collateral purpose—to harass the defendant. The court was particularly disturbed by the use of fictitious authorities. David had cited “Mentari Capital v Noor [2020] SGHC 205” in his affidavit. The court found that David had "hallucinated" this case to bolster his arguments. The court stated:

"Clearly, David had hallucinated this case... This was a dishonest attempt to mislead the court... The claimant’s conduct was an affront to the integrity of the judicial process." (at [6] and [65])

Personal Liability for Costs

Finally, the court addressed the issue of costs. While costs usually follow the event and are paid by the losing party, the court found that David’s conduct justified an order for personal costs. The court found that David was the "moving spirit" behind the claimant and had used it as his "alter ego" to insulate himself from liability. Given the "dishonest and egregious" nature of the litigation, the court ordered David to personally pay $30,000 in costs to the defendant.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court granted the defendant's applications in Summonses Nos 2841, 2992, and 3072 of 2025. The primary order was the immediate setting aside of the Mareva injunction granted on 11 September 2025.

The court’s operative order was as follows:

"I ordered that ORC 5600 be set aside." (at [17])

In addition to setting aside the injunction, the court made the following consequential orders:

• The claimant's application for a receivership order was dismissed.
• The claimant was ordered to pay costs to the defendant for the setting aside of the injunction and the related summonses.
• Crucially, the court ordered that David Max Pierre Mezhrahid personally pay the costs of the proceedings to the defendant. The court fixed these costs at $30,000.

The court’s decision to order personal costs against David was based on the finding that he had acted dishonestly and had abused the court's process for a collateral purpose. The court found that the claimant entity was merely a vehicle for David's personal vendetta and that he was the individual responsible for the "hallucinated" legal authorities and the material non-disclosures. The $30,000 quantum was deemed appropriate given the complexity of the matter and the extent of the claimant's misconduct.

Why Does This Case Matter?

Forbes Monaco APAC v Kawajiri Seiji is a landmark decision for its robust defense of the integrity of the Singapore judicial system against sophisticated abuse. It matters for several reasons across the landscape of civil procedure and legal ethics.

First, it reinforces the sanctity of the ex parte process. The Mareva injunction is one of the "nuclear weapons" of civil litigation. This judgment serves as a reminder that the court will not hesitate to dismantle such orders—and punish the applicants—if the high duty of full and frank disclosure is not met. The court's emphasis on the "materiality" of the non-disclosed facts (such as the lack of consent for the ACRA registration) provides clear guidance for practitioners on what must be brought to the court's attention, even if it is detrimental to the applicant's case.

Second, the case addresses the emerging threat of fictitious legal authorities. Whether these authorities are "hallucinated" by individuals or generated by artificial intelligence, the court's response is unequivocal: such conduct is an "affront to the integrity of the judicial process" and will be treated as a severe abuse of process. This is one of the first Singapore cases to explicitly deal with the citation of a non-existent case in a substantive affidavit, setting a precedent for how the courts will handle such dishonesty.

Third, the judgment provides a clear example of piercing the corporate veil for costs. While the claimant was a registered business entity, the court looked behind the corporate form to the "moving spirit" (David). This demonstrates that the court will not allow individuals to hide behind shell entities to escape the financial consequences of conducting "dishonest and egregious" litigation. This is a vital tool for defendants who are targeted by "straw man" claimants in meritless but expensive lawsuits.

Fourth, the court’s analysis of the "good arguable case" requirement in the context of complex international financial claims is instructive. The court refused to be swayed by the sheer magnitude of the claim (€93 million) and instead insisted on a rigorous examination of the underlying legal basis. By identifying that the "receivable" was actually share capital and that the "partnership" was non-existent, the court demonstrated that it will look past labels to the substance of the transaction.

Finally, the case highlights the international reach of the Singapore High Court. Despite the dispute involving entities in Monaco and Mwali and parties with international backgrounds, the court applied Singapore law (including the Partnership Act 1890 and the Business Names Registration Act 2014) to resolve the procedural and substantive issues. This reinforces Singapore's position as a forum that demands the highest standards of conduct from all litigants, regardless of their origin.

Practice Pointers

• Verification of Client Instructions: Practitioners must rigorously verify the basis of a client's claim to be in a partnership. As seen in this case, a mere ACRA registration is not conclusive evidence of a partnership under the Partnership Act 1890 if the underlying "business in common" is absent.
• The "Hallucination" Check: Counsel have an overriding duty to the court to ensure that all cited authorities are genuine. The citation of a fictitious case like "Mentari Capital v Noor" is a fatal blow to a party's credibility and can lead to personal costs orders.
• Full and Frank Disclosure is Absolute: In ex parte applications, counsel must disclose facts that might lead the court not to grant the order. Failure to disclose that a defendant did not consent to a business registration or that there were prior adverse proceedings in other jurisdictions will almost certainly lead to the order being set aside.
• Risk of Dissipation Requires "Solid Evidence": Do not rely on general allegations of dishonesty or the fact that a defendant has international assets. Practitioners must point to specific actions or circumstances that suggest a real risk of assets being moved to frustrate a judgment.
• Personal Liability for Costs: Litigants who use corporate shells to pursue personal vendettas should be warned that the court can and will order costs against them personally if the litigation is found to be an abuse of process.
• Scrutinize Financial Labels: When a claim involves large sums like "receivables" or "extinguished debts," practitioners should verify the accounting and corporate nature of these sums. In this case, the €93 million was share capital, not a debt, which fundamentally changed the legal analysis.
• Duty to Contextualize: As noted in The “Vasiliy Golovnin”, merely disclosing a fact without its proper context may be insufficient to satisfy the duty of candour.

Subsequent Treatment

[None recorded in extracted metadata]

Legislation Referenced

• Business Names Registration Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed), s 5
• Partnership Act 1890 (2020 Rev Ed), s 1, s 1(1), s 10
• International Business Companies Act 2014 (Mwali)
• Rules of Court 2021, Order 56 r 1

Cases Cited

• Applied: Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar v Accent Delight International Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 558
• Referred to: Econ Piling Pte Ltd v NCC International AB [2008] SGHC 26
• Referred to: Mentari Capital v Noor [2020] SGHC 205 (Identified as fictitious in name)
• Referred to: Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR(R) 655
• Referred to: JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 159
• Referred to: Continental Shipping Line Pte Ltd v Jonathan John Shipping Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 1191
• Referred to: Tay Long Kee Impex Pte Ltd v Tan Beng Huwah [2000] 1 SLR(R) 786
• Referred to: Sim Kok Beng [2009] 4 SLR(R) 365
• Referred to: The “Vasiliy Golovnin” [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994
• Referred to: Parastate Labs Inc v Wang Li [2023] 2 SLR 376
• Referred to: CIX v DGN [2025] 1 SLR 272

Source Documents

• Original Judgment at eLitigation
• Judgment PDF (CDN)