Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 225
- Title: Chang Jiunn Jye v Public Prosecutor
- Court: High Court (General Division)
- Case type: Magistrate’s Appeal
- Magistrate’s Appeal No: 9016 of 2025/01
- Date of decision: 12 November 2025
- Date of hearing: 10 October 2025
- Judge: See Kee Oon JAD
- Appellant: Chang Jiunn Jye
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Legislation referenced: Payment Services Act 2019 (Act 2 of 2019) (“PSA”); Moneylenders Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed) (by analogy)
- Other statutory context: Payment Systems (Oversight) Act (Cap 222A, 2007 Rev Ed); Money-Changing and Remittance Businesses Act (Cap 187, 1996 Rev Ed)
- Legal areas: Criminal law; statutory offences; payment services regulation; “carrying on a business”
- Key sentencing framework case: Vijay Kumar v Public Prosecutor [2023] 5 SLR 983
- Related lower court decision: Public Prosecutor v Chang Jiunn Jye [2025] SGMC 32 (“GD”)
- Judgment length: 21 pages; 5,848 words
Summary
In Chang Jiunn Jye v Public Prosecutor ([2025] SGHC 225), the High Court upheld the appellant’s conviction under the Payment Services Act 2019 (“PSA”) for providing cross-border money transfer/payment services without a licence. The appeal turned primarily on whether the appellant “carried on a business” of providing payment services, rather than whether he merely performed isolated or ad hoc transactions.
The court clarified the applicable “Business Inquiry” under the PSA. It emphasised that the statutory prohibition is directed at unlicensed persons who carry on a business of providing payment services, not at the mere act of providing such services in a single instance. Applying the relevant test, the High Court found that the appellant’s conduct—spanning two transactions involving large sums, with a structured method of facilitating the conversion and remittance, and with evidence of system, continuity and repetition—was sufficient to establish that he carried on such a business.
On sentencing, the High Court did not disturb the District Judge’s approach. It accepted that deterrence is the dominant sentencing consideration for offences under s 5(3) of the PSA and that the sentencing framework in Vijay Kumar v Public Prosecutor should guide the custodial starting point. The global sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment was found not to be manifestly excessive in the circumstances.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellant, Chang Jiunn Jye, became acquainted with a company, Coeus International Holdings Pte Ltd (“Coeus”), through his girlfriend’s sister, who was a client of Coeus. Coeus provided administrative assistance to international students seeking to study in Singapore. The appellant also knew two directors of Coeus: Feng Shukun (“Feng”) and Ng Keng Leong (“Ng”).
The first charge arose in January 2021. Feng received a call from Li Xiaona (“Li”), a Coeus client, who requested assistance in changing US$1m worth of Renminbi (“RMB”) into US dollars. The appellant happened to be in Feng’s office when Feng received the call. Feng informed the appellant of Li’s request, and the appellant told Feng that he provided currency exchange services and would check exchange rates. Li agreed to use the appellant’s services, and the appellant then communicated with Li via WeChat messages through Feng as an intermediary.
Those messages contained detailed instructions on how the currency exchange would be effected. In substance, US$1m was transferred from Indonesia into Li’s Singapore bank account through an Indonesian remittance company. The appellant provided details of various bank accounts in China, which Feng forwarded to Li. Li then arranged for certain sums of RMB to be transferred to the Chinese bank accounts in accordance with the appellant’s instructions. Feng also testified that the appellant paid her $4,048 “out of goodwill” for her assistance. These events formed the subject matter of the first charge, occurring from 26 to 27 January 2021.
The second charge arose in early 2021 as well. In February 2021, Li again requested assistance in changing US$1m worth of RMB into US dollars. Feng contacted the appellant, who agreed to assist. The appellant again provided detailed instructions to Li through Feng. The arrangement was similar in structure: Li would transfer the RMB equivalent of US$1m to various Chinese bank accounts identified by the appellant, and US$1m would then be transferred to Li’s Singapore bank account from Indonesia.
However, Li did not receive the corresponding US dollar amount for the full RMB transfer. She transferred the equivalent of US$800,000 in RMB to the Chinese bank accounts but did not receive the corresponding US$800,000 into her Singapore account. Li refused to complete the remaining transfer and requested an “IOU” note from the appellant to assure her that the US$800,000 would be transferred.
On 4 March 2021, the appellant provided Li with an IOU note and a copy of the identity card of Koh Bee Hong (“Koh”). Feng testified that the appellant told her Koh was his principal and that Koh possessed a money changing licence. A meeting was held on 12 March 2021 involving the appellant, Feng, Ng, Li, Koh, and Lee Kah Leong (“Lee”). At the meeting, the appellant reiterated that Koh was his principal. The parties agreed that US$800,000 would be remitted into Li’s bank account by 15 March 2021. Lee would issue three cheques totalling S$1m to Li on behalf of Koh, and if Li did not receive US$800,000 by 16 March 2021, she could lodge a police report. The cheques were rejected for insufficient funds, and Li never received the US$800,000.
In the proceedings below, the appellant did not deny his involvement in the two transactions. He conceded that he financially benefitted from the transactions by profiting from the exchange rate difference. His defence was that he was merely a middleman who introduced the “real parties” (Li and Koh) to each other and therefore did not provide payment services. He also denied that he was in the business of providing payment services.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court identified three principal issues. First, it had to determine whether the appellant “carried on a business of providing payment services” within the meaning of the PSA. This required the court to articulate and apply the correct “Business Inquiry” test, including whether the District Judge (“DJ”) properly assessed whether the appellant’s conduct satisfied the relevant elements such as system, continuity, and repetition.
Within this first issue, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. He argued that there were only two transactions and that this should not be enough to establish “business” activity. He also contended that there was no continuity because the transactions were based on personal friendship—particularly his relationship with Feng—rather than any broader business model. Further, he disputed the DJ’s interpretation of his messages and communications.
Second, the court had to consider whether the appellant could be prosecuted for his involvement in the transactions. This issue was closely linked to the statutory structure: the PSA criminalises carrying on a business of providing payment services without a licence, so the question was whether the appellant’s role fell within the statutory prohibition.
Third, the court had to decide whether the sentence imposed by the DJ was manifestly excessive. The appellant argued that the global sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment was higher than sentences imposed in other precedents, and he sought appellate intervention on sentencing grounds.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by situating the PSA within Singapore’s regulatory framework. The PSA, introduced in 2019, streamlined regulation of payment services previously governed under the Payment Systems (Oversight) Act and the Money-Changing and Remittance Businesses Act. In particular, the court noted that “remittance business” regulation had been restructured so that cross-border money transfer services are now regulated under the PSA. This legislative context mattered because it explained why the PSA focuses on licensing and why unlicensed “business” activity is criminalised.
The court then emphasised the statutory distinction between providing payment services and carrying on a business of providing payment services. Section 5(1)(a), read with Part 1 of the First Schedule, prohibits an individual from carrying on a business of providing any type of payment service in Singapore without the requisite licence. The prohibition is therefore not directed at payment services per se, but at unlicensed business activity. The court drew an analogy to the Moneylenders Act regime, where similar interpretive distinctions have arisen: the law targets the unlicensed carrying on of regulated activity as a business, not the mere occurrence of a transaction.
On the “Business Inquiry”, the court clarified that the relevant test is whether the person’s conduct shows the requisite degree of system, continuity, and repetition. The appellant argued that the prosecution had to show more than just system, continuity, and repetition; he submitted that the prosecution also needed to establish that he was willing to provide services to “all and sundry”. The High Court rejected the notion that the prosecution must prove an open-ended willingness to serve anyone. Instead, it treated the inquiry as a fact-sensitive assessment of whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to business activity rather than isolated conduct.
Applying the test, the court found that the evidence supported the DJ’s conclusion. Although there were only two transactions, the court held that the number of transactions is not determinative by itself. What mattered was the nature of the appellant’s involvement: he was deeply involved in structuring and facilitating the conversions and remittances, provided detailed instructions, and used a method that operated across the transactions. The appellant’s communications were not merely incidental; they were operational and directed at enabling Li to transfer RMB to specified Chinese bank accounts and to receive US dollars into Singapore.
The court also addressed the continuity argument. The appellant claimed there was no continuity because the transactions were driven by friendship with Feng. The High Court accepted that personal relationships can be part of how business is conducted, but it did not accept that this necessarily negates continuity. The relevant continuity was not limited to whether the appellant had a standing customer base; rather, it was whether his conduct demonstrated an ongoing pattern of facilitating regulated payment services in a structured way. The second transaction occurred after the first, with a similar structure and continued involvement by the appellant, supporting continuity.
On the appellant’s interpretation of his messages and role, the High Court agreed with the DJ that the appellant’s communications and actions went beyond mere introduction. The appellant provided instructions on bank accounts, exchange arrangements, and the mechanics of remittance. He also provided an IOU note when the US$800,000 was not received, and he represented that Koh was his principal and that Koh had the relevant licence. These actions indicated that the appellant was not a passive intermediary but an active facilitator who assumed responsibility for the transaction outcomes.
In relation to the second issue (prosecutability), the court’s analysis followed from its conclusion on the first issue. Once the appellant’s conduct was found to amount to carrying on a business of providing payment services without a licence, the statutory basis for prosecution was satisfied. The court did not treat the appellant’s “middleman” characterisation as a shield. The PSA’s licensing purpose would be undermined if persons who operationally facilitate unlicensed payment services could avoid liability by characterising themselves as mere introducers.
On sentencing, the High Court reviewed the DJ’s approach. It reiterated that deterrence is the dominant sentencing consideration for offences under s 5(3) of the PSA. The DJ had used Vijay Kumar v Public Prosecutor as the sentencing framework, adopting a starting point of three weeks’ imprisonment. The High Court accepted that an uplift was warranted due to the quantum of money involved in the transactions. It also accepted that the uplift was moderated because the appellant had provided S$800,000 in compensation.
The appellant argued that the global sentence was manifestly excessive compared with other precedents. The High Court did not accept that comparison. It noted that sentencing precedents must be read in light of the applicable framework and the evolution of sentencing guidance. Since Vijay Kumar provided the relevant structured approach, the DJ’s sentence was assessed against that framework rather than against older cases that did not necessarily reflect the same sentencing calibration.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence. It affirmed the DJ’s finding that the appellant carried on a business of providing payment services without a licence, and therefore committed the offences charged under the PSA.
It also upheld the sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment (with the sentences for the two charges ordered to run concurrently). Practically, the decision confirms that structured facilitation of cross-border money transfers—especially involving large sums, repeated transactions, and operational instructions—will likely satisfy the “business” element even where the accused claims to be a mere intermediary.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Chang Jiunn Jye v Public Prosecutor is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how the PSA’s “carrying on a business” requirement should be approached. The court’s emphasis on system, continuity, and repetition provides a workable analytical framework for both prosecution and defence. It also confirms that the inquiry is not reduced to a numerical threshold of transactions, nor is it defeated simply because the accused’s conduct arose through personal relationships.
For defence counsel, the case highlights the limits of the “middleman” narrative. Where the accused provides detailed operational instructions, manages the mechanics of remittance, and takes steps to address non-performance (such as issuing an IOU or representing licensing status), the court may infer that the accused is actively carrying on regulated payment services rather than merely introducing parties.
For prosecutors and compliance advisers, the decision reinforces the PSA’s licensing rationale. The court’s reasoning suggests that liability will attach to those who facilitate unlicensed payment services in a structured and repeatable manner, even if they do not hold themselves out as a public-facing service provider. This has practical implications for investigations: evidence of messaging patterns, bank account instructions, and transaction-to-transaction repetition may be central to proving the “business” element.
Legislation Referenced
- Payment Services Act 2019 (Act 2 of 2019), in particular s 5(1)(a), s 5(3)(a), and Part 1 of the First Schedule [CDN] [SSO]
- Payment Systems (Oversight) Act (Cap 222A, 2007 Rev Ed)
- Money-Changing and Remittance Businesses Act (Cap 187, 1996 Rev Ed)
- Moneylenders Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed) (by analogy on the “carrying on” concept)
Cases Cited
- Vijay Kumar v Public Prosecutor [2023] 5 SLR 983
- Public Prosecutor v Chang Jiunn Jye [2025] SGMC 32
- [2024] SGHC 101
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 225 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.