On 25 September 2024, Justice Rene Le Miere issued a decisive order in the DIFC Court of First Instance, halting the progress of ARB 018/2024. Faced with a procedural deadlock between an emergency arbitration seated in the DIFC and enforcement efforts initiated in the Dubai Courts, the Court opted for a stay under Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024. The ruling effectively pauses the Claimant’s attempt to nullify emergency arbitral awards while the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction determines the ultimate forum for the dispute.
For cross-border litigators and arbitration counsel, this decision serves as a stark reminder that the DIFC’s status as a 'seat' is increasingly subject to the jurisdictional gatekeeping of the Judicial Committee. As the Dubai Courts and DIFC Courts grapple with overlapping enforcement and annulment applications, the reliance on Decree 29 of 2024 signals a shift toward a more cautious, deferential approach to jurisdictional conflicts, forcing parties to navigate the complex interplay between the DIAC Rules and the local supervisory framework before they can reach the merits of their set-aside applications.
How Did the Dispute Between Naatiq and Nabeeh Arise?
The procedural labyrinth in Naatiq v Nabeeh [2024] DIFC ARB 018 exposes a critical vulnerability in the architecture of modern cross-border dispute resolution: the volatile transition from arbitral interim relief to state court enforcement. At its core, the dispute involves Naatiq, a joint stock company incorporated in Libya operating as a passenger airline, and Nabeeh, a UAE-based free zone company functioning as an aircraft lessor. The commercial relationship between the two entities deteriorated over obligations contained within a lease agreement. The record indicates that the lessor had previously exhibited leniency regarding contractual deadlines, as Naatiq asserted that Nabeeh was aware of operational difficulties and granted the airline certain forbearance in complying strictly with the timelines imposed by the lease.
Despite this alleged forbearance, the commercial relationship fractured, prompting Nabeeh to initiate formal proceedings. The jurisdictional anchor for the ensuing battle was firmly planted in the Dubai International Financial Centre. As Justice Rene Le Miere observed, the foundational agreement between the parties was unambiguous regarding the forum.
Whereas it is established as per the arbitration contract clause agreed upon under the Agreement that both parties agreed upon conducting the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the DIAC Arbitration Rules, provided that the seat of the arbitration is DIFC.
By selecting the DIFC as the arbitral seat, the parties subjected their dispute to the supervisory jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts and the procedural framework of the DIFC Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008). Nabeeh commenced arbitration of a dispute under the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) Rules, immediately triggering the emergency arbitrator provisions to secure its position against the Libyan airline.
The emergency phase of the arbitration generated a layered and highly contested procedural history. At Nabeeh’s behest, DIAC appointed an Emergency Arbitrator who granted emergency interim relief via an order dated 16 February 2024. Naatiq did not passively accept this initial encumbrance; the airline swiftly applied to discharge the February Order. On 27 March 2024, the Emergency Arbitrator dismissed Naatiq’s application, ruling that the initial interim measures would remain in full effect. The procedural sequence culminated on 12 July 2024, when the Emergency Arbitrator issued a formal confirmation, granting explicit permission for the execution of the interim relief.
It is at this juncture that the strategic friction between the arbitral seat and onshore enforcement materialized. Armed with three distinct arbitral instruments—the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission—Nabeeh faced a tactical choice. As the seat of the arbitration, the DIFC Courts possessed primary supervisory jurisdiction and the statutory authority to recognize and enforce the emergency measures. However, Nabeeh bypassed the DIFC Courts entirely. On 4 June 2024, the lessor commenced proceedings directly in the onshore Courts of Dubai. The objective was clear: to secure immediate onshore ratification and execution against Naatiq’s assets, circumventing any potential supervisory scrutiny or delay within the DIFC forum.
The specific relief Nabeeh sought in the Dubai Courts was aggressive and execution-oriented. The lessor petitioned the onshore tribunal for ratification of the arbitral measures and, crucially, for direct coercive action against the airline.
Second: - Ordering enforcement measures to be taken against the defendant to implement the provisions of the approved interim. measures.”
This strategic pivot to the Dubai Courts represents a recurring flashpoint in UAE arbitration practice. By seeking enforcement outside the arbitral seat, a prevailing party often attempts to outflank the respondent, securing onshore attachments before the respondent can mount a nullification challenge at the seat. This dynamic echoes the jurisdictional maneuvering frequently observed in complex enforcement actions, such as those analyzed in ARB-003-2013: Banyan Tree Corporate PTE Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2013] DIFC ARB 003, where the boundaries of the DIFC Courts' conduit jurisdiction and supervisory authority were fiercely contested.
Faced with imminent enforcement measures in onshore Dubai, Naatiq launched a comprehensive counter-offensive in the DIFC Courts. On 2 August 2024, the airline issued an Arbitration Claim Form seeking to dismantle the emergency arbitrator’s framework entirely. Naatiq invoked Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law, petitioning the Court for an order nullifying the February and March Orders and the July Permission.
Nullification alone, however, would not immediately halt the advancing onshore execution. To neutralize the immediate threat, Naatiq sought a potent equitable remedy: an anti-suit injunction designed to paralyze Nabeeh’s enforcement efforts in the Dubai Courts. The requested injunction was drafted with maximum prohibitive breadth.
(b) Antisuit injunction
(ii) Until further Order of the Court, the Defendant, whether by its directors, officers, employees or agents or in any other way, shall refrain from taking any steps to enforce the Emergency Arbitration Awards [the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission], or any subsequent interim arbitral awards, in the Dubai Courts or elsewhere.
The filing of the Arbitration Claim in the DIFC Courts, coupled with the pending enforcement action in the Dubai Courts, crystallized a textbook jurisdictional conflict. Two parallel judicial tracks were now active, addressing the exact same arbitral instruments but driving toward mutually exclusive outcomes. The Dubai Courts were being asked to ratify and execute the emergency orders, while the DIFC Courts were simultaneously being asked to nullify them and enjoin the very execution the Dubai Courts were considering.
Recognizing the untenable nature of these parallel proceedings, Naatiq escalated the matter to the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction (the JJT). Simultaneously, Naatiq filed Application No. ARB-018-2024/2 in the DIFC Courts, seeking a mandatory stay of the DIFC proceedings pursuant to Article 7 of Decree No. (29) of 2024. The newly enacted Decree 29 of 2024, which replaced the older Decree 19 of 2016, imposes a strict statutory guillotine on proceedings when a valid conflict is referred to the Judicial Committee.
The doctrinal debate before Justice Le Miere centered on whether a genuine conflict of jurisdiction had actually materialized, or whether the mere existence of parallel filings was insufficient to trigger the mandatory stay. Naatiq argued for a pragmatic interpretation of the conflict rules. The airline contended that the simultaneous activation of both court systems inherently created a jurisdictional clash that required the JJT's intervention.
Thus, the claimant submitted, so long as the two cases were “alive” without a ruling on jurisdiction, there was a conflict of jurisdiction.
To substantiate the existence of a conflict, the Court examined prior jurisprudence, notably the precedent set in Lakhan v Lamia. In that matter, the tribunal analyzed the threshold for a jurisdictional dispute, determining that a court need not affirmatively declare its jurisdiction to create a conflict; rather, the absence of a formal relinquishment of jurisdiction could suffice. The critical feature of the factual circumstances in Lakhan v Lamia was the fact that in the DIFC Court, the only step taken after the commencement of proceedings was the lodgment of an unresolved jurisdictional objection by the defendant. The claimant in that case successfully argued that it was not necessary for the Court to decide to hear the matter; it was enough that there was a “negative act,” meaning the court had not abandoned its jurisdiction.
Applying this framework to the Naatiq and Nabeeh dispute, Justice Le Miere evaluated the trajectory of the parallel filings. The Dubai Courts had not dismissed the enforcement petition, nor had the DIFC Courts declined to hear the nullification claim. Both judicial entities retained active dockets concerning the same emergency arbitral awards. The risk of irreconcilable judgments was not merely theoretical; it was the inevitable outcome if both courts proceeded to judgment. The DIFC Court might nullify an award that the Dubai Court had already ordered executed, creating an enforcement paradox that the JJT was specifically designed to prevent.
Justice Le Miere concluded that the statutory threshold for a stay under the new decree had been met. The Court acknowledged that a potential conflict of jurisdiction existed between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts, necessitating immediate deference to the Judicial Committee. The ruling emphasized that the JJT's mandate is preemptive, designed to resolve jurisdictional ambiguities before contradictory orders are issued.
On any translation of the Decree, it is clear that the JJT is given jurisdiction to intervene prior to the point of inconsistent or contradictory judgments having been reached.” [44] – [45].
Consequently, the DIFC Court was compelled to halt its own proceedings. The nullification application and the highly anticipated anti-suit injunction were frozen in place, leaving the emergency arbitral awards in a state of suspended animation while the Judicial Committee deliberated.
For all those reasons, I find that the Arbitration Claim is stayed pending the issuance of the Judicial Committee’s decision determining the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction to hear and determine the Arbitration Claim to this Court and the Petition to the Dubai Court.
The Court ordered that the proceedings be stayed pursuant to Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024, effectively transferring the jurisdictional fate of the dispute to the JJT. Furthermore, Justice Le Miere directed that the costs of the Stay Application and the directions hearing be reserved, deferring the financial allocation of this procedural skirmish until the ultimate forum is determined.
The genesis of this dispute reveals the complex tactical calculations inherent in modern arbitration within the UAE. The agreement to arbitrate in the DIFC under DIAC Rules provided a clear starting point, but the aggressive pursuit of emergency interim relief, followed by a strategic pivot to onshore enforcement, fractured the procedural pathway. By attempting to execute DIFC-seated emergency awards in the Dubai Courts, Nabeeh triggered a defensive nullification and anti-suit action from Naatiq, creating the exact type of jurisdictional deadlock that Decree 29 of 2024 was enacted to resolve. The resulting stay underscores the enduring friction between the rapid issuance of arbitral interim relief and the fragmented enforcement landscape that parties must navigate when assets and arbitral seats reside in different judicial zones.
What Was at Stake When the Claim Was Filed?
The procedural architecture of Naatiq v Nabeeh presents a textbook study in jurisdictional brinkmanship. At its core, the dispute tested the boundaries of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts’ supervisory authority over arbitrations seated within its jurisdiction, particularly when interim measures are aggressively exported to the onshore Dubai Courts for execution. The Claimant, Naatiq, sought to protect the integrity of the DIFC seat by nullifying emergency orders that were being weaponized in the Dubai Courts, setting the stage for a direct clash between curial primacy and onshore enforcement mechanics.
The genesis of the conflict lay in a commercial relationship governed by a lease agreement, which eventually fractured. The underlying tensions were briefly mitigated by commercial realities, as noted in the record:
Naatiq says that Nabeeh was aware of these difficulties and granted the Defendant certain forbearance in complying strictly with the timelines imposed by the Lease Agreement.
When forbearance evaporated, Nabeeh initiated arbitral proceedings. The jurisdictional anchor for these proceedings was unambiguous. The parties had expressly contracted for the DIFC to serve as the supervisory jurisdiction, a choice that carries profound legal consequences under the DIFC Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008). Justice Rene Le Miere observed the foundational premise of the tribunal's authority:
Whereas it is established as per the arbitration contract clause agreed upon under the Agreement that both parties agreed upon conducting the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the DIAC Arbitration Rules, provided that the seat of the arbitration is DIFC.
The procedural timeline accelerated rapidly once Nabeeh invoked the emergency arbitrator provisions. The record confirms that commenced arbitration of a dispute under the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) Rules, Nabeeh successfully petitioned for immediate protective measures. The Emergency Arbitrator granted emergency interim relief via the February Order. Naatiq’s subsequent attempt to discharge this relief was dismissed on 27 March 2024, cementing the March Order.
Rather than seeking ratification of these emergency measures in the DIFC Courts—the natural supervisory forum—Nabeeh executed a tactical pivot. On 4 June 2024, Nabeeh bypassed the DIFC entirely and commenced proceedings in the Courts of Dubai. The objective was not merely to recognize the emergency orders, but to deploy the coercive apparatus of the onshore courts against Naatiq. Nabeeh’s onshore petition explicitly sought:
Second: - Ordering enforcement measures to be taken against the defendant to implement the provisions of the approved interim. measures.”
This maneuver fundamentally altered the stakes. By seeking enforcement measures onshore while the arbitration remained seated in the DIFC, Nabeeh effectively bifurcated the arbitral process. The Emergency Arbitrator further facilitated this onshore enforcement by issuing the July Permission, explicitly authorizing the execution of the interim relief in the Dubai Courts.
Faced with imminent onshore execution, Naatiq launched a dual-pronged counter-offensive in the DIFC Courts on 2 August 2024. The strategy was designed to reassert the primacy of the DIFC seat and neutralize the onshore enforcement threat. The first prong of Naatiq’s strategy was a direct assault on the validity of the emergency orders themselves, invoking the DIFC Court's exclusive supervisory jurisdiction:
On 2 August 2024, Naatiq issued the Arbitration Claim Form, seeking the following relief:
(a) Emergency arbitration awards nullified
(i) Pursuant to Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008) (the “Arbitration Law”) the [February Order], [March Order] and [July Permission] are nullified and set aside.
Nullification under Article 41 is the ultimate supervisory remedy. By asking the DIFC Court to strike down the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission, Naatiq aimed to sever the legal root upon which Nabeeh’s onshore enforcement action relied. If the curial court nullifies an award, its enforceability in secondary jurisdictions is fatally compromised. However, nullification proceedings require time—time that Naatiq did not have, given the advanced state of the Dubai Courts proceedings.
Consequently, Naatiq required an immediate procedural shield. The second prong of the Arbitration Claim was an application for an anti-suit injunction. This equitable remedy was targeted not at the Dubai Courts themselves, but at Nabeeh in its personal capacity, seeking to enjoin the company from continuing its onshore enforcement campaign:
(b) Antisuit injunction
(ii) Until further Order of the Court, the Defendant, whether by its directors, officers, employees or agents or in any other way, shall refrain from taking any steps to enforce the Emergency Arbitration Awards [the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission], or any subsequent interim arbitral awards, in the Dubai Courts or elsewhere.
The application for an anti-suit injunction brought the doctrinal tension to a boiling point. The fundamental issue was whether the DIFC Court could exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to restrain a party from pursuing enforcement in the Dubai Courts, particularly when the Dubai Courts were already actively seized of the matter. This scenario contrasts sharply with the historical use of the DIFC Courts as a conduit jurisdiction, famously established in ARB-003-2013: Banyan Tree Corporate PTE Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2013] DIFC ARB 003. In Banyan Tree, the DIFC was utilized to funnel foreign awards into the onshore Dubai execution machinery. In Naatiq v Nabeeh, the dynamic was inverted: the DIFC was being asked to act as a firewall, preventing an arbitration seated within its own jurisdiction from bleeding into the onshore courts prematurely.
The collision of these parallel proceedings triggered the mechanisms of Decree No. (29) of 2024 Concerning the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction. Naatiq, recognizing that the DIFC Court might hesitate to issue an anti-suit injunction against proceedings already underway in a sister court, proactively applied to the Judicial Committee. The mere existence of simultaneous, contradictory claims in both forums created a jurisdictional paradox. As argued before Justice Le Miere:
Thus, the claimant submitted, so long as the two cases were “alive” without a ruling on jurisdiction, there was a conflict of jurisdiction.
The jurisprudence surrounding what constitutes a "conflict" under the Decree is highly nuanced. The DIFC Courts have previously grappled with whether a conflict requires positive assertions of jurisdiction by both courts, or merely the existence of parallel proceedings where neither court has formally declined jurisdiction. Justice Le Miere analyzed this threshold by referencing earlier authorities on jurisdictional standoffs:
In Lakhan v Lamia, the claimant said that it was not necessary that the Court decide to hear the matter, it was enough that there was a “negative act” meaning that it had not abandoned its jurisdiction.
The critical distinction in the present case was the active posture of both courts. Nabeeh had issued these proceedings seeking an Order for enforcement onshore, while Naatiq was demanding nullification and injunctive relief in the DIFC. The risk of irreconcilable judgments was not merely theoretical; it was imminent. If the Dubai Courts ordered the execution of the interim measures while the DIFC Court simultaneously nullified them, the UAE’s unified legal architecture would face a severe internal contradiction.
Justice Le Miere acknowledged the gravity of this procedural intersection, concluding that the statutory framework of Decree 29 of 2024 left the Court with little discretion once the Judicial Committee was engaged. The mandate of the Decree is designed precisely to preempt the issuance of conflicting orders by freezing the proceedings in both forums until the supreme arbiter of jurisdiction—the Judicial Committee—allocates competence. The Court recognized the potential conflict of jurisdiction as a sufficient trigger for the statutory stay.
The stakes, therefore, extended far beyond the immediate financial implications of the lease agreement dispute. For Naatiq, the Arbitration Claim was a necessary defense against the premature liquidation of assets via onshore enforcement of emergency orders that had not yet survived supervisory scrutiny. For Nabeeh, the strategy represented an aggressive attempt to bypass the often-lengthy nullification procedures at the seat by securing immediate coercive relief onshore.
Ultimately, the DIFC Court's decision to halt the proceedings underscored the absolute priority given to the Judicial Committee's conflict-resolution mandate. The resulting order dictated that the Arbitration Claim be stayed pursuant to Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024, effectively neutralizing Naatiq's anti-suit injunction application for the duration of the stay. Justice Le Miere formalized this procedural paralysis, stating:
For all those reasons, I find that the Arbitration Claim is stayed pending the issuance of the Judicial Committee’s decision determining the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction to hear and determine the Arbitration Claim to this Court and the Petition to the Dubai Court.
By staying the Arbitration Claim, the DIFC Court preserved the status quo, but it also left the underlying doctrinal question unanswered. The tension between the DIFC’s exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over its seated arbitrations and the Dubai Courts’ broad enforcement powers remains a volatile fault line in UAE arbitration practice, awaiting definitive resolution by the Judicial Committee.
How Did the Case Move From Application to Stay?
The dispute between Naatiq, a Libyan passenger airline, and Nabeeh, a UAE-based aircraft lessor, began with a conventional and seemingly unambiguous jurisdictional foundation. The commercial relationship between the parties was governed by an agreement that explicitly designated the supervisory forum for any arising disputes. The foundational architecture of the arbitration was not in question at the outset:
Whereas it is established as per the arbitration contract clause agreed upon under the Agreement that both parties agreed upon conducting the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the DIAC Arbitration Rules, provided that the seat of the arbitration is DIFC.
Despite this clear designation of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) as the arbitral seat, the timeline demonstrates the rapid escalation from arbitral emergency relief to a multi-jurisdictional standoff. When the commercial relationship fractured, Nabeeh commenced arbitration of a dispute under the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) Rules. Recognizing the urgency inherent in aircraft leasing conflicts—where the dissipation of assets or the grounding of fleets can cause irreversible commercial damage—Nabeeh successfully petitioned DIAC for the appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator.
The arbitral tribunal moved swiftly. The Emergency Arbitrator granted emergency interim relief in favor of the lessor via the February Order. Naatiq immediately attempted to dismantle this interim protection, filing an application to discharge the directive. However, on 27 March 2024, the Emergency Arbitrator dismissed Naatiq’s application, cementing the February Order and ensuring the interim measures remained fully effective.
At this juncture, the procedural trajectory fractured. Rather than seeking enforcement of the emergency measures within the DIFC Courts—the supervisory courts of the seat—Nabeeh executed a strategic pivot to the onshore Dubai Courts. On 4 June 2024, the lessor commenced onshore proceedings seeking formal ratification of the February Order. However, the mere filing of the onshore petition was not the primary accelerant of the jurisdictional crisis. The emergency arbitrator’s confirmation of the July Permission provided the catalyst for the Dubai Court enforcement. On 12 July 2024, the Emergency Arbitrator formally confirmed to the Dubai Court that permission was granted to execute the interim relief. Armed with this explicit arbitral authorization, Nabeeh’s objective before the onshore execution judge was uncompromising:
Second: - Ordering enforcement measures to be taken against the defendant to implement the provisions of the approved interim. measures.”
Faced with the imminent onshore execution of an emergency award that was legally seated in the DIFC, Naatiq was forced into an aggressive defensive posture. The airline retaliated by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts. On 2 August 2024, Naatiq filed an Arbitration Claim targeting the very foundation of the emergency arbitrator's authority, seeking an order nullifying the February and March Orders alongside the July Permission. The relief sought was absolute:
On 2 August 2024, Naatiq issued the Arbitration Claim Form, seeking the following relief:
(a) Emergency arbitration awards nullified
(i) Pursuant to Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008) (the “Arbitration Law”) the [February Order], [March Order] and [July Permission] are nullified and set aside.
Simultaneously, Naatiq recognized that mere nullification proceedings would not automatically halt the onshore execution machinery. To paralyze Nabeeh’s enforcement efforts, Naatiq petitioned the DIFC Court of First Instance for a sweeping anti-suit injunction:
(b) Antisuit injunction
(ii) Until further Order of the Court, the Defendant, whether by its directors, officers, employees or agents or in any other way, shall refrain from taking any steps to enforce the Emergency Arbitration Awards [the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission], or any subsequent interim arbitral awards, in the Dubai Courts or elsewhere.
By August 2024, the architecture for a classic Dubai jurisdictional clash was fully constructed. Nabeeh was actively driving enforcement in the Dubai Courts, while Naatiq was demanding nullification and injunctive relief in the DIFC Courts. Recognizing the procedural deadlock, Naatiq escalated the matter to the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction (the JJT) and filed Application No. ARB-018-2024/2 in the DIFC, seeking a mandatory stay under Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024. The claimant’s argument regarding the existence of a jurisdictional conflict was rooted in the parallel pendency of the actions:
Thus, the claimant submitted, so long as the two cases were “alive” without a ruling on jurisdiction, there was a conflict of jurisdiction.
The Directions Hearing on 13 September 2024 served as the focal point for the stay application. Justice Rene Le Miere heard the Stay Application and a directions hearing simultaneously, forcing the Court to confront the mechanical operation of the newly enacted Decree 29 of 2024. During the hearing, the doctrinal debate centered on what constitutes a genuine conflict of jurisdiction. Naatiq relied heavily on the precedent established in Lakhan v Lamia, arguing that a formal, positive assertion of jurisdiction by both courts was not strictly necessary to trigger the JJT’s mandate.
In Lakhan v Lamia, the claimant said that it was not necessary that the Court decide to hear the matter, it was enough that there was a “negative act” meaning that it had not abandoned its jurisdiction.
Justice Le Miere scrutinized this reliance, carefully distinguishing the procedural posture required to establish a true conflict from mere parallel filings. The Court noted that the threshold for a "negative act" requires specific procedural circumstances:
The critical feature of the factual circumstances in Lakhan v Lamia was the fact that in this Court the only step which had been taken after commencement of the proceedings was the lodgement of an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court by the defendant to those proceedings, which objection was unresolved.
Ultimately, the court had to balance the need for judicial efficiency against the mandatory requirements of Decree 29 of 2024. Proceeding with the nullification application or entertaining the anti-suit injunction while the Judicial Committee was actively seized of the matter risked generating contradictory judgments—the exact mischief the Decree was designed to eradicate. The jurisprudence surrounding the Judicial Committee's mandate heavily emphasizes early intervention to preserve the integrity of the Emirate's dual-court system:
On any translation of the Decree, it is clear that the JJT is given jurisdiction to intervene prior to the point of inconsistent or contradictory judgments having been reached.” [44] – [45].
Justice Le Miere concluded that the threshold for a mandatory stay had been unequivocally met. The parallel existence of the DIFC nullification claim and the Dubai Court enforcement petition created an undeniable friction point that only the Judicial Committee could resolve. The Court's assessment of the landscape was definitive:
In my opinion there is a potential conflict of jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts.
Consequently, the Court issued its decisive order on 25 September 2024, formally freezing the litigation. The proceedings in relation to the Arbitration Claim were halted, stripping Naatiq of its immediate ability to secure an anti-suit injunction, but simultaneously pausing the substantive nullification debate until the JJT issues its ruling:
For all those reasons, I find that the Arbitration Claim is stayed pending the issuance of the Judicial Committee’s decision determining the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction to hear and determine the Arbitration Claim to this Court and the Petition to the Dubai Court.
The tactical deployment of parallel proceedings to either accelerate or frustrate arbitral awards remains a persistent feature of UAE commercial litigation. As explored in ARB-006-2024: ARB 006/2024 Neville v Nigel, ambiguities regarding the seat or the appropriate enforcement forum frequently invite aggressive cross-filings. In the present dispute, despite the unambiguous DIFC seat, the perceived speed of Dubai Court execution measures incentivized Nabeeh to bypass the supervisory courts for enforcement. Naatiq's subsequent anti-suit injunction application was a predictable countermeasure, yet the strict application of Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024 ensured that the DIFC Court of First Instance could not unilaterally resolve the standoff. The timeline from the February Order to the September stay illustrates how quickly emergency arbitral relief can devolve into a complex jurisdictional stalemate, leaving the ultimate fate of the interim measures entirely in the hands of the Judicial Committee.
What Is the Role of Decree 29 of 2024 in Jurisdictional Conflicts?
The enactment of Decree No. (29) of 2024 Concerning the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts and Judicial Entities in the Emirate of Dubai fundamentally recalibrates the balance of power between the DIFC Courts and the onshore Dubai Courts. Replacing the previous framework established by Decree 19 of 2016, the new legislation operates as a strict procedural circuit breaker. It subordinates the inherent autonomy of individual courts to the overarching authority of the Judicial Committee. When parallel proceedings threaten to produce irreconcilable outcomes, the Decree mandates an immediate cessation of judicial activity in the subordinate forums. The DIFC Court is stripped of its discretion to manage its own docket, compelled instead to await the Judicial Committee’s determination of the competent judicial entity.
The factual matrix of Naatiq v Nabeeh [2024] DIFC ARB 018 provides a textbook illustration of how this circuit breaker is triggered. The dispute originated in an emergency arbitration seated in the DIFC, where the Defendant, Nabeeh, secured interim relief via an order dated 16 February 2024. Rather than seeking enforcement within the DIFC, Nabeeh initiated proceedings in the onshore Dubai Courts on 4 June 2024, seeking ratification of the emergency order and ordering enforcement measures against the Claimant, Naatiq. In response to this aggressive onshore enforcement strategy, Naatiq launched a counter-offensive in the DIFC Courts on 2 August 2024. Naatiq sought not only the nullification of the emergency arbitral awards under Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law but also a sweeping anti-suit injunction designed to paralyze Nabeeh’s onshore efforts.
The relief sought by Naatiq was explicitly designed to halt the Dubai Courts' processes:
Faced with a direct clash between an onshore enforcement action and an offshore nullification and injunction claim, Justice Rene Le Miere was required to determine whether the circumstances triggered the mandatory stay provisions of Decree No. (29) of 2024. The analytical crux of the matter rested on the definition of a jurisdictional conflict. Nabeeh’s position implicitly relied on the notion that until both courts positively asserted jurisdiction and issued contradictory rulings, no true conflict existed. Naatiq, conversely, argued for a proactive interpretation of the Decree, asserting that the mere existence of parallel, unresolved proceedings constituted a live conflict requiring the Judicial Committee’s intervention.
Justice Le Miere accepted the proactive interpretation, endorsing the Claimant's formulation of the threshold for a jurisdictional dispute:
Thus, the claimant submitted, so long as the two cases were “alive” without a ruling on jurisdiction, there was a conflict of jurisdiction.
122.
This interpretation aligns with the broader doctrinal trajectory of the DIFC Courts regarding jurisdictional conflicts. The court does not require a finalized, positive assertion of jurisdiction by the competing forum to recognize a conflict. Instead, the jurisprudence recognizes that a conflict crystallizes much earlier in the procedural timeline. Justice Le Miere drew heavily upon the precedent set in Lakhan v Lamia, which established that a court's failure to immediately dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction—a "negative act"—is sufficient to maintain the existence of a conflict.
In Lakhan v Lamia, the claimant said that it was not necessary that the Court decide to hear the matter, it was enough that there was a “negative act” meaning that it had not abandoned its jurisdiction.
The application of the Lakhan v Lamia standard requires a granular examination of the procedural posture of the parallel cases. The DIFC Court must assess whether the competing forum has definitively relinquished its claim to hear the matter. If an objection to jurisdiction remains pending, the conflict remains live. Justice Le Miere explicitly identified this dynamic as the operative trigger for the Judicial Committee's jurisdiction:
The critical feature of the factual circumstances in Lakhan v Lamia was the fact that in this Court the only step which had been taken after commencement of the proceedings was the lodgement of an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court by the defendant to those proceedings, which objection was unresolved.
By adopting this standard, Decree 29 of 2024 empowers the Judicial Committee to intervene pre-emptively. The legislative intent is clearly to prevent the systemic embarrassment and practical chaos of contradictory judgments being issued by different judicial entities within the same Emirate. The Judicial Committee is not merely a curative body designed to untangle conflicting orders after the fact; it is a preventative mechanism designed to halt parallel tracks before they collide. Justice Le Miere emphasized this pre-emptive mandate, noting that the Judicial Committee's authority crystallizes well before the point of irreconcilable judicial pronouncements:
On any translation of the Decree, it is clear that the JJT is given jurisdiction to intervene prior to the point of inconsistent or contradictory judgments having been reached.” [44] – [45].
72.
Once the threshold of a potential conflict is met and an application is made to the Judicial Committee, Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024 imposes a mandatory stay on the proceedings. This is where the Decree functions as a strict procedural circuit breaker. The DIFC Court is divested of its discretionary power to weigh the balance of convenience or assess the underlying merits of the jurisdictional challenge. The statutory language leaves no room for judicial maneuvering; the stay is automatic and absolute until the Judicial Committee issues its binding determination.
Justice Le Miere, recognizing the binding nature of Article 7, concluded that the parallel tracks of the onshore enforcement and the offshore nullification claim created an undeniable risk of jurisdictional collision. The court formally acknowledged the existence of this risk:
In my opinion there is a potential conflict of jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts.
98.
Consequently, the DIFC Court was compelled to halt its processes. The Claimant’s attempt to secure an anti-suit injunction—a remedy specifically designed to protect the integrity of the DIFC-seated arbitration—was frozen in its tracks. The mandatory stay mechanism effectively neutralizes the DIFC Court's ability to deploy its equitable powers to restrain onshore proceedings while the Judicial Committee deliberates.
For all those reasons, I find that the Arbitration Claim is stayed pending the issuance of the Judicial Committee’s decision determining the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction to hear and determine the Arbitration Claim to this Court and the Petition to the Dubai Court.
The strategic implications of this mandatory stay mechanism are profound for commercial litigators operating within the UAE. Decree 29 of 2024 provides a potent tactical weapon for parties seeking to delay or derail DIFC proceedings. By initiating a parallel, even if arguably speculative, claim in the onshore Dubai Courts and subsequently petitioning the Judicial Committee, a litigant can force an automatic stay of the DIFC action. The DIFC Court, bound by Article 7, cannot pierce the veil of the onshore filing to assess its legitimacy; it must simply halt its own proceedings.
This dynamic creates a jurisdictional tug-of-war that frequently plays out in complex cross-border disputes, a phenomenon explored extensively in ARB-024-2025: ARB 024/2025 Olympio v Olwin. The strict application of the Decree ensures that systemic harmony between the parallel court systems is prioritized over the rapid resolution of individual disputes. While this prevents the issuance of conflicting judgments, it also introduces significant procedural friction, requiring parties to navigate the Judicial Committee's docket before they can secure substantive relief in their chosen forum.
Ultimately, Justice Le Miere’s ruling in Naatiq v Nabeeh confirms that the DIFC Courts will strictly adhere to the procedural hierarchy established by Decree 29 of 2024. The court will not attempt to outmaneuver the Judicial Committee or artificially narrow the definition of a jurisdictional conflict to maintain control over its docket. By confirming that The proceedings in relation to the Arbitration Claim are stayed, the judgment reinforces the Judicial Committee's status as the supreme arbiter of jurisdictional boundaries within the Emirate of Dubai, ensuring that the circuit breaker functions exactly as the legislature intended.
How Did Justice Le Miere Reach the Decision to Stay?
The procedural architecture of Dubai’s bifurcated legal system demands strict adherence to jurisdictional boundaries, particularly when parallel proceedings threaten to fracture the enforceability of arbitral awards. In Naatiq v Nabeeh [2024] DIFC ARB 018, Justice Rene Le Miere was confronted with a textbook jurisdictional standoff. The Claimant, Naatiq, had initiated proceedings in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts to nullify a series of emergency arbitral orders, while simultaneously seeking an anti-suit injunction to block the Defendant, Nabeeh, from enforcing those very orders in the onshore Dubai Courts. The resulting friction triggered the application of Decree No. (29) of 2024 Concerning the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts and Judicial Entities in the Emirate of Dubai.
Justice Le Miere’s analysis hinged on a fundamental premise: the DIFC Court cannot unilaterally proceed with an annulment or an anti-suit injunction when a parallel enforcement action is actively pending before the Dubai Courts and the Judicial Committee (the JJT) has been formally petitioned. The Court’s reasoning emphasizes the necessity of avoiding contradictory outcomes between the DIFC and Dubai Courts, treating the statutory stay not as a matter of judicial discretion, but as a mandatory protective measure.
The foundation of the dispute rested on the agreed arbitral seat. The parties had bound themselves to the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) Rules, with a specific geographic and legal anchor. As Justice Le Miere noted from the underlying contract:
Whereas it is established as per the arbitration contract clause agreed upon under the Agreement that both parties agreed upon conducting the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the DIAC Arbitration Rules, provided that the seat of the arbitration is DIFC.
Despite this clear designation of the DIFC as the seat, the procedural trajectory fractured following the issuance of emergency relief. Nabeeh secured an emergency order on 16 February 2024, successfully defended it against Naatiq’s discharge application on 27 March 2024, and subsequently obtained permission from the Emergency Arbitrator on 12 July 2024 to execute the interim relief. Rather than seeking enforcement within the seat, Nabeeh pivoted onshore. On 4 June 2024, Nabeeh commenced proceedings in the Dubai Courts, seeking ratification of the emergency orders and ordering enforcement measures to be taken against Naatiq to implement the interim measures.
In response to this onshore enforcement maneuver, Naatiq launched a counter-offensive in the DIFC Courts on 2 August 2024. The relief sought by Naatiq was aggressive and dual-pronged. First, Naatiq sought the outright nullification of the emergency awards pursuant to Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. Second, and more provocatively, Naatiq sought a coercive remedy to halt the onshore proceedings:
Faced with Nabeeh’s onshore enforcement action and Naatiq’s offshore annulment and anti-suit claims, the jurisdictional conflict crystallized. Naatiq applied to the Judicial Committee to resolve the conflict and simultaneously filed Application No. ARB-018-2024/2 in the DIFC Court, seeking a stay of its own proceedings pending the determination of the Claimant’s application to the Judicial Committee.
The central analytical question for Justice Le Miere was whether the mere existence of these parallel actions constituted a "conflict of jurisdiction" sufficient to trigger the mandatory stay provisions of Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024. Naatiq advanced a pragmatic interpretation of the statutory threshold, arguing that a conflict does not require two final, contradictory judgments asserting jurisdiction. Instead, the threshold is met when two competing courts are actively seized of the same underlying dispute and neither has definitively relinquished its mandate.
Thus, the claimant submitted, so long as the two cases were “alive” without a ruling on jurisdiction, there was a conflict of jurisdiction.
122.
Justice Le Miere accepted this formulation, recognizing that the existence of two 'alive' cases without a ruling on jurisdiction constitutes a conflict. The Court acknowledged that it could not proceed while the Judicial Committee’s determination was pending, because doing so would risk the exact scenario the JJT was created to prevent. If the DIFC Court were to grant the anti-suit injunction while the Dubai Court simultaneously ordered the execution of the emergency awards, the resulting clash would place the parties in an impossible position, facing contempt in one forum for complying with the orders of another.
To ground this conclusion, Justice Le Miere examined the doctrinal precedent established in Lakhan v Lamia. In that case, the jurisprudence surrounding jurisdictional conflicts was refined to address situations where a court has not yet affirmatively asserted jurisdiction, but has also not dismissed the case. Justice Le Miere observed:
In Lakhan v Lamia, the claimant said that it was not necessary that the Court decide to hear the matter, it was enough that there was a “negative act” meaning that it had not abandoned its jurisdiction.
The "negative act" doctrine is crucial for understanding the mechanics of Decree 29 of 2024. It dictates that a conflict of jurisdiction arises the moment a party challenges the jurisdiction of a court and that challenge remains unresolved, provided a parallel action exists elsewhere. Justice Le Miere explicitly mapped the facts of Naatiq v Nabeeh onto this precedent, noting that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court by the defendant in the parallel proceedings was sufficient to keep the jurisdictional question "alive."
The critical feature of the factual circumstances in Lakhan v Lamia was the fact that in this Court the only step which had been taken after commencement of the proceedings was the lodgement of an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court by the defendant to those proceedings, which objection was unresolved.
By applying the Lakhan v Lamia standard, Justice Le Miere confirmed that a definitive ruling on jurisdiction from either the DIFC or Dubai Courts is not a prerequisite for JJT intervention. The mere potential for a clash, evidenced by active dockets in both forums, is the trigger. The Court concluded unequivocally:
In my opinion there is a potential conflict of jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts.
98.
This finding shifts the analytical focus to the purpose of the stay itself. The stay is a protective measure to ensure the finality of the eventual jurisdictional ruling. Decree 29 of 2024 is designed as a preemptive mechanism, intended to freeze the procedural landscape before irreparable harm is done to the integrity of the judicial system. Justice Le Miere emphasized the preemptive nature of the JJT's mandate, citing previous interpretations of the Decree's underlying logic:
On any translation of the Decree, it is clear that the JJT is given jurisdiction to intervene prior to the point of inconsistent or contradictory judgments having been reached.” [44] – [45].
72.
This preemptive intervention is particularly vital in the context of arbitration enforcement and annulment. The tactical deployment of parallel proceedings to frustrate arbitral awards is a well-documented strategy in cross-border litigation. Similar dynamics were heavily scrutinized in ARB-004-2016: Giacinta v Gilam LLC [2016] DIFC ARB 004, where the DIFC Courts had to navigate the complexities of parallel annulment tactics designed to derail enforcement. In Naatiq v Nabeeh, the stakes were arguably higher due to the emergency nature of the underlying arbitral orders. Nabeeh had secured rapid interim relief, but the subsequent jurisdictional warfare effectively neutralized the speed and efficacy of that emergency arbitration.
Justice Le Miere’s decision to halt the DIFC proceedings reflects a strict adherence to the statutory hierarchy. Once the JJT is engaged, the constituent courts of the Emirate must down tools. The DIFC Court cannot preempt the JJT by deciding its own jurisdiction, nor can it issue interim relief—such as an anti-suit injunction—that would alter the status quo while the JJT deliberates. The stay is absolute, pausing all substantive and procedural advancements in the Arbitration Claim.
Ultimately, the Court formalized this procedural freeze, ensuring that neither party could leverage the DIFC proceedings to outflank the other while the overarching jurisdictional question remained unanswered. Justice Le Miere ordered that the proceedings be stayed pursuant to Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024, effectively placing the entire dispute in a state of suspended animation.
For all those reasons, I find that the Arbitration Claim is stayed pending the issuance of the Judicial Committee’s decision determining the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction to hear and determine the Arbitration Claim to this Court and the Petition to the Dubai Court.
The ruling in Naatiq v Nabeeh serves as a definitive statement on the mechanics of jurisdictional conflicts within Dubai. By recognizing that a potential conflict of jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts requires an immediate and mandatory stay, Justice Le Miere reinforced the primacy of the Judicial Committee. The decision ensures that the DIFC Courts will not inadvertently contribute to a fractured legal landscape, prioritizing systemic coherence over the immediate resolution of the parties' substantive claims.
Which Earlier DIFC Cases Frame This Decision?
The procedural standoff in Naatiq v Nabeeh presents a textbook jurisdictional collision within the Emirate of Dubai’s dual-court system. When a party secures emergency arbitral relief and immediately seeks enforcement onshore, while the counterparty simultaneously petitions the offshore supervisory court for nullification, the architecture of Decree 29 of 2024 is triggered. However, the statutory mandate to stay proceedings pending a decision by the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction (the Judicial Committee) requires a foundational prerequisite: an actual conflict must exist. To define the precise moment such a conflict crystallises, Justice Rene Le Miere anchored his analysis in the precedent of Lakhan v Lamia, deploying the ‘negative act’ doctrine to determine when a court is formally seized of a dispute.
The factual matrix of the underlying arbitration set the stage for this jurisdictional friction. The foundational agreement between the parties dictated the forum and the rules of engagement.
Whereas it is established as per the arbitration contract clause agreed upon under the Agreement that both parties agreed upon conducting the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the DIAC Arbitration Rules, provided that the seat of the arbitration is DIFC.
Because The seat of the arbitration is the DIFC., the DIFC Court of First Instance inherently possesses supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral process pursuant to the DIFC Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008). Yet, the trajectory of the dispute fractured when At the request of Nabeeh, the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”) appointed an Emergency Arbitrator. Following the issuance of the February Order granting interim relief, Nabeeh bypassed the supervisory court and initiated proceedings directly in the Dubai Courts on 4 June 2024, seeking ratification and enforcement.
Nabeeh’s onshore petition was aggressive and unambiguous in its intent to execute the emergency measures against Naatiq’s assets. The onshore filing explicitly requested the Dubai Courts to take decisive action:
Second: - Ordering enforcement measures to be taken against the defendant to implement the provisions of the approved interim. measures.”
In response to this onshore enforcement maneuver, Naatiq launched a defensive counter-strike in the DIFC Court on 2 August 2024. Naatiq’s Arbitration Claim Form did not merely seek to resist enforcement; it aimed to strike at the root of the Emergency Arbitrator’s authority.
On 2 August 2024, Naatiq issued the Arbitration Claim Form, seeking the following relief:
(a) Emergency arbitration awards nullified
(i) Pursuant to Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008) (the “Arbitration Law”) the [February Order], [March Order] and [July Permission] are nullified and set aside.
Beyond nullification, Naatiq sought a highly sensitive remedy: an anti-suit injunction designed to paralyze Nabeeh’s onshore enforcement efforts. The requested injunction demanded that Nabeeh:
(b) Antisuit injunction
(ii) Until further Order of the Court, the Defendant, whether by its directors, officers, employees or agents or in any other way, shall refrain from taking any steps to enforce the Emergency Arbitration Awards [the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission], or any subsequent interim arbitral awards, in the Dubai Courts or elsewhere.
This dual-track litigation—enforcement in Dubai Courts versus nullification and anti-suit injunction in the DIFC Courts—created a volatile procedural environment. However, neither court had yet issued a substantive ruling affirming its own jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. The critical legal question before Justice Le Miere was whether a statutory conflict of jurisdiction under Decree 29 of 2024 could exist before either court had affirmatively declared itself competent to hear the matter.
To resolve this, the Court turned to the doctrinal framework established in Lakhan v Lamia. The central thesis of Lakhan is that a court does not need to take positive, substantive steps to hear a case to be considered seized of it. The mere failure to dismiss the case constitutes a retention of jurisdiction.
In Lakhan v Lamia, the claimant said that it was not necessary that the Court decide to hear the matter, it was enough that there was a “negative act” meaning that it had not abandoned its jurisdiction.
The ‘negative act’ doctrine fundamentally alters the threshold for invoking the Judicial Committee. It prevents a party from arguing that parallel proceedings are harmless simply because one court has not yet scheduled a hearing or issued a preliminary ruling. If a claim is filed, and the court has not explicitly relinquished its authority over that claim, the court remains in the arena. Justice Le Miere drew a direct parallel between the procedural posture of Lakhan and the current standoff between Naatiq and Nabeeh.
The critical feature of the factual circumstances in Lakhan v Lamia was the fact that in this Court the only step which had been taken after commencement of the proceedings was the lodgement of an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court by the defendant to those proceedings, which objection was unresolved.
In Naatiq v Nabeeh, the DIFC Court had received the Arbitration Claim Form and the subsequent applications, but had not yet adjudicated the merits of the nullification request or the anti-suit injunction. Similarly, the Dubai Courts had received the enforcement petition but had not finalised the execution measures. Both sets of proceedings were pending. Relying on the Lakhan standard, Naatiq argued that this simultaneous pendency was sufficient to trigger the statutory stay mechanism.
Thus, the claimant submitted, so long as the two cases were “alive” without a ruling on jurisdiction, there was a conflict of jurisdiction.
Justice Le Miere accepted this formulation. The ‘alive’ standard, underpinned by the ‘negative act’ doctrine, aligns perfectly with the preemptive design of Decree 29 of 2024. The Judicial Committee is not merely an appellate body tasked with untangling contradictory judgments after they have been issued; it is a traffic-control mechanism designed to prevent the collision from occurring in the first place. The statutory architecture requires intervention at the earliest sign of jurisdictional friction.
On any translation of the Decree, it is clear that the JJT is given jurisdiction to intervene prior to the point of inconsistent or contradictory judgments having been reached.” [44] – [45].
By applying the Lakhan precedent, the Court confirmed that The Defendant, Nabeeh (“Nabeeh”) commenced arbitration in a DIFC-seated forum, yet sought enforcement onshore, creating an immediate and tangible risk of parallel, conflicting judicial outcomes. The DIFC Court’s refusal to dismiss Naatiq’s nullification claim outright constituted the requisite ‘negative act’, thereby maintaining the DIFC Court’s jurisdictional footprint and solidifying the conflict with the Dubai Courts.
In my opinion there is a potential conflict of jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts.
This approach to parallel proceedings and jurisdictional thresholds echoes the DIFC Court’s broader jurisprudential philosophy regarding its supervisory duties. In ARB-005-2014: Eava v Egan [2014] ARB 005, the Court grappled with the limits of delay and the strict procedural boundaries required when parties attempt to challenge arbitral awards. While Eava v Egan focused heavily on the temporal limits of bringing a challenge, Naatiq v Nabeeh focuses on the spatial and jurisdictional limits when multiple forums are engaged simultaneously. Both precedents, however, reinforce a consistent theme: the DIFC Court demands strict adherence to statutory mechanisms—whether they be time bars under the Arbitration Law or mandatory stays under Decree 29 of 2024—to preserve the integrity of the arbitral process and prevent procedural gamesmanship.
Once the ‘negative act’ doctrine established that both the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts were actively seized of the dispute, the application of Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024 became a matter of mandatory statutory compliance rather than judicial discretion. The legislation dictates that upon a valid petition to the Judicial Committee, the parallel proceedings must be halted to allow the supreme arbiter of jurisdiction to determine the appropriate forum. Consequently, Justice Le Miere issued the decisive order.
For all those reasons, I find that the Arbitration Claim is stayed pending the issuance of the Judicial Committee’s decision determining the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction to hear and determine the Arbitration Claim to this Court and the Petition to the Dubai Court.
The formal disposition of the hearing reflected this inevitable conclusion, noting that The Stay Application is granted. Furthermore, acknowledging that the jurisdictional battle was far from over and that the ultimate allocation of costs would depend on the Judicial Committee’s ruling, the Court ordered that The costs of the Stay Application and of the Directions Hearing are reserved.
The reliance on Lakhan v Lamia in this context provides crucial clarity for commercial litigators navigating the complex interplay between onshore and offshore jurisdictions in Dubai. It establishes a definitive, low-bar threshold for what constitutes a jurisdictional conflict. Practitioners need not wait for a court to actively assert its jurisdiction or issue a preliminary ruling to invoke the protective mechanisms of the Judicial Committee. The mere filing of a claim in a competent court, coupled with that court’s ‘negative act’ of not immediately abandoning its jurisdiction, is sufficient to freeze the procedural board. This doctrinal stance ensures that the Judicial Committee retains its intended function as a preemptive safeguard against the chaos of contradictory judgments, rather than serving merely as a post-hoc appellate tribunal.
What Does This Mean for Practitioners and Enforcement?
The strategic landscape of DIFC arbitration enforcement has fundamentally shifted. For cross-border practitioners and commercial litigators, Justice Rene Le Miere’s order in Naatiq v Nabeeh cements a stark procedural reality: the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction is no longer a peripheral appellate body, but a primary player in any contested arbitration-related litigation. The tactical deployment of parallel proceedings in the Dubai Courts to trigger a statutory stay in the DIFC Courts is now a standard maneuver that counsel must anticipate from the outset of any enforcement or nullification campaign.
The factual matrix of the dispute illustrates how quickly a seemingly straightforward DIFC-seated arbitration can devolve into a jurisdictional quagmire. The underlying conflict began when The Defendant, Nabeeh initiated proceedings under the DIAC Rules. Crucially, the parties had agreed that The seat of the arbitration is the DIFC. At the request of Nabeeh, the Dubai International Arbitration Centre appointed an Emergency Arbitrator, who subsequently granted interim relief. However, rather than seeking enforcement exclusively within the supervisory jurisdiction of the DIFC, Nabeeh opted to cross the jurisdictional boundary. On 4 June 2024 Nabeeh commenced proceedings in the onshore Dubai Courts, seeking ratification and execution measures against Naatiq.
This aggressive onshore enforcement strategy immediately forced Naatiq onto the defensive, prompting a retaliatory filing in the DIFC Courts. On 2 August 2024 Naatiq issued these proceedings, seeking not only to nullify the emergency arbitration awards under the Arbitration Law 2008 but also to secure an anti-suit injunction to halt the Dubai Courts action. The resulting collision of onshore enforcement and offshore nullification created the exact scenario Decree 29 of 2024 was designed to address.
The risk of parallel proceedings necessitates early engagement with jurisdictional strategy. Practitioners can no longer assume that a DIFC seat guarantees exclusive supervisory control if the award creditor decides to test the waters in onshore Dubai. Once parallel proceedings are live, the threshold for establishing a conflict of jurisdiction is remarkably low. Justice Le Miere’s analysis relied heavily on the precedent set in Lakhan v Lamia, where the court established that a formal assertion of jurisdiction by both courts is not strictly required. A mere "negative act"—such as a court failing to immediately abandon its jurisdiction when challenged by a defendant—is sufficient to crystallize a conflict.
In my opinion there is a potential conflict of jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts.
98.
This low threshold for intervention empowers the Judicial Committee to step in long before the respective courts issue conflicting substantive orders. The statutory framework prioritizes the prevention of contradictory judgments over the swift resolution of the underlying commercial dispute. The mandate of the Judicial Committee is broad and preemptive, designed to halt jurisdictional overreach at the earliest possible stage.
On any translation of the Decree, it is clear that the JJT is given jurisdiction to intervene prior to the point of inconsistent or contradictory judgments having been reached.” [44] – [45].
72.
For practitioners seeking to protect the integrity of a DIFC-seated arbitration, the traditional weapon of choice has been the anti-suit injunction. However, the procedural mechanics of Naatiq v Nabeeh expose the severe limitations of injunctive relief when a conflict of jurisdiction is apparent and the Judicial Committee machinery is invoked. Naatiq’s Arbitration Claim Form explicitly sought an order to restrain Nabeeh's onshore enforcement efforts, aiming to ring-fence the dispute within the DIFC.
(b) Antisuit injunction
(ii) Until further Order of the Court, the Defendant, whether by its directors, officers, employees or agents or in any other way, shall refrain from taking any steps to enforce the Emergency Arbitration Awards [the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission], or any subsequent interim arbitral awards, in the Dubai Courts or elsewhere.
The pursuit of such injunctive relief is increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of Decree 29 of 2024. When a party petitions the Judicial Committee, Article 7 of the Decree mandates a stay of proceedings in the relevant courts. A court cannot issue an anti-suit injunction if its own proceedings are statutorily frozen. This dynamic fundamentally alters the calculus for award debtors. As explored in ARB-005-2025: ARB 005/2025 Nashrah v (1) Najem (2) Nex, the DIFC Courts have historically shown a willingness to deploy supportive injunctions to protect their supervisory jurisdiction. Yet, the statutory mandate of Decree 29 overrides this supportive inclination, effectively neutralizing the anti-suit injunction as a preemptive strike against parallel onshore litigation once the Judicial Committee is engaged.
Consequently, counsel must prepare for the likelihood of a stay as a standard procedural hurdle in contested enforcement cases. The stay is not a discretionary remedy that can be defeated by arguing the balance of convenience or the urgency of the underlying commercial situation; it is a strict statutory imperative. Justice Le Miere’s application of Article 7 was decisive and left no room for equitable maneuvering by the Claimant.
For all those reasons, I find that the Arbitration Claim is stayed pending the issuance of the Judicial Committee’s decision determining the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction to hear and determine the Arbitration Claim to this Court and the Petition to the Dubai Court.
The practical effect of this mandatory stay is profound, particularly in the context of emergency arbitration. The entire premise of an emergency arbitrator’s appointment is to secure urgent interim relief to preserve assets or maintain the status quo pending the constitution of the full tribunal. In this instance, Nabeeh secured the February Order to protect its commercial position. However, by initiating enforcement in the Dubai Courts and triggering Naatiq’s retaliatory nullification claim and subsequent Judicial Committee petition, the enforcement of that "emergency" relief has been indefinitely paused. The proceedings in relation to the Arbitration Claim are stayed pursuant to Article 7, meaning the DIFC Court will take no further action until the Judicial Committee issues its ruling.
This delay tactic—whether intentional or a byproduct of aggressive multi-forum litigation—requires a recalibration of enforcement strategies. Award creditors must weigh the perceived benefits of onshore enforcement against the near-certainty that the award debtor will manufacture a jurisdictional conflict to trigger an Article 7 stay. If the goal is rapid execution of an emergency order, bypassing the supervisory DIFC Court in favor of the Dubai Courts may prove counterproductive, as it opens the door to Judicial Committee intervention and months of procedural paralysis.
Furthermore, the ruling places a premium on precise drafting of arbitration agreements and early strategic planning. While the parties explicitly agreed to a DIFC seat, the mere presence of assets or operational ties in onshore Dubai provides sufficient jurisdictional nexus for a party to attempt onshore enforcement. Litigators must advise clients that a DIFC seat does not immunize an arbitration from the reach of the Judicial Committee. The moment a parallel claim is filed onshore, the trajectory of the case shifts from substantive arbitration law to the procedural mechanics of Decree 29.
Ultimately, Justice Le Miere’s order serves as a definitive guidepost for navigating the post-Decree 29 landscape. The DIFC Courts will strictly adhere to the statutory stay provisions when a genuine conflict of jurisdiction is presented to the Judicial Committee. Practitioners must account for this reality, recognizing that the battle for enforcement is often won or lost not on the merits of the arbitral award, but on the successful navigation of the jurisdictional divide between the DIFC and onshore Dubai.
What Issues Remain Unresolved?
The immediate procedural consequence of Justice Rene Le Miere’s order is absolute: The Stay Application is granted. However, the substantive fallout of this procedural pause leaves the underlying emergency arbitral awards in a precarious state of limbo. By halting the DIFC Court proceedings under Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024, the Court has effectively frozen its own supervisory jurisdiction as the designated seat of the arbitration. The substantive validity of the emergency relief granted by the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) tribunal remains entirely untested, trapped in a jurisdictional void while the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction deliberates.
The core of the unresolved dispute lies in the Claimant’s aggressive attempt to dismantle the emergency relief. After The Defendant, Nabeeh (“Nabeeh”) commenced arbitration and successfully obtained interim measures, Naatiq sought to invoke the exclusive curial authority of the DIFC Courts to strike down those orders. The nullification application strikes at the heart of the emergency arbitrator’s authority:
On 2 August 2024, Naatiq issued the Arbitration Claim Form, seeking the following relief:
(a) Emergency arbitration awards nullified
(i) Pursuant to Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008) (the “Arbitration Law”) the [February Order], [March Order] and [July Permission] are nullified and set aside.
The stay prevents the DIFC Court of First Instance from answering a critical, unresolved doctrinal question: whether an emergency arbitrator’s interim order qualifies as an "award" capable of being set aside under Article 41 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. International arbitration jurisprudence is notoriously fractured on whether emergency orders—which are inherently provisional and subject to review by the fully constituted tribunal—carry the finality required to trigger statutory nullification mechanisms. By staying the proceedings, Justice Le Miere leaves this vital question of DIFC arbitration law unanswered. The February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission remain technically active, yet clouded by a pending, unresolved nullification claim that the supervisory court is currently forbidden from hearing.
Compounding this substantive limbo is the paralysis of the DIFC Court’s injunctive powers. Naatiq did not merely seek to nullify the awards; it sought to actively restrain Nabeeh from weaponising them in parallel forums. The Arbitration Claim Form included a specific demand for an anti-suit injunction to protect the integrity of the DIFC seat:
(b) Antisuit injunction
(ii) Until further Order of the Court, the Defendant, whether by its directors, officers, employees or agents or in any other way, shall refrain from taking any steps to enforce the Emergency Arbitration Awards [the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission], or any subsequent interim arbitral awards, in the Dubai Courts or elsewhere.
Because the DIFC proceedings are stayed, this anti-suit injunction cannot be granted. The strategic consequence is profound. While the DIFC Court—the court of the seat—is sidelined, Nabeeh faces no DIFC-ordered restraint against pursuing its parallel enforcement strategy onshore. The record shows that On 4 June 2024 Nabeeh commenced proceedings in the Courts of Dubai seeking ratification and execution of the very same emergency orders that Naatiq seeks to nullify. The stay creates a structural asymmetry: the nullification action in the supervisory court is frozen, but the enforcement action in the onshore court may theoretically proceed unless the Judicial Committee issues a blanket stay covering both forums.
This dynamic exposes a significant vulnerability in the architecture of DIFC-seated arbitrations. The long-term impact on the DIFC’s reputation as a reliable, efficient seat of arbitration remains a point of intense debate among practitioners. The primary utility of emergency arbitration is speed. Parties opt into institutional rules like the DIAC Rules 2022 specifically to secure urgent, enforceable relief before a full tribunal is constituted. When At the request of Nabeeh, the Dubai International Arbitration Centre appointed an Emergency Arbitrator, the expectation was rapid resolution. Instead, the interaction between the DIAC Rules and the onshore judicial machinery has transformed an urgent interim measure into a protracted jurisdictional quagmire. If a party can obtain an emergency order in a DIFC-seated arbitration, but the losing party can stall the supervisory court's review by triggering a Judicial Committee conflict via parallel Dubai Court filings, the efficacy of the emergency arbitrator mechanism is severely compromised.
The threshold for triggering this paralysis under the new Decree 29 of 2024 appears remarkably low, relying heavily on the mere existence of parallel filings rather than irreconcilable judgments. Justice Le Miere’s application of the conflict rules underscores how easily the DIFC Court’s jurisdiction can be suspended:
In my opinion there is a potential conflict of jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts.
98.
By defining the conflict as "potential" based on the dual filings—nullification in the DIFC and enforcement in Dubai—the ruling confirms that parties can effectively manufacture a stay of DIFC supervisory proceedings by initiating parallel onshore actions. The judgment references the earlier precedent of Lakhan v Lamia, noting that a conflict exists so long as the onshore court has not explicitly abandoned its jurisdiction. This low bar for establishing a "potential conflict" suggests a pressing need for clearer statutory guidance on the interaction between DIAC Rules and the Judicial Committee. Without such guidance, recalcitrant parties possess a reliable tactical blueprint for derailing DIFC-seated emergency arbitrations: file an enforcement or nullification action in the Dubai Courts, petition the Judicial Committee, and rely on the mandatory stay under Article 7 of Decree 29 of 2024 to freeze the DIFC proceedings.
The contrast between this mandatory deference and the DIFC Courts' approach to parallel proceedings outside the Emirate of Dubai is stark. When faced with parallel proceedings in other Emirates, the DIFC Courts have historically deployed robust anti-suit injunctions to defend their exclusive jurisdiction as the seat. For example, in ARB-032-2025: ARB 032/2025 Oswin v (1) Otila (2) Ondray, the DIFC Court took aggressive steps to protect the arbitral seat against parallel litigation in Abu Dhabi, unencumbered by the Judicial Committee framework. However, because Naatiq v Nabeeh involves the Dubai Courts, the intra-Emirate conflict machinery of Decree 29 of 2024 overrides the DIFC Court’s inherent powers to protect its seat, forcing a mandatory stay and leaving the emergency awards undefended by the supervisory judge.
Ultimately, the financial and strategic burdens of this jurisdictional detour remain entirely unallocated. Justice Le Miere ordered that The costs of the Stay Application and of the Directions Hearing are reserved. Until the Judicial Committee issues its final determination on which court possesses the competent jurisdiction to hear the respective claims, the parties are locked in a costly holding pattern. The substantive validity of the February Order, the March Order, and the July Permission remains an open question, and the DIFC Court’s ability to police its own arbitral seat remains suspended by the very decree designed to resolve such conflicts.