XNG v XNH [2026] SGHCF 4

Case Details

• Citation: [2026] SGHCF 4
• Court: Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore (General Division of the High Court (Family Division))
• Decision Date: 13 February 2026
• Coram: Choo Han Teck J
• Case Number: Originating Application DTV No 4 of 2025; Summons 266 of 2025
• Hearing Date(s): 10 February 2026
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: XNG (Applicant Wife)
• Respondent / Defendant: XNH (Respondent Husband)
• Counsel for Claimants: Kok Yee Keong, Toh Ming Wai and Charis Sim Wei Li (Harry Elias Partnership LLP)
• Counsel for Respondent: Godwin Gilbert Campos and Adam Naeha Sitara Binte Adam Rabbani (Godwin Campos LLC)
• Practice Areas: Family Law — Costs; Family Law — Therapeutic Justice

Summary

The judgment in [2026] SGHCF 4 represents a significant judicial clarification on the intersection of cost-shifting principles and the framework of therapeutic justice within the Singapore Family Justice Courts. The dispute arose following the successful application by the applicant wife, XNG, for a Mareva injunction against the respondent husband, XNH, to prevent the dissipation of assets valued at S$7,564,092.50. While the substantive relief of the injunction was granted in a prior judgment on 5 February 2026, the parties remained deadlocked on the consequential issue of costs. The applicant sought indemnity costs totaling S$40,000 (excluding GST and disbursements), alleging bad faith on the part of the respondent. Conversely, the respondent invoked the concept of "therapeutic justice" to argue that no costs should be ordered at all, citing the Family Justice Courts Practice Directions 2024.

Choo Han Teck J, presiding over the General Division of the High Court (Family Division), dismissed both extreme positions. The court’s decision serves as a definitive statement that while therapeutic justice is a foundational concept in family law, it is not a "rule or principle of law" that can be used to immunize a party from the financial consequences of reprehensible litigation conduct. The court held that the respondent’s repeated payment defaults and his attempt to unilaterally alter agreed-upon terms had effectively "reopened the old wound," thereby moving the proceedings out of the "therapeutic path" and into a realm where the "exacting application of legal principles" was required. Consequently, the respondent was ordered to pay standard costs, though the court declined to elevate these to the indemnity level.

The doctrinal contribution of this case lies in its calibration of the "unreasonable to a high degree" threshold for indemnity costs in the family law context. Choo Han Teck J emphasized that even where conduct is "reprehensible and unacceptable," it may not necessarily meet the high bar required for punitive cost orders if the legal expenses can be adequately addressed through standard costs. This judgment provides practitioners with a clear boundary: therapeutic justice is a process for healing and minimizing acrimony, but it cannot be invoked as a shield by a party who has actively abandoned that process through bad faith or obstructive behavior. The court ultimately awarded the applicant S$10,000 plus reasonable disbursements, rejecting the respondent's plea for cost immunity and the applicant's demand for indemnity-level recovery.

Furthermore, the case underscores the court's discretion in high-net-worth family disputes. The involvement of assets exceeding S$7.5 million and properties such as the one at Cable Road indicates that the parties were "well-to-do," a factor the court considered when determining that the "healing process" of therapeutic justice—which might otherwise justify a "no costs" order for less affluent parties—did not apply with the same force here. This distinction ensures that the costs regime remains a tool for procedural fairness rather than a blanket application of therapeutic ideals regardless of the parties' financial standing or conduct.

Timeline of Events

1. 1 January 2023: A consent order is recorded between XNG and XNH, establishing the agreed-upon terms for the dissolution of their matrimonial matters and the division of assets.
2. 2025: XNG files Originating Application DTV No 4 of 2025, seeking to vary, rescind, or set aside certain orders within the dissolution case.
3. 23 May 2025: Choo Han Teck J delivers a judgment dismissing XNG's application to vary the consent order. However, the court grants XNG liberty to apply for a Mareva injunction should she have reason to believe XNH might dispose of assets to her detriment.
4. 2025 (Subsequent to May): XNG files Summons 266 of 2025, applying for a Mareva injunction to prevent XNH from disposing of assets to the value of S$7,564,092.50.
5. 5 February 2026: Choo Han Teck J delivers a judgment granting the Mareva injunction in favor of XNG, finding sufficient risk of dissipation.
6. 10 February 2026: The court hears further arguments specifically regarding the costs of Summons 266 of 2025.
7. 13 February 2026: Choo Han Teck J delivers the final judgment on costs, ordering the respondent to pay S$10,000 plus disbursements on a standard basis.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The litigation between XNG (the applicant wife) and XNH (the respondent husband) originated from the fallout of a consent order recorded in 2023. This order was intended to provide a final and amicable resolution to the financial and proprietary aspects of their matrimonial dissolution. However, the stability of this arrangement was short-lived. By early 2025, the applicant wife initiated Originating Application DTV No 4 of 2025, which sought the variation, rescission, or setting aside of the 2023 orders. The applicant’s primary grievance centered on the respondent’s alleged failure to adhere to the terms of the consent order, particularly regarding financial obligations.

On 23 May 2025, Choo Han Teck J dismissed the wife’s application to vary the consent order. Despite this dismissal, the court recognized the precarious nature of the respondent’s compliance. The judge specifically granted the applicant "liberty to apply" for a Mareva injunction if she could demonstrate a genuine risk that the respondent was attempting to diminish his asset pool to frustrate her claims. This judicial foresight proved necessary when the respondent’s subsequent actions—characterized by the court as "repeated payment default"—triggered the applicant’s fears of asset dissipation. The respondent’s conduct was described as "reprehensible and unacceptable," as he appeared to be moving away from the "therapeutic path" the parties had initially agreed upon in 2023.

The specific catalyst for the current cost dispute was Summons 266 of 2025. In this application, the wife sought a Mareva injunction to freeze the respondent’s assets up to the value of S$7,564,092.50. This substantial sum reflected the significant financial stakes involved in the matrimonial estate. A key asset mentioned in the proceedings was a property located at Cable Road. The applicant argued that the respondent’s behavior indicated a clear intention to deprive her of the amounts due to her under the 2023 consent order. The court, after reviewing the evidence of the respondent’s conduct and the risk of dissipation, granted the injunction on 5 February 2026.

Following the granting of the injunction, the focus shifted to the legal costs incurred by the applicant in pursuing Summons 266. The applicant wife sought S$40,000 in costs, excluding GST and disbursements, and specifically requested that these be awarded on an indemnity basis. Her counsel, from Harry Elias Partnership LLP, argued that the respondent’s bad faith and his "reprehensible" conduct in defaulting on payments justified a punitive cost order. They contended that the respondent’s actions were designed to diminish, if not entirely deprive, the applicant of her rightful dues, necessitating the expensive and complex Mareva proceedings.

The respondent husband, represented by Godwin Campos LLC, took a diametrically opposed position. He argued that no costs should be ordered against him whatsoever. His primary defense was rooted in the concept of "therapeutic justice," a guiding philosophy of the Family Justice Courts intended to minimize conflict and promote healing between parties. The respondent’s counsel cited the Family Justice Courts Practice Directions 2024, specifically Part 71, paragraph 90B, to support the claim that the court should exercise its discretion to waive costs in the interest of maintaining a non-adversarial environment. This set the stage for a legal confrontation between the traditional rules of cost-shifting and the evolving application of therapeutic justice in high-value matrimonial disputes.

The parties were described as "well-to-do," which the court noted was a relevant factor in determining whether the financial burden of costs would impede the "healing process" typically associated with therapeutic justice. Unlike cases involving parties of modest means, where a cost order might cause significant hardship and further entrench acrimony, the court viewed this dispute as one where the respondent had used his financial position to compel the applicant into "costly litigation." The factual matrix thus presented a clear case of a party who had initially agreed to a therapeutic resolution but had subsequently defaulted, forcing a return to rigorous legal enforcement.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issues before the court in this costs determination were twofold, involving both the standard of conduct required for indemnity costs and the legal status of therapeutic justice in the adjudication of costs.

The first issue was whether the respondent’s conduct warranted an award of indemnity costs. This required the court to apply the established common law test for indemnity costs, which generally requires a showing of "unreasonable to a high degree" conduct. The applicant argued that the respondent’s bad faith and repeated defaults met this threshold. The court had to determine if "reprehensible" behavior in a family law context automatically translates to the high degree of unreasonableness required to move beyond standard costs.

The second, and perhaps more doctrinally significant issue, was the role and limits of "therapeutic justice" as a basis for declining to order costs. The respondent relied on the Family Justice Courts Practice Directions 2024 to argue that the court should prioritize the "healing process" over the principle that costs follow the event. This raised several sub-questions:

• Is therapeutic justice a "rule of law" or merely a "concept" or "philosophy"?
• At what point does a party’s conduct preclude them from seeking the "protection" of therapeutic justice?
• How does the financial status of the parties ("well-to-do" vs. modest means) affect the court’s discretion to waive costs in the name of therapeutic justice?
• Does the "exacting application of legal principles" in an interlocutory application like a Mareva injunction override the general therapeutic goals of the Family Justice Courts?

These issues required the court to balance the need to compensate a successful litigant for expenses incurred due to the other party's defaults against the overarching goal of the family court system to reduce acrimony and foster long-term resolution.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

Choo Han Teck J began his analysis by addressing the applicant's request for indemnity costs. The court relied on the English Court of Appeal decision in Victor Kermit Kiam II v MGN Limited [2002] 2 All ER 242, which provides the authoritative standard for such awards. The court noted that indemnity costs are not intended to be a routine penalty for losing a case or even for being "wrong or misguided in hindsight." Instead, the conduct must be "unreasonable to a high degree" (at [4]).

While the judge acknowledged that the respondent’s "repeated payment default has been reprehensible and unacceptable," he concluded that this did not necessarily reach the level of unreasonableness required for indemnity costs. The court reasoned that:

"the legal expenses incurred are, in my view, adequately addressed through an award of standard costs without requiring additional punitive measures." (at [4])

This suggests a judicial preference for standard costs in family matters unless the conduct is so egregious that it falls outside the norms of even heated matrimonial litigation. The court found that the applicant’s request for S$40,000 was excessive, and the respondent’s counter-offer of S$0 was equally untenable.

The court then turned to the respondent's argument regarding "therapeutic justice." Choo Han Teck J provided a critical clarification of this term, which has become central to the Singapore Family Justice Courts' identity. He stated emphatically:

"Therapeutic justice is a concept and not a specific rule or principle of law." (at [6])

The judge explained that therapeutic justice is a "non-legalistic approach" aimed at achieving the best possible long-term resolution for the family by minimizing acrimony. However, he noted that for this approach to work, both parties must be willing to stay on the "therapeutic path." In this case, the respondent had "abandoned the therapeutic path" by defaulting on the 2023 consent order and forcing the applicant to seek a Mareva injunction to protect her interests. The court observed that the respondent’s attempt to change the agreed terms "reopened the old wound," and as a result:

"the time for therapeutic justice had come and gone with limited success." (at [8])

The court further analyzed the application of therapeutic justice in relation to the parties' financial status. Choo Han Teck J acknowledged that in many family matters where parties are not "well-to-do," the court exercises wide discretion not to order costs. This is done to prevent the financial burden of litigation from hindering the "healing process." However, the judge distinguished the present case, noting that the parties were affluent and that the respondent had used his resources to compel the applicant into "costly litigation." The court held that a party cannot "abandon the therapeutic path" and then "subsequently ask to be spared the costs of his conduct by invoking the concept of therapeutic justice" (at [9]).

The judge also addressed the specific nature of the application—a Mareva injunction. He noted that such applications require the "exacting application of legal principles" rather than the softer, more conciliatory approach of therapeutic justice. Because the respondent’s conduct necessitated this rigorous legal intervention, he could not then retreat into the "therapeutic" framework to avoid the financial consequences of his actions. The court found that the respondent’s reliance on the Family Justice Courts Practice Directions 2024, Part 71, para 90B was insufficient to override the general principle that a party who necessitates litigation through bad faith should bear the costs.

In determining the quantum of standard costs, the court looked at the complexity of the Mareva application and the conduct of the parties. The applicant had asked for S$40,000, while the respondent had previously offered S$30,000 and then S$35,000 during negotiations, before ultimately arguing for no costs at the hearing. The court found that S$10,000 plus reasonable disbursements was a fair and proportionate award under the standard basis, balancing the need to compensate the applicant without being unnecessarily punitive toward the respondent.

The court's analysis serves as a warning to practitioners that "therapeutic justice" is not a substitute for legal compliance. It is a framework for resolution, but it does not displace the court's duty to ensure procedural and financial fairness when one party acts in a way that undermines the very foundations of a therapeutic approach. The judge’s reasoning highlights that the "healing process" is a two-way street; if one party chooses the path of "reprehensible" default, they must be prepared for the "exacting application" of the law, including the imposition of costs.

What Was the Outcome?

The court ordered the respondent, XNH, to pay the applicant, XNG, the sum of S$10,000 plus reasonable disbursements. This order was made in relation to the costs of Summons 266 of 2025, the application for the Mareva injunction. The court's decision was a middle-ground resolution that rejected the extreme positions of both parties.

The operative paragraph of the judgment states:

"I order the respondent to pay costs of S$10,000 plus reasonable disbursements to the applicant." (at [10])

In reaching this outcome, the court made several specific determinations:

• Rejection of Indemnity Costs: The applicant's request for S$40,000 on an indemnity basis was denied. The court found that while the respondent's conduct was "reprehensible," it did not meet the "unreasonable to a high degree" threshold required by Victor Kermit Kiam II v MGN Limited. Standard costs were deemed sufficient to address the legal expenses incurred.
• Rejection of the "No Costs" Argument: The respondent's argument that no costs should be ordered in the interests of therapeutic justice was firmly rejected. The court held that the respondent had forfeited the benefits of a therapeutic approach by his repeated defaults and by forcing the applicant into "costly litigation."
• Quantum Determination: The award of S$10,000 was significantly lower than the S$40,000 sought by the applicant and also lower than the S$30,000 and S$35,000 figures that had been discussed in prior negotiations. This reflects the court's assessment of what was "reasonable" on a standard basis for an interlocutory application of this nature.
• Disbursements: In addition to the S$10,000 in costs, the respondent was ordered to pay "reasonable disbursements." These are to be agreed upon by the parties or, failing agreement, taxed by the court.
• Finality: This judgment concluded the cost dispute arising from the Mareva injunction, which itself had been granted on 5 February 2026 to protect assets valued at S$7,564,092.50.

The outcome reinforces the principle that in the Family Justice Courts, while the "therapeutic" goal is paramount, it does not override the court's power to award costs where a party's conduct has been obstructive or in bad faith. The respondent's attempt to use therapeutic justice as a shield against the financial consequences of his "reprehensible" behavior was unsuccessful, but the applicant was also reminded that indemnity costs remain an exceptional remedy.

Why Does This Case Matter?

The decision in [2026] SGHCF 4 is of critical importance to family law practitioners in Singapore for several reasons, primarily regarding the judicial definition and application of "therapeutic justice" (TJ). For years, TJ has been the buzzword of the Family Justice Courts, but this judgment provides a necessary reality check on its limits. By explicitly stating that TJ is a "concept and not a specific rule or principle of law," Choo Han Teck J has prevented the doctrine from being misused as a tactical shield by recalcitrant litigants. This ensures that the rule of law and the "exacting application of legal principles" remain the bedrock of the court's function, even within a therapeutic framework.

Practitioners now have a clear authority to cite when a party attempts to avoid cost orders by vaguely invoking the "healing process" or "minimizing acrimony." The judgment establishes that TJ is a "therapeutic path" that requires the active participation and good faith of both parties. When a party "abandons" this path—through repeated defaults, bad faith, or by "reopening old wounds"—they lose the moral and legal standing to claim the protections of a TJ-based cost discretion. This creates a powerful incentive for parties to adhere to consent orders and engage in the therapeutic process genuinely, rather than using it as a slogan to evade the consequences of their defaults.

Furthermore, the case clarifies the "unreasonable to a high degree" standard for indemnity costs in family law. It demonstrates that even conduct described by a judge as "reprehensible and unacceptable" may not be enough to trigger indemnity costs if standard costs can adequately compensate the other party. This high threshold protects the family law system from becoming overly punitive, while still allowing the court to police bad behavior. It suggests that indemnity costs will be reserved for truly extraordinary cases of litigation misconduct, rather than "standard" bad faith such as payment defaults.

The distinction made between "well-to-do" parties and those of modest means is also significant. The court acknowledged that for less affluent parties, a cost order might indeed frustrate the "healing process" by causing genuine financial hardship. However, for wealthy litigants—such as those dealing with S$7.5 million in assets and properties on Cable Road—the court is less likely to be swayed by the "therapeutic" argument if one party has used their wealth to force the other into expensive litigation. This nuanced approach ensures that TJ is applied equitably, taking into account the actual impact of costs on the parties' lives and their ability to move forward.

Finally, the judgment highlights the procedural reality of interlocutory applications like Mareva injunctions. These are high-stakes, technically demanding legal maneuvers that, by their nature, are adversarial. The court’s recognition that such applications require the "exacting application of legal principles" suggests that the "therapeutic" approach may have less weight in these specific contexts compared to the final division of assets or custody disputes. This provides a more predictable framework for practitioners when advising clients on the cost risks of pursuing or defending such injunctions.

In the broader Singapore legal landscape, this case reinforces the General Division of the High Court's role in supervising the Family Justice Courts and ensuring that the push for therapeutic justice does not come at the expense of legal rigor. It is a reminder that the "Family" in Family Justice Courts does not mean that the "Justice" is any less bound by established legal standards and the consequences of one's actions in court.

Practice Pointers

• TJ is not a Shield: Do not rely on "therapeutic justice" as a primary defense against cost orders if your client has been obstructive or has defaulted on prior orders. The court views TJ as a concept, not a rule of law that overrides reprehensible conduct.
• The "Therapeutic Path" is Conditional: Advise clients that the court's willingness to exercise discretion in favor of "no costs" depends on their continued adherence to the "therapeutic path." Abandoning this path through bad faith defaults will likely lead to standard cost orders.
• Indemnity Costs Threshold: When seeking indemnity costs, remember that "reprehensible" conduct alone may not suffice. You must demonstrate that the conduct was "unreasonable to a high degree" and that standard costs are insufficient to address the legal expenses.
• Affluence Matters: Be aware that the court is less likely to waive costs for "well-to-do" parties in the name of therapeutic justice. The "healing process" argument carries more weight when a cost order would cause genuine financial hardship to less affluent parties.
• Mareva Injunction Costs: In applications for Mareva injunctions, emphasize the "exacting application of legal principles." The court recognizes these as rigorous legal processes where the standard rules of cost-shifting are more likely to apply than the softer TJ framework.
• Documenting Defaults: To support a claim for costs (standard or indemnity), meticulously document the other party's "repeated payment defaults" or attempts to "reopen old wounds." This evidence is crucial to showing the court that the "therapeutic path" has been abandoned.
• Negotiation Strategy: Note the court's quantum determination (S$10,000) in relation to the parties' prior offers (S$30,000–S$35,000). This suggests that the court may take a more conservative view of "reasonable" costs for interlocutory family matters than the parties themselves.
• Practice Direction 90B: When citing Part 71, para 90B of the Family Justice Courts Practice Directions 2024, ensure it is not your only argument. The court will look beyond the direction to the actual conduct of the parties and the nature of the application.

Subsequent Treatment

As a decision from early 2026, [2026] SGHCF 4 is a relatively recent authority. It is expected to be frequently cited in the Family Justice Courts for its clear distinction between therapeutic justice as a "concept" versus a "rule of law." It will likely serve as the leading case for calibrating cost awards in high-net-worth matrimonial disputes where one party attempts to invoke therapeutic justice to avoid the consequences of litigation misconduct. Its reliance on Victor Kermit Kiam II v MGN Limited also reaffirms the continuity of standard common law cost principles within the specialized family law jurisdiction.

Legislation Referenced

• Family Justice Courts Practice Directions 2024: Specifically Part 71, paragraph 90B. This provision was cited by the respondent to argue that the court should decline to order costs in the interest of therapeutic justice. The court analyzed this direction in the context of the broader "therapeutic path" and the parties' conduct, ultimately finding it insufficient to protect a party who had acted in bad faith.

Cases Cited

• Applied: Victor Kermit Kiam II v MGN Limited [2002] 2 All ER 242. This case was applied by the court to establish the "unreasonable to a high degree" threshold for indemnity costs. The court used this authority to determine that the respondent's conduct, while "reprehensible," did not warrant the punitive measure of indemnity costs.
• Self-Reference: [2026] SGHCF 4. The judgment itself serves as the primary record of the costs determination following the Mareva injunction granted on 5 February 2026.

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — eLitigation
• Judgment PDF — Digital Ocean CDN