Case Details
- Citation: [2002] SGCA 24
- Case Number: CA 600151/2001
- Decision Date: 07 May 2002
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Coram: Chao Hick Tin JA; Tan Lee Meng J; Yong Pung How CJ
- Title: Wee Soon Kim Anthony v The Law Society of Singapore (No 4)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Wee Soon Kim Anthony
- Defendant/Respondent: The Law Society of Singapore (No 4)
- Counsel: Appellant in person; Yang Lih Shyng and Candice Kwok (Khattar Wong & Partners) for the respondent
- Legal Areas: Legal Profession — Disciplinary procedures; Legal Profession — Professional conduct
- Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed), ss 85(6D), 86(5), 86(6), 86(7) (Part VII of the Legal Profession Act)
- Core Topics: Role of the Inquiry Committee (IC); whether a complaint should be referred to a Disciplinary Committee (DC); fairness of IC procedure; whether conflict of evidence prevents IC findings; whether IC can hear from any person; prima facie professional misconduct; duty of solicitor to verify client instructions; whether solicitors knew of falsehood
- Judgment Length: 9 pages, 4,725 words
- Prior Procedural History (high level): Multiple appeals arising from a complaint lodged by Mr Wee against two solicitors; earlier decisions addressed when the Law Society must refer complaints to an IC and whether solicitors could intervene in proceedings to compel appointment of a DC
Summary
Wee Soon Kim Anthony v The Law Society of Singapore (No 4) [2002] SGCA 24 concerned the disciplinary process under Part VII of the Legal Profession Act. The complainant, Mr Wee, sought to compel the Law Society to refer his complaint against two advocates and solicitors to a Disciplinary Committee (DC) for a full disciplinary hearing. The complaint arose from an affidavit filed in earlier litigation in which a sentence stated that certain account opening forms were prepared in Singapore and executed by Mr Wee and his family in Singapore. Mr Wee alleged that the sentence was false and that the solicitors either knowingly caused a false affidavit to be filed or otherwise permitted perjury.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Wee’s appeal. It upheld the approach taken by the Inquiry Committee (IC) appointed by the Law Society to investigate the complaint. The IC had concluded that there was no prima facie case of professional misconduct requiring referral to a DC. Central to the Court’s reasoning was the nature of the IC’s task: the IC must act fairly, must hear from the solicitor under investigation unless it can dismiss the complaint without more as frivolous, and may hear from other persons who can shed light on the matter. However, the IC should not make findings on disputed material facts where the complaint is serious and warrants referral to a DC. On the facts, the Court found that the IC’s process and conclusion were justified, and that the evidence did not show that the solicitors knew the disputed sentence was false.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The factual background begins with disputes between Mr Wee and his family and their bank, UBS (AG) (“UBS”). Mr Wee and his wife and son were customers of UBS and held three accounts. When disputes arose, UBS closed the three accounts. UBS then commenced legal proceedings (OS 546/99) seeking directions regarding the disposal of certain assets held by UBS in relation to the accounts. Mr Wee refused to provide instructions in relation to those assets, and the matter proceeded to settlement at the doorsteps of the court.
In OS 546/99, two advocates and solicitors acted for UBS: Mr Davinder Singh SC and Mr Hri Kumar (“the two solicitors”). The complaint letter that later triggered the disciplinary process was lodged by Mr Wee on 8 August 1999, a few months after the settlement. The complaint focused on a particular sentence in an affidavit filed by a UBS officer, Ms Shirreen Sin (“Shirreen”). The disputed sentence stated that the account opening forms for all three accounts were prepared by UBS in Singapore and executed by Mr Wee and his family in Singapore.
Mr Wee alleged that the disputed sentence was false. His position was that not all of the account opening documents were prepared and executed in Singapore. In particular, he claimed that the opening forms relating to one account (account No. 207038), dated 26 August 1997, were prepared and witnessed by Sheila Wong of UBS (Hong Kong) in Hong Kong. To support this, Mr Wee produced his passport to show that he was in Hong Kong from 24 August to 11 September 1997. On this basis, Mr Wee concluded that the two solicitors had misconducted themselves by either knowingly preparing an affidavit containing a false allegation and/or permitting Shirreen to perjure herself in court.
When the complaint reached the Law Society’s disciplinary machinery, it was investigated by an Inquiry Committee (IC). The IC’s task was not to conduct a full disciplinary trial but to determine whether a prima facie case of professional misconduct was established such that the complaint should be referred to a Disciplinary Committee (DC). The IC considered the solicitors’ written explanation and heard evidence from Shirreen. After inquiry, the IC recommended dismissal of the complaint, and the Council endorsed that recommendation. Mr Wee then sought judicial intervention to compel referral to a DC, leading to the present appeal.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The Court of Appeal had to address several interrelated legal issues concerning the disciplinary process under the Legal Profession Act. First, it considered the role and scope of the IC. In particular, the Court examined whether the IC should refer a complaint to a DC, and what threshold or approach governs that decision. This included the question of whether the IC is required to resolve disputed facts before deciding whether a prima facie case exists, or whether it should refrain from making findings on disputed material facts where the complaint is serious.
Second, the Court addressed procedural fairness and evidence-handling concerns raised by Mr Wee. He argued, in substance, that conflict of evidence should preclude the IC from making findings. He also challenged whether the IC could hear from “any person” and whether it could properly rely on evidence obtained in the course of its inquiry. These issues were tied to the statutory framework in Part VII of the Legal Profession Act, including ss 85(6D), 86(5), 86(6) and 86(7), which govern aspects of the inquiry and disciplinary process.
Third, the Court considered the substantive professional conduct question: whether, on the evidence, a prima facie case of professional misconduct was established against the two solicitors. This required analysis of the duty of an advocate and solicitor regarding client instructions and affidavits, including whether solicitors have a duty to verify the truth of what a client has deposed. It also required assessment of whether the solicitors knew of the falsehood alleged by Mr Wee.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by situating the IC’s function within the statutory disciplinary scheme. The IC is an investigative body tasked with determining whether there is a prima facie case warranting referral to a DC. The Court emphasised that the IC must act fairly at all times. Fairness, however, does not mean that the IC must conduct a full adversarial hearing or resolve every disputed fact. Instead, the IC’s approach depends on the nature of the complaint and the circumstances of the case.
On procedure, the Court held that the IC must hear from the solicitor under investigation unless it can determine without more that the complaint is frivolous and should be dismissed. This reflects the statutory expectation that the solicitor is given an opportunity to respond. The Court also accepted that the IC is entitled to hear from any person who may be able to shed light on the matter. In other words, the IC is not confined to the parties’ written submissions; it may obtain relevant information from witnesses or other persons connected to the events giving rise to the complaint.
Crucially, the Court drew a line between permissible inquiry and impermissible fact-finding. It stated that while the IC must make a value judgment on whether the complaint is made out, including determining issues of fact, it should not seek to make findings on disputed material facts if the complaint is serious and warrants referral to a DC. This principle ensures that serious allegations are dealt with by the DC, which is the forum designed for disciplinary adjudication. The Court’s analysis therefore treated the “severity” of the complaint as a practical guide to how far the IC should go in resolving factual disputes.
Turning to the substantive professional conduct issue, the Court examined the duty of advocates and solicitors in relation to client instructions and affidavits. The IC had relied on established case law, including Wee Soon Kim Anthony v The Law Society of Singapore [1988] 3 MLJ 9 and Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1998] 1 SLR 97. The Court endorsed the general propositions that it is not part of an advocate and solicitor’s duty to believe or disbelieve a client’s information unless the solicitor has personal knowledge, or the client’s statements are inherently incredible, or logically impossible. Even then, the duty does not extend to verifying beyond advising the client of the folly of making incredible or illogical statements. Similarly, it is not part of an advocate’s duty on every occasion to verify the truth or otherwise of what a client has deposed in an affidavit.
Applying these principles, the Court agreed with the IC’s conclusion that the evidence did not support a prima facie case that the solicitors knew the disputed sentence was false. The IC had scrutinised Shirreen’s explanation. Shirreen had provided two statements to the IC and testified before it. The IC accepted her account as forthright and without prevarication, and it was satisfied that she was telling the truth to the best of her honest recollection. Shirreen’s evidence was that she visited Mr Wee at his residence and that he signed all three sets of the account opening forms in her presence. The IC also considered a letter from Mr Wee’s Hong Kong solicitors dated 14 December 1998, which stated that all three accounts were arranged by Shirreen for Mr Wee.
On the solicitors’ knowledge, the Court noted that the affidavit was prepared by Mr Kumar in consultation with Shirreen and another UBS legal officer, Mr Mathias Lee. Upon enquiry by Mr Kumar, Shirreen informed him that the account opening forms for all three accounts were executed in Singapore. The Court further observed that the evidence showed neither Mr Kumar nor Mr Singh knew that the disputed sentence was false. Indeed, Mr Singh was not even present when Mr Kumar received the instructions from Shirreen. This factual matrix undermined Mr Wee’s allegation of knowing preparation of a false affidavit and also weakened the claim that the solicitors permitted perjury.
Importantly, the IC had taken an approach that avoided resolving the ultimate factual dispute regarding where account No. 207038’s forms were executed. The Court accepted that it was “wholly unnecessary” in the circumstances to resolve that dispute for the purpose of determining whether there was a prima facie case. The IC’s focus was on whether the solicitors had the requisite knowledge or whether the complaint was made out on the evidence available. The IC was satisfied that the solicitors acted on instructions received from a bank officer and that there was no basis to infer knowledge of falsity.
Finally, the Court addressed Mr Wee’s procedural objections. The Court’s reasoning indicates that the IC’s ability to hear from Shirreen and to accept her explanation did not violate the fairness requirements of the statute. The presence of a factual dispute did not automatically bar the IC from making a prima facie assessment. The key was whether the complaint was serious enough to require referral to a DC and whether the evidence before the IC established a prima facie case. On the evidence, the Court found that the IC’s process and conclusion were sound.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Wee’s appeal. It upheld the High Court’s refusal to compel the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Committee. The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
Practically, the effect of the decision was to confirm that where an IC, acting fairly and within its statutory remit, concludes that no prima facie case of professional misconduct is established, the complaint will not be escalated to a DC merely because the complainant disputes the underlying facts. The decision reinforces the threshold-based nature of the IC’s role and the evidential focus on whether misconduct is prima facie made out, including whether the solicitors knew of any alleged falsehood.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters because it clarifies how the disciplinary process under Part VII of the Legal Profession Act should operate at the inquiry stage. Practitioners often encounter complaints that allege false affidavits or perjury, and the question becomes whether those allegations automatically require referral to a DC. Wee Soon Kim Anthony (No 4) confirms that the IC is not a mere administrative filter; it must conduct a fair inquiry and make a value judgment on whether a prima facie case exists. However, it also confirms that the IC should not usurp the DC’s role by making findings on disputed material facts where the complaint is serious enough to warrant referral.
From a professional conduct perspective, the decision is also useful for understanding the limits of a solicitor’s duty to verify. The Court’s endorsement of the principle that solicitors are generally not required to verify the truth of client instructions on every occasion, absent personal knowledge or inherently incredible or logically impossible statements, provides a structured framework for assessing allegations of misconduct arising from affidavits. This is particularly relevant where solicitors rely on information from clients or institutional officers and where the complainant later disputes the factual accuracy of that information.
For lawyers and law students, the case is a strong reference point on evidential assessment at the IC stage, including the acceptability of hearing from relevant persons and the approach to conflict of evidence. It also demonstrates the appellate court’s willingness to defer to the IC’s assessment where the evidence supports the conclusion that the solicitors lacked knowledge of the alleged falsehood. In disciplinary practice, this can influence how complaints are framed and how responses are structured at the inquiry stage.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed) — Part VII (disciplinary procedures)
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed) s 85(6D)
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed) s 86(5)
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed) s 86(6)
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed) s 86(7)
Cases Cited
- [1962] MLJ 125
- Anthony Wee Soon Kim v The Law Society of Singapore [1988] 3 MLJ 9
- Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1998] 1 SLR 97
- Re an Advocate and Solicitor [1962] MLJ 125
- Re James Gray Exp. The Incorporated Law Society [1869] 20 LT 730
- Seet Melvin v Law Society of Singapore [1995] 2 SLR 323
- Subbiah Pillai v Wong Meng Meng [2001] 3 SLR 544 (distd)
- Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 4 SLR 25 (distd)
- Whitehouse Holdings Pte Ltd v Law Society of Singapore [1994] 2 SLR 476 (distd)
- [2002] SGCA 24
Source Documents
This article analyses [2002] SGCA 24 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.