Case Details
- Title: VJZ & Anor v VKB & 14 Ors
- Citation: [2021] SGHCF 15
- Court: High Court (Family Division)
- Date of Decision: 9 June 2021
- Judgment Reserved: 18 May 2021
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Originating Process: Originating Summons Probate No 3 of 2019
- Summonses: SUM 36/2021 and SUM 58/2021
- Applicants/Plaintiffs: VJZ & Anor (former joint administrators of the deceased’s estate)
- Respondents/Defendants: VKB & 14 Ors (15 beneficiaries under the Will)
- Legal Area: Probate and administration; remuneration of personal representatives/administrators and solicitors’ costs
- Statutes Referenced: Probate and Administration Act (Cap 251, 2000 Rev Ed)
- Other Legislation Mentioned: Trustees Act (Cap 337, 2005 Rev Ed) (reference to s 41R(6)); Public Trustee (Fees) Rules (S 248/2010) (Rule 6(1)(i))
- Key Prior Orders in the Estate: ORC 253/2019 (13 August 2019) and ORC 212/2020 (3 August 2020)
- Length of Judgment: 7 pages; 1,959 words
- Reported/Published Version: Version No 1: 09 Jun 2021 (12:30 hrs)
- Counsel: Allen & Gledhill LLP for applicants; ACIES Law Corporation for 1st–5th and 15th respondents; Tan Kok Quan Partnership for 10th–14th respondents; 6th and 7th respondents in person; 8th and 9th respondents absent/unrepresented
Summary
This High Court (Family Division) decision concerns an application by former joint administrators for (i) remuneration for administering a deceased’s estate and (ii) reimbursement of solicitors’ fees incurred over a multi-year period. The estate was administered following the deceased’s death in 2012 and a series of disputes among 15 beneficiaries. After executors named in the Will renounced their rights, the administrators were appointed in 2018. Subsequent settlement agreements and court orders governed how the administrators were to account for their work and how their fees could be paid from the estate.
The court was asked to decide whether the administrators’ claimed remuneration and solicitors’ costs should be determined by the court by way of declaration, or whether the matter should be sent for taxation (assessment) by the taxing registrar/master. The court held that the affidavits and supporting materials were insufficient to justify the amounts claimed, applying principles on disclosure and reasonableness drawn from Re Econ Corp Ltd (in provisional liquidation). Because the taxing master is better placed to assess reasonableness of professional remuneration and litigation costs, the court granted the beneficiaries’ application to proceed to taxation and dismissed the administrators’ application for a declaration that the fees were reasonable.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The deceased died on 31 October 2012, leaving a will dated 24 November 1995. The will named 15 beneficiaries, and the beneficiaries’ interests and positions fractured into three groups. The beneficiaries were broadly organised into Family [A] (the 1st to 5th and 15th respondents), Family [B] (the 10th to 14th respondents), and a group of “Unrepresented Beneficiaries” (the 6th to 9th respondents). The record indicates that the estate administration became contentious, with disagreements about who should administer the estate and how the administrators’ remuneration should be assessed.
All three executors named in the will renounced their rights in May 2015. In the absence of willing executors, the beneficiaries disagreed on the appropriate administrators and the administration process. Eventually, on 19 March 2018, Foo Tuat Yien JC appointed the applicants (VJZ and another) as joint administrators of the estate. The appointment was made against the background of the beneficiaries’ continuing disputes and the need to put in place an administration framework that could manage the estate’s complexity.
On 18 April 2018, the beneficiaries entered into a First Settlement Agreement to settle their differences. This settlement agreement became operational through a later court order. On 13 August 2019, Tan Puay Boon JC ordered in HCF/ORC 253/2019 (“ORC 253”) that the applicants were to administer the estate in accordance with the First Settlement Agreement. ORC 253 expressly addressed reimbursement and remuneration: the administrators were entitled to be reimbursed from the estate for “such reasonable expenses properly incurred” in administering the estate in all jurisdictions, and to receive “reasonable remuneration for services performed” in the administration in all jurisdictions.
Crucially, ORC 253 also set out a procedural mechanism for interim billing and objections. Under Schedule 2 of ORC 253 (“Schedule 2”), the administrators were to render an interim bill accompanied by a statement of work (“Interim Bill”). If a majority of respondents did not object within ten working days, the administrators could satisfy the interim bill from the estate and render an account. If there were objections, the administrators were required to apply to the Singapore Court for a determination on the Interim Bill. Later, on 13 December 2019, the beneficiaries entered a Second Settlement Agreement to replace the administration arrangement for the 1st respondent and another person to take over administration. On 3 August 2020, Tan Puay Boon JC ordered in HCF/ORC 212/2020 (“ORC 212”) that the Second Settlement Agreement replaced the First Settlement Agreement. ORC 212 further provided that the applicants were entitled to reimbursement for costs and expenses already approved under Schedule 2, and for “all other reasonable costs and expenses incurred” in the administration and in the handover to the new administrators.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal legal issue was procedural and evidential: whether the administrators’ claimed remuneration and solicitors’ fees should be determined by the court on the basis of affidavits and supporting documents (leading to a declaration of reasonableness), or whether the matter should be sent for taxation. The beneficiaries objected that the administrators’ claimed amounts were too high and argued that “reasonableness” under the relevant framework required an assessment exercise rather than a declaration.
More specifically, Family [A] contended that the court should direct taxation under Rule 863 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 or under s 66 of the Probate and Administration Act. The argument was that the court should not simply accept the administrators’ narrative and time summaries as sufficient proof of reasonableness, particularly where the amounts claimed were substantial and where the invoices and fee narratives did not adequately explain complexity, urgency, and the necessity of the personnel deployed.
On the other side, the administrators sought a declaration that their fees and solicitors’ legal costs were reasonable and reimbursable from the estate. They relied on the court’s power to determine reasonableness and, in submissions, pointed to principles associated with remuneration of fiduciaries and trustees (including reference to s 41R(6) of the Trustees Act). The administrators’ position was that the claimed remuneration was consistent with earlier estimates and that the estate administration was complex and contentious.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by considering the approach in Re Econ Corp Ltd (in provisional liquidation), where VK Rajah JC (as he then was) set out principles for determining remuneration for insolvency practitioners. Although Re Econ concerned insolvency practitioners rather than estate administrators, the court accepted that the principles had “general application” to remuneration of fiduciaries, including administrators. The court therefore treated Re Econ as a relevant guide for the evidential standard and the proper forum for assessing reasonableness.
In Re Econ, Rajah JC emphasised that affidavits must provide adequate disclosure. The court noted that in Re Econ, the focus was not merely on time spent, but on whether the work was complex and effective, the responsibilities assumed by each person, and the qualifications, expertise, and experience of those who performed the work. The court also highlighted the need for disclosure “in proportion to the remuneration sought”. In other words, where remuneration is substantial, the evidence must be correspondingly detailed to enable a reasonableness assessment.
Another important aspect of the analysis was the court’s view on institutional competence. Rajah JC in Re Econ had observed that the taxing master is in the best position to determine remuneration, citing the concern that a judge is “ill-equipped” to conduct a detailed investigation of charges on an itemised basis without expert education. The High Court in this case agreed with that reasoning. The court further noted that there was no evidence before it on the usual industry rate for professional administrators, which limited the court’s ability to benchmark the claimed fees.
Applying these principles, the court examined the administrators’ affidavits and supporting materials. While the “fee narratives” provided a detailed description of tasks performed and a summary of hours, the court found that they did not state each person’s years of experience, qualifications, or the need for the number of team members deployed. The court also found that the materials did not sufficiently explain who did what task and why that person’s role was necessary. The court gave an example relating to the appointment of solicitors: the fee narrative and summary allocated time across a partner, director, manager, and associate, but did not explain the qualifications and experience of each person, nor why their involvement was necessary for that task. Similar deficiencies existed across other items.
The court also scrutinised the solicitors’ invoices. It found that the invoices did not consistently indicate the nature, complexity, and urgency of phone calls, meetings, or emails. Some entries were generic (for example, “drafting email to clients” or “drafting correspondence”) without elaboration on complexity or urgency. The invoices similarly did not state the experience and qualification of each person in the team, nor why particular persons were required for particular tasks. Given the size of the amounts claimed, the court held that the administrators had an obligation to provide further details, consistent with the disclosure principle in Re Econ.
Having found the evidential record inadequate for a court declaration, the court then considered whether it should order further affidavits for its own review or instead send the matter for taxation. The court preferred taxation. It reasoned that the taxing master is equipped with experience in determining solicitors’ remuneration and litigation costs, and that the parties’ disputes were item-specific. The court observed that the beneficiaries’ affidavits disputed specific invoice items and focused on explaining why each item was reasonable or not. In that context, taxation would allow each item to be assessed in a structured manner, rather than requiring the court to undertake further rounds of affidavit evidence that could generate further disputes.
Accordingly, the court granted SUM 36 (the beneficiaries’ application to proceed to taxation) and dismissed SUM 58 (the administrators’ application for a declaration of reasonableness). The court ordered that the matter proceed for taxation, while reserving costs until after the taxation hearing. The order was made “without prejudice to the Registrar to allow further evidence,” preserving flexibility for the taxation process.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court granted the beneficiaries’ application (SUM 36) and directed that the administrators’ remuneration and solicitors’ fees be assessed through taxation rather than determined by declaration on the existing affidavit record. The court dismissed the administrators’ application (SUM 58) seeking a declaration that their fees and solicitors’ costs were reasonable and reimbursable from the estate.
Practically, this meant that the administrators would not obtain immediate judicial confirmation of the reasonableness of their claimed amounts. Instead, the taxing process would evaluate the reasonableness of each disputed item, with the court reserving the issue of costs until after taxation.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners involved in probate, estate administration, and the remuneration of personal representatives. It underscores that courts will not treat fee narratives and time summaries as automatically sufficient proof of reasonableness, especially where the amounts claimed are substantial and where the work involved multiple team members. The court’s insistence on disclosure “in proportion to the remuneration sought” provides a practical evidential checklist for administrators and solicitors preparing remuneration claims.
Substantively, the case reinforces the relevance of Re Econ beyond insolvency contexts. By treating the Re Econ principles as having general application to fiduciary remuneration, the court signals that remuneration disputes in estate administration will be approached with similar concerns: complexity, effectiveness, responsibility allocation, and the qualifications and experience of those who performed the work. This is particularly important where remuneration is claimed for work performed over years and where the administration is contentious.
Procedurally, the case highlights the court’s preference for taxation when disputes are itemised and evidentially complex. For administrators and their solicitors, the decision suggests that early preparation for taxation—such as ensuring invoices and fee narratives clearly articulate complexity, urgency, and the necessity of personnel—can reduce friction and improve the prospects of recovering claimed sums. For beneficiaries, the case provides support for challenging remuneration claims by insisting on taxation rather than accepting declarations based on incomplete evidence.
Legislation Referenced
- Probate and Administration Act (Cap 251, 2000 Rev Ed) — including reference to s 66
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014) — including Rule 863 (as argued by the objecting beneficiaries)
- Trustees Act (Cap 337, 2005 Rev Ed) — reference to s 41R(6) (as relied upon by the applicants)
- Public Trustee (Fees) Rules (S 248/2010) — Rule 6(1)(i) (noted by the court as a comparative point)
Cases Cited
- [2021] SGHCF 15 (this case)
- Re Econ Corp Ltd (in provisional liquidation) [2004] 2 SLR(R) 264
- Re Potters Oils Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 201
- VIK v VIL and others [2021] 3 SLR 857
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGHCF 15 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.