THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v ZERO GERALDO MARIO NALPON

"This is an application by the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”) pursuant to s 98(1) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the LPA”) for an order that Mr Zero Geraldo Mario Nalpon (“Mr Nalpon”) be made to suffer punishment under s 83(1) of the LPA for his conduct in relation to Magistrate’s Appeal No 9269 of 2018 (“the MA”) and subsequent events." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 1

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 81 (Para 0)
• Court: Court of Three Judges of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date of hearing: 19 January 2022; date of judgment: 12 April 2022 (Para 0)
• Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA and Chao Hick Tin SJ (Para 0)
• Case number: Originating Summons No 4 of 2021 (Para 0)
• Counsel for the applicant: Yeap Poh Leong Andre SC and Timothy Ng Xin Zhan (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) (Para 71)
• Counsel for the respondent: Zero Geraldo Mario Nalpon (Nalpon & Co) (Para 71)
• Area of law: Legal profession discipline; contempt-related professional misconduct; disciplinary procedure under the Legal Profession Act (Paras 1, 19, 40)
• Judgment length: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)

Summary

This disciplinary application concerned Mr Zero Geraldo Mario Nalpon’s conduct in relation to a criminal appeal and later proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal. The Law Society proceeded under s 98(1) of the Legal Profession Act, seeking punishment under s 83(1) for conduct said to arise from Facebook publications about pending proceedings and from his conduct concerning a costs order. The court identified three principal issues: the validity of the Attorney-General’s complaints, the Disciplinary Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the Third and Fourth Charges, and whether due cause was shown on the merits and, if so, what sanction should follow. (Paras 1, 19)

The court held that the complaints were validly made by the Attorney-General through the Attorney-General’s Chambers, and that there was no non-compliance with s 85(3)(b) on the facts. However, it concluded that the Disciplinary Tribunal had no jurisdiction to investigate and determine the Third and Fourth Charges because s 89(4) did not apply to complaints made under s 85(3)(b). The court therefore set aside the Tribunal’s findings on those charges. (Paras 27, 32, 38)

On the merits, the court found due cause in respect of the First Charge, holding that Mr Nalpon’s 11 February 2019 Facebook publication breached the sub judice rule and amounted to improper and grossly improper conduct. It also found due cause in respect of the Second Charge, holding that his conduct in relation to the costs order amounted to misconduct under s 83(2)(h). The court ordered that he be suspended from practice for 15 months in respect of the First and Second Charges and ordered him to pay 85% of the Law Society’s costs of the application and the proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal. (Paras 55, 63, 70, 71)

What Were the Proceedings About and How Did the Court Frame the Dispute?

The court described the matter as an application by the Law Society under s 98(1) of the LPA for punishment under s 83(1) arising from Mr Nalpon’s conduct in relation to Magistrate’s Appeal No 9269 of 2018 and subsequent events. The judgment makes clear that the disciplinary proceedings were not confined to a single act, but instead concerned a sequence of publications and later conduct surrounding a costs order and the disciplinary process itself. (Para 1)

The court expressly framed the dispute around three questions: whether the proceedings were void because the complaints were not filed by the Attorney-General personally; whether the Disciplinary Tribunal was entitled to investigate and determine the Third and Fourth Charges; and whether due cause had been shown under s 83(2) such that punishment under s 83(1) should follow, and if so what sanction was appropriate. That framing governed the structure of the judgment and the sequence in which the court addressed the parties’ submissions. (Para 19)

"The facts of this case and the arguments made before us raised the following issues for our determination: (a) First, are the proceedings against Mr Nalpon void because the Complaints were not filed by the AG personally? (b) Second, was the DT entitled to investigate and make determinations in respect of the Third and Fourth Charges? (c) Third, has due cause been shown under s 83(2) of the LPA in respect of the relevant charges, such that Mr Nalpon should be subject to the sanctions set out in s 83(1) of the LPA? If so, what is the appropriate sanction that should be imposed on Mr Nalpon?" — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 19

The court’s approach was therefore both procedural and substantive. It first resolved the validity of the complaints and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, because those issues determined whether the Third and Fourth Charges could stand at all. Only after that did it turn to the merits of the First and Second Charges and the appropriate sanction. (Paras 19, 27, 32, 70)

How Did the Attorney-General’s Complaints Become the Foundation of the Disciplinary Proceedings?

The judgment explains that the Attorney-General’s complaints were made through the Attorney-General’s Chambers, and that the court was concerned with whether that mode of filing complied with s 85(3)(b) of the LPA. The respondent argued that the complaints were void because they were not filed by the Attorney-General personally, but the court rejected that contention after examining the statutory scheme and the face of the complaints. (Paras 18, 20, 25)

The court held that the relevant statutory powers were in fact exercised by the Attorney-General and were not delegated or devolved to another officer. It reasoned that the complaints themselves showed that the Attorney-General was the source of the complaints, and that the Attorney-General’s Chambers merely signified that decision. The court therefore concluded that there was no non-compliance with s 85(3)(b). (Paras 25, 27)

"In the present case, it is clear on the face of the Complaints that these statutory powers were in fact exercised by the AG, and were not delegated or devolved to another officer." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 25

The court also drew a distinction between the question whether a statutory power has been properly signified and the question whether it must be exercised personally. In doing so, it referred to the Interpretation Act and to authority on ministerial decision-making, but it did so only to illuminate the structure of the statutory scheme rather than to create a general rule that all such powers may be exercised by subordinates. The court’s conclusion was narrower: on these facts, the Attorney-General had made the complaints. (Paras 24, 25, 27)

"The Complaints were therefore duly made by the AG, and there is no non-compliance with s 85(3)(b) of the LPA on the facts." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 27

Why Did the Court Hold That the Disciplinary Tribunal Lacked Jurisdiction Over the Third and Fourth Charges?

The Third and Fourth Charges were added later, after the Law Society applied for leave to amend its Statement of Case to include them. The court held that the Disciplinary Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to investigate and determine those charges because s 89(4) did not apply to proceedings commenced by a complaint made by the Attorney-General under s 85(3)(b). That was a central procedural holding, because it meant the Tribunal had no power to adjudicate charges that were not within the statutory route triggered by the Attorney-General’s complaint. (Paras 12, 32)

The court reasoned that s 85(3)(b) confers on a select group of office holders a special statutory shortcut that bypasses the usual inquiry by an Inquiry Committee. It contrasted that scheme with the ordinary complaint route and emphasised that the practical concern for efficiency could not override the distinct statutory structures laid down in the LPA. The court therefore refused to extend s 89(4) beyond the circumstances for which it was enacted. (Paras 29, 37)

"Section 85(3)(b) of the LPA, in contrast to s 85(1), confers on a very select group of office holders a power of a relatively exceptional nature by granting their complaints special weight, according them a statutory “shortcut” that bypasses the usual procedure of an inquiry by an Inquiry Committee before a complaint can come before a Disciplinary Tribunal." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 29

The court was explicit that the key factor was whether the substance of the Third and Fourth Charges had emanated from the Attorney-General or another specified office holder. Because they did not, the Tribunal could not properly investigate them in this proceeding. The court therefore set aside the Tribunal’s findings on those charges. (Paras 32, 38)

"The important prerequisite is that the substance of the complaints specified in the Third and Fourth Charges had to have emanated from the AG or one of the other specified office holders. That is the key factor." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 38

The court also noted that the practical concern to ensure efficiency in the disposal of complaints could not justify extending s 89(4) to circumstances not envisaged by the provision. That observation reinforced the court’s insistence on statutory fidelity in disciplinary proceedings, especially where the legislature had created a special route for complaints by high office holders. (Para 37)

"The practical concern to ensure efficiency in the disposal of complaints cannot override the distinct statutory schemes laid down in the LPA, and it would be wrong to extend the applicability of provisions like s 89(4) to circumstances not envisaged under that provision." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 37

What Were the First and Second Charges, and How Did the Court Assess the Facebook Publications?

The First Charge concerned Mr Nalpon’s publication on 11 February 2019, and the court treated that publication as falling within the sub judice rule. The court analysed the publication against the legal standard under the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act and the common law understanding of “real risk”, asking whether the publication created a real risk of prejudicing the administration of justice. It concluded that the publication did. (Paras 40, 50, 51, 55)

The court stated that the AJPA does not define “real risk”, but that the common law definition preserved by s 8(3) of the AJPA is one that is not merely remote or fanciful. The court further noted that whether there is a real risk depends on the court’s objective assessment of the relevant facts. Applying that standard, it found that the Facebook Group was public and had around 579 members in February 2019, and that the posts were deliberate attempts to galvanise public sentiment while the appeal remained pending. (Paras 50, 51)

"The AJPA does not define a “real risk”, but the common law definition of a “real risk” (preserved by virtue of s 8(3) of the AJPA) is one that is not merely a “remote possibility” or a “fanciful” risk, though whether there is indeed a real risk in a particular case “depends very much on the court’s objective assessment of the relevant facts of the case itself” [emphasis in original]." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 50

The court’s factual assessment was direct and adverse to Mr Nalpon. It agreed with the Law Society that his publication posed a real risk of damaging the integrity and credibility of the appeal regardless of whether it actually influenced the judge. The court also emphasised the public nature of the Facebook Group and the deliberate character of the posts. (Para 51)

"In these circumstances, we agree with the Law Society’s submission that Mr Nalpon’s publication of these posts posed a real risk of damaging the integrity and credibility of the MA regardless of whether this in fact influenced the decision of the Judge." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 51

On that basis, the court held that Mr Nalpon breached r 13(6)(a) of the PCR and that the conduct amounted to improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor as well as conduct that was grossly improper within s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. The court therefore found due cause in respect of the First Charge. (Para 55)

"We therefore find that Mr Nalpon is guilty of such a breach of r 13(6)(a) of the PCR as amounts to “improper conduct … as an advocate and solicitor”, as well as conduct that is “grossly improper”, within s 83(2)(b) of the LPA." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 55

Why Did the Court Treat the Costs-Related Conduct as Professional Misconduct?

The Second Charge concerned Mr Nalpon’s conduct in relation to the Costs Order, which required him to pay the Attorney-General’s costs fixed at $2,600 inclusive of disbursements. The court examined the sequence of correspondence and publications surrounding that order, including letters in which Mr Nalpon maintained that there was no legal basis for the costs to be paid to an entity other than the Attorney-General. The court treated this as conduct going beyond a mere private dispute about payment. (Paras 6, 60)

The court noted that the three letters attached to the Further Posts maintained Mr Nalpon’s position that no provision in the Rules of Court had been cited to support payment of the costs to an entity other than the Attorney-General. It also considered the broader context of his public posts about the dispute. On that basis, the court concluded that his conduct amounted to misconduct under s 83(2)(h). (Paras 60, 63)

"The three letters from Mr Nalpon which were attached to the Further Posts maintained his position that Mr Sabapathy had not cited any provision in the Rules of Court to support the claim for the Costs to be paid to an entity other than the AG." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 60

The court rejected the suggestion that the conduct could not amount to misconduct simply because the Attorney-General’s Chambers had no basis in law to compel payment in its own name. Instead, it focused on the respondent’s conduct as a whole and on the way he publicly pursued the dispute. It concluded that due cause was made out in respect of the Second Charge. (Paras 18, 63)

"In the circumstances, we find that due cause is made out in respect of the Second Charge." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 63

How Did the Court Deal with the Respondent’s Arguments Against the Charges?

The respondent advanced several arguments. He contended that the complaints were void because they were not filed by the Attorney-General personally; that his publications were not contemptuous; that his non-payment of the Costs could not amount to misconduct; and that the Third and Fourth Charges related to publications about the disciplinary proceedings themselves and were unrelated to the original complaints. The court addressed these arguments in turn, rejecting the first, third, and fourth in substance and accepting the jurisdictional objection to the Third and Fourth Charges. (Paras 18, 25, 32, 38)

On the first point, the court held that the complaints were duly made by the Attorney-General. On the second and third points, it found that the Facebook publication created a real risk of prejudicing the administration of justice and that the costs-related conduct amounted to misconduct. On the fourth point, it held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the later-added charges because they did not emanate from the Attorney-General’s complaint within the meaning of the statutory scheme. (Paras 27, 55, 63)

"First, that the Complaints are void because they were not filed by the AG in compliance with s 85(3)(b) of the LPA." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 18

"Third, that his non-payment of the Costs to the AGC could not amount to misconduct, particularly because the AGC had no basis in law to compel him to pay the Costs in its name." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 18

"Fourth, that the Third and Fourth Charges relate to his publication of material concerning the present DT proceedings, which are completely unrelated to the Complaints lodged by the AG against him which initially formed the subject of the DT proceedings." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 18

The court’s treatment of these arguments shows a careful separation between procedural validity and substantive culpability. It did not accept the respondent’s attempt to collapse the complaint-validity issue into a broader challenge to the disciplinary process, but it did accept that the later charges could not be shoehorned into the Attorney-General complaint route. (Paras 27, 32, 38)

What Evidence Did the Court Rely On in Finding a Real Risk of Prejudice and Misconduct?

The court relied on the Facebook posts themselves, the public nature of the Facebook Group, the timing of the posts relative to the pending appeal, and the surrounding correspondence about the costs dispute. It also relied on the fact that the posts were deliberate and were made in a public forum with around 579 members. These facts were central to the court’s objective assessment of risk and misconduct. (Paras 51, 60)

In relation to the First Charge, the court found that the posts posed a real risk of damaging the integrity and credibility of the appeal regardless of whether the judge was actually influenced. In relation to the Second Charge, the court considered the letters attached to the Further Posts and the respondent’s continued insistence that the costs should not be paid to the Attorney-General’s Chambers. The court treated that conduct as part of the overall disciplinary picture. (Paras 51, 60, 63)

"Mr Nalpon’s posts were made on the Facebook Group, which was a “Public” group with around 579 members in February 2019." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 51

"By these publications, which were deliberate, Mr Nalpon sought to galvanise public sentiment in his client’s favour while the MA, in which the very same point had been submitted for determination, had yet to be heard by a judge." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 51

The court’s reliance on these facts underscores that disciplinary liability may be established by the manner, audience, and timing of publication, not merely by the literal content of the words used. The public and deliberate nature of the posts was enough to support the court’s conclusion that the conduct crossed the line into professional misconduct. (Paras 50, 51, 55)

What Legal Principles Did the Court Apply to “Grossly Improper” Conduct and Sanction?

The court reiterated that whether conduct is “grossly improper” depends on whether it is dishonourable to the solicitor as a person and dishonourable in his profession. It also stated that such conduct may be grossly improper even without dishonesty, fraud, or deceit. That principle was important because the court’s finding of due cause did not depend on proving deceitful intent; it depended on the character of the conduct in the professional context. (Para 55)

The court also considered the totality of the facts in determining sanction. It referred to authorities on seriousness and sanction, including cases dealing with grossly improper conduct, seniority, and the absence of leniency where a respondent contests clearly established facts. The sanction analysis was therefore not mechanical; it was tied to the nature of the misconduct, the respondent’s conduct throughout the proceedings, and the need to protect the administration of justice. (Paras 55, 70, 71)

"Whether particular conduct is “grossly improper” depends on whether the conduct is dishonourable to the solicitor concerned as a man and dishonourable in his profession, and conduct may be “grossly improper” notwithstanding that there is no dishonesty, fraud or deceit." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 55

Applying that principle, the court concluded that the First Charge satisfied the statutory threshold and that the Second Charge also amounted to misconduct. It then imposed a suspension of 15 months for those charges, reflecting the seriousness of the conduct while also distinguishing the jurisdictional defect affecting the Third and Fourth Charges. (Paras 55, 63, 70)

What Order Did the Court Make on Sanction and Costs?

The court ordered that Mr Nalpon be suspended from practice for 15 months in respect of the First and Second Charges. That was the principal sanction imposed after the court found due cause on those charges. The court did not impose punishment in respect of the Third and Fourth Charges because it had already held that the Disciplinary Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine them. (Para 70)

On costs, the court considered it fair to order Mr Nalpon to pay 85% of the Law Society’s costs of and incidental to the application, as well as the costs of the proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal. The court explained that the jurisdiction issue concerning the Third and Fourth Charges formed only a small part of the case before it, which had focused predominantly on the s 85(3)(b) argument and the First and Second Charges. (Para 71)

"For the foregoing reasons, we order that Mr Nalpon be suspended from practice for a period of 15 months in respect of the First and Second Charges." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 70

"That said, we think it is only fair to order Mr Nalpon to pay the Law Society 85%, instead of 100%, of the costs of and incidental to this application, as well as the costs of the proceedings before the DT." — Per Chao Hick Tin SJ, Para 71

The court’s costs order also reflects its partial success analysis. Although Mr Nalpon succeeded on the jurisdiction point concerning the Third and Fourth Charges, he failed on the central merits issues and on the validity of the complaints. The 85% figure therefore tracked the relative weight of the issues actually litigated. (Paras 70, 71)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it clarifies the operation of the disciplinary complaint route under s 85(3)(b) of the LPA. The court confirmed that complaints may be validly made by the Attorney-General through the Attorney-General’s Chambers, but it also drew a firm line against expanding the Disciplinary Tribunal’s jurisdiction beyond what the statutory scheme permits. That distinction is important for future disciplinary proceedings involving complaints by high office holders. (Paras 25, 27, 29, 32, 37, 38)

The case also matters because it applies the sub judice and professional conduct rules to social media publications by a lawyer. The court treated a public Facebook post about pending proceedings as capable of creating a real risk of prejudice, and it did so by focusing on audience size, timing, and deliberate intent to influence public sentiment. That reasoning is highly relevant in an era where lawyers communicate instantly to large audiences online. (Paras 50, 51, 55)

Finally, the case is significant because it shows that conduct surrounding a costs order can itself amount to professional misconduct when viewed in context. The court did not treat the dispute as a mere private disagreement over payment; it assessed the respondent’s public conduct and correspondence as part of a broader pattern of behaviour inconsistent with professional obligations. The resulting 15-month suspension demonstrates that disciplinary consequences can be severe even where the misconduct is not dishonest in the conventional sense. (Paras 60, 63, 70)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed): ss 83(1), 83(2)(b), 83(2)(h), 83(5), 85(1), 85(3)(b), 87, 89(1), 89(3), 89(4), 93, 98(1) (Paras 1, 19, 20, 29, 32, 55, 63, 70)
• Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016: ss 3(1)(b), 8(3), 13(1), 16(1), 28 (Paras 5, 40, 50)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015: r 13(6) (Paras 40, 55)
• Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed): ss 27(2), 35, 36 (Paras 24, 25)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 81 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.