Case Details
- Citation: [2019] SGHC 111
- Title: Attorney-General v Wham Kwok Han Jolovan and another matter
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 29 April 2019
- Judge: Woo Bih Li J
- Coram: Woo Bih Li J
- Case Numbers: Originating Summonses Nos 510 and 537 of 2018 (Summonses Nos 2196 and 2192 of 2018)
- Proceedings Type: Contempt of Court – sentencing (following convictions for scandalising contempt)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Attorney-General
- Defendants/Respondents: Wham Kwok Han Jolovan; Tan Liang Joo John
- Legal Area: Contempt of Court — Sentencing
- Statutory Provision(s) Referenced (from extract): s 3(1)(a) of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016)
- Other Statutory Provision(s) Referenced (from extract): s 12(3) (notice to apologise); ss 12(2) to 12(5) (purging contempt framework); s 9(d) (inherent power/injunction context)
- Representation: Francis Ng, SC, Senthilkumaran Sabapathy and Sheryl Janet George (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the applicant; Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam (Eugene Thuraisingam LLP) and Choo Zheng Xi and Priscilla Chia Wen Qi (Peter Low & Choo LLC) for the respondent in OS 510/2018; Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam (Eugene Thuraisingam LLP) for the respondent in OS 537/2018.
- Prior Liability Judgment: Attorney-General v Wham Kwok Han Jolovan and another matter [2018] SGHC 222 (“Wham Kwok Han Jolovan”)
- Related Appellate Note (LawNet Editorial Note): Appeals in Civil Appeals Nos 99, 108 and 110 of 2019 dismissed; appeal in Civil Appeal No 109 of 2019 allowed in part by the Court of Appeal on 16 March 2020 ([2020] SGCA 16).
- Judgment Length: 24 pages, 11,979 words
Summary
Attorney-General v Wham Kwok Han Jolovan and another matter [2019] SGHC 111 is a sentencing decision in scandalising contempt proceedings brought under the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (“the Act”). Both respondents—Wham Kwok Han Jolovan and Tan Liang Joo John—had been convicted on 9 October 2018 for contempt by scandalising the court pursuant to s 3(1)(a) of the Act, arising from Facebook posts that the High Court found to be scandalising. The present judgment addresses what sentences and ancillary orders were appropriate for each respondent.
The High Court (Woo Bih Li J) considered the sentencing framework for scandalising contempt, including the continued relevance of common law sentencing precedents, and assessed aggravating and mitigating factors such as the mode and extent of online dissemination, the respondents’ lack of remorse, and whether the contempt had been “purged” by removal and/or apology. The court also addressed the proper use of statutory mechanisms for notice to apologise and the possibility of injunctive relief to restrain continuing publication.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying liability facts are set out in the earlier decision Attorney-General v Wham Kwok Han Jolovan and another matter [2018] SGHC 222 (“Wham Kwok Han Jolovan”). In broad terms, the respondents were convicted for scandalising contempt based on their respective posts on their Facebook profiles. The court treated the posts as publications capable of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.
In Originating Summons No 510 of 2018, Wham was convicted on 9 October 2018 for scandalising contempt. The court’s liability findings focused on Wham’s Facebook post (“Wham’s post”), which, although it purported to relate to proceedings in Malaysia, was found to contain a “sly dig” at the Singapore courts. The post was characterised as an indiscriminate attack on the Singapore judiciary and was published on a social media platform that enables rapid and wide dissemination.
In Originating Summons No 537 of 2018, Tan Liang Joo John was also convicted on 9 October 2018 for scandalising contempt under the same statutory provision. While the present extract primarily details the sentencing submissions for Wham, the overall procedural posture is that both respondents were convicted for scandalising contempt arising from their own Facebook publications. The sentencing hearing on 20 March 2019 therefore required the court to calibrate appropriate penalties for each respondent based on their individual conduct and the relevant sentencing considerations.
At the sentencing stage, a key factual theme was whether the respondents had taken steps to remove the offending material and whether they had offered an apology. The Attorney-General’s submissions emphasised that, as at the sentencing hearing, Wham had not removed his post from his Facebook profile and had not apologised. This lack of remedial action was treated as a significant aggravating factor and also as relevant to whether the contempt had been effectively purged.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal legal issue was the determination of the appropriate sentence for scandalising contempt under s 3(1)(a) of the Act, in circumstances where the contempt arose from online publication. This required the court to decide how sentencing precedents—particularly common law authorities on scandalising contempt—should inform the statutory sentencing regime under the Act.
A second legal issue concerned the scope and timing of ancillary orders designed to purge the contempt. The Attorney-General sought an order under s 12(3) of the Act requiring Wham to publish a notice to apologise, with conditions including immediate removal of the post and undertakings against republication. The court had to consider whether such an apology notice should be ordered as a matter of course when a contemnor refuses to apologise or remove the contemptuous publication, or whether it should be reserved for exceptional circumstances.
A third issue related to whether the court could order removal of the offending publication through injunctive relief. The Attorney-General relied on s 9(d) of the Act to argue that the court had the inherent power to restrain continuing publication, framing the relief as a prohibitory injunction to prevent ongoing scandalising contempt or ongoing publication of the contemptuous material.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On sentencing, the court accepted that common law cases on scandalising contempt remain relevant sentencing precedents. The Attorney-General argued that Au Wai Pang v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 992 (“Au Wai Pang”) was the most useful comparator because the contemnor in that case had also created and published contemptuous material on the internet. The sentencing analysis therefore turned on the extent to which the respondents’ conduct in the present case was more or less egregious than the conduct in Au Wai Pang.
The Attorney-General’s position was that Wham’s culpability was higher than that of the contemnor in Au Wai Pang. The AG emphasised that Wham’s post was an indiscriminate attack on the entire Singapore judiciary, whereas Au Wai Pang’s article was directed at specific members of the judiciary. The AG also argued that Wham’s post, though ostensibly about Malaysian proceedings, was in substance a dig at the Singapore courts. These characterisations were offered to justify a higher fine and a longer term of imprisonment in default.
Another aggravating factor advanced by the AG was Wham’s lack of remorse. The AG submitted that Wham had neither removed the post nor apologised by the time of the sentencing hearing, and that this demonstrated a blatant disregard for the court’s finding of scandalising contempt. The AG contrasted this with Au Wai Pang, where the contemnor had removed the contemptuous material and apologised after the AG obtained leave to apply for committal. In the AG’s submission, the absence of remedial steps in Wham’s case supported a higher sentence.
The court also had to consider the online dissemination dimension. The AG argued that Wham’s post had remained online for a longer period than the contemptuous material in Au Wai Pang, increasing the potential reach and impact. The AG further pointed to additional posts made by Wham on 8 and 9 October 2018, which, while ostensibly informing the public of the status of proceedings, also republished the contemptuous content. This was submitted to amplify dissemination and to show persistence in the publication of the scandalising material.
Turning to the statutory “purging” mechanism, the Attorney-General sought an order under s 12(3) for Wham to publish a notice to apologise. The AG’s argument was that the purpose of such an order is to purge the contempt, and that the court should focus on the efficacy of the notice to apologise in purging the scandalising effect. The AG contended that the apology notice should be published in the same manner as the contemptuous publication, so that the same audience is informed that the contempt has been purged.
Importantly, the AG argued that the court should not require the apology to be “genuine” as a condition for ordering the notice. The AG submitted that if genuine contrition were required, s 12(3) would be rendered otiose. The AG further submitted that if Wham refused to comply with an apology notice order, that refusal would itself constitute further contempt. In essence, the AG’s submissions framed the apology notice as a structured remedial tool rather than a subjective inquiry into the contemnor’s sincerity.
On removal of the post, the AG sought, in the alternative, an order for Wham to remove his post forthwith. The AG relied on s 9(d) of the Act to support the court’s power to issue an injunction restraining continuing contempt or continuing publication. The AG characterised the relief as prohibitory rather than mandatory, drawing an analogy to defamation cases where prohibitory injunctions are granted as a matter of course to restrain ongoing publication. The AG’s submissions again emphasised purging: removal would prevent the contemptuous material from continuing to undermine public confidence.
Wham’s submissions, by contrast, sought to reduce both the punitive and remedial components. While Wham did not dispute that Au Wai Pang was an appropriate reference point, he argued that his conduct was less egregious. He contended that his post was more general and superficial than the detailed, acerbic, and insidious article in Au Wai Pang, which had alleged grave misconduct by key figures in the Singapore judiciary. Wham also argued that the court should consider his subjective intention in publishing the post, which he said was to compare judicial philosophies of the courts in Singapore and Malaysia.
Wham also challenged the AG’s dissemination-based aggravation. He argued that the extent of dissemination was less than in Au Wai Pang because a reasonable person would be less likely to take his post with the same degree of seriousness and credibility. Although the extract truncates the remainder of Wham’s submissions, the thrust is that both the qualitative nature of the content and the likely audience impact should lead to a lower fine and shorter imprisonment in default, and that the court should not order apology publication or immediate removal as ancillary relief.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court delivered its sentencing decision after hearing parties on 20 March 2019 and reserving judgment. The judgment addressed the appropriate sentence for Wham first, and it also dealt with the corresponding sentencing position for Tan. The court’s orders were designed to achieve both punishment and the purging of scandalising contempt, particularly where the offending material remained online and where no apology had been offered.
As reflected in the LawNet editorial note, subsequent appeals were dealt with by the Court of Appeal in [2020] SGCA 16, where some appeals were dismissed and one was allowed in part. This indicates that while the High Court’s approach to sentencing and ancillary orders was broadly accepted, the appellate court made at least some adjustments to the outcome for one of the parties.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Attorney-General v Wham Kwok Han Jolovan [2019] SGHC 111 is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how the sentencing of scandalising contempt under the Act should be approached in the context of modern online publication. The court’s reliance on common law sentencing precedents, while still treating the Act as the governing statutory framework, provides a practical roadmap for how fines and imprisonment in default may be calibrated by reference to the egregiousness of the conduct and the likely impact on public confidence.
Equally important is the case’s focus on remedial “purging” measures. The Attorney-General’s submissions—accepted in principle in many contempt frameworks—highlight that orders such as notices to apologise and removal/injunction relief are not merely punitive add-ons; they are mechanisms intended to neutralise the continuing harm caused by the scandalising publication. For lawyers advising contemnors or advising the AG’s Chambers, the case underscores that failure to remove offending material and failure to apologise may aggravate sentence and may also influence whether ancillary orders are granted.
Finally, the case is useful for law students and litigators because it demonstrates how courts reason about proportionality in contempt sentencing: the court must balance the seriousness of the attack on the administration of justice against mitigating factors such as the nature of the publication, the contemnor’s intention, and the actual extent of dissemination. The later appellate treatment in [2020] SGCA 16 further confirms that sentencing in this area remains fact-sensitive and subject to appellate scrutiny.
Legislation Referenced
- Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016), s 3(1)(a) [CDN] [SSO]
- Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016), s 12(3) [CDN] [SSO]
- Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016), ss 12(2) to 12(5) [CDN] [SSO]
- Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016), s 9(d) [CDN] [SSO]
Cases Cited
- [2016] SGDC 220
- [2018] SGHC 222
- [2019] SGHC 111
- [2020] SGCA 16
- Au Wai Pang v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 992
- Chin Bay Ching v Merchant Ventures Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R) 142
Source Documents
This article analyses [2019] SGHC 111 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.