Case Details
- Citation: [2020] SGHC 255
- Title: The Law Society of Singapore v Lee Suet Fern (alias Lim Suet Fern)
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ; Judith Prakash JA; Woo Bih Li J
- Date of Decision: 20 November 2020
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 2 of 2020
- Tribunal/Court: Court of Three Judges
- Plaintiff/Applicant: The Law Society of Singapore
- Defendant/Respondent: Lee Suet Fern (alias Lim Suet Fern)
- Legal Area(s): Legal Profession — solicitor-client relationship; Legal Profession — professional conduct
- Procedural Posture: Application under s 98(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act for sanctions under s 83(1) following disciplinary tribunal findings
- Judgment Length: 55 pages; 31,832 words
- Decision Summary: The High Court differed from certain findings of the disciplinary tribunal, but agreed that the respondent was guilty of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor; ordered suspension from practice for 15 months (instead of striking off sought by the Law Society)
- Counsel for Applicant: Koh Swee Yen and Queenie Angeline Lim Xiaoyan (WongPartnership LLP)
- Counsel for Applicant (instructed): Kenneth Tan SC, Soh Wei Chi (Kenneth Tan Partnership) and Walter Woon SC (RHTLaw Asia LLP)
- Counsel for Respondent: Vergis S Abraham and Asiyah binte Ahmad Arif (Providence Law Asia LLC)
- Key Statute(s) Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”)
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2020] SGHC 166; [2020] SGDT 1; [2020] SGHC 255
Summary
This case arose from disciplinary proceedings against an advocate and solicitor, Mrs Lee Suet Fern (alias Lim Suet Fern), who was found to have engaged in misconduct connected to the preparation and execution of her late father-in-law’s last will. The Law Society applied to the High Court for sanctions under the Legal Profession Act after the disciplinary tribunal (“DT”) concluded that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action and that the respondent’s conduct warranted the severest sanction sought by the Law Society.
In the High Court, the Court of Three Judges (Sundaresh Menon CJ, Judith Prakash JA and Woo Bih Li J) accepted that the respondent’s conduct amounted to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor. However, the Court differed from the DT on certain factual and legal characterisations, particularly on the question whether the respondent received instructions or directions directly from her putative client and whether an implied retainer existed. Despite these differences, the Court concluded that the nature and circumstances of the misconduct justified a substantial sanction, ordering suspension from practice for 15 months.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The disciplinary matter concerned the respondent’s participation, principally on 16 and 17 December 2013, in the preparation and execution of what became the last will of her father-in-law, the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“the Testator”). The Court emphasised that disciplinary proceedings can adversely affect a practitioner’s livelihood and reputation, and therefore applied the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to contested facts (citing earlier authorities including Law Society of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani and Law Society of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James).
Before the relevant events in December 2013, the Testator had executed six wills between 20 August 2011 and 2 November 2012. These wills were prepared by Ms Kwa Kim Li, a partner in the firm Lee & Lee. The wills reflected evolving wishes regarding the distribution of the Testator’s estate among his three children: Mr Lee Hsien Loong (“Mr LHL”), Dr Lee Wei Ling (“Dr LWL”), and the respondent’s husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang (“Mr LHY”). The Court’s narrative of the six wills is important because it shows that the Testator’s testamentary intentions were not static; they changed over time, including with respect to the Oxley Road property (“Oxley House”), the right of Dr LWL to reside there, and clauses such as a demolition clause and a valuation clause.
After the execution of the Sixth Will on 2 November 2012, the Testator’s health deteriorated. Between September and October 2013, he was hospitalised for an extended period. Following discharge, he initiated discussions with Ms Kwa on or around 29 November 2013 about making changes to the Sixth Will. Those discussions were recorded in a series of emails beginning on 30 November 2013. In summary, the email correspondence reflected the Testator’s concern about potential “de-gazetting” of the Oxley House and the possibility that its value might increase after his passing. Ms Kwa outlined options to ensure that Dr LWL and Mr LHY would benefit from any increased value. On 12 December 2013, Ms Kwa wrote again noting the Testator’s wish to revert to leaving equal shares to each child, and she indicated that she would prepare a codicil to effect this. The Testator replied on 13 December 2013 at 10.50pm, adding that the codicil should specify that two carpets go to Mr LHY. The Court noted that the respondent was not involved or copied in these discussions.
As at 13 December 2013, three days before the events of 16 December 2013, the Court found that the respondent had received from the Testator a draft of what became the last will, and that the Testator’s professed intention—discussed over a two-week period with his solicitor—was to execute a codicil to the Sixth Will, not to replace it with an entirely new will or reinstate the First Will as a whole (including the demolition clause). The Court also observed that while it was not clear whether the Testator’s children knew the precise contents of each will, it was not disputed that they were aware they were beneficiaries under each will.
The critical events occurred on 16 December 2013. The respondent sent an email to the Testator at 7.08pm, copying her husband and, based on the addressee list, apparently also Ms Kwa, although Ms Kwa did not receive that email for unknown reasons. The respondent attached a draft will dated 19 August 2011 and told the Testator that it was the “original agreed Will” ensuring that all three children received equal shares. She also asked Ms Kwa to “engross” the enclosed draft. The Court later addressed contentious issues about how the respondent obtained the draft and why she sent the email when she did, but the undisputed fact was that the respondent’s email was intended to refer to the First Will and that it was presented as an “original agreed” instrument.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court had to determine what sanction should be imposed under the Legal Profession Act, but that required it to assess the underlying misconduct findings. In particular, the Court considered whether the respondent’s conduct involved a breach of professional obligations connected to the solicitor-client relationship and whether the respondent had acted in a manner that was inconsistent with the standards expected of an advocate and solicitor.
Two issues were especially prominent. First, the Court examined whether the respondent received instructions or directions directly from her putative client (the Testator). The disciplinary tribunal had apparently proceeded on a characterisation that implied a direct solicitor-client dynamic. The High Court, however, indicated that it would differ from the DT on this point, concluding that the respondent did not receive instructions or directions directly from the Testator.
Second, the Court considered whether there was an implied retainer between the respondent and the Testator. This question matters because an implied retainer would potentially ground duties owed by the respondent to the Testator, including duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and proper handling of instructions. The Court signalled that it did not find an implied retainer, even though it still found misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by framing the applicable standard of proof. Because the proceedings could adversely affect the respondent’s livelihood and reputation, the Court applied the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to contested facts. This approach reflects the seriousness of disciplinary findings and ensures that factual conclusions are not made on a mere balance of probabilities where the consequences are grave.
On the solicitor-client relationship issues, the Court carefully analysed the evidence surrounding the respondent’s involvement. The Court accepted that the respondent was involved in sending the 7.08pm email and attaching a draft will. However, the Court’s focus was on whether the respondent had been instructed by the Testator in a manner that would establish a direct solicitor-client relationship. The Court concluded that she did not receive instructions or directions directly from the Testator. This conclusion required the Court to distinguish between the respondent’s actions (including her communications and requests to Ms Kwa) and the presence of a genuine instruction-giving relationship from the Testator to her.
Relatedly, the Court rejected the existence of an implied retainer. While the respondent’s status as an advocate and solicitor and her involvement in the will-making process might suggest that she was acting in a professional capacity, the Court held that the evidential basis did not support an implied retainer. The Court’s reasoning underscores that professional status alone does not automatically create a retainer; the existence of a retainer depends on the substance of the relationship and the presence of instruction or engagement in a manner that gives rise to duties.
Despite these differences from the DT, the Court agreed that the respondent was guilty of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor. The Court’s analysis therefore proceeded on the basis that misconduct can arise even where a direct retainer is not established. The Court’s reasoning, as reflected in the introduction and the Court’s ultimate sanction, indicates that the respondent’s conduct was inappropriate in the context of will preparation and execution, particularly given the timing, the manner in which the draft was presented, and the implications for the integrity of the testamentary process. In other words, the absence of a direct solicitor-client relationship did not exculpate the respondent; it merely affected how the Court characterised the professional duties at stake.
On sanctions, the Court considered the Law Society’s request for a striking off order under s 83(1)(a) of the LPA. The Court, however, found that suspension was more appropriate given the circumstances and nature of the misconduct. This reflects the disciplinary sentencing principle that sanctions must be proportionate to the seriousness of the misconduct, the need to protect the public and maintain confidence in the profession, and the specific facts of the case. The Court ultimately imposed a 15-month suspension, signalling that the misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant a significant penalty, but not at the level of permanent removal from the roll.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the Law Society’s request for a striking off order and instead ordered that the respondent be suspended from practising as a solicitor for a period of 15 months. The practical effect is that the respondent is prohibited from practising during the suspension period, subject to the usual regulatory and administrative consequences that follow disciplinary sanctions.
While the Court agreed with the DT that the respondent’s conduct amounted to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor, it modified certain factual findings, particularly those relating to the existence of direct instructions and an implied retainer. This means the sanction was upheld on a refined understanding of the relationship and the respondent’s role, rather than on the DT’s broader characterisation of a solicitor-client dynamic.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how disciplinary courts may approach the solicitor-client relationship in misconduct cases. The Court’s refusal to find a direct instruction-giving relationship or an implied retainer demonstrates that disciplinary liability is not confined to situations where a formal retainer is established. Conduct can still be misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor even if the evidential foundation for a retainer is not made out.
From a professional conduct perspective, the case also highlights the importance of safeguarding the integrity of testamentary processes. Will preparation and execution are areas where the profession must be especially vigilant to ensure that instructions are properly sourced, that the client’s wishes are accurately reflected, and that third-party influence does not undermine the legitimacy of the instrument. The Court’s sanction indicates that conduct perceived as interfering with or improperly steering will-making can attract serious disciplinary consequences.
For law students and lawyers, the case is also useful as an example of how the High Court reviews disciplinary tribunal findings. The Court differed from the DT on certain findings but still reached a conclusion of misconduct and imposed a substantial sanction. This illustrates that appellate review in disciplinary matters may involve both factual refinement and legal re-characterisation, while still preserving the core disciplinary outcome where the misconduct is established to the required standard.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), including:s 98(1)(a): application by the Law Society for an order that a respondent be subject to sanctions under the Act
- s 83(1): sanctions available upon proof of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor (including striking off and suspension)
Cases Cited
- Law Society of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani [2006] 4 SLR(R) 308
- Law Society of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James [2013] 3 SLR 221
- Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2013] 3 SLR 875
- The Law Society of Singapore v Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern) [2020] SGDT 1
- [2020] SGHC 166
- [2020] SGHC 255
Source Documents
This article analyses [2020] SGHC 255 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.