Suria Shaik Aziz

"For all these reasons, I was of the view that the Applicant was not suitable to be admitted at this time." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 46

Case Information

• Citation: [2023] SGHC 129 (Para heading block)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para heading block)
• Date of hearing: 11 April 2023; grounds issued on 5 May 2023 (Para heading block)
• Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ (Para heading block)
• Case number: Admission of Advocates and Solicitors 530 of 2022 / HC/AAS 530/2022 (Para heading block; Para 1)
• Area of law: Legal Profession — Admission (Para heading block)
• Counsel for the applicant: Uthayasurian s/o Sidambaram and Divanan s/o Narkunan (Phoenix Law Corporation) (Para heading block)
• Counsel for the Attorney-General: Lee Hui Min and Clement Lim Chau Jie (Attorney-General’s Chambers) (Para heading block)
• Counsel for the Law Society of Singapore: Andrew Chua (Drew & Napier LLC) and Darryl Chew (Chia Wong Partnership LLC) (Para heading block)
• Counsel for the Singapore Institute of Legal Education: Wong Li-Yen Dew (Dew Chambers) (Para heading block)

Summary

HC/AAS 530/2022 was an application by Mr Suria Shaik Aziz for admission as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice identified the central question as whether the applicant was suitable for admission in terms of character, given that competence and qualifications were not in dispute. The case turned on a prior plagiarism incident during the applicant’s law studies, and on whether his later explanations, disclosures, and reflections showed sufficient ethical insight to justify admission at that time. (Para 1; Para 20)

The court accepted that the applicant had disclosed the plagiarism incident in his admission materials, but it was troubled that he had not fully disclosed the earlier research-outline incident or the warning he had received from his professor. The court also examined the applicant’s explanations that he had been rushing to meet deadlines and had no malicious intention to pass off others’ work as his own. Those explanations did not persuade the court that he had truly appreciated the gravity of the misconduct or the ethical implications of plagiarism. (Para 7; Para 42; Para 28; Para 29)

Ultimately, the Chief Justice concluded that the applicant was not suitable to be admitted at that time. Leave was granted for the applicant to withdraw his application, but only subject to an undertaking not to bring a fresh application to the bar in Singapore or elsewhere for four months, and to comply with any further requirements reasonably imposed to satisfy the stakeholders or the court that he was fit and proper. The judgment also stressed that deferment in admission matters is rehabilitative rather than punitive, and that future applicants should disclose prior misconduct at the first opportunity. (Para 46; Para 48; Para 23; Para 41)

Why Did the Court Say the Central Inquiry Was the Applicant’s Character Rather Than His Competence?

The court framed the case as one in which the applicant’s competence and qualifications were not in issue, so the decisive question was whether he was suitable for admission in terms of character. That framing mattered because the court was not conducting a technical assessment of academic ability or professional training; instead, it was assessing whether the applicant’s conduct, disclosures, and reflections demonstrated the ethical qualities expected of a member of the profession. The court expressly treated this as the central inquiry in admission applications where competence is not disputed. (Para 20)

"the central inquiry in admission applications, where there is no question as to the applicant’s competence or qualifications, is whether the applicant in question is suitable for admission in terms of her character." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 20

That approach also explains why the court focused so closely on the applicant’s response to the plagiarism incident rather than on his overall academic record. The judgment noted that the University’s records revealed no other finding of academic or general misconduct against him, but that did not end the inquiry. The court still had to decide whether the particular misconduct disclosed a character issue serious enough to justify withholding admission at that time. In other words, a clean record apart from the plagiarism incident was relevant, but not determinative. (Para 10; Para 20)

The court’s reasoning shows that admission cases are not resolved by counting incidents alone. Instead, the court examined the nature of the misconduct, the applicant’s state of mind, the way he handled the investigation, and the extent to which he had internalised the ethical lesson. This is why the judgment repeatedly returned to the question whether the applicant had merely broken a rule, or whether he had understood that he was passing off the work of others as his own. (Para 25; Para 28; Para 29)

What Exactly Happened During the University Plagiarism Incident?

The applicant graduated from the University of Tasmania and, in his last semester in 2016, took an International Trade Law module under Professor Anja Hilkemeijer. For that module, he had to submit a research paper that accounted for 60% of his grade. The judgment also records that he had earlier submitted a research outline for the same module. The factual background therefore involved not a single isolated document, but a sequence of submissions in the same academic exercise. (Para 2; Para 3)

"The Applicant graduated from the University of Tasmania (the “University”). In 2016, during his last semester at the University, he took the International Trade Law module (the “Module”) under Professor Anja Hilkemeijer (“Professor Hilkemeijer”), for which he had to submit a research paper that accounted for 60% of his grade for the Module (the “Research Paper”)." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 2

The court found that the applicant had copied material from the internet into his research outline and later into his research paper. The Turnitin report for the research paper revealed a similarity index of 42%, and the court described the copied material as substantial. The judgment also records that the applicant had admitted to copying material from the internet and that he knew the similarity index was high. These facts were central because they showed that the issue was not a trivial citation error but a serious plagiarism problem. (Para 5; Para 28)

"The Turnitin report for his Research Paper revealed a similarity index of 42%." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 5

The court ultimately found that the allegation of academic misconduct had been substantiated. It also noted that the applicant had been warned by Professor Hilkemeijer after the research-outline incident, but that warning did not prevent the later misconduct in the research paper. That sequence mattered because it showed that the applicant had already been alerted to the problem before he submitted the final paper, yet he still proceeded in a way that the court regarded as ethically serious. (Para 8; Para 42)

"I find therefore, that the allegation of academic misconduct has been substantiated." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 8

Why Was the Applicant’s Disclosure in His Admission Materials Considered Incomplete?

The applicant did disclose the plagiarism incident relating to the research paper in his admission affidavit, but the court found that he made no mention of the earlier research-outline incident or the warning he received from Professor Hilkemeijer. That omission mattered because the court was assessing not merely whether he had disclosed some misconduct, but whether he had been forthright about the full sequence of events that bore on his suitability for admission. (Para 42)

"Although the Applicant disclosed his act of plagiarism for the Research Paper in his Admission Affidavit, he made no mention of the Research Outline incident and the warning he received from Professor Hilkemeijer." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 42

The court also considered the applicant’s supplementary affidavit, in which he attached medical certificates, the professor’s letter, the Turnitin report, and the revised research paper. Those materials showed that he had attempted to place the incident before the court in documentary form, but the court still had to assess whether the narrative he presented was complete and candid. The existence of supporting documents did not cure the omission of the earlier incident and warning. (Para 13; Para 42)

"He attached as exhibits to the Supplementary Affidavit (a) medical certificates evidencing his absence from school for various relatively brief periods in 2016; (b) the Letter from Professor Otlowski; (c) the Turnitin report for the Research Paper which included excerpts of the Research Paper; and (d) the Revised Research Paper." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 13

The court’s concern was not simply that the applicant had failed to mention every detail, but that the omitted facts were directly relevant to the ethical assessment. A prior warning from the professor would have shown that the applicant had already been put on notice about the seriousness of plagiarism. By not disclosing that warning and the earlier outline incident, the applicant presented a less complete picture of his conduct than the court considered appropriate in an admission context. (Para 42; Para 41)

How Did the Parties Characterise the Plagiarism: Lack of Integrity or Lack of Diligence?

The applicant’s explanation, as recorded in the judgment, was that he had been rushing to meet the deadline for the research paper and did not have sufficient time to complete his referencing when he uploaded the incomplete paper. He also told the professor that he had no malicious intention to pass off anyone else’s work as his own and that he merely had an incomplete paper that was not appropriately referenced. Those explanations were important because they were directed at the applicant’s state of mind: whether he intended deception or merely acted carelessly under pressure. (Para 7)

"he explained to her that he had been rushing to meet the deadline for the Research Paper and that he did not have sufficient time to complete his referencing when he uploaded his incomplete research paper." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 7

"He also told her that he had no “malicious intention to pass off anyone else’s work as [his] own and that [he] merely had an incomplete paper that was not appropriately referenced”." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 7

Counsel for the Law Society argued that the conduct should be viewed as reflecting a lack of academic diligence rather than a lack of academic integrity. Counsel for the Singapore Institute of Legal Education similarly suggested that there was no integrity concern because the applicant had already been warned about plagiarism and knew that Turnitin would quickly flag the issue if the university reviewed the essay. These submissions attempted to reframe the misconduct as a lapse in care, not a moral failing. (Para 31; Para 32)

"Counsel for Law Society, Mr Andrew Chua, suggested that I should see the Applicant’s conduct as reflecting a lack of academic diligence rather than of academic integrity." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 31

"Counsel for the SILE, Ms Wong Li-Yen Dew (“Ms Wong”), likewise suggested that she thought there was no concern over integrity because (a) the Applicant had already been warned about the consequences of plagiarism; and (b) he was aware at the time he submitted the paper that if the University reviewed the essay using Turnitin, this would quickly flag the concern of plagiarism." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 32

The court did not accept that reframing. It reasoned that the main issue was that a significant portion of the research paper had been lifted in its entirety from the internet. That factual finding made it difficult to characterise the conduct as a mere lapse in diligence, because the copying was extensive and deliberate enough to raise the question whether the applicant appreciated that he was passing off others’ work as his own. (Para 28; Para 29)

What Legal Test Did the Court Apply to Admission and Deferment?

The court relied on earlier admission cases to explain the governing approach. It cited Re Wong Wai Loong Sean and Re Tay Jie Qi for the proposition that the central inquiry is suitability for admission in terms of character. It also treated the circumstances of misconduct, the applicant’s conduct during investigations, disclosures, remorse, and rehabilitation as relevant signposts that help the court decide whether a deferment is needed and, if so, for how long. (Para 20; Para 21)

"These may be seen as signposts that can inform the court of the nature and severity of the applicant’s character issues, whether there is a need for a deferment of her admission and if so, the amount of time she will likely need to resolve those character issues." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 21

The court also emphasised that the purpose of a deferment in admission applications is rehabilitative, not punitive. That principle is important because it means the court is not punishing the applicant for past wrongdoing in the criminal or disciplinary sense; rather, it is deciding whether more time is needed for the applicant to demonstrate the ethical maturity required for admission. The judgment therefore treated deferment as a forward-looking protective and rehabilitative measure. (Para 23)

"the purpose of a deferment in admission applications is rehabilitative, not punitive" — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 23

Applying that framework, the court asked whether the applicant had yet resolved the character issue raised by the plagiarism incident. The answer was no, because the court was not satisfied that he sufficiently appreciated the ethical implications of his misconduct some years earlier while still a law student. That lack of insight, rather than the mere existence of the past incident, was what made him unsuitable at that time. (Para 1; Para 46)

Why Did the Court Reject the Argument That the Applicant Merely Lacked Diligence?

The court’s reasoning began with the nature of the copied material. It observed that the main issue lay in the fact that a significant portion of the research paper was lifted in its entirety from the internet. That finding undercut the suggestion that the problem was only incomplete referencing or a deadline-driven lapse, because wholesale copying is qualitatively different from a minor citation oversight. (Para 28)

"It seemed to me that the main issue lay in the fact that a significant portion of his Research Paper was lifted in its entirety from the internet." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 28

The court then reasoned that, in those circumstances, it was unable to see how the applicant could fail to appreciate the effect of his act, namely that he was passing the work of others off as his own, and the gravity of that misconduct when he went ahead and submitted the research paper. This was a direct rejection of the idea that the applicant’s state of mind could be reduced to mere carelessness. The court treated the act of submission itself as demonstrating awareness of the ethical significance of what he was doing. (Para 29)

"In these circumstances, I was unable to see how the Applicant could fail to appreciate the effect of his act (namely, that he was passing the work of others as his own), and the gravity of this misconduct when he went ahead and submitted the Research Paper." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 29

The court’s analysis also shows that the prior warning from Professor Hilkemeijer mattered. Once the applicant had already been warned about the research-outline incident, the later submission of a substantially copied research paper could not easily be explained away as an innocent mistake. The court therefore treated the sequence as evidence that the applicant had not yet internalised the ethical lesson that plagiarism is wrong because it misrepresents authorship and undermines academic integrity. (Para 8; Para 42; Para 29)

How Did the Court Assess Remorse, Insight, and Rehabilitation?

The court did not treat the applicant’s later disclosure of the plagiarism incident as enough by itself. It examined whether he had shown genuine insight into the ethical implications of his conduct. The judgment suggests that the applicant’s understanding remained too superficial, because he appeared to have learned mainly that he should follow the rules more carefully next time, rather than that he should understand why plagiarism is wrong in the first place. (Para 34)

"This suggested to me that the Applicant’s conclusion, after all these years, was that he simply needed to follow the rules more carefully next time." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 34

"With respect, this missed the true learning point, which is to see beyond the rules, understand their rationale, and appreciate the gravity of passing the work of others off as his own." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 34

That observation is significant because it distinguishes between formal compliance and ethical understanding. The court was not satisfied with a lesson limited to procedural caution. It wanted evidence that the applicant had reflected on the moral and professional meaning of plagiarism, including why it is incompatible with the standards expected of an advocate and solicitor. The court therefore viewed the applicant’s insight as incomplete. (Para 34; Para 46)

The court also drew a contrast with Re Tay Jie Qi, where the applicant immediately admitted taking paragraphs from another student’s paper when informed of a possible integrity breach. By contrast, the present applicant’s conduct during the university’s initial investigation drew parallels with Re Tay Quan Li Leon, where the applicant sought to downplay culpability. These comparisons were used to assess the quality of the applicant’s response to scrutiny and the depth of his remorse. (Para 36; Para 37)

"This stood in stark contrast with that of the applicant in Re Tay Jie Qi. In that case, when Ms Tay Jie Qi was informed by the Singapore Management University (“SMU”) that she may have violated SMU’s Code of Integrity, she immediately admitted that she had taken some paragraphs from a research paper submitted by another student who had taken the module in a previous year." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 36

"The Applicant’s conduct during the initial investigation by the University drew some parallels with that of the applicant in Re Tay Quan Li Leon [2022] SGHC 133, where Mr Tay Quan Li Leon sought to downplay his culpability during the initial investigations by stating that the similarities in his script with another student’s script were because they studied together and prepared notes together (at [2] and [7])." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 37

What Did the Court Say About the Statutory Framework for Admission and Part-Call?

The judgment referred to section 12 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 and rule 25 of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011 in the heading block, and it also discussed section 32(3) of the LPA in relation to the applicant’s earlier part-call application. The court noted that on 20 June 2022, by way of HC/SUM 2270/2022, the applicant applied to be part called under section 32(3). That procedural history formed part of the broader admission context. (Heading block; Para 11)

"On 20 June 2022, by way of HC/SUM 2270/2022 (“SUM 2270”), the Applicant applied to be part called under s 32(3) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (“LPA”)" — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 11

The court then explained that section 32(3) is the applicable provision governing part-call applications and sets out the requirement that a specified duration of practice training must have been completed, being not less than three months. However, it says nothing about the other requirements for admission, such as good character under section 13(b) of the LPA. This distinction mattered because the applicant’s completion of the training requirement did not resolve the separate character question that remained before the court. (Para 39)

"Section 32(3) of the LPA, the applicable provision governing part call applications, sets out the requirement that a specified duration of practice training must have been completed (this being not less than three months), but says nothing about the other requirements for admission, such as that of “good character” as set out in s 13(b) of the LPA" — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 39

The court also cited Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie) for that statutory proposition. The use of that authority reinforced the point that procedural eligibility for part call is not the same as substantive suitability for admission. The applicant could satisfy the training-duration requirement and still fail the character assessment required for admission as an advocate and solicitor. (Para 39)

Why Did the Court Grant Leave to Withdraw Instead of Simply Refusing Admission?

After concluding that the applicant was not suitable to be admitted at that time, the court granted leave to withdraw the application subject to an undertaking. The order was not a bare refusal; it was a controlled withdrawal with conditions. That approach reflects the rehabilitative logic of admission deferment, because it gives the applicant time to reflect further and to demonstrate improved insight before making a fresh application. (Para 46; Para 48; Para 23)

"I therefore granted leave to the Applicant to withdraw his application subject to his undertaking not to bring a fresh application to the bar in Singapore or elsewhere for a period of four months from today" — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 48

The court also required that, at the time of any fresh application, the applicant provide information about his efforts to enhance his understanding of the ethical implications of his actions, in addition to any other applicable requirements. This condition shows that the court was not merely imposing a waiting period; it was directing attention to the specific deficiency that had led to the present outcome. The applicant would need to show more than the passage of time. (Para 48)

"At the time of the fresh application, the Applicant is also to provide any information pertaining to his efforts to enhance his understanding of the ethical implications of his actions in addition to any other requirements that may be applicable." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 48

The four-month undertaking also signals that the court considered the matter capable of rehabilitation, but not yet ripe for admission. The judgment therefore occupies a middle ground: it did not permanently bar the applicant, but it did insist that he had not yet crossed the threshold of suitability. That is consistent with the court’s repeated emphasis that deferment is meant to facilitate genuine ethical development rather than to punish. (Para 23; Para 46; Para 48)

What Cases Did the Court Rely On, and How Were They Used?

The court referred to Re Wong Wai Loong Sean and Re Tay Jie Qi for the central proposition that admission cases turn on character where competence is not in dispute. Those cases were used to articulate the governing framework and to support the court’s focus on suitability rather than mere technical eligibility. (Para 20)

"As I held in Re Wong Wai Loong Sean and other matters [2022] SGHC 237 (“Re Wong Wai Loong Sean”) and Re Tay Jie Qi and another matter [2023] SGHC 59 (“Re Tay Jie Qi”), the central inquiry in admission applications, where there is no question as to the applicant’s competence or qualifications, is whether the applicant in question is suitable for admission in terms of her character." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 20

Re Tay Jie Qi was also used as a contrast case on remorse and immediate candour. The court noted that, when informed of a possible integrity breach, Ms Tay immediately admitted that she had taken paragraphs from another student’s paper. That contrast helped the court assess the present applicant’s response to the university’s investigation and his later reflections. (Para 36)

Re Tay Quan Li Leon was used to illustrate a situation where an applicant sought to downplay culpability during initial investigations. The court drew a parallel between that conduct and the present applicant’s handling of the university’s inquiry, suggesting that the present case similarly involved an attempt to minimise the seriousness of the misconduct. (Para 37)

Finally, Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie) was cited for the statutory point that section 32(3) governs the duration of practice training for part-call applications but does not address good character. That authority supported the court’s explanation that the applicant’s procedural progress did not answer the substantive admission question. (Para 39)

Why Does This Case Matter for Future Admission Applicants?

This case matters because it makes clear that admission to the Singapore Bar depends not only on formal qualifications and completion of training, but also on genuine ethical insight. The court was prepared to look beyond the existence of a past misconduct incident and ask whether the applicant had truly understood why the conduct was wrong and whether he had been candid about it. That is a practical warning to future applicants that disclosure must be complete and reflection must be substantive. (Para 20; Para 42; Para 46)

"Those who wish to be part called in the future should disclose any prior misconduct that may affect their suitability to practice at the first opportunity in their part call affidavits." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 41

The case also matters because it clarifies the court’s rehabilitative approach to deferment. The court expressly said that deferment is not punitive, which means applicants should understand that the court is looking for evidence of growth, not merely the passage of time. A future applicant who has committed misconduct will need to show that he or she has moved beyond rule-following and has internalised the ethical rationale of professional obligations. (Para 23; Para 34; Para 48)

More broadly, the judgment underscores that incomplete disclosure can itself be damaging in an admission context. Even where an applicant discloses the core incident, omitting related facts such as prior warnings or earlier misconduct may undermine confidence in the applicant’s candour. The case therefore serves as a practical guide on the level of forthrightness expected from those seeking admission to the profession. (Para 42; Para 41)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act 1966, section 12 (Heading block) [CDN] [SSO]
• Legal Profession Act 1966, section 13(b) (Para 39) [CDN] [SSO]
• Legal Profession Act 1966, section 32(3) (Para 11; Para 39) [CDN] [SSO]
• Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011, rule 25 (Heading block)
• Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011, Second Schedule (Para 20; heading context)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "The Turnitin report for his Research..."
• View in judgment: "The Turnitin report for his Research..."

This article analyses [2023] SGHC 129 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.