Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 274
- Title: Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie)
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 23 October 2015
- Coram: Edmund Leow JC
- Case Number: Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 197 of 2015 (HC/Summons No 1927 of 2015)
- Legal Area: Legal Profession — Admission
- Applicant: Mr Nicholas Jeyaraj s/o Narayanan (Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP)
- Practice Trainee (Subject of Application): Mr Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie)
- Singapore Law Practice: Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP (“the Firm”)
- Respondents/Interested Parties: Attorney-General’s Chambers; Law Society of Singapore
- Other Institution: Singapore Institute of Legal Education (“SILE”)
- Statutory Provision in Focus: Section 32(3) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the Act”)
- Judgment Length: 6 pages, 3,214 words
- Counsel: Nicholas Jeyaraj s/o Narayanan for the applicant; Jeyendran Jeyapal and Ang Ming Sheng Terence for the Attorney-General’s Chambers; Christopher Daniel and Aw Sze Min for the Law Society of Singapore
Summary
In Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie) [2015] SGHC 274, the High Court considered how the court should exercise its discretion under s 32(3) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) when a practice trainee seeks a “part-call” order allowing limited audience before specified courts. The applicant sought permission for his practice trainee, Mr Teo, to be part-called even though Mr Teo had not yet completed Part B of the Singapore Bar Examinations (“Part B Examinations”).
The court accepted that s 32(3) does not contain an express statutory requirement that Part B be completed before a practice trainee can be part-called. However, Edmund Leow JC held that the provision must be read in light of the overall legislative scheme governing admission and training. The court concluded that the Part B Course and Part B Examinations are central to ensuring that a qualified person has the basic procedural and ethical knowledge expected of an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court. On the evidence before the court, the applicant had not shown that the trainee had acquired the relevant knowledge and skills that Part B is designed to impart.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The application arose from a request by Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP to allow its practice trainee, Mr Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie), to appear on behalf of the Firm in limited circumstances. The application was made under s 32(3) of the Act, which empowers a High Court judge to allow a “qualified person” who has served at least three months of practice training to appear before specified judicial officers and courts during the trainee’s practice training period.
At the time of the application, Mr Teo was serving his practice training period but had not undertaken Part B of the Singapore Bar Examinations. His situation was described as unusual. Mr Teo had completed his Juris Doctor degree at the University of Sydney on 23 November 2013. Because of the timing of his return to Singapore, he commenced his relevant legal training (“RLT”) with Selvam LLC on 2 January 2014 and completed it six months later. This meant that, unlike many overseas graduates who typically undertake RLT after completing Part A, Mr Teo did not have the opportunity to complete Part B before starting his practice training contract.
After completing the Part A Course, the National University of Singapore certified on 24 December 2014 that Mr Teo had passed the Part A Examinations. By then, he had already commenced his practice training contract with the Firm on 4 December 2014 and received SILE approval in February 2015 on how he would serve his practice training period. By 30 January 2015, his name had been entered into the register of qualified persons maintained by SILE. The part-call application was filed about four months after he began his practice training contract.
Mr Teo’s application materials described his practical exposure through internships and training. He had attended pre-trial conferences, criminal sentencing hearings, and a civil trial in the State Courts. He had also attended an appeal against a summary judgment before a judge in chambers during vacation internships in 2011 and 2012. During his RLT, he attended a hearing involving an application for a worldwide Mareva injunction and an application for pre-action discovery. During his training contract with the Firm, he attended a 10-day criminal trial in the State Court and assisted in a striking-out application. He further argued that, as an Australian graduate, he had benefited from mandatory studies in civil procedure, criminal procedure, and professional ethics, which overlapped with subjects in the Part B Course. He also relied on his commendable Juris Doctor grades.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central issue was whether, as a matter of law and principle, a practice trainee should be permitted to be part-called under s 32(3) before completing Part B of the Singapore Bar Examinations. Although s 32(3) sets out certain conditions—such as the applicant being a “qualified person” who has served not less than three months of practice training and is serving that training under a practice training contract at the time of the application—it does not expressly mention Part B completion.
Accordingly, the court had to decide whether the absence of an express requirement meant that Part B completion was irrelevant, or whether Part B completion (or at least the knowledge and skills associated with it) could be treated as an implied or necessary consideration when exercising the discretion under s 32(3). This required the court to interpret s 32(3) within the broader statutory framework for admission and training.
A related issue concerned the evidential threshold. Even if the court accepted that Part B completion was not strictly mandatory as a matter of textual reading, the court still needed to determine what evidence would be required to satisfy the court that the trainee had acquired the substantive procedural and ethical competence that Part B is designed to provide.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Edmund Leow JC began by identifying the statutory structure. Under s 32(3) of the Act, the court has an overriding discretion to allow a “qualified person” to appear on behalf of a Singapore law practice before specified judicial officers and courts. The provision is framed as permissive (“may, if he thinks fit”), and it is triggered by conditions relating to the trainee’s status and stage of practice training. The court therefore accepted that the discretion is broad in principle.
However, the judge then addressed the interpretive question: whether the discretion should be exercised in a way that effectively requires Part B completion. The court accepted the applicant’s submission that s 32(3) does not contain an express requirement that the practice trainee complete Part B. Nevertheless, the judge held that s 32(3) was drafted on the assumption that practice trainees applying to be part-called would have satisfactorily completed the courses of instruction and passed examinations that SILE may prescribe as necessary for admission as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court.
To reach this conclusion, the court relied on the “schema” of the Act and the admission framework. The judge pointed to s 13(1) of the Act, which sets out the requirements for admission as an advocate and solicitor. These include not only age, good character, and satisfactory completion of practice training, but also attendance and satisfactory completion of courses of instruction and passing examinations prescribed by the Institute. The Part B Course and Part B Examinations were prescribed under the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011 (Cap 161, S 244/2011) for the purposes of s 13(1)(d) and s 13(1)(e). This indicated that Part B is not merely an administrative step; it is part of the statutory pathway to admission.
The court further examined the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011, particularly r 16(1), which provides that a qualified person is not entitled to serve his practice training period unless he has attended and satisfactorily completed the preparatory course leading to Part B and has sat for the written examinations for all examinable subjects in Part B. While the rules contain exceptions (which explained why Mr Teo could commence practice training without having completed Part B), the default structure remained instructive. The judge reasoned that the default scenario is that Part B is completed before practice training begins, and therefore s 32(3) should be understood against that background.
On the submissions, the Law Society conceded the absence of an express requirement but argued that the 2011 amendments expanded the scope of what a part-called qualified person may do. The Law Society’s position was that, because the right of audience had expanded beyond limited chambers appearances to include appearances in open court on behalf of the Singapore law practice, the court should apply more stringent qualifying criteria. In that context, the Law Society suggested that completion of Part B Course and Part B Examinations is a suitable criterion because the modules (including Civil Litigation Practice and Criminal Litigation Practice, as well as Ethics & Professional Responsibility) equip the qualified person with the substantive procedural knowledge and ethical awareness required for court appearances.
The Attorney-General’s Chambers supported a cautious approach. It emphasised that all persons appearing before the court owe the same duties as those owed by an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court. The AG argued that successful completion of the Part B Course imparts the basic skills and knowledge on procedural law and practice in Singapore necessary to discharge those duties. The court should therefore be slow to allow a qualified person who has not completed Part B to appear, absent sufficient evidence that the trainee has acquired the basic skills and knowledge that Part B would otherwise provide.
In applying these principles to Mr Teo, the court accepted that his practical experience was relevant. The judge also acknowledged the unusual timing of his training pathway and the fact that he had attended various hearings and trials. However, the court did not treat practical exposure alone as a substitute for the structured instruction and assessment that Part B provides. The reasoning reflected a concern that practical experience “simply does not vest” a comprehensive understanding of court processes and their rationales, and does not necessarily provide the ethical awareness required for appearances in court.
Accordingly, the court required more than general assertions of overlap between overseas coursework and the Part B modules. The applicant needed to demonstrate, with sufficient evidence, that Mr Teo had acquired the basic skills and knowledge that Part B is designed to impart. On the material before the court, the judge found that the evidence was insufficient to justify the exercise of discretion in Mr Teo’s favour.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the part-call application. Although the court recognised that s 32(3) does not expressly require Part B completion, it held that the legislative scheme and the purpose of Part B mean that the court should not grant part-call relief to a practice trainee who has not completed Part B unless the applicant can show that the trainee has acquired the relevant procedural and ethical competence that Part B is meant to ensure.
Practically, the decision meant that Mr Teo could not be permitted to appear on behalf of the Firm in the limited audience capacities under s 32(3) at that stage of his training. The ruling underscores that the court’s discretion is not exercised purely on the basis of time served in practice training or general practical exposure; it is also guided by the statutory admission framework and the competence that Part B is designed to certify.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie) is significant for practitioners and law students because it clarifies how s 32(3) should be interpreted when a trainee’s training pathway deviates from the default sequence. The case confirms that, even where a statutory provision does not expressly mention a particular requirement, the court may treat that requirement as central to the proper exercise of discretion by reading the provision in light of the entire legislative scheme.
For law firms, the decision provides practical guidance on evidential preparation. If an application is made for part-call before Part B completion, the firm and applicant must be prepared to adduce concrete evidence demonstrating that the trainee has acquired the procedural and ethical knowledge that Part B would have provided. General claims of practical experience, overseas coursework, or academic performance may not be enough to satisfy the court that the trainee can discharge the duties owed by an advocate and solicitor when appearing before the court.
For the legal profession generally, the case reinforces the policy that court appearances carry professional responsibilities that must be grounded in competence, not merely in exposure. It also illustrates the court’s willingness to align discretionary admission-related relief with the structured training and examination framework established by the Legal Profession Act and the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) — s 32(3); s 13(1) [CDN] [SSO]
- Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011 (Cap 161, S 244/2011) — Part II (prescription of Part B Course and Part B Examinations); Part IV (including r 16(1))
- Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2011 (Act 8 of 2011)
Cases Cited
- [2015] SGHC 274 (the present case)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 274 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.