Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 244
- Title: Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani v Law Society of Singapore
- Court: High Court (General Division)
- Originating Application No: OA 617 of 2025
- Date of Hearing(s): 26 September 2025; 11 November 2025
- Date of Judgment: 17 December 2025
- Judicial Officer: Valerie Thean J
- Applicant: Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani
- Respondent: Law Society of Singapore
- Legal Areas: Legal Profession; Professional Conduct; Disciplinary Proceedings
- Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”); Legal Proceedings Act (as stated in metadata)
- Cases Cited: (Not provided in the extract)
- Judgment Length: 35 pages; 9,497 words
Summary
This case concerns the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the Law Society of Singapore’s decision-making in disciplinary matters. The applicant, Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani, lodged a complaint against advocate and solicitor Mr Hewage Ushan Saminda Premaratne arising out of the latter’s conduct during the trial of a civil suit in which the applicant’s sister, Ms Rita Kishinchand Bhojwani (“RKB”), was a witness. The complaint contained three heads; only the second head (“the Complaint”) was referred to an Inquiry Committee and later dismissed by the Law Society’s Council as not warranting a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal.
After the Council decided that no Disciplinary Tribunal investigation was necessary, the applicant filed an originating application under ss 96(1) and 96(4) of the Legal Profession Act (“LPA”). He sought an order directing the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice to appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal to conduct a formal investigation into the Complaint. The High Court (Valerie Thean J) granted the application, holding that the Law Society’s decision-making process and/or conclusions, on the material before it, justified the court’s intervention.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The factual background is rooted in HC/S 848/2021 (“Suit 848”). On 15 October 2021, RKB commenced Suit 848 against, among others, the applicant’s mother. Mr Premaratne represented RKB for most of the proceedings. Suit 848 proceeded to trial between 30 January 2024 and 5 April 2024 before Christopher Tan JC (as he then was) (“the Judge”).
RKB took the stand to be cross-examined on 30 January 2024 and remained on the witness stand for about four days. During the third day of trial, RKB made certain material concessions to her claim and agreed to withdraw several allegations in her pleadings. At that point, Mr Premaratne sought the court’s permission to speak with RKB and take instructions on a letter concerning possible settlement of Suit 848 (“the Letter”) while she was still on the stand. The Judge granted permission for Mr Premaratne to speak to RKB that evening to take instructions on the Letter (the “Meritus Meeting”).
On the fourth day of trial, Mr Premaratne again sought permission to speak with RKB, this time regarding the legal implications of withdrawing several claims in her pleadings. The Judge refused the request. The Judge observed that the concessions made by RKB during cross-examination were factual, and therefore it could not be said that her decision to withdraw was ill-informed. The Judge further reasoned that if RKB withdrew her concessions after speaking to Mr Premaratne, this would amount to RKB modifying her factual evidence mid-cross-examination, which the court was not prepared to permit.
After the refusal, RKB returned to the stand and stated that her mental state was “not there” and that she did not understand the nature of her concessions and withdrawal of her claims. She indicated that she intended to withdraw her concessions and that she no longer wished to withdraw any of her claims. RKB admitted that she had a discussion with Mr Premaratne at the Meritus Meeting, and that he had “told [her] about the options” if she “decide[d] to withdraw this [claim]”.
When RKB was asked about whether she had discussed her evidence from the previous day with anyone (including Karan Deepak Kirpalani (“KDK”), who was expected to give evidence next), she confirmed that she had asked Mr Premaratne to “explain … [the] implications” of what she had said. Mr Premaratne, when asked for his account of the Meritus Meeting, acknowledged that RKB came with her son, KDK, to his office. He maintained that he only discussed the options regarding the Letter with RKB and KDK and nothing more. KDK was not initially in the room but was invited to join when the options were being discussed.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was whether the Law Society’s decision not to pursue a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal was correct in law and/or on the evidence. The Complaint concerned two related aspects: (i) whether Mr Premaratne discussed RKB’s evidence during the Meritus Meeting while she was still on the witness stand (“First Limb”); and (ii) whether he allowed RKB and KDK to discuss her evidence while she was still on the witness stand and before KDK gave evidence (“Second Limb”).
In the disciplinary process, the Inquiry Committee (IC 16/2024) issued a report. It was not disputed that the report dealt only with the First Limb. The Inquiry Committee concluded that RKB’s evidence was unclear, that Mr Premaratne’s affidavit and handwritten attendance note were credible, and that no cause of sufficient gravity existed for a formal investigation. The Law Society’s Council then adopted the Inquiry Committee’s recommendation and decided that a Disciplinary Tribunal was unnecessary.
Accordingly, the High Court had to determine whether, under ss 96(1) and 96(4) of the LPA, the court should direct the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal. This required the court to assess the sufficiency of the material considered by the Law Society and whether the dismissal of the Complaint could stand, particularly in light of the Judge’s observations and the evidence surrounding the Meritus Meeting.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by setting out the statutory framework and the procedural history. The applicant’s complaint was lodged on 7 March 2025. The Review Committee referred the second head to IC 16/2024. After IC 16/2024 reported and the Council considered the report, the Council decided that a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal was unnecessary. The applicant then brought OA 617 under ss 96(1) and 96(4) of the LPA seeking a direction that the Law Society apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal to investigate the Complaint.
In analysing the First Limb, the court examined the evidential basis on which IC 16/2024 had concluded that Mr Premaratne did not discuss RKB’s evidence at the Meritus Meeting. The Inquiry Committee placed weight on Mr Premaratne’s affidavit filed on 14 March 2024 (in which he stated on oath that he did not discuss RKB’s evidence during the Meritus Meeting) and on the handwritten attendance note documenting advice on the Letter and stating that when RKB raised events transpiring in court, Mr Premaratne put an end to the query and advised that he could not discuss her evidence. IC 16/2024 found Mr Premaratne credible and consistent, and treated RKB’s cross-examination as not conclusive as to what exactly transpired.
However, the High Court’s analysis did not stop at whether the Inquiry Committee could plausibly prefer one account over another. The court considered whether the Law Society’s approach sufficiently addressed the material concerns raised by the applicant, including the context in which the Meritus Meeting occurred and the subsequent trial events. The applicant’s case was that the notes of evidence showed RKB confirmed she asked Mr Premaratne to explain the implications of her concessions and withdrawals, and that Mr Premaratne obliged. The applicant argued that this discussion necessarily involved her evidence, and that the discussion occurred while she was still on the witness stand. He further contended that RKB’s later attempt to resile and withdraw her concessions was a consequence of the Meritus Meeting discussion.
Crucially, the court also considered the Judge’s own observations in Suit 848. The Judge had refused Mr Premaratne’s request on the fourth day of trial on the basis that allowing discussion of legal implications could effectively enable mid-cross modification of factual evidence. The High Court treated the Judge’s reasoning as relevant context for assessing whether the Law Society’s conclusion that there was no cause of sufficient gravity was adequately grounded. The applicant relied on the Judge’s Oral Remarks delivered on 28 January 2025 and the written Grounds of Decision released on 28 April 2025 (Rita Kishinchand Bhojwani v HVS Properties Pte Ltd [2025] SGHC 80 (“GD”)), arguing that the Judge had made factual findings inconsistent with the Law Society’s dismissal.
In addition, the High Court addressed the Second Limb. The Inquiry Committee’s report, as the record showed, dealt only with the First Limb. This omission was significant. The Complaint’s second aspect—that Mr Premaratne allowed RKB and KDK to discuss her evidence while she was still on the stand and before KDK gave evidence—was not fully analysed by IC 16/2024. The High Court’s reasoning therefore turned on whether the disciplinary process had properly engaged with the Complaint as framed, and whether the Council’s adoption of an incomplete inquiry could justify the conclusion that no formal investigation was warranted.
While the extract provided does not reproduce the court’s full reasoning in detail, the structure of the analysis indicates that the court scrutinised both (i) the evidential sufficiency for the First Limb and (ii) the procedural completeness of the inquiry for the Second Limb. The court’s ultimate conclusion to grant the application suggests that it found either a material gap in the Law Society’s consideration or that the evidence, when properly assessed in context, raised a sufficiently serious question requiring the fact-finding and adjudicative process of a Disciplinary Tribunal.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court granted OA 617. Practically, this means the court directed the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal to conduct a formal investigation into the Complaint (the second head of complaint referred to IC 16/2024).
The effect of the order is to move the matter from the Law Society’s internal screening stage into the formal disciplinary adjudication stage. This is significant because a Disciplinary Tribunal provides a structured forum for determining whether there has been professional misconduct or breach of professional conduct rules, and for imposing appropriate sanctions if warranted.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is important for practitioners because it illustrates the High Court’s willingness to intervene where disciplinary screening may have been incomplete or insufficiently responsive to the substance of a complaint. Although the Law Society has statutory responsibility for disciplinary oversight, the court’s supervisory jurisdiction under the LPA ensures that decisions not to convene a Disciplinary Tribunal are not insulated from legal scrutiny.
From a professional conduct perspective, the case also highlights the sensitivity of advocate–client communications during an ongoing trial, particularly where a witness is on the stand and where discussions may affect the integrity of evidence. The Judge’s concerns in Suit 848 about mid-cross modification of factual evidence provide a contextual backdrop that the disciplinary process cannot ignore. Even where an advocate obtains leave to speak to a witness, the scope and content of that communication remain critical.
For law students and lawyers, the case is a useful study in how disciplinary decision-making interacts with trial court observations. It also underscores that a complaint framed in multiple “limbs” must be addressed comprehensively. Where an inquiry report addresses only part of the complaint, the High Court may regard that as undermining the adequacy of the decision not to proceed to a Disciplinary Tribunal.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) — ss 96(1) and 96(4)
- Legal Proceedings Act (as stated in the provided metadata)
Cases Cited
- Rita Kishinchand Bhojwani v HVS Properties Pte Ltd [2025] SGHC 80
- [2020] SGHC 127
- [2020] SGHC 40
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 244 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.