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Saridewi bte Djamani v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2022] SGCA 64

In Saridewi bte Djamani v Public Prosecutor and another matter, the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Criminal Law — Statutory offences, Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Statements.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2022] SGCA 64
  • Title: Saridewi bte Djamani v Public Prosecutor and another matter
  • Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
  • Date of Decision: 6 October 2022
  • Judgment Type: Ex tempore judgment
  • Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA and Tay Yong Kwang JCA
  • Appellant/Applicant: Saridewi bte Djamani
  • Respondent: Public Prosecutor
  • Related Proceedings: Criminal Appeal No 30 of 2018; Criminal Motion No 15 of 2019
  • Underlying Trial Case: Criminal Case No 28 of 2018 (HC/CC 28/2018)
  • Prior High Court Decisions: Public Prosecutor v Saridewi Bte Djamani and another [2018] SGHC 204 (“Main Judgment”); Public Prosecutor v Saridewi bte Djamani [2022] SGHC 150 (“Remittal Judgment”)
  • Legal Areas: Criminal Law — Statutory offences; Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Statements
  • Statutory Offence: Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”), ss 5(1)(a) and 5(2) (possession for purpose of trafficking)
  • Key Statutory Provision: MDA s 17 (presumption of trafficking purpose upon possession)
  • Sentence at Trial: Death sentence (as recorded in the Main Judgment)
  • Core Evidential Themes: Admissibility and reliability of investigative statements; psychiatric/medical evidence of methamphetamine withdrawal; consumption defence
  • Judgment Length: 16 pages, 3,795 words
  • Cases Cited (as provided): [2003] SGCA 17; [2018] SGHC 204; [2022] SGCA 39; [2022] SGCA 64; [2022] SGHC 150

Summary

In Saridewi bte Djamani v Public Prosecutor ([2022] SGCA 64), the Court of Appeal dismissed both Saridewi’s appeal against her conviction and sentence for possession of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking, and her application to adduce fresh medical evidence. The central contest was whether Saridewi had rebutted the statutory presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) by proving a defence of consumption—specifically, that a particular packet (marked A1A2A) was intended for her own consumption rather than trafficking.

The Court reaffirmed the structured approach to consumption defences: the “key pillar and essential foundation” is the accused’s rate of consumption, which must be established with credible evidence. While the case also involved the admissibility and reliability of investigative statements, the Court held that the psychiatric evidence on remittal did not demonstrate that Saridewi’s methamphetamine withdrawal impaired her ability to give reliable statements. The medical evidence therefore did not justify excluding her statements or undermining the trial judge’s findings on guilt.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The appellant, Saridewi bte Djamani (“Saridewi”), was charged in HC/CC 28/2018 (“CC 28”) with possession of six packets and seven straws containing not less than 1,084.37g of powdery substance, which was found to contain a total of 30.72g of diamorphine. The charge was brought under ss 5(1)(a) and 5(2) of the MDA, alleging possession for the purpose of trafficking. Saridewi claimed trial and advanced a consumption defence. Her position was that a substantial portion of the diamorphine was not meant for trafficking; rather, she asserted that the packet containing more diamorphine and described as “better quality” was intended for her own consumption.

At trial, the High Court rejected her defence and convicted her. She was sentenced to death, as reflected in the Main Judgment: Public Prosecutor v Saridewi Bte Djamani and another [2018] SGHC 204. The conviction was based in part on the contents of statements Saridewi gave during investigations. On appeal, Saridewi argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting her defence relating to one packet in particular, marked A1A2A, contending it was for her own consumption.

On 17 June 2016, CNB officers conducted a covert operation near Block 350, Anchorvale Road. At about 3.35pm, one Muhammad Haikal Bin Abdullah (“Haikal”) arrived by motorcycle and retrieved a white plastic bag. He went to the 17th floor, met Saridewi, and handed her the bag. In exchange, Saridewi handed him an envelope marked “10.000”. After the exchange, Haikal left, and Saridewi returned to her unit (“the Unit”).

Shortly thereafter, CNB officers moved into position near the Unit. Saridewi, upon hearing their movements and voices outside her door, suspected CNB presence and threw items out of the kitchen window. CNB officers attempted to access the Unit, and Saridewi eventually let them in. She was arrested and the Unit was searched. Among the seized items were packets of crystalline substance, numerous glass tubes, a slab of tablets, empty packets and straws, unused envelopes, a digital weighing scale, and a heat sealer. CNB also recovered items from the vicinity of the Unit, including a white “SKP” plastic bag containing two packets (A1A1 and A1A2A) and other packets and straws marked B1, C1, D1A, D2A, D3A, and D5.

The seized materials were sent to the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) for analysis. The HSA findings showed diamorphine quantities in multiple exhibits, with the total diamorphine in Saridewi’s charge corresponding to the sum of diamorphine found in A1A1A, A1A2A, C1, D2A and D3A. The packet A1A2A was one of the key exhibits in the consumption defence dispute.

The Court of Appeal identified two interlinked issues. First, in Criminal Appeal No 30 of 2018 (“CCA 30”), the Court had to determine whether Saridewi had rebutted the presumption in s 17 of the MDA that a person found in possession of controlled drugs possessed them for the purpose of trafficking. The specific question was whether her evidence established that the packet A1A2A was intended for her own consumption rather than trafficking, and whether the overall circumstances supported a consumption defence.

Second, in Criminal Motion No 15 of 2019 (“CM 15”), Saridewi sought leave to adduce fresh evidence in the form of a medical report by Dr Rajesh Jacob (“Dr Rajesh”) dated 13 July 2019. The report purported to show that Saridewi’s state of mind was impaired at the time her statements were taken. This raised a procedural and evidential question: whether psychiatric/medical evidence of methamphetamine withdrawal could undermine the admissibility or reliability of Saridewi’s investigative statements, and whether the statements should be excluded or given reduced weight.

Because the conviction relied in part on those statements, the Court also had to consider how the medical evidence affected the reliability of the statements and whether it altered the trial judge’s earlier findings. The Court had previously remitted specific questions to the High Court regarding whether Saridewi was suffering from methamphetamine withdrawal between 18 and 24 June 2016 (immediately after arrest) and whether that had implications for her ability to give reliable statements.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court began by restating the correct legal approach to consumption defences under the MDA. It referred to Muhammad bin Abdullah v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 427, emphasising that the court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the accused has rebutted the s 17 presumption. The relevant circumstances include the accused’s rate of consumption, the frequency and typical manner by which the accused could obtain supply, the ability to afford drugs at the alleged rate of consumption, and whether any admissions in the accused’s statements indicated that the whole quantity was for sale.

Critically, the Court clarified that the “key pillar and essential foundation” of a consumption defence is the rate of consumption, citing A Steven s/o Paul Raj v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 39. Other factors—such as financial ability, how the accused came to be in possession, and possession of trafficking paraphernalia—are secondary. The Court explained the logic: secondary factors flow from the rate of consumption, so the inquiry must start with whether the accused can establish a credible consumption rate. It also reiterated that the accused bears the burden of establishing the alleged rate with credible evidence.

On the evidential front, the Court addressed the psychiatric evidence adduced on remittal. The remittal findings were in Public Prosecutor v Saridewi bte Djamani [2022] SGHC 150. The High Court found that Saridewi had at most been suffering from mild to moderate methamphetamine withdrawal during the relevant period. Although the Court of Appeal accepted that the withdrawal was at least moderate, it held that the evidence did not establish that the withdrawal affected Saridewi’s ability to give reliable statements. Accordingly, there was no basis to exclude all her statements.

The Court’s reasoning focused on the absence of a demonstrated link between the medical condition and the reliability of the statements. When the Court remitted questions to the High Court, it had asked the experts to specify the implications of the diagnosis on the ability to give reliable statements and the particular symptoms that would impede such ability. The defence expert’s response was described as unhelpful because it did not tie the general effects of withdrawal (such as poor concentration or suggestibility) to Saridewi’s specific claims. It also did not identify which parts of her statements should be disregarded, nor did it explain any shifting nature of her consumption defence.

Most importantly, the Court considered contemporaneous observations by doctors and nurses who assessed Saridewi at the time. Those observations did not show serious manifestations of withdrawal capable of interfering with statement-taking. Saridewi did not raise complaints or exhibit symptoms of withdrawal to the assessing doctors. The doctors did not observe noticeable withdrawal signs or distress. She was able to respond and communicate lucidly and coherently, and was observed to be alert and oriented. These factual observations undermined the argument that her withdrawal impaired her ability to provide reliable investigative statements.

Turning back to the consumption defence, the Court held that the appeal fell far short of the threshold required to rebut the s 17 presumption. While the extract provided does not reproduce the full discussion of Saridewi’s consumption evidence, the Court’s conclusion indicates that the defence did not satisfy the foundational requirement of a credible rate of consumption. The Court also highlighted that the psychiatric evidence did not assist Saridewi’s case because it did not undermine the reliability of the statements that supported the prosecution’s case, nor did it provide a coherent evidential basis for the claimed consumption intention regarding A1A2A.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court of Appeal dismissed Saridewi’s appeal against conviction and sentence. It found that the appeal was without merit and that Saridewi failed to rebut the statutory presumption in s 17 of the MDA. The Court therefore upheld the conviction and the sentence imposed by the High Court.

In addition, the Court dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence (CM 15). The medical evidence on methamphetamine withdrawal did not establish that Saridewi’s state of mind impaired her ability to give reliable statements, and it did not alter the trial judge’s conclusions on guilt.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision is significant for practitioners because it reinforces the structured, evidence-driven approach to consumption defences under the MDA. The Court’s emphasis on the “rate of consumption” as the essential foundation means that defence strategies that rely primarily on secondary factors—such as the circumstances of possession, paraphernalia, or general assertions about “better quality” drugs—will likely fail unless supported by credible evidence of consumption patterns and affordability.

From an evidential standpoint, the case also illustrates the limits of psychiatric or medical evidence in undermining investigative statements. Even where withdrawal is established at a moderate level, the defence must show a specific and practical impact on the accused’s ability to give reliable statements. Expert evidence that remains general, does not identify which symptoms would affect statement reliability, and does not connect the diagnosis to the accused’s actual presentation during questioning will be unlikely to succeed.

For law students and litigators, the decision is a useful example of how appellate courts evaluate both (i) substantive defences under s 17 and (ii) procedural/evidential challenges to statements. It demonstrates that courts will scrutinise not only the existence of a medical condition but also contemporaneous observations and the expert’s ability to translate medical findings into concrete implications for reliability and admissibility.

Legislation Referenced

  • Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) — ss 5(1)(a), 5(2), and 17

Cases Cited

  • [2003] SGCA 17
  • Public Prosecutor v Saridewi Bte Djamani and another [2018] SGHC 204
  • Muhammad bin Abdullah v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 427
  • A Steven s/o Paul Raj v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 39
  • Sulaiman bin Jumari v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 557
  • Public Prosecutor v Saridewi bte Djamani [2022] SGHC 150
  • [2022] SGCA 64
  • [2022] SGHC 150

Source Documents

This article analyses [2022] SGCA 64 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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