Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 54
- Title: Saminathan a/l Selvaraju v Attorney-General
- Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
- Proceeding Type: Court of Appeal / Originating Application (OAC) No 3 of 2025
- Date of Judgment: 26 November 2025
- Judges: Tay Yong Kwang JCA
- Applicant: Saminathan a/l Selvaraju (“Mr Saminathan”)
- Respondent: Attorney-General (“AG”)
- Legal Area(s): Criminal Procedure and Sentencing; Stay of execution; Post-appeal applications in capital cases
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”)
- Key Statutory Provision(s): s 60G(1) SCJA (permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case)
- Related Capital Offence Framework: Post-appeal applications in capital cases (PACC) regime; reference to the PACC Act and amendments to the SCJA
- Judgment Length: 21 pages; 5,469 words
- Context / Trigger: Application filed by a prisoner awaiting capital punishment for permission to file a further post-appeal application and for a stay of execution
- Execution Date at Issue: Scheduled for 27 November 2025
- Notice of Execution Date: 20 November 2025
- Constitutional Challenge in Another Proceeding: HC/OA 1213/2025 (“OA 1213”) challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty under s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) read with its Second Schedule
Summary
In Saminathan a/l Selvaraju v Attorney-General ([2025] SGCA 54), the Court of Appeal dealt with an urgent originating application by a prisoner awaiting capital punishment (“PACP”). Mr Saminathan sought, under s 60G(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), permission to file a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC application”). He also sought a stay of execution pending the determination of his permission application and any consequent PACC application.
The central practical issue was whether the Court should stay a scheduled execution because of the pendency of a separate constitutional challenge in HC/OA 1213/2025 (“OA 1213”), brought by members of the Transformative Justice Collective. OA 1213 sought retrospective declarations that the mandatory death penalty under the Misuse of Drugs Act (“MDA”) violated Arts 9(1) and 12(1) and infringed Art 93 of the Constitution. Although Mr Saminathan was not a party to OA 1213, he argued that its outcome might affect his conviction and sentence and that a stay was therefore warranted.
The Court of Appeal’s decision, delivered by Tay Yong Kwang JCA on 26 November 2025, refused the relief sought. In doing so, the Court emphasised the statutory structure governing post-appeal applications in capital cases, the need for finality in capital proceedings, and the limited circumstances in which execution should be stayed. The Court also treated the pendency of OA 1213 as insufficient, on its own, to justify a stay or to warrant permission for a post-appeal application.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Mr Saminathan was convicted in the High Court for trafficking in diamorphine (heroin) under the Misuse of Drugs Act. He was tried jointly with two co-accused: Mr Mohammad Rizwan bin Akbar Husain (“Mr Rizwan”) and Mr Zulkarnain bin Kemat (“Mr Zulkarnain”). The prosecution case involved possession of a substantial quantity of diamorphine in bundles, and the trial judge made findings as to each accused’s role in the trafficking chain.
In Public Prosecutor v Zulkarnain bin Kemat and others [2018] SGHC 161, the trial judge found that Mr Zulkarnain was a “courier” within the meaning of s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA. A certificate of substantive assistance was issued by the Public Prosecutor. Exercising her discretion, the trial judge imposed life imprisonment rather than the mandatory death penalty. Mr Zulkarnain was also not liable to caning because he was above 50 years of age.
By contrast, the trial judge found that Mr Rizwan was not a courier and that he did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance. Accordingly, the mandatory death sentence was imposed on him. Similarly, the trial judge found that Mr Saminathan was a courier but he did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance. As a result, the mandatory death sentence was imposed on Mr Saminathan as well.
Mr Zulkarnain did not appeal. Mr Rizwan and Mr Saminathan appealed against their convictions in CA/CCA 9/2018 and CA/CCA 13/2018 (“CCA 13”). Both appeals were dismissed on 8 May 2020 by the Court of Appeal in Mohammad Rizwan bin Akbar Husain v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] SGCA 45. The Court of Appeal’s judgment is referenced in the present proceedings as Mohammad Rizwan bin Akbar Husain v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] SGCA 45.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue concerned the statutory threshold for permission under s 60G(1) SCJA. Mr Saminathan was required to obtain permission from the Court of Appeal before filing a post-appeal application in a capital case. The Court therefore had to consider whether the proposed PACC application met the requirements for permission, and whether the application was properly grounded in the statutory framework.
The second legal issue concerned whether the Court should grant a stay of execution. Mr Saminathan’s execution was scheduled for 27 November 2025. He sought a stay pending the determination of his permission application and any consequent PACC application. The stay question was closely tied to his argument that OA 1213—an ongoing constitutional challenge to the mandatory death penalty—might affect the constitutionality of the sentence imposed on him.
More broadly, the Court had to balance the competing imperatives of (i) constitutional adjudication and the possibility of legal developments arising from OA 1213, against (ii) the finality of criminal convictions and the orderly administration of capital punishment proceedings under the PACC regime.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by situating the application within the capital post-appeal framework established by the SCJA. Section 60G(1) SCJA is designed to regulate when and how a convicted person may bring further applications after the conclusion of the appeal process. The Court’s analysis reflects that permission is not granted as a matter of course; rather, it is subject to a structured threshold that protects the integrity of the post-appeal regime and prevents repetitive or speculative applications that would undermine finality.
Against that statutory backdrop, the Court examined Mr Saminathan’s proposed PACC application. He sought (a) a prohibiting order against his execution, (b) a quashing order for the notice of execution dated 20 November 2025, and (c) a stay pending the permission and PACC application. The Court therefore had to consider whether the grounds advanced by Mr Saminathan were sufficiently connected to the statutory purpose of the PACC application and whether they justified permission at that late stage.
The Court then addressed the stay argument based on OA 1213. OA 1213 had been filed on 28 October 2025 by members of the Transformative Justice Collective and subsequently amended to add further applicants. It sought retrospective declarations that the mandatory death penalty under s 33(1) of the MDA read with its Second Schedule was unconstitutional for violating Arts 9(1) and 12(1) and infringing Art 93 of the Constitution. OA 1213 was scheduled to be heard on 3 December 2025 before the General Division of the High Court.
Although Mr Saminathan was not a party to OA 1213, he argued that the outcome might affect his conviction and sentence. The Court’s reasoning, as reflected in the judgment’s structure and the focus of the submissions, treated this as an insufficient basis for a stay. The Court effectively required more than the mere existence of a pending constitutional challenge by others. The Court also had to consider that the PACC permission mechanism is meant to filter and channel post-appeal litigation, and that granting stays solely on the basis of other proceedings could create an open-ended basis for delaying execution.
In addition, the Court considered the broader procedural history of Mr Saminathan’s attempts to obtain relief after his appeal was dismissed. The judgment records a long sequence of post-appeal applications, including clemency petitions, applications for pre-action discovery and interrogatories (OS 975), judicial review leave and related proceedings (OS 664), challenges concerning confidential correspondence (OS 188 and subsequent appeal), constitutional challenges to provisions on costs (OC 166 and CA 31), and other applications seeking declarations and prohibitory orders (OA 480 and related appeals). The Court also noted that earlier constitutional challenges and procedural attempts had been dismissed or struck out, and that appeals and applications had been refused or withdrawn due to procedural defaults or lack of success.
This history mattered to the Court’s analysis because it demonstrated that Mr Saminathan had already pursued multiple avenues of relief. While the Court did not treat those applications as automatically barring the present one, it underscored that the permission and stay mechanisms are not intended to permit repeated litigation of issues that have already been ventilated or that do not meet the statutory threshold for further post-appeal intervention.
Finally, the Court’s conclusion reflects a careful approach to constitutional litigation. The Court did not deny the importance of constitutional challenges. Instead, it required that the legal and procedural conditions for a stay and for permission under s 60G(1) SCJA be satisfied. The pendency of OA 1213, without Mr Saminathan being a party and without a demonstrated basis that the statutory criteria for permission were met, did not justify the exceptional step of staying an execution scheduled in the near term.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Saminathan’s application for permission to file a post-appeal application in a capital case and refused the stay of execution. As a result, the execution scheduled for 27 November 2025 was not stayed pending the determination of his permission application or any consequent PACC application.
Practically, the decision meant that Mr Saminathan could not obtain the immediate procedural relief he sought through the s 60G(1) permission route. The Court’s refusal also signalled that capital execution schedules will not be automatically paused merely because related constitutional proceedings are pending in other cases.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how the Court of Appeal will approach applications under s 60G(1) SCJA in the context of imminent execution. It reinforces that permission to file a post-appeal application is a gatekeeping function and that courts will scrutinise whether the proposed application and the requested stay are properly justified within the statutory framework.
From a constitutional litigation perspective, the case illustrates that the pendency of a constitutional challenge in another proceeding does not automatically translate into a right to a stay for non-parties. Even where the constitutional issue is similar—here, the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty—the Court requires a more direct and legally grounded basis for intervention at the execution stage.
For defence counsel and law students, the judgment is also a useful reminder of the importance of procedural strategy and timing in capital cases. The judgment’s detailed recitation of Mr Saminathan’s extensive post-appeal history demonstrates that repeated applications, even when framed differently, may face significant hurdles. The decision therefore provides practical guidance on how courts may treat late-stage applications and how they will balance constitutional concerns against finality and the orderly administration of justice.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) — s 60G(1) (permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) — s 33(1) and Second Schedule (mandatory death penalty context referenced in OA 1213)
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed) — Arts 9(1), 12(1), and Art 93 (constitutional challenge context in OA 1213)
Cases Cited
- Public Prosecutor v Zulkarnain bin Kemat and others [2018] SGHC 161
- Mohammad Rizwan bin Akbar Husain v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] SGCA 45
- Criminal Procedure Code
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 54 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.