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Singapore
By Sushant Shukla 13 min read

Saminathan a/l Selvaraju v Attorney-General [2025] SGCA 54

A stay of execution will not be granted solely because there are pending legal proceedings, regardless of the merits of those proceedings, if the application for permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case lacks reasonable prospects of success.

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Case Details

  • Citation: [2025] SGCA 54
  • Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
  • Decision Date: 26 November 2025
  • Coram: Tay Yong Kwang JCA
  • Case Number: Court of Appeal / Originating Application (OAC) No 3 of 2025
  • Hearing Date(s): 26 November 2025
  • Claimants / Plaintiffs: Saminathan a/l Selvaraju
  • Respondent / Defendant: Attorney-General
  • Counsel for Claimants: The applicant in person
  • Counsel for Respondent: Anandan Bala, Marcus Foo, Yohanes Ng, Vishnu Menon and Joel Fun (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
  • Practice Areas: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing; Stay of execution; Post-appeal applications in capital cases

Summary

In Saminathan a/l Selvaraju v Attorney-General [2025] SGCA 54, the Court of Appeal addressed an urgent application for permission to file a post-appeal application in a capital case ("PACC application") and a corresponding stay of execution. The applicant, Saminathan a/l Selvaraju ("Mr Saminathan"), faced an imminent execution scheduled for 27 November 2025. The application was filed under s 60G(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) ("SCJA"), a provision introduced to regulate the finality of capital proceedings by requiring judicial permission before a prisoner awaiting capital punishment ("PACP") can initiate further litigation after their primary appeals have been exhausted.

The crux of the application rested on the pendency of a separate constitutional challenge, HC/OA 1213/2025 ("OA 1213"), filed by third parties. OA 1213 sought to challenge the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty under s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 ("MDA") and the statutory presumptions of knowledge and possession under ss 18(1) and 18(2) of the same Act. Mr Saminathan argued that because the outcome of OA 1213 could potentially invalidate the legal basis of his conviction or sentence, his execution should be stayed until that challenge was resolved. He relied heavily on the precedent of Pannir Selvam Pranthaman v Attorney-General [2025] 1 SLR 237, where a stay had been granted in somewhat analogous circumstances.

The Court of Appeal, through Tay Yong Kwang JCA, dismissed the application summarily. The decision reinforces the high threshold required for PACC applications and clarifies that the mere existence of a pending legal challenge—even one involving fundamental constitutional issues—does not automatically entitle a PACP to a stay of execution. The Court emphasized that for permission to be granted under s 60G, the applicant must demonstrate "reasonable prospects of success" in the underlying PACC application. In this instance, the Court found that the arguments raised in OA 1213 were either foreclosed by established precedent or lacked the necessary legal merit to undermine Mr Saminathan's specific conviction and sentence.

This judgment is a significant doctrinal contribution to Singapore's criminal procedure, particularly regarding the interpretation of the PACC regime. It underscores the judiciary's commitment to the principle of finality while maintaining a rigorous gatekeeping function to prevent what the Court characterized as "thinly veiled attempts" to bypass statutory safeguards. The ruling clarifies that a stay of execution is an exceptional remedy that will not be granted solely on the basis of external litigation that does not directly and substantively impact the applicant's own legal standing.

Timeline of Events

  1. 2018: Mr Saminathan is convicted in the High Court for trafficking 301.6g of diamorphine under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed).
  2. 8 May 2020: The Court of Appeal dismisses Mr Saminathan's appeal against conviction and sentence in [2020] SGCA 45.
  3. 1 October 2020: Mr Saminathan files OS 975/2020 for pre-action discovery and interrogatories.
  4. 22 February 2021: OS 975/2020 is dismissed by the High Court.
  5. 16 March 2021: Mr Saminathan files OS 664/2021 for leave to apply for judicial review.
  6. 2 July 2021: OS 664/2021 is dismissed by the High Court.
  7. 25 February 2022: Mr Saminathan files OS 188/2022 regarding the alleged breach of confidential correspondence.
  8. 1 July 2022: OS 188/2022 is dismissed by the High Court.
  9. 1 August 2022: Mr Saminathan files OC 166/2022 challenging the constitutionality of s 356 of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding costs.
  10. 22 August 2022: OC 166/2022 is struck out by the High Court.
  11. 26 April 2023: Mr Saminathan files OA 480/2023 seeking declarations and a prohibiting order.
  12. 25 May 2023: OA 480/2023 is struck out by the High Court.
  13. 28 March 2024: Mr Saminathan files OA 987/2024 challenging the constitutionality of the PACC Act.
  14. 9 September 2024: OA 987/2024 is struck out by the High Court.
  15. 28 October 2025: Third parties file OA 1213/2025 challenging the mandatory death penalty.
  16. 20 November 2025: Mr Saminathan receives notice that his execution is scheduled for 27 November 2025.
  17. 21 November 2025: Mr Saminathan files the present application (OAC 3/2025) for permission to file a PACC application and for a stay of execution.
  18. 26 November 2025: The Court of Appeal hears and dismisses OAC 3/2025.
  19. 27 November 2025: Scheduled date of execution for Mr Saminathan.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The applicant, Mr Saminathan, was a prisoner awaiting capital punishment following his conviction for a serious drug trafficking offence. The original criminal proceedings involved a joint trial with two other individuals: Mr Mohammad Rizwan bin Akbar Husain ("Mr Rizwan") and Mr Zulkarnain bin Kemat ("Mr Zulkarnain"). The charges related to the possession of 35 bundles of a granular and powdery substance which, upon analysis, was found to contain a total of 301.6g of diamorphine. This quantity significantly exceeded the 15g threshold for the mandatory death penalty under the Misuse of Drugs Act.

In the High Court decision of [2018] SGHC 161, the trial judge made specific findings regarding the roles and eligibility for alternative sentencing for each of the three accused. Mr Zulkarnain was found to be a "courier" within the meaning of s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA. Because the Public Prosecutor issued him a certificate of substantive assistance, the trial judge exercised discretion to sentence him to life imprisonment instead of death. Mr Rizwan, however, was found not to be a courier and did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance, resulting in a mandatory death sentence. Mr Saminathan was found to be a courier, but like Mr Rizwan, he did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance from the Public Prosecutor. Consequently, the trial judge was required by law to impose the death penalty on Mr Saminathan.

Mr Saminathan and Mr Rizwan appealed their convictions and sentences. On 8 May 2020, the Court of Appeal dismissed these appeals in [2020] SGCA 45. Following the exhaustion of the standard appellate process, Mr Saminathan engaged in an extensive series of post-appeal legal maneuvers over several years. These included applications for pre-action discovery (OS 975/2020), judicial review (OS 664/2021), and challenges related to the confidentiality of legal correspondence (OS 188/2022). He also challenged the constitutionality of costs provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code (OC 166/2022) and the constitutionality of the PACC Act itself (OA 987/2024). All of these applications were either dismissed, struck out, or withdrawn.

The immediate catalyst for the present application was the issuance of an execution notice on 20 November 2025, setting the execution for 27 November 2025. Simultaneously, a separate legal challenge, OA 1213, had been initiated by members of the Transformative Justice Collective on 28 October 2025. OA 1213 sought a declaration that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional under Articles 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution. Mr Saminathan, although not a party to OA 1213, sought to leverage its existence to secure a stay of his own execution, arguing that if OA 1213 succeeded, his own sentence would be rendered unlawful. He filed his application for permission under s 60G(1) of the SCJA on the afternoon of 21 November 2025, just six days before his scheduled execution.

The application presented two primary legal hurdles for the Court of Appeal to resolve within the framework of the post-appeal regime for capital cases.

  • The Threshold for Permission under Section 60G(1) SCJA: The Court had to determine whether Mr Saminathan had met the statutory requirements for permission to file a PACC application. This involved assessing whether the application was based on "material" that could not have been adduced earlier with reasonable diligence and whether the underlying PACC application had "reasonable prospects of success" as required by ss 60G(7) and 60G(8) of the SCJA.
  • The Grounds for a Stay of Execution: The Court had to decide whether the pendency of a third-party constitutional challenge (OA 1213) constituted a sufficient basis to stay a scheduled execution. This required an analysis of the relationship between an individual's execution and ongoing litigation to which they are not a party, specifically whether the potential for a future change in the law justifies halting the administrative process of carrying out a sentence that was validly imposed under existing law.

These issues were framed against the backdrop of the "PACC regime," which was specifically enacted to prevent the abuse of court processes through repetitive and meritless last-minute applications. The Court had to balance the applicant's right to life and access to justice against the state's interest in the finality of criminal judgments and the orderly administration of the law.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court’s analysis began with a strict application of the statutory framework governing post-appeal applications. Under s 60G(1) of the SCJA, a PACP must obtain permission from the Court of Appeal before making a PACC application. The Court noted that this is a "gatekeeping" provision intended to ensure that only applications with genuine merit proceed. The Court referred to the criteria established in Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2025] 1 SLR 605, which require the court to consider whether the application is based on material that is "reliable, substantial and has a high degree of probative value" and whether it has "reasonable prospects of success."

Regarding the first issue—the threshold for permission—the Court found that Mr Saminathan’s application failed to meet the "reasonable prospects of success" requirement. The Court scrutinized the arguments raised in OA 1213, which Mr Saminathan sought to adopt. These arguments included the claim that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional and that the presumptions in ss 18(1) and 18(2) of the MDA should be "read down" to impose only an evidential burden. The Court held that these arguments were not "material" in the sense required by the SCJA because they were legal arguments rather than new factual evidence, and more importantly, they were arguments that had been repeatedly rejected by Singapore courts over decades.

The Court conducted a deep dive into the constitutional authorities. It cited Ong Ah Chuan and another v Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710, where the Privy Council held at [32] that:

"the argument that capital punishment is unconstitutional in itself is foreclosed by the recognition in Art 9(1) that a person may be deprived of life 'in accordance with law'."

The Court also referenced Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [20]–[21], which reaffirmed that the mandatory death penalty does not violate the Constitution. Because these precedents were binding and settled, the Court concluded that a PACC application based on challenging them had no reasonable prospect of success.

On the second issue—the stay of execution—the Court distinguished the present case from Pannir Selvam Pranthaman v Attorney-General [2025] 1 SLR 237. In Pannir Selvam, a stay was granted because the ongoing constitutional challenge in that case had the potential to "undermine" the applicant's conviction. However, the Court in the present case clarified that a stay is not a matter of right simply because some litigation is pending. At [37], the Court articulated a critical principle:

"A stay of execution will not be granted solely because there are some pending legal proceedings, regardless of the merits of those proceedings."

The Court noted that OA 1213 was characterized by the Attorney-General as a "thinly veiled attempt" to provide an avenue for PACPs to apply for stays of execution by bypassing the PACC Act. The Court observed that the applicants in OA 1213 were not themselves facing execution and that the challenge was a broad, generalized attack on the MDA's sentencing framework. The Court held that for a stay to be granted, there must be a "powerful reason" to believe that the pending proceedings would actually result in a change of law that would affect the applicant. Given that the arguments in OA 1213 were "foreclosed" by existing case law such as Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 and Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 173, no such powerful reason existed.

Finally, the Court addressed the applicant's late-stage submissions regarding the "reading down" of statutory presumptions. The Court held that even if such a reading were adopted, it would not assist Mr Saminathan. His conviction did not rest solely on presumptions; the trial judge had made affirmative findings of fact regarding his possession and knowledge of the drugs based on the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, even a radical shift in the interpretation of ss 18(1) and 18(2) of the MDA would not undermine the safety of his conviction.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Saminathan’s application in its entirety. The Court exercised its power to dispose of the matter summarily without a full substantive hearing, finding that the application was clearly without merit and failed to meet the statutory threshold for permission under the SCJA.

The operative order of the Court was stated as follows at [46]:

"I dismiss summarily Mr Saminathan’s present application for permission to file a PACC application and for a stay of execution of his sentence, without setting it down for hearing."

The dismissal meant that the legal barriers to the execution were removed. The scheduled execution for 27 November 2025 was permitted to proceed as planned. The Court did not grant any of the ancillary reliefs sought by the applicant, including the prohibiting order against the execution or the quashing order for the notice of execution dated 20 November 2025.

Regarding costs, although the V51 data does not specify a quantum, the procedural history indicates that the Attorney-General had previously sought to strike out similar applications as an abuse of process. In this instance, the summary dismissal served as a final judicial determination that the applicant's attempt to link his fate to the third-party challenge in OA 1213 was legally unsustainable. The Court's refusal to set the matter down for a further hearing underscored the urgency and the perceived lack of merit in the applicant's position.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is a cornerstone for understanding the limits of the PACC regime and the judiciary's approach to eleventh-hour constitutional challenges in capital cases. Its significance can be analyzed across three main dimensions: the principle of finality, the threshold for stays of execution, and the treatment of third-party constitutional litigation.

First, the judgment reinforces the principle of finality in the Singapore legal system. By summarily dismissing the application, the Court of Appeal signaled that the PACC regime—specifically s 60G of the SCJA—is an effective tool for preventing the indefinite delay of criminal sentences through repetitive litigation. The Court made it clear that once the appellate process is exhausted, the burden on a PACP to reopen their case is extremely high. This provides certainty to the administration of justice and ensures that the "gatekeeping" function of the Court is not easily bypassed by re-characterizing old legal arguments as "new material."

Second, the case provides a clear doctrinal distinction regarding stays of execution. It clarifies the scope of the Pannir Selvam precedent. Practitioners now have a clear rule: the mere existence of a pending constitutional challenge is not a "get out of jail free" card for a stay of execution. The Court requires a direct nexus between the pending litigation and the applicant's specific case, and more importantly, the pending litigation must have "reasonable prospects of success." By labeling the arguments in OA 1213 as "foreclosed," the Court has effectively set a high bar for what constitutes a "pending proceeding" worthy of halting an execution.

Third, the case addresses the phenomenon of third-party constitutional challenges. The Court's skepticism toward OA 1213—noting it was a "thinly veiled attempt" to assist PACPs—suggests that the judiciary is alert to strategic litigation aimed at systemic delay. This has implications for human rights advocates and practitioners who may seek to use broad constitutional declarations to impact individual criminal cases. The judgment suggests that unless an applicant is a party to such a challenge, or the challenge addresses a novel and unresolved point of law that directly impacts the applicant's conviction, the courts will be reluctant to grant stays.

Finally, the case matters because it reaffirms the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty and the statutory presumptions in the MDA. By citing Ong Ah Chuan and Yong Vui Kong, the Court of Appeal reminded the legal community that these issues are considered settled law in Singapore. For practitioners, this means that any future challenge to these provisions must bring something truly "material" and "new" to the table to avoid summary dismissal under the PACC framework. The decision serves as a stern reminder that the PACC Act 2022 was designed to streamline these processes and that the courts will apply its provisions rigorously to maintain the integrity of the capital punishment process.

Practice Pointers

  • Understand the PACC Threshold: Practitioners must recognize that s 60G of the SCJA requires more than just a "triable issue." The applicant must show "reasonable prospects of success," which is a higher bar than the standard for ordinary interlocutory applications.
  • Distinguish Factual vs. Legal Material: The Court emphasized that "material" for a PACC application usually refers to new evidence. Purely legal arguments, especially those already rejected by higher courts, are unlikely to satisfy the requirements of s 60G(7).
  • Direct Nexus for Stays: When seeking a stay based on other pending proceedings, counsel must demonstrate a direct and substantive link between those proceedings and the client's specific conviction or sentence. General constitutional challenges by third parties are insufficient.
  • Exhaustion of Remedies: The Court noted the applicant's extensive history of prior applications (OS 975, OS 664, etc.). Practitioners should be aware that a history of multiple unsuccessful post-appeal applications may lead the court to view subsequent applications with increased scrutiny for abuse of process.
  • Timeliness is Critical: While the PACC regime allows for late applications, filing just days before an execution without a compelling reason for the delay will be viewed unfavorably and may lead to summary dismissal without a hearing.
  • Presumptions and Affirmative Findings: If a conviction is based on affirmative findings of fact (e.g., actual knowledge) rather than just statutory presumptions, challenging the constitutionality of those presumptions (ss 18(1) and 18(2) MDA) will likely be considered irrelevant to the safety of the conviction.

Subsequent Treatment

As a recent decision from late 2025, Saminathan a/l Selvaraju v Attorney-General [2025] SGCA 54 stands as a primary authority on the summary dismissal of PACC applications. It reinforces the ratio that a stay of execution will not be granted solely due to pending legal proceedings if the underlying application lacks reasonable prospects of success. This case is expected to be cited in future capital cases to justify the summary disposal of last-minute applications that rely on generalized constitutional challenges or third-party litigation to delay the execution of a sentence.

Legislation Referenced

Cases Cited

Source Documents

Written by Sushant Shukla
Topics
Singapore SLW Case Law Singapore Court of Appeal Criminal Procedure Sentencing 2025 cases
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