Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 16
- Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
- Originating Application No: 9 of 2025
- Originating Application / OAC No: OAC No 1 of 2025
- Judgment Date: 10 April 2025
- Judges: Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA
- Applicant: Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway
- Respondent (First matter): Public Prosecutor
- Respondent (Second matter): Attorney-General of Singapore
- Legal Area(s): Criminal Procedure and Sentencing; Stay of execution; Post-appeal clemency procedure
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”); Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”); Misuse of Drugs Act (2020 Rev Ed) (for constitutional presumptions context)
- Cases Cited (as reflected in extract): Public Prosecutor v Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway [2020] SGHC 232; Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535; Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984
- Related Appeals/Applications: CA/CCA 29/2020 (“CCA 29”) dated 11 November 2021; CA/SUM 16/2023 (“SUM 16/2023”); CA/CA 2/2023 (“CA 2/2023”); CA 2/2023 and SUM 16/2023 were said to engage constitutionality of MDA presumptions
- Judgment Length: 30 pages, 8,047 words
- Procedural Posture: Applications for permission to file a post-appeal application for clemency (“PACC”) and for stay of execution pending determination of permission and any consequent PACC
- Sentence Context: Applicant was a prisoner awaiting capital punishment (“PACP”); execution scheduled for 10 April 2025
Summary
In Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor and another matter ([2025] SGCA 16), the Court of Appeal dealt with urgent applications filed on the eve of a scheduled execution. The applicant, a prisoner awaiting capital punishment, sought (i) permission to file a post-appeal application for clemency (“PACC”) and (ii) a stay of execution pending the determination of that permission application and any consequent PACC. The applications were brought in two forms: a counsel-filed application and a separate application filed by the applicant himself.
The Court summarily dismissed both applications under s 60G(8) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), without an oral hearing. Although the Court acknowledged certain procedural irregularities—such as an inconsistency between the originating applications and the submissions, and the general bar against filing a second PACC permission application while another PACC application is pending—it proceeded to analyse the substance as a single permission application. Ultimately, the Court found that the proposed grounds did not justify permission to bring the PACC application, and therefore no stay of execution could be granted.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicant, Mr Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway, was charged with a capital offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act (“MDA”) relating to trafficking. The charge alleged that he possessed, for the purpose of trafficking, 267 packets and 250 straws containing 2,201.22g of granular/powdery substance, which was analysed to contain not less than 78.77g of diamorphine. He claimed trial and was convicted on 17 August 2020. Because he was not a courier and had not been issued a certificate of substantive assistance, the trial judge imposed the mandatory death penalty.
At trial, the applicant admitted both possession of the drugs and knowledge of their nature. The dispute was narrower: whether his possession was for the purpose of trafficking. His defence was that he was merely “safekeeping” the drugs for another person, Chandran Prasanna Anu (“Chandran”), to whom he intended to return the drugs. This was described as a “bailment defence” or “safekeeping defence”. The defence was not only raised at trial for the first time, but the trial judge found it materially contradicted the applicant’s earlier statements recorded during investigations.
Those statements were central to the prosecution’s case. In particular, the applicant had identified the drugs as “heroin”, described that they were for sale at specified prices, and explained his packing method. He also referred to equipment allegedly used for weighing and packing, and described the use of spoons and paper materials in the packing process. The trial judge concluded that the prosecution proved the element of possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond reasonable doubt, relying essentially on the applicant’s admissions in the statements and supporting extrinsic evidence. The trial judge also indicated that even though the statutory presumption framework under s 17(c) of the MDA was applicable, there was sufficient evidence to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt; in the alternative, the applicant had not rebutted the presumption on the balance of probabilities.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence in Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535 (“Roshdi CA”). The Court agreed that the trial judge had correctly admitted and relied on the statements, correctly assessed the evidence “in the round” to find that the trafficking element was made out, and correctly rejected the safekeeping/bailment defence as a matter of fact. The Court of Appeal further reasoned that even if the applicant had had a safekeeping arrangement, the trafficking element would still be made out because the applicant’s conduct would have facilitated the process of intended sale and distribution.
After the appellate process concluded, the applicant sought permission to bring a PACC. On 9 April 2025—one day before the scheduled execution—he filed two applications: CA/OA 9/2025 filed by counsel at about 5.06pm, and CA/OAC 1/2025 filed by the applicant himself at about 5.27pm. Both sought permission to file a PACC and a stay of execution pending the permission determination and any consequent PACC. The Court of Appeal treated the applications together for analysis as a single permission application, notwithstanding procedural defects.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The primary legal issue was whether the applicant should be granted permission to file a post-appeal application for clemency under the SCJA framework, and whether that permission should be accompanied by a stay of execution. In capital cases, the procedural architecture is designed to ensure that only properly justified grounds can reopen the clemency pathway after the appellate process has concluded. The Court therefore had to assess whether the proposed grounds for PACC permission met the threshold for granting permission.
A second issue concerned procedural compliance and timing. The Court noted that, ordinarily, a second application for PACC permission cannot be filed while a previous PACC application is pending (s 60I(1) of the SCJA). The existence of two PACC applications before the Court would ordinarily bar the second application. Additionally, there was an inconsistency between the originating applications and the submissions: the submissions sought a stay pending the determination of CA/SUM 16/2023 and CA/CA 2/2023, but the originating application did not expressly pray for that stay. The Court nevertheless indicated it was prepared to overlook these defects for the purposes of analysis.
Third, the Court had to consider the substantive content of the proposed grounds. The applicant advanced multiple grounds, including: (i) a “fresh clemency ground” based on the need for more time to file a second clemency petition to the President; (ii) an “intended complaint ground” relating to a planned complaint to the Law Society about prior counsel’s conduct; (iii) a ground tied to the constitutionality of MDA presumptions, referencing the pending constitutional challenges in CA/SUM 16/2023 and CA/CA 2/2023; and (iv) an alternative argument that the High Court and Court of Appeal were demonstrably wrong in finding actual and presumptive knowledge.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by addressing the urgent procedural context. The applicant was awaiting capital punishment, with execution scheduled for 10 April 2025. The applications were filed on 9 April 2025, leaving little time for full hearings. Under s 60G(8) of the SCJA, the Court has the power to summarily dismiss applications without an oral hearing where appropriate. The Court indicated that it would proceed in that manner.
Although the Court identified procedural defects, it chose to focus on substance. It observed that a second PACC permission application is ordinarily barred while a previous PACC application is pending (s 60I(1) of the SCJA). It also noted the inconsistency between the originating applications and the submissions regarding the scope of the requested stay. Despite these issues, the Court was prepared to overlook the procedural defect and treat both applications as seeking the same reliefs in substance: permission to bring a PACC application and a stay of execution. This approach allowed the Court to analyse the grounds without being diverted by technicalities.
On the merits, the Court examined the “fresh clemency ground” first. The applicant’s position was that he needed more time to file a second petition for clemency to the President, given that his first petition had been rejected on 7 June 2022. The Court’s analysis (as reflected in the structure of the judgment extract) indicates it considered whether such a need for time could constitute a proper basis for permission to bring a PACC application at this late stage, particularly where the appellate process had already concluded and where the statutory clemency framework is not intended to operate as a general extension mechanism.
The Court then considered the “intended complaint ground”, which concerned the applicant’s wish to file a complaint to the Law Society of Singapore regarding his previous counsel’s conduct. The Court’s approach would have required it to assess whether a prospective complaint about counsel could amount to a “fresh” or sufficiently material ground for clemency permission, or whether it was too speculative and not capable of supporting the specific statutory purpose of the PACC permission stage. In capital cases, the Court typically expects concrete and relevant grounds rather than general grievances that do not directly engage the legal or factual basis for clemency.
The most legally significant part of the analysis concerned the “MDA presumptions ground”. The applicant sought to rely on the pending constitutionality challenges in CA/SUM 16/2023 and CA/CA 2/2023, which were said to engage the constitutionality of presumptions contained in the MDA. The Court had to determine whether the existence of those pending proceedings could justify permission for a PACC in the applicant’s case. This required the Court to consider the relationship between the presumptions and the applicant’s conviction, including whether the conviction depended on the presumptions or whether it was independently supported by other evidence.
Here, the factual and reasoning background from the trial and appeal mattered. The trial judge had found that the prosecution proved the element of possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond reasonable doubt based essentially on the applicant’s admissions in statements, without relying on the presumption under s 17(c) of the MDA. The Court of Appeal in Roshdi CA had affirmed that position, holding that the trafficking element was made out on the evidence “in the round” and that the safekeeping defence was not accepted as a matter of fact. In that context, the Court in the present judgment would have assessed whether the constitutional challenge to the presumptions could be relevant at all to the applicant’s conviction, given that the conviction was not dependent on the presumptions in the first place.
Finally, the Court addressed an “inconsistency ground” and an “alternative” argument that the High Court and Court of Appeal were demonstrably wrong in finding actual and presumptive knowledge. The Court’s structure suggests it evaluated whether the applicant’s attempt to re-litigate knowledge findings could properly be channelled through a PACC permission application. The Court’s conclusion, as indicated by the summary dismissal, was that the grounds did not meet the threshold for permission.
In essence, the Court’s reasoning reflects a careful balancing exercise: it acknowledged the urgency and procedural irregularities but maintained the statutory gatekeeping function of PACC permission. The Court treated the application as a single permission application and still found that the proposed grounds—whether time-related, complaint-related, constitutionality-related, or re-litigation-related—were insufficient to justify permission to bring a PACC and therefore insufficient to warrant a stay of execution.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed both the First Application (CA/OA 9/2025) and the Second Application (CA/OAC 1/2025) under s 60G(8) of the SCJA. As a result, the applicant was not granted permission to file a PACC, and the stay of execution sought in connection with the permission application was not granted.
Practically, the dismissal meant that the execution scheduled for 10 April 2025 was not stayed pending any PACC process. The Court’s decision therefore closed the immediate procedural pathway the applicant had attempted to invoke on the eve of execution.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it illustrates the strict gatekeeping role of the SCJA’s PACC permission framework in capital cases. Even where an execution is imminent and even where procedural defects exist, the Court will still scrutinise whether the proposed grounds are legally and factually capable of supporting permission. The summary dismissal mechanism under s 60G(8) underscores that the Court will not allow the PACC permission stage to become a general forum for delay or for re-arguing matters already determined on appeal.
The case also highlights how constitutional challenges to statutory presumptions may or may not be relevant depending on the evidential basis of the conviction. Where the conviction is found to be proved beyond reasonable doubt on independent admissions and evidence, rather than on the presumptions, the constitutional challenge may have limited utility for clemency permission. Lawyers should therefore carefully map the trial and appellate reasoning to the statutory presumptions before relying on pending constitutional litigation as a “fresh ground”.
Finally, the decision provides guidance on the kinds of grounds that are unlikely to succeed at the permission stage. Time to file further petitions and intended complaints about counsel may be understandable from the applicant’s perspective, but they may not satisfy the legal threshold for permission to bring a PACC. Practitioners should ensure that any proposed ground is concrete, material, and capable of affecting the clemency analysis in a way that the statutory framework recognises.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), including ss 60G(8), 60I(1)
- Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”), including s 5(1)(a), s 5(2), and s 17(c) [CDN] [SSO]
- Misuse of Drugs Act (2020 Rev Ed) (referenced in the context of constitutionality of presumptions)
Cases Cited
- Public Prosecutor v Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway [2020] SGHC 232
- Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535
- Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 16 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.