Roshdi Bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2025] SGCA 16

Case Details

• Citation: [2025] SGCA 16
• Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 10 April 2025
• Coram: Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA
• Case Number: CA/OA 9/2025; CA/OAC 1/2025
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway
• Respondent / Defendant: Public Prosecutor; Attorney-General of Singapore
• Counsel for Claimants: Patrick Fernandez (Fernandez LLC)
• Counsel for Respondent: Mark Tay, Sunil Nair, Natalie Chu (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
• Practice Areas: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Stay of execution

Summary

In [2025] SGCA 16, the Court of Appeal addressed two eleventh-hour applications filed by Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway, a prisoner awaiting capital punishment. The applications sought permission to bring a post-appeal application in a capital case (a "PACC application") and an immediate stay of execution. This judgment serves as a significant clarification of the procedural rigour required under the PACC regime, particularly concerning the summary dismissal of meritless applications filed shortly before a scheduled execution.

The applicant’s primary contentions rested on four grounds: a desire to file a fresh petition for clemency, an intended complaint against former legal counsel, a challenge to the constitutionality of the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) presumptions currently pending in other proceedings, and an allegation that the trial court erred by finding both actual and presumptive knowledge. The Court, presided over by Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, meticulously dismantled each ground, finding them to be either legally unsustainable, procedurally defective, or a deliberate attempt to delay the finality of the judicial process.

Central to the Court’s reasoning was the application of section 60G(8) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (SCJA), which empowers the Court to summarily dismiss PACC applications without an oral hearing if they are found to be without merit. The judgment emphasizes that the PACC framework was specifically designed to prevent the abuse of court processes through repetitive or baseless last-minute filings. The Court’s refusal to grant a stay of execution underscores the principle that litigation must reach a definitive end, especially when the grounds raised have been previously litigated or lack a reasonable prospect of success.

This decision is a stark reminder to practitioners of the high threshold required to disturb a final conviction and sentence in capital cases. It reinforces the judiciary's stance against "stopgap" measures and clarifies that pending constitutional challenges in unrelated cases do not automatically entitle a prisoner to a stay of execution. The judgment also provides critical guidance on the treatment of allegations against former counsel, noting that such claims must be particularized and cannot serve as a vague basis for staying an execution.

Timeline of Events

1. 27 September 2016: The Applicant’s fifth long statement was recorded, in which he identified the drugs as "heroin" and admitted they were for sale at $70–80 a packet.
2. 17 August 2020: The Applicant was convicted of the Charge in the High Court and sentenced to death by the trial judge in [2020] SGHC 232.
3. 11 November 2021: The Court of Appeal dismissed the Applicant’s appeal (CCA 29) and upheld the conviction and sentence in Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535.
4. 9 March 2022: The Applicant filed a petition for clemency to the President of the Republic of Singapore.
5. 7 June 2022: The President rejected the Applicant’s petition for clemency.
6. 25 November 2022: The High Court dismissed an application by Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed and others (including the Applicant) challenging the constitutionality of certain MDA provisions in [2022] SGHC 291.
7. 27 March 2024: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414, which involved the Applicant as one of the claimants.
8. 27 March 2025: The President issued an order under s 313(1)(f) of the Criminal Procedure Code for the execution of the death sentence.
9. 3 April 2025: The Applicant was informed that his execution was scheduled for 10 April 2025.
10. 9 April 2025: At approximately 5:06 pm, the Applicant filed the First Application (CA/OA 9/2025) and the Second Application (CA/OAC 1/2025) seeking permission for a PACC application and a stay of execution.
11. 10 April 2025: The Court of Appeal delivered its judgment summarily dismissing both applications.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The Applicant, Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway, was a prisoner awaiting capital punishment following his conviction for a capital charge under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed). The Charge involved the possession of 267 packets and 250 straws containing a total of 2,201.22g of granular/powdery substance for the purpose of trafficking. Forensic analysis confirmed that this substance contained not less than 78.77g of diamorphine, well above the 15g threshold for the mandatory death penalty.

At the trial stage, the Applicant’s primary defence was one of "safekeeping" or "bailment." He contended that he was merely holding the drugs for an individual named Chandran Prasanna Anu ("Chandran") and that he had always intended to return the drugs to Chandran. This defence was subjected to rigorous scrutiny during an ancillary hearing regarding the admissibility of the Applicant’s statements. The trial judge ultimately rejected the bailment defence, finding it to be a late invention that was materially contradicted by the Applicant’s own contemporaneous statements to the police.

Specifically, in his fifth long statement recorded on 27 September 2016, the Applicant had explicitly identified the drugs as "heroin" and explained that they were for sale at a price of $70–80 per packet. He further detailed his drug trafficking activities, which the trial judge found to be a clear admission of the purpose of trafficking. The trial judge noted that the Applicant was not a courier and had not been issued a certificate of substantive assistance, which led to the imposition of the mandatory death penalty on 17 August 2020 in [2020] SGHC 232.

The Applicant’s conviction was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal on 11 November 2021. In that appeal, the Court concluded that the Applicant’s guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt without the need to rely on the statutory presumption of trafficking under s 17(c) of the MDA. The Court found that the evidence of actual possession and the Applicant’s own admissions regarding the sale of the drugs were sufficient to establish the charge. Following the dismissal of his appeal, the Applicant’s petition for clemency was rejected by the President on 7 June 2022.

The procedural history of this case is also marked by the Applicant’s involvement in several group applications. He was one of the claimants in [2022] SGHC 291, which challenged the constitutionality of certain MDA provisions. He was also a party to HC/OA 987/2023 and HC/OA 306/2024, both of which were struck out by the High Court. Despite these multiple failed attempts to challenge his conviction and the legal framework surrounding it, the Applicant filed the present applications on 9 April 2025, less than 24 hours before his scheduled execution, raising grounds that the Court characterized as "stopgap" measures.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the Applicant should be granted permission to file a PACC application under the framework introduced by the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022. This required the Court to determine if the Applicant had met the stringent requirements for such an application, including whether there was "new" evidence or legal arguments that could not have been raised earlier and whether the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

Linked to this was the issue of whether a stay of execution should be granted. Under s 313(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, the Court of Appeal has the power to stay the execution of a death sentence. However, the Court had to decide if the grounds raised by the Applicant—specifically the pending constitutional challenges in other cases—justified such an extraordinary measure. This involved an assessment of whether the pending matters (SUM 16/2023 and CA 2/2023) had any direct bearing on the Applicant’s conviction, especially given that his conviction did not rely on the presumptions being challenged.

A third issue concerned the procedural propriety of filing a second PACC application while a first was still pending. Section 60I(1) of the SCJA generally bars the filing of a PACC application if another is pending. The Court had to decide whether to overlook this procedural defect to address the merits of the Applicant’s claims, given the extreme urgency of the situation. Finally, the Court had to address the "Inconsistency Ground," which challenged the legal basis of the conviction by alleging a conflation of actual knowledge and presumptive knowledge, a doctrine rooted in the interpretation of [2020] SGCA 102.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court’s analysis was divided into four distinct grounds raised by the Applicant. The Court first addressed the Fresh Clemency Ground. The Applicant argued that he wished to make a fresh petition for clemency to the President and required time to do so. The Court rejected this, applying the principle from [2024] SGCA 56 at [66], which states that seeking more time to file a petition for clemency does not justify a stay of execution. The Court noted that the Applicant’s first petition had already been rejected in June 2022, and he had provided no basis for why a second petition would have any prospect of success or why it had not been filed in the nearly three years since the first rejection.

Regarding the Intended Complaint Ground, the Applicant claimed he intended to lodge a complaint with the Law Society of Singapore regarding the conduct of his previous solicitors. He argued that his current counsel, Mr. Fernandez, required time to correspond with the former solicitors as required by the Legal Profession Act 1966. The Court found this ground entirely meritless. Citing the recent caution in [2025] SGCA 15, the Court held that:

“grave allegations against former counsel, which attack the reputation of counsel and the finality and integrity of the judicial process, should not be lightly made” (at [38]).

The Court observed that the Applicant had failed to provide any particulars of the alleged misconduct or explain how such misconduct, even if proven, would affect the safety of his conviction. The lack of detail suggested that this was merely a tactical move to secure a stay.

The MDA Presumptions Ground formed a significant part of the Applicant’s case. He argued that his execution should be stayed pending the determination of SUM 16/2023 and CA 2/2023, which challenged the constitutionality of the presumptions in ss 17 and 18 of the MDA. The Court noted that the Applicant had been a party to these challenges since 2022 and had already seen them fail in the High Court in [2022] SGHC 291. More importantly, the Court highlighted that the Applicant’s conviction did not rely on the s 17(c) presumption. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal had both found that the Applicant had actual knowledge of the drugs and the purpose of trafficking based on his own admissions. Therefore, even if the constitutional challenge to the presumptions were successful, it would have no impact on the Applicant’s conviction.

Finally, the Court dealt with the Inconsistency Ground. The Applicant argued that the courts were "demonstrably wrong" in finding that he had both actual knowledge and presumptive knowledge. He relied on a passage from [2020] SGCA 102. The Court of Appeal found this argument to be based on a "deliberate" misreading of the law. The Court reproduced the full quote from Gobi at [55]:

“Second, keeping the two inquiries separate and distinct is important in order to ensure that an accused person knows the case he has to meet... An accused person should not be placed in the position of having to run a potentially inconsistent defence in an attempt to address undifferentiated allegations of both actual knowledge and wilful blindness... we are satisfied that the Prosecution did not run alternative cases against the Applicant at the trial.” (at [57]).

The Court clarified that Gobi was about the Prosecution’s duty to be clear about its case (actual knowledge vs. wilful blindness) to ensure procedural fairness. It did not mean that a court could not find actual knowledge where the evidence supported it. In the Applicant’s case, the trial judge found actual knowledge beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also distinguished [2022] SGCA 50, noting that it did not support the Applicant’s proposition that the Prosecution is barred from running alternative cases of actual knowledge and presumptive knowledge, provided there is no prejudice.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed both the First Application (CA/OA 9/2025) and the Second Application (CA/OAC 1/2025). The Court exercised its power under section 60G(8) of the SCJA, which allows for the dismissal of such applications without an oral hearing when they are found to be without merit. The Court’s decision was final, and no stay of execution was granted.

The operative paragraph of the judgment states:

“I summarily dismiss the First and Second Applications without the need for an oral hearing pursuant to s 60G(8) of the SCJA.” (at [64]).

In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted a procedural defect: the Applicant had filed the Second Application while the First Application was still pending, which is technically prohibited by s 60I(1) of the SCJA. However, the Court chose to overlook this defect in the interest of addressing the merits of the applications given the imminent execution. The Court found that none of the grounds raised had a reasonable prospect of success. The clemency ground was a repeat of a failed process; the complaint against counsel was unparticularized; the constitutional challenge was irrelevant to the Applicant’s specific conviction; and the inconsistency ground was based on a misinterpretation of legal precedent.

The Court also addressed the timing of the applications, noting that they were filed only after the Applicant was informed of his execution date, despite the fact that many of the grounds (such as the constitutional challenges and the Gobi arguments) could have been raised years earlier. This delay was seen as a further indication that the applications were not bona fide attempts to seek justice but were intended to frustrate the execution process. No costs were awarded in the summary dismissal.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is a landmark in the procedural landscape of capital litigation in Singapore, specifically regarding the PACC (Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases) regime. It reinforces the judiciary's commitment to the finality of legal proceedings and the prevention of the abuse of court processes. For practitioners, the judgment serves as a definitive guide on the limitations of last-minute stay applications.

First, the case clarifies the application of section 60G(8) of the SCJA. By summarily dismissing the applications without an oral hearing, the Court of Appeal demonstrated that the PACC framework is an effective tool for filtering out meritless applications that are filed as "stopgap" measures. This sends a clear signal that the Court will not tolerate tactical delays, especially those filed on the eve of an execution.

Second, the judgment provides critical guidance on the separation of actual knowledge and statutory presumptions. The Court’s analysis of the "Inconsistency Ground" reaffirms that if a conviction is based on a finding of actual knowledge beyond reasonable doubt, subsequent challenges to the constitutionality or application of statutory presumptions (like s 17 or s 18 of the MDA) are legally irrelevant. This distinction is vital for defense counsel to understand when evaluating the potential success of a post-appeal challenge.

Third, the Court’s treatment of allegations against former counsel is significant. By citing [2025] SGCA 15, the Court emphasized that attacking the reputation of previous solicitors requires specific particulars. Vague assertions of "intended complaints" to the Law Society will not suffice to stay an execution. This protects the integrity of the legal profession and ensures that the finality of the judicial process is not undermined by unsubstantiated claims of professional negligence or misconduct.

Fourth, the case addresses the interplay between pending constitutional challenges and individual stays of execution. The Applicant attempted to piggyback on the pending SUM 16/2023 and CA 2/2023 matters. The Court’s refusal to grant a stay on this basis establishes that a prisoner is not automatically entitled to a stay simply because a broader legal challenge is pending in the courts, especially if that challenge has no direct impact on the specific facts of the prisoner's conviction.

Finally, the judgment underscores the duty of candour and the consequences of delay. The Court noted that many of the grounds raised could have been brought much earlier. This reinforces the principle set out in [2022] SGCA 46 and Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General [2022] SGCA 26, where the Court warned against the "drip-feeding" of applications to delay the carrying out of a sentence. This case solidifies the Court's stance that the PACC regime is not a "backdoor" for re-litigating settled issues.

Practice Pointers

• Timing is Critical: Practitioners must avoid filing PACC applications at the eleventh hour. The Court will view last-minute filings with extreme skepticism, particularly if the grounds raised were available at an earlier stage.
• Particularize Allegations Against Counsel: If a PACC application is based on the conduct of previous solicitors, counsel must provide specific particulars of the alleged misconduct and explain how it renders the conviction unsafe. Failure to do so may lead to summary dismissal.
• Distinguish Actual Knowledge from Presumptions: Before challenging statutory presumptions, counsel must verify whether the conviction actually relied on those presumptions. If the trial court found actual knowledge, a challenge to the presumption is likely to be deemed irrelevant.
• Understand the Summary Dismissal Power: Be aware that under s 60G(8) of the SCJA, the Court can dismiss an application without an oral hearing. This means the written submissions must be comprehensive and legally robust from the outset.
• Avoid Repetitive Grounds: Grounds that have already been litigated and rejected in previous applications (such as clemency petitions or group constitutional challenges) will not be entertained unless there is genuinely "new" evidence or a change in the law.
• Comply with s 60I(1) SCJA: Ensure that no other PACC application is pending before filing a new one. While the Court may overlook this defect in urgent cases, it remains a procedural bar that should be avoided.
• Cite Authorities Accurately: When relying on cases like [2020] SGCA 102, ensure the full context of the judgment is presented. Misrepresenting the ratio of a case can damage the credibility of the application.

Subsequent Treatment

As this is a very recent decision (April 2025), there is no recorded subsequent treatment in the extracted metadata. However, the judgment itself follows the doctrinal lineage of recent Court of Appeal decisions such as [2024] SGCA 56 and [2025] SGCA 15, reinforcing the strict procedural requirements of the PACC regime and the high bar for staying executions in capital cases.

Legislation Referenced

• Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), ss 5(1)(a), 5(2), 17, 17(c), 18, 18(1), 18(2), 33, 33B
• Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), ss 60F, 60G(1), 60G(4), 60G(7), 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6), 60I(1), 394H
• Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), ss 313(1)(f), 313(1)(ia)(ii), 313(2)
• Legal Profession Act 1966
• Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (Act 41 of 2022)
• Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed), Arts 9, 12

Cases Cited

• Applied: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGCA 56
• Considered: Pannir Selvam Pranthaman v Attorney-General [2025] 1 SLR 237
• Referred to: Public Prosecutor v Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway [2020] SGHC 232
• Referred to: Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535
• Referred to: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2025] SGHC 20
• Referred to: Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 15
• Referred to: Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed and others v Attorney-General [2022] SGHC 291
• Referred to: Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 102
• Referred to: Public Prosecutor v Aishamudin bin Jamaludin [2020] SGCA 70
• Referred to: Chong Hoon Cheong v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 50
• Referred to: Attorney-General v Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah [2022] SGCA 46
• Referred to: Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General and another matter [2022] SGCA 26
• Referred to: Fuad v PP [2020] 1 SLR 984

Source Documents

• Original Judgment (PDF)
• eLitigation Case Record