Case Details
- Citation: [2021] SGCA 74
- Case Number: Criminal Motion No 17 of 2021
- Decision Date: 05 August 2021
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Coram: Steven Chong JCA
- Applicant: Rahmat bin Karimon
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Counsel for Applicant: Chan Tai-Hui Jason SC, Leong Yi-Ming, Zeslene Mao Huijing, Tan Xue Yang (Allen & Gledhill LLP)
- Counsel for Respondent: Muhamad Imaduddien and Chin Jincheng (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
- Legal Areas: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Criminal review; Criminal Law — Statutory offences
- Statutes Referenced: Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”); Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”)
- Key Procedural Provisions: ss 394H(1), 394J(2), 394J(3), 394J(4), 394J(5), 394F(1), 394G(1), 394H(6)(a), 313(f), 313(g), 313(h)
- Key Substantive Provision: s 18(2) MDA (presumption of knowledge)
- Related Earlier Decisions: Zainal bin Hamad v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 1119 (“Rahmat (CA)”); Public Prosecutor v Rahmat bin Karimon and another [2018] 5 SLR 641 (“Rahmat (HC)”)
- Subsequent Change in Law Relied On: Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180 (“Gobi”)
- Other Review Applications Mentioned: Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 30 (“Datchinamurthy”); Khartik Jasudass and another v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 13 (“Khartik”)
- Judgment Length: 11 pages, 6,359 words
Summary
Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 74 is a criminal review leave application under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), brought after a concluded Court of Appeal conviction for trafficking in diamorphine. The applicant, Rahmat, sought leave to review the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Rahmat (CA) on the footing that the law had changed following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180 (“Gobi”), particularly as to the proper treatment of “wilful blindness” in relation to the statutory presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA).
The Court of Appeal (Steven Chong JCA) clarified the contours of the “legitimate basis” requirement for review leave, focusing on the statutory “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements in s 394J of the CPC. Applying those requirements, the court held that Rahmat’s application did not disclose a sufficient basis to reopen the concluded appeal. In substance, the court found that the prosecution’s case and the appellate court’s reasoning were not dependent on an impermissible use of the s 18(2) presumption to presume wilful blindness after Gobi.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Rahmat was employed as a “runner” for an illegal money-lending figure known as “Kanna”. Rahmat had known Kanna for less than two months before his arrest. On 27 May 2015, Rahmat entered Singapore from Malaysia via the Woodlands Checkpoint in a car with his wife and their three children. He was acting on instructions from Kanna, and after entering Singapore he drove to Rochor Road where he met a man known as “Bai”. Bai instructed Rahmat to meet Zainal bin Hamad (“Zainal”) at the IKEA store in Tampines.
Rahmat and Zainal met at the staircase on the second level of IKEA. At about 8.35pm, Zainal passed Rahmat S$8,000. Rahmat then placed a green bag at the staircase landing in front of Zainal and left IKEA. Rahmat subsequently reunited with his wife and children and drove back towards Woodlands Checkpoint. At the checkpoint, Rahmat and his wife were arrested by Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) officers. Rahmat’s wife was searched and S$8,000 was found concealed in her brassiere. The evidence was that Rahmat had passed the S$8,000 to his wife and told her to conceal it while they travelled to Woodlands Checkpoint.
Zainal later picked up the green bag and placed it in a warehouse located on the second floor of IKEA. At about 9.25pm, CNB officers entered the warehouse and arrested Zainal. The bag contained a red plastic bag with three plastic packets of granular/powdery substance weighing 1381.7g. The drugs were found to contain not less than 53.64g of diamorphine, a controlled drug under the MDA. Neither Rahmat nor Zainal was authorised under the MDA or its regulations to traffic or possess controlled drugs.
Rahmat and Zainal were tried jointly. Zainal faced a charge of possessing not less than 53.64g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) and punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA. Rahmat was charged with trafficking in not less than 53.64g of diamorphine under s 5(1)(a) and punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA. At trial, Rahmat’s defence was that he believed he was carrying medicine.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The primary legal issue was procedural and statutory: whether Rahmat’s application for leave to commence a criminal review under s 394H(1) of the CPC disclosed a “legitimate basis” for the exercise of the court’s review power. This required the court to consider the requirements in s 394J, in particular the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements in s 394J(2).
Substantively, the issue was tied to the post-Gobi change in law. Rahmat argued that the prosecution’s case at trial and on appeal was “in substance” based on wilful blindness rather than actual knowledge. He contended that, after Gobi, the prosecution could not rely on the s 18(2) presumption of knowledge to presume wilful blindness. Accordingly, he submitted that the trial judge’s and the Court of Appeal’s findings that he could not rebut the s 18(2) presumption could not stand.
A further issue, reflected in the court’s discussion, was the proper approach to review leave applications where the applicant relies on a change in law. The court had to determine whether the change in law, standing alone, was enough, or whether the applicant must still demonstrate—through sufficient and compelling material—that there had been a miscarriage of justice in the earlier appellate decision.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Steven Chong JCA began by emphasising the structure of the criminal review regime. The review process is directed at the earlier appellate decision—here, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rahmat (CA)—not at the trial judgment. Therefore, the focus of the leave application must be on showing that the appellate decision is “demonstrably wrong” such that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. This framing is important because it prevents review leave from becoming a general re-litigation of the trial record; it is instead a targeted mechanism to correct demonstrable appellate error.
The court then set out the settled approach to leave applications under s 394H. Following Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2020] 2 SLR 1175, an applicant must disclose a “legitimate basis” for review. This involves satisfying the requirements in s 394J, including the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements. Under s 394J(2), there must be (a) sufficient material on which the appellate court may conclude that (b) there has been a miscarriage of justice. The court referred to these as the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements, respectively.
For material to be “sufficient”, the court explained that it must satisfy the requirements in ss 394J(3)(a) to 394J(3)(c): the material must not have been canvassed at any stage of the criminal matter before the filing of the leave application; it must not have been adduced earlier even with reasonable diligence; and it must be “compelling”—reliable, substantial, powerfully probative, and capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Where the material consists of legal arguments, s 394J(4) adds an additional requirement: the legal argument must be based on a change in law arising from a decision made after the conclusion of all proceedings relating to the criminal matter. In Rahmat’s case, Gobi was such a post-conclusion decision, so the change-in-law element was not disputed.
However, the court stressed that a change in law does not automatically justify reopening a concluded appeal. The court relied on the principle articulated in Gobi itself: the mere existence of a legal change is not, by itself, enough. The applicant must still show that the earlier appellate decision was affected in a way that meets the “miscarriage of justice” threshold. This is where Rahmat’s argument turned: he needed to demonstrate that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Rahmat (CA) depended on an impermissible use of the s 18(2) presumption to presume wilful blindness.
In assessing this, the court examined the procedural history and the manner in which the prosecution’s case and the trial judge’s findings were framed. The court noted that, at trial, the prosecution ran three arguments in closing submissions: (a) Rahmat could not rebut the s 18(2) presumption; alternatively (b) Rahmat was either wilfully blind or (c) had actual knowledge of the nature of the drugs. The trial judge convicted Rahmat and found that Rahmat failed to rebut the s 18(2) presumption, while also finding that actual knowledge and wilful blindness were separately proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, Rahmat chose to focus on his sole defence that the s 18(2) presumption had been rebutted. The Court of Appeal in Rahmat (CA) dismissed the appeal on that basis, holding that Rahmat failed to rebut the presumption. Importantly, the court observed that there was no suggestion that the Court of Appeal’s grounds of decision inaccurately recorded the parties’ cases. Thus, the review court’s task was to determine whether, in light of Gobi, the Court of Appeal’s reliance on the s 18(2) presumption necessarily involved an impermissible presumption of wilful blindness.
The court also drew attention to prior review applications—Datchinamurthy and Khartik—where applicants similarly argued that the prosecution’s case was “in substance” based on wilful blindness rather than actual knowledge. In those cases, the court had rejected the applications because it found that the prosecution’s case and the court’s decisions were in fact based on actual knowledge, not wilful blindness. This comparative analysis served to show that the “in substance” characterisation is not determinative unless the record truly supports it.
Applying these principles, the court concluded that Rahmat’s application did not meet the sufficiency and miscarriage of justice requirements. The court’s reasoning, as reflected in the extract, indicates that the earlier appellate decision did not depend on the kind of reasoning that Gobi prohibits—namely, invoking the s 18(2) presumption to presume wilful blindness. Rather, the earlier findings were supported by proof of actual knowledge and/or findings that were not merely derivative of the presumption in the manner alleged. Consequently, Rahmat could not establish that the earlier Court of Appeal decision was demonstrably wrong in a way that would amount to a miscarriage of justice.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Rahmat’s application for leave to commence a criminal review. The practical effect is that the concluded conviction and sentence—already subject to the mandatory death framework at the time of conviction—remained undisturbed by the review mechanism.
More broadly, the decision confirms that even where a change in law occurs after a concluded appeal, an applicant must still demonstrate, through compelling and sufficient material, that the earlier appellate decision was affected in a manner that reaches the miscarriage of justice threshold. A leave application will fail if the applicant cannot show that the earlier reasoning fell within the legal error identified in the later change of law.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 74 is significant for two connected reasons. First, it reinforces the disciplined gatekeeping function of s 394H leave applications. The court’s analysis clarifies that the review process is not a second appeal; it is a narrow corrective mechanism. Applicants must satisfy both the sufficiency and miscarriage of justice requirements, and the court will scrutinise whether the earlier appellate decision truly rests on the legal error alleged.
Second, the case contributes to the post-Gobi jurisprudence on the s 18(2) presumption of knowledge and the role of wilful blindness. While Gobi held that the s 18(2) presumption cannot be invoked to presume wilful blindness, Rahmat illustrates that applicants cannot succeed merely by re-labelling the prosecution’s case as “wilful blindness” if the record supports findings of actual knowledge or otherwise does not reflect the prohibited reasoning. For practitioners, this means that careful attention must be paid to how the prosecution’s case was articulated at trial and how the appellate court’s reasoning was structured.
For lawyers and law students, the decision is also useful as a guide to how the CPC review provisions operate in practice. It shows how the court evaluates “compelling” legal arguments under s 394J(4), and how the existence of a change in law is necessary but not sufficient. In future cases, counsel should prepare review leave applications by mapping the alleged legal error directly onto the reasoning of the earlier appellate decision, rather than relying on general assertions about the nature of the evidence or the prosecution’s “in substance” theory.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed), including ss 394F(1), 394G(1), 394H(1), 394H(6)(a), 394J(2), 394J(3), 394J(4), 394J(5), and ss 313(f), 313(g), 313(h)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), including s 18(2)
Cases Cited
- [2021] SGCA 13
- [2021] SGCA 30
- [2021] SGCA 74
- Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2020] 2 SLR 1175
- Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180
- Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 30
- Khartik Jasudass and another v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 13
- Zainal bin Hamad v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 1119
- Public Prosecutor v Rahmat bin Karimon and another [2018] 5 SLR 641
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGCA 74 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.