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Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Salihin bin Ismail [2024] SGCA 22

In Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Salihin bin Ismail, the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Criminal Law — Offences.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2024] SGCA 22
  • Title: Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Salihin bin Ismail
  • Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
  • Date: 1 July 2024
  • Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Tay Yong Kwang JCA and Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD
  • Criminal Appeals: Criminal Appeal Nos 5, 19 and 23 of 2022
  • Originating Proceedings: Criminal Case No 6 of 2021
  • Parties: Public Prosecutor (Appellant/Respondent depending on appeal) v Muhammad Salihin bin Ismail (Respondent/Appellant depending on appeal)
  • Legal Area: Criminal Law — Offences (murder; s 300(c) Penal Code; sentencing)
  • Statutes Referenced: Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed); Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed); Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)
  • Key Penal Provisions: s 300(c) and s 302(2) Penal Code; s 325 Penal Code; s 324 Penal Code; s 5(1) Children and Young Persons Act
  • Procedural Provision: s 141 Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (power to amend charge)
  • Trial Outcome: Acquittal on s 300(c) murder; conviction on amended s 325 voluntarily causing grievous hurt
  • Sentence at Trial: 9 years’ imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane (with commencement backdated to 3 September 2018)
  • Appeal Outcome: Murder conviction restored (life imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane); appeals against sentence on the s 325 charge became irrelevant
  • Judgment Length: 32 pages; 9,134 words
  • Cases Cited: [2020] SGHC 168; [2023] SGHC 155; [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 (Lim Poh Lye); Virsa Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465

Summary

In Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Salihin bin Ismail ([2024] SGCA 22), the Court of Appeal considered whether the stepfather of a four-year-old child should be convicted of murder under s 300(c) of the Penal Code. The charge arose from two incidents on 1 September 2018 in which Salihin applied force to the child’s abdomen, followed by the child’s death on 2 September 2018 due to intra-abdominal bleeding (haemoperitoneum) caused by blunt force trauma.

The High Court trial judge had acquitted Salihin of murder but convicted him of the lesser offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt under s 325 after amending the charge under s 141 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the Prosecution’s appeal against the acquittal, holding that the evidence established the requisite intention to inflict the bodily injury actually suffered—namely the intra-abdominal injuries—within the framework of the “Virsa Singh test” for s 300(c). The Court therefore convicted Salihin of murder and imposed life imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

Salihin was the stepfather of the deceased, Nursabrina Agustiani Abdullah (“the Victim”). At the time of the relevant incidents, the Victim was slightly more than four years old. Salihin lived with the Victim, the Victim’s biological mother, Syabilla, and two twin boys born in November 2016. The family lived together in a rental flat, which became the setting for the incidents leading to the Victim’s death.

The first incident occurred at about 10.00am on 1 September 2018. Salihin noticed a puddle of urine outside the toilet. He became angry, believing the Victim—who was already toilet-trained—had misbehaved. Salihin called the Victim to the toilet and placed her on the toilet bowl. While it was undisputed that Salihin applied force on the Victim’s abdomen with his knuckles, the parties disputed the nature of that force: the Prosecution characterised it as punches, whereas the Defence maintained it was mere nudges to prevent the Victim from getting off the toilet seat.

The second incident occurred at about 3.00pm on the same day. The Victim indicated she wanted to go to the toilet. After she went into the toilet and later left, Salihin found that she had urinated again on the floor in front of the toilet bowl. He became angry, called the Victim over, questioned her, then pushed her on the left shoulder, causing her to fall sideways. With the Victim lying on her side, Salihin kicked her abdomen twice with his right leg while barefoot. Salihin admitted to pushing the Victim and kicking her abdomen twice during this incident. After the kicks, he placed her back on the toilet bowl and again applied force on her abdomen with his knuckles a few times; again, the parties disputed whether these were punches or nudges.

Following these incidents, the Victim vomited periodically during the night of 1 September 2018 and into the early hours of 2 September 2018. On 2 September 2018 at about 8.00am, Salihin brought the Victim to the toilet. When she had difficulty vomiting, Salihin used his index finger to ease her vomiting. The Victim then vomited and became unconscious. Salihin carried her out and informed Syabilla that the Victim was no longer breathing, asking Syabilla to call for an ambulance. Syabilla asked Salihin to perform CPR, which he did for about 15 minutes until paramedics arrived at about 9.28am.

The Victim was taken to the Accident and Emergency Department of Ng Teng Fong General Hospital, arriving at about 9.44am. She was not breathing and had no heartbeat. After resuscitation efforts failed, she was pronounced dead at 10.12am on 2 September 2018. The autopsy report, prepared by forensic pathologist Dr Gilbert Lau, certified the cause of death as “haemoperitoneum due to blunt force trauma of the abdomen”. Dr Lau concluded that death was primarily due to intra-abdominal haemorrhage amounting to about 300ml of blood in the peritoneal cavity, largely attributable to traumatic disruption of the greater omentum and severe bruising. He opined that the intra-abdominal injuries were consistent with blunt force trauma to the abdomen, such as that caused by a fist blow or multiple fist blows.

The central legal issue was whether Salihin’s conduct amounted to murder under s 300(c) of the Penal Code. That provision criminalises causing death by doing an act with the intention of causing bodily injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court of Appeal therefore had to determine, on the evidence, (a) whether the bodily injury inflicted by Salihin was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and (b) whether Salihin intended to inflict that bodily injury.

A second issue concerned the evidential and analytical approach to causation and injury identification. The Defence sought to undermine the Prosecution’s case by pointing to other purported contributory causes—such as “twins bouncing” incidents, CPR-related matters, and vomiting incidents—arguing that the court could not reliably isolate which injuries were inflicted by Salihin as opposed to arising from other causes. The Court of Appeal had to address whether the Prosecution’s case necessarily fails where the court cannot precisely identify and isolate each injury from other possible causes, particularly in the context of s 300(c).

Finally, because the trial judge had amended the charge and convicted Salihin under s 325, the Court of Appeal also had to consider the sentencing consequences. Once murder conviction was restored, the appeals against sentence on the s 325 charge became legally and practically irrelevant, but the Court still addressed the procedural posture of the multiple appeals.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The Court of Appeal began by setting out the trial judge’s approach and the factual findings that were either accepted or disputed. The trial judge had accepted the Defence’s characterisation of the force applied during the 10.00am and 3.00pm incidents as nudges rather than punches, largely relying on Salihin’s testimony and demonstrations. However, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the undisputed parts of the Prosecution case were decisive. In particular, it was not in dispute that Salihin intended to kick the Victim’s abdomen and did so with “exceptional force”.

On the causation question, the Court of Appeal accepted that the intra-abdominal injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This conclusion followed from the autopsy evidence: the certified cause of death was haemoperitoneum due to blunt force trauma of the abdomen, with intra-abdominal haemorrhage and traumatic disruption of internal structures. The Court therefore treated the medical sufficiency element of s 300(c) as satisfied.

The more contested aspect was intention. The Court of Appeal applied the principles associated with the “Virsa Singh test”, as adopted in Singapore jurisprudence, including the approach described in Lim Poh Lye ([2005] 4 SLR(R) 582). Under that framework, the Prosecution does not need to prove that the accused intended to kill or intended the precise medical consequences or degree of seriousness. Instead, the inquiry focuses on whether the accused intended to inflict the bodily injury that in fact resulted, and whether that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

In its analysis, the Court of Appeal underscored that once the evidence established that Salihin intended to kick the Victim in the stomach/abdomen with exceptional force, it was unnecessary for the Prosecution to go further to show that Salihin knew, or intended, the specific medical consequences such as intra-abdominal bleeding or haemoperitoneum. The Court relied on the reasoning in Lim Poh Lye at [47], explaining that what is required is intention to inflict the injury in question, not intention to kill or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness. The Court therefore concluded that it was clear Salihin intended to inflict the intra-abdominal injuries that were sustained.

The Court also addressed the Defence’s attempt to introduce alternative or “other purported contributory causes”. The Court considered the “twins bouncing incident”, the CPR incident, and vomiting incidents. While these matters were raised to suggest that the Victim’s condition could have been caused or worsened by factors other than Salihin’s kicks and punches/nudges, the Court’s reasoning was that the intra-abdominal injuries inflicted by Salihin were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. In other words, even if other factors existed, they did not negate the legal sufficiency and intention elements required for s 300(c) once the evidence established that Salihin inflicted the relevant bodily injury.

Importantly, the Court made observations on the question of whether the Prosecution’s case necessarily fails where the court cannot identify and isolate the injuries inflicted by the accused from injuries arising from other causes. The Court’s approach indicates that the legal analysis under s 300(c) is not defeated by imperfect medical granularity, provided the evidence supports that the accused inflicted bodily injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that the accused intended to inflict that bodily injury. This is consistent with the functional purpose of the Virsa Singh test: to connect intention to the injury actually suffered, without requiring proof of detailed medical foreseeability.

What Was the Outcome?

The Court of Appeal allowed the Prosecution’s appeal in CA 5 against the trial judge’s acquittal on the murder charge under s 300(c) of the Penal Code. Applying the Virsa Singh test and the principles articulated in Lim Poh Lye, the Court held that Salihin intended to inflict the bodily injury in question—his kicks to the Victim’s abdomen with exceptional force—and that the intra-abdominal injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court therefore convicted Salihin of murder.

Salihin was sentenced to life imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane. As a result, the appeals against sentence on the s 325 charge (CA 19 and CA 23) became irrelevant because the conviction and sentencing basis changed from voluntarily causing grievous hurt to murder.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision is significant for criminal practitioners because it clarifies, in a child-abuse context, the operation of s 300(c) and the evidential threshold for intention. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the Prosecution need not prove that the accused intended to kill or intended the precise medical consequences of the assault. Instead, the focus is on whether the accused intended to inflict the bodily injury that actually resulted and which is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

For lawyers and law students, the case is also useful on how courts handle causation arguments that propose alternative contributory causes. The Court’s reasoning suggests that where the medical evidence establishes that the injuries inflicted by the accused are independently sufficient to cause death, the existence of other possible factors does not automatically undermine the murder charge. This is particularly relevant in cases involving complex timelines of symptoms, emergency interventions, and competing narratives about how injuries occurred.

Finally, the case demonstrates the appellate court’s willingness to correct trial-level mischaracterisations of force and to reframe the legal analysis around undisputed elements. Even where there were disputes about whether certain movements were “nudges” or “punches”, the Court treated the undisputed intent to kick the abdomen with exceptional force as decisive for the Virsa Singh intention inquiry. Practitioners should therefore pay close attention to which factual findings are truly contested and which are effectively conceded, as those can become determinative for the mental element of murder under s 300(c).

Legislation Referenced

  • Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed): s 300(c); s 302(2); s 325; s 324
  • Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed): s 141
  • Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed): s 5(1)

Cases Cited

  • Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582
  • Virsa Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465
  • [2020] SGHC 168
  • [2023] SGHC 155
  • [2024] SGCA 22

Source Documents

This article analyses [2024] SGCA 22 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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