Case Details
- Citation: [2010] SGHC 221
- Case Title: PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 05 August 2010
- Judge: Tan Lee Meng J
- Proceeding Type: Originating Summons
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 190 of 2010 (Summons No 1001 of 2010/F)
- Decision Reserved: 5 August 2010
- Plaintiff/Applicant: PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK)
- Defendants/Respondents: Aperchance Co Ltd and others
- Respondents Identified: 1st respondent: Aperchance Co Ltd (Hong Kong company); 2nd respondent: Mr Otto Rodusek (director); 3rd respondent: Mr Toh Keng Siong (director)
- Legal Area: Courts and Jurisdiction; Contempt of Court — Civil Contempt
- Key Procedural History (as noted): Appeal to this decision in Civil Appeal No 137 of 2010 dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 February 2011 (see [2011] SGCA 19)
- Counsel for Applicant: Chandra Mohan / Mabelle Tay (Rajah & Tann LLP)
- Counsel for Respondents: Davinder Singh SC / Cheryl Tay / Alecia Quah (Drew & Napier LLC)
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed)
- Rules of Court Referenced: O 52 r 1 and O 52 r 2(2) and O 52 r 5(3) (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed)
- Judgment Length: 8 pages, 4,214 words
Summary
In PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others [2010] SGHC 221, the High Court dealt with an application for committal for contempt of court arising from misleading media advertisements published in Indonesia. The applicant, PT Makindo, sought to punish the 1st respondent, Aperchance Co Ltd, and its directors, for allegedly undermining or disobeying orders made by the Singapore High Court in earlier proceedings.
The dispute stemmed from a Singapore action in which Aperchance obtained a worldwide Mareva injunction against PT Makindo and certain officers. That injunction, and the related permission to serve process out of jurisdiction, were later set aside on jurisdictional grounds. After the Singapore court’s orders were discharged, both sides published advertisements in Indonesian newspapers, each portraying the Singapore litigation in a manner the other side said was false and harmful to its position with Indonesian authorities.
Applying the stringent criminal standard for contempt (proof beyond reasonable doubt) and emphasising the draconian nature of committal, the court focused on whether the respondents’ advertisements amounted to contempt on the specific grounds pleaded in the applicant’s statement. The court also considered the effect of the applicant’s own non-disclosure of its earlier misleading advertisements when seeking leave to bring the committal application. Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for committal, and the Court of Appeal later dismissed the appeal as well.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying controversy began with a Singapore lawsuit commenced by Aperchance. On 22 November 2003, Aperchance filed Suit No 1149 of 2003/H against PT Makindo and three other defendants for, among other things, repayment of approximately US$126 million. The three other defendants were officers of PT Makindo: Rachmiwaty Jusuf, Gunawan Jusuf and Claudine Jusuf (collectively, the “Jusuf defendants”).
Shortly after the suit was filed, Aperchance obtained an ex parte worldwide Mareva injunction on 24 November 2003. The injunction restrained PT Makindo and the Jusuf defendants from dealing with assets worldwide. It also reflected the court’s acceptance, at that stage, of Aperchance’s application for urgent protective relief.
In response, the Jusuf defendants brought two applications on 23 December 2003. First, they sought to set aside the Mareva injunction (Summons No 7795 of 2003/Q). Second, they sought declarations and orders relating to service and jurisdiction (Summons No 7802 of 2003/K). In particular, they asked the court to declare that the writ had not been duly served, or if it had been purportedly served, to set aside that purported service. They also sought discharge of the order granting leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction, and a declaration that the Singapore courts had no jurisdiction over PT Makindo and the two individual defendants in respect of the subject matter of the claim.
These applications were heard by Lai Kew Chai J in February 2004. On 27 February 2004, the Mareva injunction and the order permitting service out of jurisdiction were set aside. Importantly, Lai J did not consider the merits of the substantive claim; the decision was based on jurisdiction. Aperchance did not appeal. Costs were taxed and Aperchance was ordered to pay costs of $122,557.48 to the Jusuf defendants.
After the Singapore jurisdictional decision, Aperchance instructed Indonesian lawyers to make representations to Indonesian government agencies concerning its claim. The respondents asserted that PT Makindo and the Jusuf defendants became aware that Aperchance intended to pursue recovery in Indonesia. According to the respondents, PT Makindo and the Jusuf defendants then embarked on a “media war” to discredit Aperchance and pressure it to drop its Indonesian claim.
Whether or not that characterisation was accurate, PT Makindo published a number of advertisements in Bahasa Indonesia in December 2009 and January 2010 in newspapers including Bisnis Indonesia, Kompas and Kontan. The applicant’s advertisements claimed, among other things, that the Singapore High Court had dismissed Aperchance’s claim following a trial and that the Singapore court’s “verdict” had “permanent legal force”. They also suggested that PT Makindo had no obligation to repay Aperchance and that Aperchance had acknowledged obligations by paying compensation costs.
Aperchance retaliated by placing its own advertisements in the same Indonesian newspapers between 7 and 11 January 2010. Those advertisements asserted that the respondents’ assets/capital were “all over the world” pursuant to the judgment of the Singapore High Court in Suit 1149/2003/H dated 24 November 2003. The applicant later argued that these advertisements were misleading because the worldwide Mareva injunction had already been discharged by Lai J on 27 February 2004.
PT Makindo then sought to escalate the matter through Singapore contempt proceedings. On 18 February 2010, it filed Originating Summons No 190 of 2010 on an ex parte basis for leave to apply for an order of committal for contempt against Aperchance and its directors. Leave was granted on 2 March 2010, and the application was heard on 24 May 2010. A critical issue later arose: PT Makindo did not disclose its own earlier misleading advertisements to the court when seeking leave.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal question was whether the respondents’ Indonesian advertisements amounted to contempt of court, specifically civil contempt, in breach of Singapore court orders made in February 2004. Contempt in this context is not merely about reputational harm or factual inaccuracies; it is about interference with the authority of the court and disobedience of court orders.
Because committal for contempt is a quasi-criminal process, the court had to consider the applicable standard of proof and the proper scope of the applicant’s case. The court emphasised that contempt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that the applicant must confine its grounds to those pleaded in the statement filed under the relevant procedural rule.
In addition, the court had to address whether the applicant’s failure to disclose its own misleading advertisements when obtaining leave affected the court’s approach to the application. While the judgment extract provided does not show the full resolution of this point, it is clear that non-disclosure was treated as a significant procedural and fairness concern.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Tan Lee Meng J began by identifying the statutory and procedural basis for the High Court’s power to punish for contempt. Section 7(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and O 52 r 1 of the Rules of Court confer the power to punish for contempt. The judge then articulated the rationale for contempt jurisdiction: courts exist to settle disputes peacefully and maintain law and order, and their authority must not be imperilled by unjustifiable interference. The court relied on the House of Lords decision in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] 1 AC 273, where Lord Morris explained that suppressing unjustifiable interference is necessary to protect the structure of ordered life.
The court also endorsed the Singapore Court of Appeal’s endorsement of this rationale in Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC and others [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518. This framing is important because it situates contempt not as a tool for private vindication, but as a mechanism to protect the integrity of the judicial process.
Next, the judge addressed the standard of proof. Contempt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, reflecting its criminal character and the possibility of imprisonment. The court cited In re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 128, where Lord Denning MR explained that because a person may be sent to prison, the allegation must be satisfactorily proved to the criminal standard.
Related to this, the court stressed restraint. The power to punish for contempt is draconian and must be exercised sparingly and only in serious cases. This principle was drawn from Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v King-Emperor [1945] 1 AC 264, where Lord Goddard cautioned against using contempt proceedings to suppress merely offensive advocacy rather than serious interference with the administration of justice.
Having set out these principles, the court turned to procedural discipline. Under O 52 r 5(3), except with leave, no grounds may be relied upon at the hearing except those set out in the statement under O 52 r 2(2). This rule ensures that the alleged contemnor is properly informed of the case they must meet and that the court does not decide contempt on unpleaded or shifting grounds.
In the applicant’s statement, PT Makindo alleged that the respondents’ advertisements failed to mention that the worldwide Mareva injunction had been set aside on 27 February 2004. It also alleged that the advertisements did not mention that service of the writ and statement of claim in Suit 1149 had been set aside. The applicant characterised these omissions as “blatant disregard” and “willful disobedience” of the order of 27 February 2004, and as contempt because the advertisements were “utterly untrue” and breached the order requiring service-related steps to be taken.
According to the judgment extract, the court scrutinised whether the applicant’s pleaded case could be sustained on the evidence and whether the respondents’ advertisements, as published, were capable of amounting to contempt of the specific orders made in February 2004. The court also had to consider the factual context: the advertisements were published in Indonesia, and the alleged contempt was tied to the effect of those advertisements on Indonesian authorities and the parties’ positions there.
Finally, the court considered the applicant’s conduct in bringing the application. PT Makindo did not disclose its own earlier misleading advertisements when seeking leave for committal. While the extract does not show the full legal consequences the judge attached to this non-disclosure, it is evident that the court treated it as relevant to the overall fairness and propriety of the contempt application. In contempt proceedings, where the court’s coercive power is engaged, full and frank disclosure is especially important because the applicant is asking the court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed PT Makindo’s application for committal for contempt. The practical effect was that Aperchance and its directors were not punished by committal orders in Singapore for the publication of the Indonesian advertisements.
As noted in the LawNet editorial note, the applicant’s appeal was also unsuccessful: Civil Appeal No 137 of 2010 was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 February 2011 (see [2011] SGCA 19). Thus, the dismissal of the contempt application stood as the final outcome.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how Singapore courts approach contempt applications that arise from media or publicity campaigns, particularly where the alleged interference occurs outside Singapore. While the court recognises the need to protect the authority of the courts, it also insists on strict procedural compliance and evidential discipline. The requirement that contempt be proven beyond reasonable doubt, coupled with the sparing use of committal powers, means that applicants must present a clear and properly pleaded case.
For lawyers, the decision also underscores the importance of the procedural rule limiting reliance to the grounds pleaded in the statement under O 52 r 2(2). Contempt proceedings are not a forum for broad or evolving allegations; the alleged contemnor must know the case they must meet, and the court must decide within the pleaded framework unless leave is granted.
Finally, the judgment highlights the ethical and procedural expectations placed on applicants seeking leave for committal. Non-disclosure of relevant matters—especially matters that bear on the applicant’s own conduct—can undermine the applicant’s position and affect the court’s willingness to grant coercive relief. In practice, this reinforces the need for full and frank disclosure and careful case preparation before invoking the court’s contempt jurisdiction.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 7(1) [CDN] [SSO]
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed), O 52 r 1
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed), O 52 r 2(2)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed), O 52 r 5(3)
Cases Cited
- Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] 1 AC 273
- Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC and others [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518
- In re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 128
- Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v King-Emperor [1945] 1 AC 264
- PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others [2010] SGHC 221
- PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others [2011] SGCA 19
Source Documents
This article analyses [2010] SGHC 221 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.