Case Details
- Citation: [2016] SGCA 14
- Title: Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 09 March 2016
- Case Number: Civil Appeal No 154 of 2015
- Judges: Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA; Tay Yong Kwang J; Quentin Loh J
- Coram: Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA; Tay Yong Kwang J; Quentin Loh J
- Appellant: Lim Mey Lee Susan (Dr Susan Lim Mey Lee)
- Respondent: Singapore Medical Council (SMC)
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs (Taxation)
- Procedural History: Appeal from the High Court decision in Singapore Medical Council v Lim Mey Lee Susan [2015] SGHC 129
- Decision Type: Oral judgment of the court (reserved judgment)
- Counsel for Appellant: Lee Eng Beng SC, Paul Tan and Amy Seow (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)
- Counsel for Respondent: Melanie Ho, Chang Man Phing, Joycelyn Ngiam and Tan Kia Hua (WongPartnership LLP)
- Core Substantive Context: Party-and-party costs payable by the Appellant to the SMC in a Bill of Costs for work done for hearings before two Disciplinary Committees
- Narrow Issue on Appeal: Fees of the second legal assessor (“2nd LA”) to the second Disciplinary Committee (“2nd DC”) appointed by the SMC
- Judgment Length (as provided): 4 pages, 2,028 words
Summary
In Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council [2016] SGCA 14, the Court of Appeal addressed a narrow but practically important costs issue arising from disciplinary proceedings: the reasonableness of the party-and-party costs awarded in respect of the work of the second legal assessor (“2nd LA”) appointed to assist the second Disciplinary Committee (“2nd DC”). The appeal concerned the taxation of costs, specifically the quantum of the 2nd LA’s fees and the level of detail required in the bill of costs and supporting material.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that, on taxation on a standard basis, the starting point is that a paying party should be allowed only a reasonable amount of costs reasonably incurred, with doubts resolved in favour of the paying party. However, the court emphasised that taxation is necessarily granular and context-sensitive. Applying that approach, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court Judge’s decision to allow the full sum claimed for the 2nd LA’s work, finding both the hourly rate and the number of hours to be reasonable in the circumstances of the disciplinary history.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute arose from disciplinary proceedings involving Dr Susan Lim Mey Lee and the Singapore Medical Council (“SMC”). The SMC appointed Disciplinary Committees to conduct inquiries. In the course of these proceedings, legal assessors were appointed to assist the Disciplinary Committees. The costs dispute that reached the Court of Appeal was not about the merits of the disciplinary findings; it was about the party-and-party costs payable by Dr Lim to the SMC after the disciplinary process concluded.
After the High Court decision in Singapore Medical Council v Lim Mey Lee Susan [2015] SGHC 129, Dr Lim appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was deliberately narrow: it focused on the fees charged by the second legal assessor (“2nd LA”) for work done in connection with hearings before the second Disciplinary Committee (“2nd DC”). The 2nd DC was appointed following procedural developments, including the recusal of the first Disciplinary Committee (“1st DC”). The costs in question were rendered in a Bill of Costs for work done for hearings before the two Disciplinary Committees, but the Court of Appeal’s attention was confined to the 2nd LA’s fees for the 2nd DC.
At the taxation stage, the assistant registrar (“AR”) awarded $22,000 in costs against Dr Lim in respect of the 2nd LA’s work. Dr Lim challenged that award, while the SMC defended the reasonableness of its claim. On review, the High Court Judge disagreed with the AR and awarded the full sum claimed for the 2nd LA’s professional charges, which amounted to $235,200 (before GST), plus disbursements and GST. The Court of Appeal then considered whether the High Court Judge was correct to interfere with the AR’s taxation decision.
The record showed that the 2nd LA’s invoice described “professional charges (224 hours at $1,050 per hour)” amounting to $235,200. The invoice also included disbursements subject to GST, and the total bill reflected GST at 7%. Dr Lim’s complaints were directed at (i) the hourly rate used by the AR, (ii) the adequacy of the time allowed for preparatory work, (iii) the sufficiency of particulars in the bill of costs and the invoice, and (iv) the fact that the invoice appeared to cover work beginning before the 2nd DC was formally constituted.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The Court of Appeal identified the central issue as whether the costs allowed for the 2nd LA’s work were reasonable on taxation on a standard basis. This required the court to assess the proper hourly rate and the appropriate number of hours to be allowed for the 2nd LA’s involvement, including preparatory work that may not have directly resulted in the writing of the 2nd DC’s decision.
Second, the court had to consider the level of detail required in a bill of costs and supporting documents. Dr Lim argued that the bill of costs lacked sufficient particulars, particularly regarding disbursements and professional fees. She also challenged the wording used in the 2nd LA’s invoice, including the general phrase “(where necessary)” and the absence of specific counts of internal meetings and telephone calls.
Third, the court addressed a timing-related concern: the 2nd LA’s invoice appeared to cover work from 27 August 2010 to 17 July 2012, while the 2nd DC was formally constituted on 14 September 2010. The question was whether this discrepancy undermined the reasonableness of the costs or suggested that work was improperly claimed.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by restating the governing principles for taxation on a standard basis. It noted that it is settled law that a party should be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred, and that doubts are resolved in favour of the paying party. The court cited O 59 r 27(2 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules”). However, the court also stressed that taxation is not a mechanical exercise. It is granular, fact-sensitive, and context-dependent, meaning that appellate interference with a taxing decision must be approached with care.
On the hourly rate, the AR had effectively applied an hourly rate of $570, which was the rate charged by the first legal assessor (“1st LA”) and which the AR appeared to have taken into account. The Court of Appeal held that this was wrong. The agreed hourly rate for the 2nd LA was $1,050, and both the 1st LA and 2nd LA were Senior Counsel. The court found that the agreed rate of $1,050 was reasonable given the 2nd LA’s seniority. It also relied on correspondence between the parties’ solicitors, including a letter dated 23 May 2014 from the SMC’s solicitors responding to Dr Lim’s request for more information about disbursement items. That letter indicated that the 1st LA had given the SMC a discounted hourly rate rather than his usual charge-out rate.
Dr Lim’s counsel accepted that $1,000 per hour for a Senior Counsel would be reasonable in a solicitor-client context. The SMC’s position was that the 2nd LA was acting as solicitor for the SMC in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Appeal agreed with that characterization and concluded that the agreed rate of $1,050 could not be said to be unreasonable. Importantly, the court rejected any principle that hourly rates should necessarily differ between court work and work performed as a legal assessor. It further observed that the paying party bears the risk of higher hourly rates because the paying party benefits from any lower rates only if they are actually applied.
On the number of hours and preparatory work, the Court of Appeal found that the AR’s figure was too low. The case was complex both legally and factually, and the 2nd LA would therefore have spent substantial time on preparatory work. The AR’s award of $22,000, when analysed on the assumptions that the hourly rate was $570 and that 32 hours were spent in the hearings proper, implied that only 6.6 hours were allowed for preparatory work. The Court of Appeal considered that figure unreasonable, even though the 2nd LA did not assist in writing the 2nd DC’s decision.
The court acknowledged that the AR may have been influenced by a concern that Dr Lim should not bear costs for work that duplicated the work of the 1st DC. However, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court Judge that Dr Lim was liable for costs associated with the recusal of the 1st DC and therefore had to bear the cost of duplicative efforts. This reasoning connected the complexity and procedural history of the disciplinary proceedings with the reasonableness of the time claimed by the 2nd LA.
Turning to the High Court Judge’s review, the Court of Appeal endorsed the Judge’s approach. The Judge had awarded the full sum of $235,200, disagreeing with the AR. The Court of Appeal agreed that the number of hours spent by the 2nd LA was reasonable and that the hourly rate should be $1,050. The court also found it “natural” that the 2nd LA would be conscious of the disciplinary history and would do more work to avert further procedural or legal errors. In that sense, the court treated the disciplinary context as a relevant factor supporting the reasonableness of both time and rate.
The court then addressed Dr Lim’s reservation about the billing period. The 2nd DC was formally constituted on 14 September 2010, but the 2nd LA billed for work from 27 August 2010. The Court of Appeal treated this as an issue of substance rather than form. It found that hardly any work was done during the period before formal constitution. The court relied on what transpired at the first Pre-Inquiry Conference held on 24 September 2010, ten days after the 2nd DC was formally constituted. At that conference, the 2nd LA decided to maintain an information barrier until it was decided that the disciplinary inquiry should proceed, and declined to receive material from either party. In the absence of material, the court reasoned that hardly any work could have been done. The invoice’s starting date was likely the date the 2nd LA was first approached by the SMC to act as legal assessor, rather than the date substantive work began.
On the sufficiency of particulars, Dr Lim criticised the bill of costs as lacking particulars for legal professionals and disbursement items. The Court of Appeal held that the bill of costs accorded with procedural rules and practice. It accepted that it is permissible to state the 2nd LA’s fees as a disbursement item without elaboration. However, when the paying party requests particulars or proof, the claiming party should furnish reasonable particulars. The SMC’s solicitors had done so by providing correspondence dated 23 May 2014 stating the agreed hourly rate and reproducing the particulars in the 2nd LA’s invoice dated 16 September 2013. The court observed that it would have been equally acceptable for the SMC to provide a copy of the 2nd LA’s invoice, because the invoice contained sufficient particulars for assessing reasonableness.
Dr Lim also challenged the phrase “(where necessary)” in the invoice, arguing that it did not specify when the 2nd LA found it necessary to do the described work. The Court of Appeal rejected this as an overly literal reading. It explained that the phrase was a general term covering the myriad occasions when documents had to be reviewed, telephone calls made or answered, and research conducted to deal with issues that arose. The court considered it unduly onerous to require the assessor to record each such occasion in detail.
Finally, Dr Lim relied on Order 59 Appendix 1 para 2(2) of the Rules, which provides that for attendances, telephone conversations and correspondence, it shall be sufficient to state only the number of such attendances, telephone calls and correspondence, and where possible, the total number of hours. The Court of Appeal held that this paragraph applies to a bill of costs, not to invoices within a bill of costs. It also explained that the provision was introduced to simplify bills of costs by abolishing the practice of listing each meeting, call, and letter, which added little value to the taxing registrar’s discretion while increasing work and costs. While the 2nd LA could have stated the number of internal meetings attended, the court held that this should not be a critical factor in assessing overall reasonableness, because the taxing registrar had enough material and could apply the non-exhaustive factors in O 59 Appendix 1 para 1(2).
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Dr Lim’s appeal. It upheld the High Court Judge’s decision to allow the full sum of $235,200 in respect of the 2nd LA’s professional charges, subject to the usual consequential orders. The practical effect was that Dr Lim remained liable for the costs assessed at the higher level rather than the lower $22,000 awarded by the AR.
The court indicated that it would hear the parties on costs of the appeal, applying the standard approach to consequential costs following dismissal.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how appellate courts should approach taxation disputes involving professional fees of legal assessors in disciplinary contexts. Although the appeal was narrow, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning provides guidance on the proper evaluation of hourly rates, the allowance of preparatory time, and the relevance of procedural history to assessing reasonableness.
First, the case reinforces that taxation is not a purely arithmetic exercise. Even where a paying party argues that costs are duplicative or that time should be reduced, the court will examine the complexity of the matter and the procedural reasons why additional work was required. The court’s acceptance that the 2nd LA would do more work to avert further errors highlights the importance of context in costs assessment.
Second, the decision offers practical guidance on particulars. It confirms that bills of costs may state legal professionals’ fees as disbursements without extensive elaboration, but that reasonable particulars should be provided when requested. It also demonstrates the limits of strict pleading-like scrutiny of invoices: general wording such as “(where necessary)” will not automatically defeat a claim, and the absence of granular counts of internal meetings or telephone calls will not necessarily render the costs unreasonable, especially where the Rules aim to simplify taxation.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 59 r 27(2)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 59 Appendix 1 para 1(2)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 59 Appendix 1 para 2(2)
Cases Cited
- Singapore Medical Council v Lim Mey Lee Susan [2015] SGHC 129
- Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council [2016] SGCA 14
Source Documents
This article analyses [2016] SGCA 14 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.