Liew Michael Marcus v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2024] SGHC 4

Case Details

• Citation: [2024] SGHC 4
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 11 January 2024
• Coram: Vincent Hoong J
• Case Number: Magistrate’s Appeal Nos 9024, 9025, 9026, 9027 and 9028 of 2020
• Hearing Date(s): 19 July, 15, 23 November 2023
• Appellants: Michael Marcus Liew; Cheo Lye Choon; Tok Meng Chong; Ng Wan Seng; Chan Hui Yi Regina
• Respondent: Public Prosecutor
• Counsel for Appellants: Tan Joon Liang Josephus and Cory Wong Guo Yean (Invictus Law Corporation) for Michael Marcus Liew and Cheo Lye Choon; Wee Heng Yi Adrian and Lynette Chang Huay Qin (Lighthouse Law LLC) for Tok Meng Chong; Sunil Sudheesan, Ngiam Hian Theng Diana and Khoo Hui-Hui Joyce (Quahe Woo & Palmer LLC) for Ng Wan Seng; Tanaya Shekhar Kinjavdekar (Trident Law Corporation) for Chan Hui Yi Regina
• Counsel for Respondent: Yang Ziliang and Zhou Yang (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
• Practice Areas: Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Sentencing

Summary

The decision in Liew Michael Marcus v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2024] SGHC 4 serves as a critical appellate clarification on the evidentiary threshold required to establish a "common object" in the context of unlawful assembly and rioting under the Penal Code. The case arose from a series of physical altercations in a carpark involving five appellants and four victims. While the lower court had convicted all five appellants of rioting under Section 147 of the Penal Code, the High Court set aside these convictions, finding that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants shared a singular, cohesive common object to cause hurt to all four victims named in the charge.

The central doctrinal contribution of this judgment lies in its granular analysis of how a common object is formed and maintained during a fast-moving, multi-party incident. Vincent Hoong J emphasized that the mere fact of being friends and being present at a scene of violence does not automatically translate into a shared criminal purpose for every act of violence committed by individual members of the group. The court meticulously deconstructed the three distinct clusters of violence that occurred across different parking lots, concluding that these were spontaneous, separate incidents rather than a coordinated group attack. This distinction is vital for practitioners when dealing with "group" charges where the specific involvement of each accused person varies across multiple victims.

Furthermore, the High Court exercised its corrective jurisdiction under Section 390(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code to frame altered charges of voluntarily causing hurt under Section 323. This move ensured that while the appellants were acquitted of the more serious rioting charge, they remained accountable for the specific acts of violence they were proven to have committed. The judgment also provides significant guidance on the treatment of expert psychiatric evidence in intoxication defenses, reaffirming the principle that an accused person’s self-reported state of mind to an expert long after the event carries limited weight compared to contemporaneous objective evidence of their behavior.

Ultimately, the High Court's decision underscores the necessity for the Prosecution to align the framing of charges precisely with the evidence of collective intent. By setting aside the rioting convictions and substituting them with individual hurt charges, the court reinforced the principle that criminal liability must be commensurate with the specific culpability of each individual, particularly in chaotic environments where "commonality" of purpose cannot be easily inferred from proximity alone.

Timeline of Events

1. 30 April 2017: The five appellants (Michael, Lye Choon, Meng Chong, Wan Seng, and Regina) meet at Frienzie Bar and Bistro for an evening of social drinking.
2. 1 May 2017 (Early Hours): The appellants and the four victims (Maureen, George, Daniel, and Sreelatha) leave the bar separately.
3. 1 May 2017 (Approx. 03:00 - 04:00): A series of physical altercations occur at an open carpark near the bar involving various combinations of the appellants and victims.
4. 15 May 2017: Initial investigations and statements are recorded following the incident.
5. 4 January 2019: The trial commences in the State Courts before a District Judge.
6. 25 October 2019: The District Judge delivers the verdict, convicting all five appellants of the rioting charge under Section 147 of the Penal Code.
7. 16 February 2021: Dr Tan Sheng Neng prepares a psychiatric report for Michael Marcus Liew regarding his state of intoxication during the incident.
8. 21 May 2021: The High Court orders a remittal to the District Court for the limited purpose of taking further evidence from Dr Tan and a Prosecution expert.
9. 31 January 2022: The remittal hearing concludes in the District Court.
10. 21 June 2023: The High Court resumes the hearing of the appeals against conviction and sentence.
11. 11 January 2024: The High Court delivers its judgment, allowing the appeals against the rioting conviction and substituting altered charges.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The incident took place in the early hours of 1 May 2017 at an open carpark (the "Carpark") located near Frienzie Bar and Bistro. The five appellants—Michael Marcus Liew ("Michael"), Cheo Lye Choon ("Lye Choon"), Tok Meng Chong ("Meng Chong"), Ng Wan Seng ("Wan Seng"), and Chan Hui Yi Regina ("Regina")—had spent the preceding evening drinking at the bar. The four victims—Maureen Baricautro Mamucod ("Maureen"), G K Karunan George ("George"), K Amuthan Daniel ("Daniel"), and Sreelatha Thankamaniamma ("Sreelatha")—were also patrons of the same establishment. The parties were not known to each other prior to the night in question.

The violence was not a single, unified brawl but rather a sequence of three distinct clusters of physical confrontation spread across different locations within the Carpark. The first cluster occurred near Lot 42, where Michael engaged in a confrontation with Daniel. This initial spark appeared to be spontaneous, triggered by Michael's state of intoxication and a perceived slight. During this encounter, Michael physically assaulted Daniel, causing him minor injuries. At this stage, the other four appellants were not actively involved in the assault on Daniel, though they were present in the general vicinity of the Carpark.

The second cluster of violence shifted to Lot 55, involving a confrontation between Michael, Lye Choon, and George. George observed Wan Seng retrieving a black baton (the "baton") from a blue van (the "Van") parked at Lot 55. While Wan Seng retrieved the weapon, the primary physical assault on George was carried out by Michael and Lye Choon. George was subjected to punches and kicks. The Prosecution alleged that this was a continuation of the "riot," but the defense argued that this was a separate dispute arising from George's attempt to intervene or protect his vehicle after Michael had kicked it.

The third cluster of violence took place near Lot 57 and Lot 58, involving the female victims, Maureen and Sreelatha. In this instance, the primary aggressors were Meng Chong, Wan Seng, and Regina. Maureen and Sreelatha were assaulted as they attempted to leave the scene or assist the other victims. Wan Seng was noted to have used the baton during this phase of the incident. Crucially, the evidence showed that while Michael and Lye Choon were occupied at Lot 55/42, the other three appellants were engaged at Lot 57/58. There was no clear evidence of communication or a coordinated plan between the two sub-groups to target all four victims simultaneously or sequentially.

The procedural history was complex. The District Judge originally convicted all five of rioting, finding that they formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of causing hurt to the four victims. On appeal, Michael raised a defense of intoxication, supported by a report from Dr Tan Sheng Neng, which led to a remittal for further evidence. The District Judge, in the remittal grounds (Public Prosecutor v Michael Marcus Liew and others [2023] SGDC 6), maintained that the intoxication did not negate the necessary intent and that the psychiatric evidence was not cogent enough to disturb the original findings of fact.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The appeals turned on three primary legal pivots, each requiring a deep examination of the intersection between group liability and individual criminal acts.

• The Requirement of a Common Object: Whether the District Judge erred in finding that the five appellants shared a common object to voluntarily cause hurt to all four victims. This required the court to determine if the three clusters of violence were sufficiently linked by a "community of purpose" to satisfy the definition of an unlawful assembly under Section 141 of the Penal Code.
• The Defense of Intoxication: Whether Michael and Lye Choon were so intoxicated that they were incapable of forming the specific intention to cause hurt, and whether the District Judge erred in rejecting the expert psychiatric evidence provided by Dr Tan Sheng Neng.
• The Exercise of Appellate Power to Alter Charges: Whether, upon finding the rioting charge unsustainable, the High Court should acquit the appellants entirely or exercise its power under Section 390(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code to frame altered charges for the specific acts of hurt proven by the evidence.

These issues were framed against the backdrop of the Prosecution's decision to charge all five appellants with a single count of rioting, rather than individual charges of hurt. This strategic choice by the Prosecution meant that the entire case for rioting stood or fell on the existence of a shared common object encompassing all victims named in the charge.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The High Court’s analysis began with a rigorous examination of the "common object" element of Section 141 of the Penal Code. Vincent Hoong J noted that the existence of a common object is a question of fact to be inferred from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case, citing Lim Thiam Hor and another v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 SLR(R) 758 and Pannirselvam s/o Anthonisamy v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 784. The court observed at [84]:

"(a) The existence of a common object is a question of fact which must be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case; (b) A common object can be formed at any time, even after an assembly has come together for a lawful purpose; and (c) It is not necessary for every member of the unlawful assembly to commit an overt act in furtherance of the common object."

However, the court found that the District Judge had over-extended these principles. The evidence demonstrated that the violence was fragmented. Michael’s initial assault on Daniel at Lot 42 was a "frolic of his own" triggered by his intoxication. There was no evidence that the other four appellants even knew Michael was assaulting Daniel at that specific moment, let alone shared a purpose to cause him hurt. Similarly, the assault on George at Lot 55 involved only Michael and Lye Choon. While Wan Seng was present and retrieved a baton, the court found no evidence that Meng Chong or Regina were involved in or even aware of the specifics of the assault on George. The third cluster at Lots 57 and 58, involving the female victims, appeared to be a separate escalation involving Meng Chong, Wan Seng, and Regina.

The court emphasized that for a rioting charge to stick, the common object must be shared by at least five persons. If the group of five did not share the same common object regarding all the victims listed in the charge, the charge as framed must fail. The court held at [90] that "the evidence did not support a finding that there had been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims." The incidents were spontaneous and lacked the "community of purpose" required to transform separate acts of hurt into a singular riot.

Regarding the intoxication defense, the court applied the high threshold established in Teo Ghim Heng v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1240. Michael and Lye Choon argued that their high blood-alcohol level (estimated by Dr Tan) meant they lacked the capacity to form intent. The court rejected this, noting that an accused person is often not the best source of information regarding their own state of mind during a blackout. The court preferred the objective evidence: the appellants were able to navigate the carpark, engage in verbal altercations, and perform physical acts like kicking a car and retrieving a baton. These actions indicated a functioning mind capable of forming the basic intent to cause hurt. The court affirmed the District Judge's rejection of Dr Tan’s report, noting that it relied too heavily on Michael’s self-serving post-facto accounts.

Finally, the court turned to the power to alter charges. The Prosecution urged the court to use Section 390(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court cited [2021] SGCA 91, which states that the power to alter charges on appeal should be exercised to prevent a miscarriage of justice where the evidence clearly supports a lesser or different offense. The court found that while the "common object" for rioting was not proven, the individual acts of hurt were undeniable. Consequently, the court framed altered charges under Section 323 and Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, tailored to each appellant's specific proven actions.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court allowed the appeals against the conviction for rioting. The operative order was stated at [7]:

"I allowed the appellants’ appeal against conviction in relation to each of their charges under s 147 of the Penal Code. The appellants’ convictions and sentences in relation to the charge under s 147 of the Penal Code were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted of their respective charge under s 147 of the Penal Code."

However, the court immediately exercised its power to convict the appellants on altered charges. The disposition was as follows:

• Michael Marcus Liew: Convicted of two altered charges under Section 323 for the assaults on Daniel and George. Sentenced to fines of $5,000 and $4,000 respectively (Total: $9,000).
• Cheo Lye Choon: Convicted of one altered charge under Section 323 for the assault on George. Sentenced to a fine of $4,000.
• Tok Meng Chong: Convicted of one altered charge under Section 323 read with Section 34 for the assault on Maureen and Sreelatha. Sentenced to a fine of $5,000.
• Ng Wan Seng: Convicted of one altered charge under Section 323 read with Section 34 for the assault on Maureen and Sreelatha. Due to the use of a baton, he received a higher fine of $7,000.
• Chan Hui Yi Regina: Convicted of two altered charges under Section 323 for the assaults on Maureen and Sreelatha. Sentenced to fines of $3,000 for each charge (Total: $6,000).

The court determined that fines were the appropriate sentencing tool given the relatively minor nature of the injuries sustained by the victims and the fact that the more serious rioting charge had been set aside. The voluntary intoxication of the appellants was treated as an aggravating factor in determining the quantum of the fines, in line with Public Prosecutor v Satesh s/o Navarlan [2019] SGHC 119.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is a landmark for practitioners dealing with group-based violence and the complexities of "common object" liability. It serves as a cautionary tale for the Prosecution regarding the "all-or-nothing" risk of framing a single rioting charge for a series of fragmented incidents. If the Prosecution cannot prove that all members of the group shared a common object toward all victims, the rioting charge is fundamentally flawed. This judgment reinforces the need for more precise charging—perhaps multiple counts of hurt or smaller group charges—where the evidence of a unified purpose is thin.

Doctrinally, the case clarifies that "spontaneity" can be the enemy of "common object." While a common object can form in an instant, it still requires a meeting of minds. In chaotic carpark brawls where parties are separated by distance and different targets, the court will not easily infer a collective intent. This protects individuals from being held liable for the more serious offense of rioting simply because they were part of a group where some members committed violence that others did not intend or even witness.

The treatment of the intoxication defense is also significant. By rejecting the psychiatric report of Dr Tan, the court reaffirmed that medical expertise cannot override common-sense observations of an accused's purposeful behavior. This sets a very high bar for the "capacity to form intent" defense, suggesting that as long as an accused can perform coordinated physical acts, a claim of "alcoholic blackout" will rarely succeed in negating mens rea for simple hurt.

Finally, the extensive use of Section 390(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code demonstrates the High Court's commitment to substantive justice. The court refused to let the appellants walk free despite the Prosecution's failure on the rioting charge, using its appellate powers to ensure that the proven acts of violence were still punished. This provides a clear roadmap for how appellate courts can "fix" over-charged cases without requiring a full retrial.

Practice Pointers

• Precision in Charging: When dealing with multiple victims and multiple perpetrators, the Prosecution should consider whether the evidence supports a single "common object" or whether separate charges for each incident would be more robust against appellate scrutiny.
• Deconstructing Common Object: Defense counsel should meticulously map out the physical locations and timing of each assault. If the accused was at "Lot A" while a co-accused was at "Lot B," the argument for a shared common object is significantly weakened.
• Expert Evidence Limitations: Psychiatric reports on intoxication must be grounded in objective, contemporaneous evidence. Reports based solely on the accused's later recollections are likely to be given minimal weight, especially if they contradict the accused's observed physical coordination at the scene.
• Invoking Section 390(4) CPC: Practitioners should be prepared to argue for or against the framing of altered charges if the primary charge appears shaky. This requires a thorough understanding of the evidence already on record to ensure the "new" charges are supported.
• Intoxication as Aggravation: Even if intoxication is used as a defense to negate intent, practitioners must remember that under Singapore law, voluntary intoxication is almost always an aggravating factor for sentencing if the defense fails.
• Sentencing for Group Hurt: In cases where rioting is reduced to hurt, the court will look at the specific role of each individual. The use of a weapon (like the baton in this case) will lead to a significantly higher sentence even within the same group of offenders.

Subsequent Treatment

As a 2024 decision, Liew Michael Marcus is currently a leading authority on the limits of "common object" in spontaneous group violence. It has been cited for its pragmatic application of Section 390(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code and its reinforcement of the principle that rioting requires a cohesive, shared intent among at least five persons that extends to all aspects of the charged common object.

Legislation Referenced

• Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), Sections 34, 141, 147, 323, 324
• Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed), Sections 353, 390(4), 390(6), 390(8)(a), 392
• Protection from Harassment Act (Cap 256A, 2015 Rev Ed), Section 6(3)

Cases Cited

• Applied / Followed:
  • Lim Thiam Hor and another v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 SLR(R) 758
  • Pannirselvam s/o Anthonisamy v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 784
  • Imran bin Mohd Arip v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2021] SGCA 91
  • Teo Ghim Heng v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1240
  • Public Prosecutor v Satesh s/o Navarlan [2019] SGHC 119
• Considered / Referred to:
  • Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489
  • Public Prosecutor v Michael Marcus Liew and others [2020] SGDC 104
  • Public Prosecutor v Michael Marcus Liew and others [2023] SGDC 6
  • Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed Hanib v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2022] SGHC 101
  • Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen [2018] 2 SLR 249
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505
  • Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299
  • Wong Tian Jun De Beers v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 805
  • GDC v Public Prosecutor [2020] 5 SLR 1130
  • Low Song Chye v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 5 SLR 526
  • Chung Wan v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 858
  • Arumugam Selvaraj v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 881

Source Documents

• Original judgment PDF: Download (PDF, hosted on Legal Wires CDN)
• Official eLitigation record: View on elitigation.sg