Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 39
- Title: Kishor Kumar A/L Raguan v Public Prosecutor
- Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Motion)
- Case Number: Court of Appeal / Criminal Motion No 20 of 2025
- Date of Judgment: 30 July 2025
- Judges: Tay Yong Kwang JCA
- Applicant: Kishor Kumar A/L Raguan (“Mr Kishor”)
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor (“PP”)
- Procedural Posture: Application under s 60G of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) for permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC permission”); application for stay of execution
- Legal Area(s): Criminal procedure; capital punishment; stay of execution; post-appeal applications; service requirements
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”); Rules of Court 2021; Criminal Procedure Code (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”); Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (as amended/2020 Rev Ed); Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (Act 41 of 2022) (context); Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (background to conviction)
- Regulations Referenced: Criminal Procedure Code (Service on Singapore Prison Service for Application relating to Stay of Execution) Regulations 2024
- Key Provisions: SCJA ss 60F, 60G, 60L; CPC s 313(1)(ia)(ii); Regulation 2 of the 2024 Regulations; Rules of Court 2021 O 24A r 1(3)(a)
- Judgment Length: 19 pages, 4,949 words
Summary
This Court of Appeal decision concerns an urgent application by a prisoner awaiting capital punishment (“PACP”) for a stay of execution scheduled for the same day. Mr Kishor sought (i) permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC permission”) and (ii) a stay of execution, relying on the statutory framework in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). The application was filed after office hours and, critically, after the “relevant date” (the date of dismissal of his appeal by the Court of Appeal on 11 October 2022).
The Court treated the matter as an application for PACC permission notwithstanding procedural defects in how it was commenced. However, it also addressed a further procedural issue: whether the application had been properly served on the Singapore Prison Service in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code (Service on Singapore Prison Service for Application relating to Stay of Execution) Regulations 2024. The Prosecution verified that personal service on the Singapore Prison Service had not been effected by 6 p.m. on 29 July 2025. While the Court acknowledged that the breach could have “drastic consequences”, it proceeded to consider the merits given the extreme urgency of the application.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Mr Kishor was convicted in the High Court (HC/CC 2/2020) of trafficking in granular/powdery substance containing not less than 36.05 grammes of diamorphine, an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). The conviction followed a joint trial with his co-accused, Mr Pung Ah Kiang, who was charged with possession for the purposes of trafficking. The undisputed factual core was that Mr Kishor delivered the drugs to Mr Pung near Mr Pung’s home on 29 July 2016, and that Mr Kishor’s DNA was found on the drugs.
At trial, Mr Kishor advanced two defences. First, he claimed he believed he was delivering “ice” or other decorative “stones”, rather than diamorphine. Second, he argued that the Prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the drugs. The trial judge rejected both defences. The judge found that the elements of trafficking were made out, including knowledge of the nature of the drugs (or, alternatively, failure to rebut the statutory presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA). The judge also found that the chain of custody was established, and that Mr Kishor’s admitted act of delivery supported the trafficking finding.
Because the Prosecution did not issue Mr Kishor a certificate of substantive assistance under s 33B(2)(b) of the MDA, the death sentence was mandatory. Mr Pung, by contrast, received a certificate of substantive assistance and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Mr Kishor appealed against both conviction and sentence, but the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal in CA/CCA 4/2022 on 11 October 2022. The Court of Appeal affirmed that there was no viable basis to challenge the knowledge element, and it also rejected the chain of custody argument. The Court emphasised the evidential significance of Mr Kishor’s DNA on the bundles.
After his appeal was dismissed, Mr Kishor did not submit a clemency petition to the President. Instead, he and other PACPs made multiple post-appeal applications. These included constitutional challenges to provisions introduced by the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (Act 41 of 2022) and challenges to aspects of legal aid administration for capital offences. The present decision, however, is focused on a narrow procedural and remedial question: whether the Court should grant permission for a post-appeal application and, consequentially, a stay of execution on the scheduled date.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was statutory and procedural: whether Mr Kishor could obtain “PACC permission” under s 60G of the SCJA, given that his application was made after the “relevant date” (11 October 2022). Under the SCJA framework, a PACP must apply to the Court of Appeal for permission before making a post-appeal application for a stay of execution. The Court had to determine whether it should entertain the application despite non-compliance with the prescribed mode of commencement.
The second key issue concerned service and timing. The Court identified a further procedural requirement under s 313(1)(ia)(ii) of the CPC, read with Regulation 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Service on Singapore Prison Service for Application relating to Stay of Execution) Regulations 2024. The Regulations require personal service on the Singapore Prison Service by delivering a copy of the application personally to an officer, not later than 6 p.m. on the day immediately before the scheduled execution date. The Prosecution contended there was a breach because no such personal service had been effected by the deadline.
Finally, the Court had to decide whether, notwithstanding procedural defects, it should consider the application on its merits and whether a stay of execution should be granted. This required the Court to balance the strictness of procedural safeguards against the practical reality that execution dates are fixed and that last-minute applications can have irreversible consequences.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by setting out the statutory architecture governing post-appeal applications in capital cases. The SCJA provides that a stay of execution may only be granted by the Court of Appeal. It also provides that a PACP who wishes to make a post-appeal application for a stay must first obtain permission from the Court of Appeal under s 60G. The Court treated the present application as a PACC permission application, even though it was commenced as a Criminal Motion under the Criminal Procedure Code rather than by an originating application under O 24A r 1(3)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021. The Court’s willingness to overlook procedural defects was expressly linked to the extreme urgency of the application and the fact that execution was scheduled for that day.
In doing so, the Court effectively adopted a pragmatic approach: it did not condone non-compliance, but it recognised that rigid adherence to formality could defeat the purpose of the statutory permission mechanism in a time-sensitive capital context. The Court also noted that, under s 60G(2), an application for PACC permission may be heard and determined by a single Judge of the Court of Appeal. This clarified the procedural competence of the Court to hear the matter urgently.
The Court then addressed the second procedural defect: non-compliance with the service requirement on the Singapore Prison Service. The Court directed the parties to address this in written submissions and identified the relevant statutory and regulatory framework. Regulation 2 of the 2024 Regulations requires personal service by 6 p.m. on the day immediately before the execution date, with specific labelling of the envelope and delivery to a specified address. The Prosecution verified with the Singapore Prisons Service that personal service had not been effected by the deadline.
Mr Kishor’s counsel candidly admitted that he was not aware of Regulation 2 at the material time and apologised. Counsel stated that he was in the process of serving the court papers on the Singapore Prisons Service. He argued, however, that s 313(1)(ia)(ii) of the CPC merely states that the warrant of execution may be carried out if there is non-compliance, rather than requiring that it must be carried out. On that basis, counsel submitted that the breach was procedural and that the Court should still consider the application on its merits.
The Court accepted that the breach could be characterised as procedural, but it emphasised the potential for “drastic consequences”. This is a crucial analytical point: the Court treated the service requirement not as a mere technicality, but as a safeguard designed to ensure that the prison authorities are promptly informed of applications that could affect the execution process. At the same time, the Court proceeded to deal with the merits due to the urgency, indicating that procedural non-compliance would be weighed in the overall context rather than automatically determining the application.
Although the provided extract truncates the remainder of the judgment, the structure and the Court’s stated approach indicate that the Court’s analysis would have proceeded from (i) jurisdiction and admissibility (including permission), to (ii) whether a stay should be granted on the merits, and then to (iii) costs. The Court explicitly stated that it would return to the procedural breach when addressing costs at the end of the judgment. This suggests that, while the breach was relevant, it did not necessarily foreclose substantive consideration of the application.
What Was the Outcome?
The extract indicates that the Court was prepared to overlook certain procedural defects in order to hear the application immediately, given that execution was scheduled for that day. The Court also proceeded to consider the merits despite the admitted breach of the service requirement on the Singapore Prison Service. The decision therefore reflects a balancing exercise: procedural safeguards are important, but the Court will not allow last-minute capital applications to be defeated solely by technical non-compliance where execution is imminent.
However, the Court also signalled that the breach would be addressed in relation to costs. In practical terms, even if a stay is granted or the application is entertained, failure to comply with service requirements may expose the applicant to adverse costs consequences. For PACPs and counsel, the decision underscores that compliance with the statutory and regulatory steps is not optional, particularly where execution dates are fixed and the Court’s tolerance for procedural defects may be limited by urgency.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters because it clarifies how the Court of Appeal will manage the intersection of (i) the SCJA’s permission-based framework for post-appeal applications in capital cases and (ii) the CPC and 2024 Regulations’ service requirements designed to ensure operational readiness of the Singapore Prison Service. For practitioners, it demonstrates that the Court may treat certain procedural missteps as curable or forgivable in the face of extreme urgency, but it also makes clear that such missteps carry serious consequences.
From a doctrinal perspective, the decision reinforces that the SCJA’s capital-case procedural regime is tightly structured: permission is a statutory gatekeeping requirement, and stays can only be granted by the Court of Appeal. At the same time, the Court’s approach suggests that the Court will not let formal commencement defects (such as using the wrong procedural vehicle) automatically prevent substantive review where the statutory purpose would otherwise be undermined.
For capital defence counsel, the most practical lesson is compliance with service requirements. The Court’s emphasis that the breach could have “drastic consequences” indicates that future applicants should treat Regulation 2 service as a hard deadline with operational significance. Even if the Court is willing to consider merits in exceptional circumstances, counsel should not assume that the Court will always overlook non-compliance. The decision also highlights the importance of being fully conversant with newly introduced procedural regulations, particularly those that affect execution logistics.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), including ss 60F, 60G, 60L
- Rules of Court 2021, O 24A r 1(3)(a)
- Criminal Procedure Code (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), including s 313(1)(ia)(ii)
- Criminal Procedure Code (Service on Singapore Prison Service for Application relating to Stay of Execution) Regulations 2024, including Regulation 2
- Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (Act 41 of 2022) (context for introduction of SCJA provisions)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (background to conviction and mandatory death sentence framework)
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (as referenced in metadata)
Cases Cited
- Public Prosecution v Kishor Kumar a/l Raguan and another [2022] SGHC 27
- Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 4 SLR 331
- Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414
- [2025] SGHC 20
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 39 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.