Case Details
- Citation: [2024] SGCA 36
- Title: Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General and another and another appeal
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 25 September 2024
- Judgment Reserved: 18 September 2024
- Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Judith Prakash SJ
- Appellants: Theodoros Kassimatis KC; Edward Fitzgerald KC
- Respondents: Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore; Law Society of Singapore
- Procedural History (High Court): Dismissal of ad hoc admission applications and ruling on a preliminary objection in Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General and another and another matter [2024] SGHC 24
- Appeals: Court of Appeal — Civil Appeals Nos 16 and 17 of 2024
- Originating Applications: Originating Application No 696 of 2023 (for Mr Kassimatis KC); Originating Application No 811 of 2023 (for Mr Fitzgerald KC)
- Statutory Basis: Section 15 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA)
- Underlying Matters: Civil appeal and related summons concerning convicted persons charged under the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA), including CA/CA 2/2023 and CA/SUM 16/2023
- Legal Area: Legal Profession — Admission (ad hoc admission)
- Key Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act 1966 (including ss 15, 33, 34); Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed)
- Cases Cited: [2002] 1 SLR(R) 751 (Re Nicholas William Henric QC and another application); [2018] SGHC 207; [2021] SGHC 154; [2022] SGHC 291; [2024] SGHC 24; [2024] SGCA 36
- Judgment Length: 20 pages, 5,720 words
Summary
In Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General ([2024] SGCA 36), the Court of Appeal considered a narrow but practically important question for foreign counsel seeking admission to practise in Singapore: whether a person applying for ad hoc admission under s 15 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA) may address the court on the merits of his or her own application before being admitted.
The appellants, King’s Counsel from England (Mr Theodoros Kassimatis KC and Mr Edward Fitzgerald KC), applied for ad hoc admission so that they could represent accused persons in specific civil proceedings arising from drug-related criminal convictions. The Attorney-General and the Law Society objected. The High Court dismissed the applications and held that the applicants were not entitled to address the court on their own ad hoc admission applications. On appeal, the Court of Appeal addressed only the preliminary objection—whether the applicants could address the court in the ad hoc admission proceedings—and upheld the High Court’s approach.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellants were appointed Queen’s Counsel in England—Mr Kassimatis KC in March 2017 and Mr Fitzgerald KC in January 1995. Following the death of Queen Elizabeth II, their designations were automatically changed to King’s Counsel on 8 September 2022. Although they were senior advocates in their home jurisdiction, they were not yet admitted to practise as advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore.
The underlying substantive context involved four accused persons (the “Claimants”) who had been convicted at trial and sentenced to suffer the death penalty for offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA). Their criminal appeals were dismissed. After the conclusion of the criminal process, the Claimants pursued civil proceedings challenging the compatibility of ss 18(1) and 18(2) of the MDA with the presumption of innocence and the Constitution.
One such civil application, HC/OA 480/2022 (“OA 480”), was dismissed by the General Division of the High Court in Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed and others v Attorney-General [2022] SGHC 291. The Claimants then appealed to the Court of Appeal in CA/CA 2/2023 (“CA 2”). However, CA 2 was deemed withdrawn due to failure to file required documents in time. The Claimants sought reinstatement and an extension of time via CA/SUM 8/2023 (“SUM 8”), which was dismissed by a single judge in Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed and others v Attorney-General [2023] 1 SLR 1437 (“Jumaat (SUM 8)”).
Subsequently, on 6 June 2023, the Claimants filed CA/SUM 16/2023 (“SUM 16”) seeking reconsideration by the full Court of Appeal and asking that CA 2 be reinstated. It was in this procedural setting that the appellants sought ad hoc admission under s 15 of the LPA: on 11 July 2023, Mr Kassimatis KC filed HC/OA 696/2023 (“OA 696”) to act for certain Claimants in relation to CA 2 and SUM 16; and on 11 August 2023, Mr Fitzgerald KC filed HC/OA 811/2023 (“OA 811”) to act for other Claimants in relation to the same matters.
In OA 696, Mr Kassimatis KC sought ad hoc admission to act for Jumaat and Saminathan. OA 696 was later amended to remove Mr Fitzgerald KC as an applicant, following the court’s direction. Mr Fitzgerald KC then brought his own separate application (OA 811). The Attorney-General and the Law Society objected to both applications. A preliminary issue arose as to whether the applicants could address the court on their own ad hoc admission applications, given that they were not yet admitted to practise in Singapore.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue on appeal concerned the scope of a statutory exception to the general prohibition on unauthorised persons acting as advocates and solicitors. Specifically, the appellants relied on s 34(1)(e) of the LPA, which provides that s 33 does not extend to “any person acting personally for himself or herself only in any matter or proceeding to which he or she is a party”. The question was whether an applicant for ad hoc admission under s 15 could be regarded as “acting personally” for himself or herself “only” in the relevant “matter or proceeding”.
Related to this was the proper interpretation of earlier authority, particularly Re Nicholas William Henric QC and another application [2002] 1 SLR(R) 751 (“Re Henric”). In Re Henric, the High Court had discussed the ability of a QC (who was not yet admitted) to affirm affidavits and address the court in certain contexts, and it had referenced the LPA’s provisions on acting in person. The appellants argued that Re Henric supported their right to address the court on the merits of their own ad hoc admission applications.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the High Court was correct to hold that the appellants were not entitled to address the court on their own applications, because they were seeking admission not for their own legal interests but to represent others in the underlying proceedings.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal approached the preliminary objection by focusing on the statutory architecture of the LPA. Section 33 criminalises unauthorised persons who act as advocates or solicitors, including by commencing or defending proceedings in the name of another person, and by drawing or preparing documents relating to proceedings. Section 34 then carves out limited exceptions. The appellants’ argument depended on s 34(1)(e), which permits a person to act personally for himself or herself only in matters or proceedings to which he or she is a party.
The High Court had held that the appellants did not fall within s 34(1)(e) because they were not acting for their own interests; they were seeking ad hoc admission to act for the Claimants. The Court of Appeal, in considering the preliminary objection, treated this as a question of statutory purpose and proper characterisation of the applicant’s role in the ad hoc admission process. The court’s reasoning proceeded from the idea that ad hoc admission is a regulated gateway: it is designed to ensure that only those who satisfy the statutory criteria are permitted to practise, and it is not meant to be treated as an open forum where an applicant can argue for permission to practise while still unauthorised.
In analysing Re Henric, the Court of Appeal endorsed the High Court’s reading that Re Henric did not stand for a general proposition that an applicant for ad hoc admission may address the court on the merits of his or her own application. The High Court had emphasised that Re Henric’s discussion was context-specific: it concerned how a QC could affirm an affidavit and address the court in the particular procedural setting before the court, and it did not purport to confer a right for an applicant for admission to make submissions in the admission proceeding itself.
Further, the High Court had relied on the cautionary language in Re Henric: it warned that if a self-represented person chooses to affirm the affidavit, he or she cannot claim to have no or insufficient knowledge of what is required for ad hoc admissions. The Court of Appeal treated this as inconsistent with the appellants’ position. If applicants were entitled to address the court freely on their own applications, the warning about knowledge would be less meaningful. The Court of Appeal therefore treated Re Henric as supporting the principle that the LPA’s exception for acting in person is not a carte blanche for unauthorised persons to litigate the admission question on their own behalf.
The Court of Appeal also considered the appellants’ attempt to characterise themselves as “self-represented persons” because they were parties to the ad hoc admission applications. While the appellants were indeed parties to the admission proceedings, the Court of Appeal accepted the High Court’s distinction between being a party to the application and being the person whose interests are being advanced in the underlying substantive dispute. The admission application was a regulatory step enabling representation of others. That functional reality mattered for the interpretation of s 34(1)(e): the exception was not intended to allow an unauthorised person to circumvent the admission regime by presenting arguments to secure permission to act for another party.
In addition, the Court of Appeal’s analysis reflected a broader concern with maintaining the integrity of the admission process. Allowing applicants to address the court on the merits of their own admission could undermine the role of the Attorney-General and the Law Society in objecting and assisting the court. It could also create uncertainty about the procedural fairness of admission hearings, particularly where the court must assess whether the statutory criteria are met and whether the applicant is suitable to practise.
Although the truncated extract provided does not include the full reasoning beyond the preliminary objection, the Court of Appeal’s approach, as reflected in the High Court’s reasoning and the framing of the issue, indicates a careful, purposive interpretation of the LPA. The court treated the exception in s 34(1)(e) as limited to genuine self-representation in proceedings where the person is acting personally “only” for himself or herself, and not as a mechanism to permit unauthorised counsel to argue for admission to represent others.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision on the preliminary objection. It affirmed that the appellants were not entitled to address the court on the merits of their own ad hoc admission applications before being admitted to practise in Singapore.
Practically, this meant that the appellants’ submissions on their own admission applications were procedurally barred, and the court would proceed on the basis of the material before it and the submissions of the respondents (and any other permitted parties) in the admission proceedings.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for foreign counsel and for law firms that routinely engage overseas advocates in Singapore proceedings. Ad hoc admission is often sought on an expedited basis to ensure continuity of representation. The Court of Appeal’s ruling clarifies that, despite being parties to the admission applications, applicants cannot assume a right to address the court on the merits of their own admission while still unauthorised.
For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of procedural compliance and careful planning. If foreign counsel intend to participate in the substantive proceedings, they must ensure that their participation is channelled through the admission framework in a manner consistent with the LPA. Practically, this may require preparing written materials in advance and coordinating with Singapore counsel or ensuring that the respondents’ and the court’s assessment of suitability is not procedurally complicated by submissions from the applicants themselves.
From a doctrinal perspective, the case strengthens the interpretive approach that exceptions to unauthorised practice provisions must be construed narrowly, consistent with the regulatory purpose of the LPA. It also provides guidance on how to read Re Henric: context matters, and earlier statements about acting in person do not automatically translate into a general right for applicants in admission proceedings to make oral submissions on their own behalf.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) — Section 15 (ad hoc admission)
- Legal Profession Act 1966 — Section 33 (unauthorised person acting as advocate or solicitor)
- Legal Profession Act 1966 — Section 34(1)(e) (exception for acting personally for oneself only)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) — Sections 18(1) and 18(2)
Cases Cited
- Re Nicholas William Henric QC and another application [2002] 1 SLR(R) 751
- Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed and others v Attorney-General [2022] SGHC 291
- Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed and others v Attorney-General [2023] 1 SLR 1437
- Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General and another and another matter [2024] SGHC 24
- Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General [2024] SGCA 36
- [2018] SGHC 207
- [2021] SGHC 154
- [2022] SGHC 291
- [2024] SGHC 24
Source Documents
This article analyses [2024] SGCA 36 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.