Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHCF 6
- Title: JBB v JBA
- Court: High Court (Family Division)
- Date of Decision: 29 July 2015
- Judge: Debbie Ong JC
- Coram: Debbie Ong JC
- Procedural History: District Court appeal from the Family Courts; husband’s appeal against grant of an interim judgment of divorce dismissed; costs reserved and later decided
- Case Number: District Court Appeal from the Family Courts No [X]
- Parties: JBB (appellant/wife) v JBA (respondent/husband)
- Applicant/Plaintiff: JBB
- Respondent/Defendant: JBA
- Counsel for Appellant: Mahadevan Lukshumayeh (S T Chelvan & Company)
- Counsel for Respondent: Sandra Segeram Mahendra (Segeram & Co)
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure—Costs in matrimonial proceedings
- Statutes Referenced: Family Justice Act 2014
- Rules/Regulations Referenced: Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014) (“FJR”)
- Other Statutory Reference (in background): Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed), s 95(3)(e) and s 95(3)(b)
- Judgment Length: 10 pages, 5,917 words
- Key Issue Decided: Costs of an appeal in matrimonial proceedings; scope of discretion and application of “costs follow the event” under the FJR
Summary
JBB v JBA concerned the award of costs in matrimonial proceedings following the dismissal of the husband’s appeal against an interim judgment of divorce. The High Court (Family Division), Debbie Ong JC, had previously dismissed the husband’s appeal and reserved judgment on costs because the parties’ submissions were substantial and strongly argued. After considering the matter, the court ordered the husband to pay the wife costs of the appeal fixed at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements.
The decision is significant not because it departs from the general principle that costs follow the event, but because it clarifies how that principle operates in the family context under the Family Justice Rules 2014. The court emphasised that costs are always discretionary, and that the FJR expressly provides for “costs follow the event” subject to the court’s power to make some other order where the circumstances justify it. The court also drew on Court of Appeal guidance from the 1990s on costs in matrimonial matters, particularly the idea that ancillary hearings are part of the divorce process and that the successful party should ordinarily receive costs unless there is unreasonable conduct or other good reason.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties were married in Singapore on 17 November 1994. In October 2012, the wife commenced divorce proceedings. Her initial case relied on the statutory ground that the parties had lived apart for a continuous period of at least four years immediately preceding the filing of the writ. This ground was pleaded under s 95(3)(e) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed). The husband contested the wife’s case, and the divorce proceedings proceeded on that basis.
In May 2013, the wife amended her writ to rely on a different statutory ground: that the husband had behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him. This amendment invoked s 95(3)(b) of the Women’s Charter. The husband filed a defence to contest the wife’s amended case, and the matter proceeded to a contested hearing.
The hearing in the Family Courts lasted several days. In October 2014, the district judge granted an interim judgment of divorce. Importantly for the later costs dispute, the district judge ordered that the parties bear their own costs. The husband appealed against the grant of the interim judgment of divorce, challenging the district judge’s decision.
On appeal, the High Court dismissed the husband’s appeal. The court then turned to the question of costs. The wife sought costs for the appeal, and the husband resisted, arguing for a general approach of “no order as to costs” in matrimonial cases. The High Court ultimately awarded the wife costs of the appeal fixed at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements, while leaving the district judge’s costs order for the hearing below undisturbed.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The primary legal issue was how the High Court should exercise its discretion on costs in matrimonial proceedings, particularly where the husband’s appeal against an interim judgment of divorce had been dismissed. The court had to decide whether the general principle that costs follow the event should apply in family cases, or whether matrimonial proceedings justify a different baseline approach, such as “no order as to costs”.
A second issue concerned the interaction between the court’s broad discretionary power and the specific framework in the Family Justice Rules 2014. The FJR contains an express “costs follow the event” rule, but also allows the court to depart from it where the circumstances warrant another order. The court therefore had to determine what “circumstances” were relevant and whether any such circumstances existed on the facts.
Finally, the court considered how earlier Court of Appeal guidance on matrimonial costs should be understood in light of the modern procedural regime. The judgment referenced two notable Court of Appeal decisions from the 1990s that had treated costs in matrimonial matters as following the successful party, especially where ancillary proceedings are part of the divorce process. The High Court had to reconcile those principles with the current rules and the parties’ competing submissions.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by restating that costs are fundamentally discretionary. It relied on Court of Appeal authority to emphasise that, although the general principle is that costs follow the event, the overriding concern is to achieve the fairest allocation of costs. In Aurol Anthony Sabastian v Sembcorp Marine Ltd, the Court of Appeal had explained that the power to award costs is discretionary and not confined to the outcome of the litigation. Similarly, in BMG v BMH, the court cautioned against treating “costs follow the event” as a rigid rule that must always be applied.
Against that general background, the court explained the rationale for the indemnity principle that underpins the “costs follow the event” approach. It cited Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other appeals, where the Court of Appeal described cost-shifting as ordinarily indemnifying the successful litigant for legal costs incurred. The court also noted subordinate policies: achieving finality in litigation and suppressing parasitic litigation. The court further referred to Then Khek Koon and another v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other suits, which highlighted that the indemnity principle ultimately supports access to justice by enabling a meritorious litigant to obtain justice at the opponent’s expense rather than bearing the costs personally.
Having set out the general costs framework, the court turned to the specific matrimonial context under the Family Justice Rules 2014. It noted that the Family Justice Courts have “full power” to determine costs, subject to express provisions in written law and the FJR. Under r 852(2) of the FJR, costs should follow the event unless the court considers that, in the circumstances of the case, some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs. The court also set out the FJR’s list of considerations, including payments into court, parties’ conduct (including before and during proceedings), conduct in relation to mediation or other dispute resolution, compliance with pre-action protocols or practice directions, failure to establish claims or issues that unnecessarily protracted or added to costs, and any unreasonable or improper acts or omissions.
Crucially, the court observed that these considerations largely relate to the conduct of the parties in the legal proceedings. That observation matters because it frames the departure from “costs follow the event” as something grounded in identifiable circumstances, rather than a blanket matrimonial exception. The husband’s submission—that there should generally be no order as to costs in matrimonial cases—therefore had to be tested against the express rule in the FJR and the listed factors that guide the exercise of discretion.
The court then addressed Court of Appeal guidance from the 1990s. It discussed Shi Fang v Koh Pee Huat, where the Court of Appeal held that there was no reason why the wife should not be entitled to the full costs of the hearing of the divorce petition, and that ancillary matters were a continuation or part of the hearing of the divorce petition. It also discussed Tham Khai Meng v Nam Wen Jet Bernadette, where the Court of Appeal criticised the High Court for making no order as to costs at the conclusion of ancillary matters, holding that ancillary hearings are part of or a continuation of the divorce petition hearing and that the same costs order should follow unless the successful party acted unreasonably at the ancillary hearing or for other good reasons.
From these authorities, the High Court derived that the Court of Appeal was articulating no more than the general principle that costs follow the event, with the “event” referring to the grant of the divorce judgment. The court’s analysis suggested that matrimonial proceedings do not create a categorical rule against costs recovery; rather, costs principles apply, subject to the court’s discretion and the specific rule set out in the FJR.
Although the extract provided is truncated, the reasoning structure is clear: the court treated the dismissal of the husband’s appeal as the relevant “event” for costs purposes. The wife was the successful party on appeal, and absent some good reason grounded in the FJR considerations—such as unreasonable conduct by the wife, failure to comply with relevant protocols, or other circumstances—the default position under r 852(2) would favour an order that costs follow the event. The court also indicated that it would not disturb the district judge’s costs order for the hearing below, which had been “no order as to costs”. This reflects a practical and principled approach: the High Court addressed costs for the appeal while respecting the district judge’s discretion on the earlier stage.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court ordered that the husband pay the wife costs of the appeal fixed at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements. This order directly implemented the “costs follow the event” approach for the appeal stage, given that the husband’s appeal was dismissed.
In addition, the court did not disturb the district judge’s earlier order that the parties bear their own costs for the hearing below. Thus, the practical effect was a costs shift only at the appellate level, not a wholesale reworking of costs across the entire divorce process.
Why Does This Case Matter?
JBB v JBA matters because it reinforces that matrimonial proceedings in Singapore are governed by the same overarching costs principles of discretion and fairness, but with an express statutory/rules-based baseline under the Family Justice Rules 2014. Practitioners should not assume that family litigation automatically attracts “no order as to costs”. Instead, the FJR’s r 852(2) starts from “costs follow the event”, and any departure must be justified by the circumstances contemplated by the rules.
The case is also useful for understanding how older Court of Appeal guidance on matrimonial costs should be applied today. By treating the “event” as the grant of the divorce judgment and recognising that ancillary proceedings form part of the divorce process, the court provides a coherent conceptual framework for costs orders across stages of matrimonial litigation. This is particularly relevant where parties seek to isolate costs decisions for ancillary matters or where appeals are brought against interlocutory outcomes.
For lawyers, the decision highlights the importance of addressing costs submissions with reference to the FJR factors—especially conduct, reasonableness, and procedural behaviour such as mediation efforts and compliance with pre-action protocols. A general argument that matrimonial cases should ordinarily have no costs order is unlikely to succeed where the rules point towards costs recovery for the successful party and where there is no demonstrated basis to depart from that rule.
Legislation Referenced
- Family Justice Act 2014 (Act 27 of 2014), s 3 [CDN] [SSO]
- Family Justice Act 2014 (Act 27 of 2014), s 3 (Family Justice Courts structure) [CDN] [SSO]
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), r 851(2)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), r 852(2)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), r 854(a)–(d)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), r 856
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), r 857
- Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed), s 95(3)(e) [CDN] [SSO]
- Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed), s 95(3)(b) [CDN] [SSO]
Cases Cited
- Aurol Anthony Sabastian v Sembcorp Marine Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 246
- BMG v BMH [2014] SGHC 112
- Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other appeals [2015] 1 SLR 496
- Then Khek Koon and another v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other suits [2014] 1 SLR 245
- Shi Fang v Koh Pee Huat [1996] 1 SLR(R) 906
- Tham Khai Meng v Nam Wen Jet Bernadette [1997] 1 SLR(R) 336
- [2010] SGHC 148
- [2010] SGHC 255
- [2011] SGHC 138
- [2012] SGCA 3
- [2012] SGHC 213
- [2013] SGHC 228
- [2013] SGHC 283
- [2014] SGHC 112
- [2014] SGHC 184
- [1996] SGHC 206
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHCF 6 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.