Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHCF 6
- Title: JBB v JBA
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 29 July 2015
- Judges: Debbie Ong JC
- Coram: Debbie Ong JC
- Case Number: District Court Appeal from the Family Courts No [X]
- Decision Date: 29 July 2015
- Tribunal/Court: High Court
- Plaintiff/Applicant: JBB (the “Wife”)
- Defendant/Respondent: JBA (the “Husband”)
- Counsel for Appellant: Mahadevan Lukshumayeh (S T Chelvan & Company)
- Counsel for Respondent: Sandra Segeram Mahendra (Segeram & Co)
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs in matrimonial proceedings
- Statutes Referenced: Family Justice Act; Family Justice Act 2014
- Rules/Regulations Referenced: Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014) (“FJR”)
- Other Statutory Provision Mentioned in Background: Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed), s 95(3)(e) and s 95(3)(b)
- Judgment Length: 10 pages, 5,837 words
Summary
JBB v JBA [2015] SGHCF 6 concerned the High Court’s approach to costs in matrimonial proceedings following an appeal that had already been dismissed. The court had earlier dismissed the husband’s appeal against the grant of an interim judgment of divorce. Costs were reserved because the parties’ submissions on costs were substantial and contested. On 6 July 2015, the court awarded the wife costs of the appeal fixed at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements, and subsequently delivered written reasons explaining the governing principles.
The High Court emphasised that costs are always a matter of judicial discretion, even though the general principle is that costs follow the event. In matrimonial proceedings, the discretion is exercised within the framework of the Family Justice Rules 2014, which provide that costs should follow the event unless the court considers that some other order should be made in the circumstances. The court also reviewed earlier Court of Appeal guidance from the 1990s on costs in divorce and ancillary matters, treating the “event” as the grant of the interim judgment of divorce and recognising that ancillary hearings are part of, or a continuation of, the divorce petition hearing.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties, JBB and JBA, were married in Singapore on 17 November 1994. In October 2012, the wife commenced divorce proceedings on the basis that the parties had lived apart for a continuous period of at least four years immediately preceding the filing of the writ. This ground was pleaded under s 95(3)(e) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed). The husband challenged the wife’s reliance on that ground and filed a defence.
In May 2013, the wife amended her writ to rely instead on another statutory ground: that the husband had behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him, pleaded under s 95(3)(b) of the Women’s Charter. The husband continued to contest the wife’s case, and the matter proceeded to a hearing that lasted a number of days.
In October 2014, the district judge granted an interim judgment of divorce. At that stage, the district judge ordered that parties bear their own costs. The husband appealed against the district judge’s decision to grant the interim judgment of divorce. The High Court dismissed the husband’s appeal, thereby upholding the interim judgment of divorce.
After dismissing the appeal on the merits, the High Court reserved judgment on costs. The wife sought costs of the appeal, and also asked that the costs order below be disturbed. The husband’s position was that, as a general matter, there should generally be no order as to costs in matrimonial cases. The High Court ultimately ordered the husband to pay the wife costs of the appeal fixed at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements, while leaving the district judge’s costs order for the hearing below undisturbed.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal issue was how the court should exercise its discretion on costs in matrimonial proceedings after an appeal had been dismissed. Although the general principle in civil litigation is that costs follow the event, the husband argued for a matrimonial-specific approach: that there should generally be no order as to costs in such cases. The wife, by contrast, argued that there was no reason to depart from the general principle and that costs should follow the event.
A second issue concerned the scope of the “event” for the purposes of costs in divorce proceedings. The court needed to determine whether the relevant event was confined to the interim judgment of divorce or whether it should be treated differently in relation to ancillary or intermediate hearings. This question mattered because the district judge had made a “no order as to costs” decision at first instance, and the wife had asked the High Court to disturb that order.
Finally, the court had to consider how the Family Justice Rules 2014 structure the exercise of discretion. The FJR provides that costs should follow the event unless the court considers that some other order should be made, and it sets out specific factors relating to party conduct and procedural behaviour. The court therefore had to apply these rules to the facts and determine whether any departure from the “costs follow the event” default was justified.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by reiterating the general legal framework: costs are fundamentally discretionary. The court referred to Court of Appeal authority, including Aurol Anthony Sabastian v Sembcorp Marine Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 246, which explains that even where the general principle is costs follow the event, the overriding concern is to achieve the fairest allocation of costs through the exercise of discretion. The court also cited BMG v BMH [2014] SGHC 112, which cautioned against treating “costs follow the event” as a rigid rule that must always be applied.
In explaining why costs generally follow the event, the court drew on the policy rationale behind the indemnity principle and access to justice. It cited Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other appeals [2015] 1 SLR 496, where the Court of Appeal described how cost-shifting ordinarily indemnifies the successful litigant and supports access to justice by ensuring that a meritorious party is not left to bear the costs of vindicating rights. The court also referenced Then Khek Koon and another v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other suits [2014] 1 SLR 245, which explained that the indemnity principle is not merely punitive but ultimately facilitates access to justice.
Having set out the general principles, the court turned to the matrimonial context under the Family Justice Rules 2014. The High Court noted that the Family Justice Courts have “full power” to determine costs, subject to express provisions of written law and the FJR. Rule 852(2) of the FJR provides the key default: costs should follow the event unless the court considers that, in the circumstances, some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs. The court then highlighted the additional considerations in the FJR, including payment into court, the conduct of the parties (including before and during proceedings), conduct relating to mediation or other dispute resolution, adherence to pre-action protocols or practice directions, failure to establish claims or issues that unnecessarily protracted or added to costs, and unreasonable or improper acts or omissions.
Importantly, the court observed that these FJR considerations largely relate to party conduct in the proceedings. This matters because it shifts the analysis away from broad, categorical statements such as “there should generally be no order as to costs in matrimonial cases” and towards a structured inquiry: whether the circumstances justify departing from the default rule, and whether the parties’ conduct warrants a different costs outcome.
The court then reviewed two Court of Appeal decisions from the 1990s that had provided guidance on costs in matrimonial proceedings: Shi Fang v Koh Pee Huat [1996] 1 SLR(R) 906 and Tham Khai Meng v Nam Wen Jet Bernadette [1997] 1 SLR(R) 336. In Shi Fang, the Court of Appeal held that there was no reason why the wife should not be entitled to the full costs of the hearing of the divorce petition where the husband’s desertion led to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. It further reasoned that ancillary matters were a continuation or part of the hearing of the divorce petition, so the wife should also be entitled to costs of those proceedings.
In Bernadette, the Court of Appeal addressed a situation where the court below had awarded costs at the petition stage but made no order as to costs at the conclusion of ancillary matters. The Court of Appeal corrected this, holding that the hearing of ancillary matters is part of or a continuation of the hearing of the petition. Therefore, where a party is awarded costs at the hearing of the petition, the same order should follow at the hearing of the ancillaries unless the party awarded costs acted unreasonably at the ancillaries or for other good reasons. The High Court treated these cases as articulating the general principle that costs follow the event, with the “event” being the grant of the interim judgment of divorce, and with ancillary matters treated as part of the same overall divorce process.
Applying these principles to the case before it, the High Court had already determined the husband’s appeal on the merits and dismissed it. The “event” for costs purposes was therefore the wife’s success in obtaining the interim judgment of divorce, and the husband’s failure on appeal. The court’s approach to costs thus aligned with the default rule in the FJR that costs follow the event, unless there were circumstances justifying a different order. The husband’s argument for a general matrimonial exception did not, on the court’s reasoning, displace the structured discretion under the FJR.
As to the wife’s request to disturb the district judge’s “no order as to costs” decision for the hearing below, the High Court declined to do so. While the extract provided does not reproduce the full reasoning on this point, the court’s ultimate disposition indicates that it treated the district judge’s costs order below as not warranting interference, while still awarding costs for the appeal itself. This reflects a practical and principled distinction: the High Court’s costs order addressed the costs consequences of the husband’s unsuccessful appeal, rather than automatically revisiting the first-instance costs discretion.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court ordered that the husband pay the wife costs of the appeal fixed at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements. This was the court’s final costs order in respect of the appeal against the grant of the interim judgment of divorce.
Although the wife had asked for costs of the hearing below and sought to disturb the district judge’s “no order as to costs” order, the High Court did not disturb that order. The practical effect was that the wife received a costs award for the appeal stage, but the first-instance position remained unchanged.
Why Does This Case Matter?
JBB v JBA is useful for practitioners because it demonstrates how the court approaches costs in matrimonial proceedings after the Family Justice Rules 2014 came into force. While matrimonial cases have historically attracted arguments for a “no order as to costs” approach, the High Court’s reasoning shows that the court will not treat such arguments as overriding the default rule in the FJR. Instead, the court will apply the structured discretion in the FJR, with costs generally following the event unless the circumstances justify a departure.
The case also reinforces the importance of identifying the relevant “event” for costs purposes. By relying on Court of Appeal guidance from Shi Fang and Bernadette, the High Court treated the divorce process as a continuum in which ancillary matters are part of, or a continuation of, the divorce petition hearing. For litigants, this means that costs outcomes at different stages of the divorce process should be coherent, and parties should not assume that costs decisions at one stage will be insulated from the overall event-based logic.
For law students and litigators, the decision is also a reminder that costs are not purely compensatory or punitive; they are tied to access to justice and finality in litigation. The court’s discussion of the indemnity principle and the policies underlying cost-shifting provides a doctrinal foundation for why “costs follow the event” remains the default even in sensitive matrimonial contexts.
Legislation Referenced
- Family Justice Act 2014 (Act 27 of 2014)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), including r 851(2), r 852(2), r 854(a)-(d), r 856, and r 857
- Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed), s 95(3)(e) and s 95(3)(b) (as referenced in the background facts) [CDN] [SSO]
Cases Cited
- Aurol Anthony Sabastian v Sembcorp Marine Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 246
- BMG v BMH [2014] SGHC 112
- Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other appeals [2015] 1 SLR 496
- Then Khek Koon and another v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other suits [2014] 1 SLR 245
- Shi Fang v Koh Pee Huat [1996] 1 SLR(R) 906
- Tham Khai Meng v Nam Wen Jet Bernadette [1997] 1 SLR(R) 336
- [1996] SGHC 206
- [2010] SGHC 148
- [2010] SGHC 255
- [2011] SGHC 138
- [2012] SGCA 3
- [2012] SGHC 213
- [2013] SGHC 228
- [2013] SGHC 283
- [2014] SGHC 112
- [2014] SGHC 184
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHCF 6 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.