Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 238
- Title: Islam Mohammad Khabirul v Public Prosecutor
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Case Number: Magistrate’s Appeal No 9245 of 2024
- Date of Decision: 3 December 2025 (Judgment reserved; hearing dates include 13 August and 3 December 2025)
- Judge: Vincent Hoong J
- Appellant: Islam Mohammad Khabirul
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Legal Area: Criminal Law — Statutory offences
- Statutes Referenced: Criminal Procedure Code; Evidence Act; Evidence Act 1893; Work Injury Compensation Act (Cap 354, 2009 Rev Ed)
- Key WICA Provisions (as reflected in the extract): s 35(2)(f), s 35(2)(iv), s 35(2)(c), s 35(2)(ii), and s 3(4) (discussed)
- Lower Court: Public Prosecutor v Islam Mohammad Khabirul [2025] SGMC 8 (“GD”)
- Trial Outcome: Convicted on three charges; sentenced to imprisonment
- Sentence Imposed (summary from extract): 8 weeks’ imprisonment (1st charge); 5 weeks’ imprisonment each (2nd and 3rd charges); 1st and 3rd charges ordered to run consecutively; aggregate 13 weeks’ imprisonment
- Appeal Scope (as clarified): Appellant appealed only against conviction (not sentence)
- Judgment Length: 61 pages; 18,006 words
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2011] SGCA 52; [2017] SGHC 252; [2023] SGHC 74; [2025] SGHC 238; [2025] SGMC 8
Summary
Islam Mohammad Khabirul v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGHC 238 concerned a prosecution under the Work Injury Compensation Act (“WICA”) for allegedly fraudulent claims and false statements made to the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) in support of a work injury compensation application. The appellant, a Bangladeshi worker employed by Vigour Technologies Pte Ltd (“VTP”), claimed that he was injured aboard a vessel at a shipyard and subsequently applied for compensation. MOM investigated the application on suspicion that it was false, and the appellant gave statements to the investigation officer (“IO”).
The appellant was convicted on three charges: (1) fraudulently making a WICA claim knowing it to be false, to induce his employer to pay compensation; and (2) and (3) making statements to the IO under WICA which he knew were false in material particulars. On appeal to the High Court, the court upheld the convictions. The High Court accepted the trial judge’s findings that the appellant had been expressly told not to work on the relevant day, had not attended the daily toolbox meeting and did not receive work instructions, and that the appellant’s account of the alleged accident and injuries was not credible. The court therefore concluded that the statutory offences were made out beyond reasonable doubt.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellant was employed by VTP and worked on a vessel known as the Heerema Sleipnir at Sembcorp Marine Tuas Boulevard Yard (“the Yard”). On 1 March 2019, he was found lying on the tween deck of the vessel. He later claimed that he had been injured in an accident. On 11 April 2019, he submitted an application for work injury compensation under WICA. MOM then investigated the application for allegedly making a false claim and obtained statements from the appellant dated 11 April 2019 and 27 June 2019.
The prosecution’s case was that the appellant’s WICA claim and supporting statements were knowingly false. The first charge focused on the appellant’s alleged fraudulently making a claim for compensation for personal injuries allegedly sustained by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The second and third charges concerned specific averments made by the appellant in his statements to the IO. In particular, the appellant said that while walking up stairs onboard the vessel at the Yard under VTP’s employment, he was hit in his left leg by a bundle of insulation, causing him to fall and roll down the stairs and sustain injuries to various parts of his body. He also said that on 28 February 2019, a VTP employee did not speak to him about collecting his yard access card, and that he did not hear instructions from VTP’s director not to enter the Yard for work the next day (1 March 2019).
At trial, the court reconstructed the events of 28 February 2019 and 1 March 2019 using multiple strands of evidence. The trial judge found that on 28 February 2019, VTP’s director (Sengani) arranged for certain workers, including the appellant, to surrender their yard access cards and to remain in the dormitory rather than report for work on 1 March 2019. This was communicated through a combination of phone calls and a “Group Call” in which Sengani instructed the workers not to work the next day. The trial judge accepted the evidence of Sengani, Nasu (an employee tasked with collecting the cards), Mohosin (who coordinated the card collection), and Robin, and found their accounts consistent on the material aspects.
On 1 March 2019, the trial judge found that the appellant entered the Yard at 4.43am, earlier than his usual routine, and did not attend the toolbox meeting (“TBM”) that typically began at 7.30am. The TBM included morning exercise, a safety briefing with work instructions, and the signing of a risk assessment acknowledgement form (“RA Form”). Because the appellant was absent, he did not sign the RA Form or receive work instructions. The trial judge further found that during the TBM period, a shipyard safety supervisor called the appellant’s supervisor (Subuj) to inform him that a worker was lying on the tween deck corridor of the vessel, and that Subuj then attended to the appellant. The trial judge relied on yard entry records from a subcontractor access control system, the RA Form dated 1 March 2019, and evidence from Subuj, a health, safety and environment patrolman, and a paramedic who attended to the appellant.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court had to determine whether the trial judge was correct to find that the offences under WICA were made out beyond reasonable doubt. This required assessing whether the appellant’s WICA claim was fraudulently made with knowledge of falsity, and whether his statements to the IO were false in material particulars and made knowingly.
A second issue concerned the credibility and reliability of the appellant’s account of the alleged accident and injuries. Even where the trial judge found that the appellant’s knowledge of not working on 1 March 2019 was dispositive, the court still evaluated the alleged accident narrative and the medical evidence. The legal question was not merely whether the appellant had been injured, but whether the statutory elements of the WICA offences—particularly knowledge and material falsity—were satisfied.
Third, the court considered the interaction between the appellant’s alleged accident and the statutory deeming provision in WICA, including whether s 3(4) could apply to treat the accident as arising out of and in the course of employment. Although the extract indicates that the trial judge held s 3(4) did not apply, the High Court’s analysis necessarily involved whether the appellant’s circumstances could support a valid compensation claim in the first place, given the alleged instructions not to work and the appellant’s absence from the TBM.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court’s analysis proceeded from the trial judge’s factual findings, especially those relating to the appellant’s knowledge and the circumstances on 28 February and 1 March 2019. The trial judge’s reasoning turned on the court’s assessment of witness credibility and corroboration. The High Court accepted that the evidence of Sengani, Nasu, Mohosin, and Robin was consistent on the material events: Sengani intended that the five workers, including the appellant, should not go to work on 1 March 2019 and should surrender their yard access cards. This was corroborated by contemporaneous WhatsApp messages between Sengani and Mohosin, between Sengani and Nasu, and between Sengani and an operations executive responsible for the dormitory. Such contemporaneous records supported the trial judge’s conclusion that the appellant had been instructed not to enter the Yard for work.
On the appellant’s side, the trial judge rejected defence witnesses’ evidence as unreliable or equivocal. The High Court, in reviewing the appeal, treated these credibility findings as central. The court found that the appellant’s statement to the IO that he did not hear instructions not to enter the Yard for work was false in a material particular. The court also found that the appellant’s statement that Nasu did not speak to him about collecting his yard access card was not credible in light of the accepted evidence that Nasu had informed the workers to return their cards and that Sengani’s instructions were communicated through the Group Call.
With knowledge and falsity established, the court then addressed the first charge: fraudulently making a WICA claim knowing it to be false to induce the employer to pay compensation. The trial judge’s reasoning, which the High Court endorsed, was that even if the appellant had suffered an injury on 1 March 2019, the injury would not have been a work-related injury for which a valid compensation claim could be made. The trial judge reasoned that the appellant was expressly told not to go to work, did not attend the TBM, and therefore did not receive work instructions or participate in the work process. This meant that the appellant must have known that any injury he suffered in those circumstances would not be work-related. The court treated this knowledge as supporting the inference that the appellant deliberately, falsely, and fraudulently made the compensation claim.
Similarly, for the second charge, the court found that the appellant’s statement about being injured while working onboard the vessel was false and made knowingly. The trial judge’s approach was to connect the factual findings about the appellant’s non-attendance and the instructions not to work with the appellant’s narrative to MOM. The High Court accepted that the appellant’s account was inconsistent with the established circumstances and therefore satisfied the statutory element of knowledge of falsity in material particulars.
Although the trial judge found the above reasons dispositive, the court also assessed the alleged accident and injuries. The trial judge found no accident befell the appellant on 1 March 2019, citing inconsistencies between the appellant’s trial evidence, the case put to Subuj in cross-examination, and the appellant’s statements to MOM. The trial judge also found the appellant’s description inherently unbelievable and suspicious due to the absence of eyewitnesses to the alleged accident. Further, Subuj did not observe blood or visible injuries and did not see insulation material where the appellant was found. The High Court treated these findings as reinforcing the conclusion that the appellant’s story was fabricated or at least not reliable.
The court also considered medical evidence. The trial judge found that the appellant exaggerated the seriousness and extent of his injuries and pain. The trial judge further noted that the appellant did not take medication and refused treatment, tests, examinations, and a review by a medical social worker. These factors undermined the appellant’s credibility and supported the conclusion that the appellant’s statements to MOM were knowingly false. Finally, the trial judge held that s 3(4) of WICA did not apply and that the alleged accident was not deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. While the extract truncates the full discussion of s 3(4), the thrust of the reasoning was that the statutory deeming mechanism could not rescue a claim where the appellant’s conduct and circumstances did not fall within the intended scope.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the appeal against conviction and upheld the appellant’s convictions on all three WICA-related charges. The practical effect was that the appellant remained convicted of fraudulently making a false WICA compensation claim and of making false statements to the IO in material particulars.
Because the appellant clarified that he was appealing only against conviction, the sentencing orders made by the trial court (including the aggregate 13 weeks’ imprisonment with the specified concurrency/consecutivity) were not disturbed in the appeal as reflected in the extract.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how WICA offences are proved through a combination of (a) documentary and contemporaneous communications evidence, (b) credibility assessments of witness testimony, and (c) the logical connection between the accused’s knowledge of the employment context and the falsity of the compensation narrative. The case demonstrates that courts may treat evidence of instructions not to work, non-attendance at work routines, and the absence of work-related circumstances as powerful indicators that a claimant knew his compensation claim could not be valid.
From a doctrinal perspective, the case reinforces that WICA prosecutions are not limited to whether an injury occurred. The statutory offences focus on fraudulent conduct and knowingly false statements in material particulars. Accordingly, even where there is some suggestion of injury, the prosecution can still succeed if the court finds that the accused knowingly misrepresented the circumstances to induce compensation. The decision also shows that courts may evaluate the alleged accident narrative and medical evidence as corroborative support, even where the knowledge/falsity findings are already sufficient to dispose of the case.
For employers and counsel advising on WICA claims, the case underscores the importance of maintaining accurate records of work instructions, access control, and attendance at safety briefings and risk assessment processes. For defence counsel, it highlights the evidential risk of inconsistent accounts across statements to MOM and trial testimony, and the difficulty of overcoming contemporaneous records and corroborated witness evidence.
Legislation Referenced
- Work Injury Compensation Act (Cap 354, 2009 Rev Ed) — in particular:
- s 35(2)(f) and s 35(2)(iv) (fraudulent WICA claim knowing it to be false)
- s 35(2)(c) and s 35(2)(ii) (false statements to an IO in material particulars)
- s 3(4) (deeming provision discussed in relation to “arising out of and in the course of employment”)
- Criminal Procedure Code
- Evidence Act
- Evidence Act 1893
Cases Cited
- [2011] SGCA 52
- [2017] SGHC 252
- [2023] SGHC 74
- [2025] SGHC 238
- [2025] SGMC 8
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 238 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.