Gobi a/l Avedian and another v Attorney-General [2020] SGHC 31

"I therefore could not see any basis for concluding that Mr Ravi would have felt threatened in any way, or that it would have been reasonable for him to do so or that Mr Wong’s communication of the AG’s position could have any bearing on how Mr Ravi would conduct the case." — Per Valerie Thean J, Para 5

Case Information

• Citation: [2020] SGHC 31
• Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 13 February 2020
• Coram: Valerie Thean J
• Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Ravi s/o Madasamy (Carson Law Chambers) for the first and second plaintiffs (Para 1)
• Counsel for Defendant/Respondent: Wong Woon Kwong, Seah Ee Wei and Pavithra Ramkumar (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the defendant in OS 111/2020; Ng Yong Kiat, Francis SC, Seah Ee Wei and Pavithra Ramkumar (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the defendant in OS 181/2020 (Para 1)
• Case Number: Originating Summonses Nos 111 and 181 of 2020 (Para 2)
• Area of Law: Administrative Law — Judicial review; Constitutional Law — Equal protection of law; Constitutional Law — Fundamental Liberties (Heading before Para 1)
• Judgment Length: Approximately 15 paragraphs / short ex tempore judgment (Paras 1–15)

Summary

The High Court dismissed both originating summonses brought by two Malaysian citizens who had been convicted in separate drug cases and were under sentence of death. In OS 181/2020, the plaintiffs challenged a statement made by counsel for the Attorney-General at a pre-trial conference, alleging that it breached their right to a fair hearing under Article 9 of the Constitution. The court held that there was no factual basis for any claim of threat or unfairness: the statement was merely an express reservation of rights, and the application was dismissed. (Paras 1, 3-6)

In OS 111/2020, the plaintiffs sought leave for judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to an alleged execution protocol, and also sought orders compelling the Minister for Home Affairs and the Attorney-General to grant immunity to a former Singapore Prison Service officer, or alternatively for the court itself to grant such immunity. The court held that the evidence relied upon for the alleged protocol was inadmissible hearsay and unreliable media material, and that there was no credible basis for leave. It further held that there was no legal basis to compel the Minister or the Attorney-General to grant immunity, and no basis in law for the court to grant immunity itself. (Paras 7-15)

The judgment also clarified the evidential standard for leave applications for judicial review, emphasising that affidavits must comply with Order 41 rule 5(1) and contain only facts within the deponent’s own knowledge. The court noted that a low threshold for leave does not permit “skimpy or vague” assertions, and found that the plaintiffs had presented no admissible evidence capable of supporting a prima facie case. (Paras 8-12)

What Were the Proceedings Before the Court?

The plaintiffs filed two separate originating summonses, OS 111/2020 and OS 181/2020, and the court dealt with OS 181/2020 first because OS 111/2020 had been amended to include a stay pending the outcome of OS 181/2020 or any appeal arising from it. The court explained that OS 181/2020 concerned a statement made at a pre-trial conference in OS 111/2020, while OS 111/2020 concerned leave to seek judicial review and related reliefs. (Paras 2-3, 6-7)

What Did the Plaintiffs Allege in OS 181/2020?

In OS 181/2020, the plaintiffs sought a declaration under Order 15 rule 16 of the Rules of Court that a statement made by Mr Wong Woon Kwong at the pre-trial conference breached their right to a fair hearing under Article 9 of the Constitution. The statement complained of was: “I am also instructed to state that we are expressly reserving all our rights against Mr Ravi”. The plaintiffs’ case was that this amounted to a threat or improper pressure. (Para 3)

How Did the Court Deal with the Alleged Threat to Counsel?

The court held that there was no basis for claiming that Mr Ravi had been threatened by the Attorney-General. It observed that the statement was simply an express reservation of existing legal rights that may be exercised in the future, which should be familiar to all lawyers. The court further found that the statement was, if anything, a salutary reminder to counsel to conduct himself appropriately and in accordance with professional standards. (Paras 4-5)

Why Was OS 181/2020 Dismissed?

OS 181/2020 was dismissed because it lacked any factual basis. The court found that it could not conclude that Mr Ravi would have felt threatened, that it would have been reasonable for him to do so, or that the statement could have affected how he would conduct the case. Because the court found no factual foundation for the alleged breach, it said it was unnecessary to discuss the further question of the scope of rights under Article 9. (Para 5)

What Reliefs Were Sought in OS 111/2020?

In OS 111/2020, the plaintiffs sought leave under Order 53 of the Rules of Court for three principal forms of relief. First, they sought a prohibiting order to stay their executions based on an allegation about the execution protocol. Second, they sought a mandatory order directing the Minister for Home Affairs and the Attorney-General to grant immunity from criminal and civil liability to a former Singapore Prison Service officer. Third, they sought an order that the court itself grant the same immunity to that officer. A fourth prayer for a stay pending OS 181/2020 fell away after the court dismissed OS 181/2020. (Para 7)

What Were the Requirements for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review?

The court stated that three requirements had to be satisfied for leave under Order 53: the matter must be susceptible to judicial review, the plaintiffs must have sufficient standing, and the material before the court must disclose an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of the remedies sought. The court also noted that the burden rested on the plaintiffs to satisfy that prima facie standard. (Para 8)

What Did Each Party Argue About the Alleged Execution Protocol?

The plaintiffs relied on a press statement dated 16 January 2020 by Lawyers for Liberty and an affidavit by a Malaysian lawyer, Mr Zaid bin Abd Malek, to support the allegation that prison officers were trained and instructed to kick the back of a prisoner’s neck if the rope broke during hanging. The Attorney-General pointed out that the press statement and Mr Zaid’s account were inconsistent, and the court agreed that the material was unreliable hearsay. The court also noted that neither the plaintiffs nor Mr Zaid had personal knowledge of the matters alleged. (Para 9)

Why Did the Court Reject the Evidence on the Alleged Protocol?

The court held that media reports were not reliable evidence for judicial proceedings and that the affidavit evidence was hearsay. It further held that affidavits used in applications for leave to commence judicial review must comply with Order 41 rule 5(1), which requires that an affidavit contain only facts the deponent is able to prove from personal knowledge. The court reasoned that Order 41 rule 5(2) did not apply because such applications are not interlocutory proceedings. On that basis, the plaintiffs had not presented admissible evidence to support their claim. (Paras 9-10)

How Did the Court Treat the Low Threshold for Leave?

The court accepted that the leave threshold is low, but emphasised that this does not permit applicants to come to court with “skimpy or vague” arguments and evidence. Citing earlier authority, the court found that the plaintiffs’ case consisted only of bare and unsubstantiated assertions. It also noted, in contrast, an affidavit from Deputy Assistant Commissioner See Hoe Kiat stating that the Singapore Prison Service had never carried out the alleged training or instructions and that no execution rope had ever broken before. (Paras 11-12)

What Did the Court Decide on the Requests for Immunity?

The court held that the plaintiffs’ request for a mandatory order compelling the Minister and the Attorney-General to grant immunity failed. Counsel for the plaintiffs accepted that the court could not compel the Minister or the Attorney-General not to prefer charges, and instead asked the court to compel them to consider exercising discretion. The court noted that the Attorney-General had already exercised his discretion and would not grant immunity to the former officer. It further held that prosecutorial discretion is the sole province of the Attorney-General under Article 35(8) of the Constitution, and that there was no basis in law to impose a duty on the Minister to consider granting immunity in the manner sought. (Para 13)

Could the Court Itself Grant Immunity to the Former Officer?

The court held that the third prayer, asking the court itself to grant immunity, had no basis in law. It also held that the prayer was not one for a prerogative order within Order 53 of the Rules of Court. The court further stated that counsel’s reference to section 134 of the Evidence Act did not provide a basis for the court to grant immunity, given the way the prayer had been framed. (Para 14)

What Was the Final Outcome?

The court dismissed OS 181/2020 and OS 111/2020. It first dismissed OS 181/2020 for lack of factual basis, then proceeded to hear OS 111/2020 and dismissed it because the plaintiffs had not shown admissible evidence, had not established a prima facie case, and had not identified any legal basis for the immunity-related reliefs sought. (Paras 5-6, 15)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is significant for its strict approach to evidential sufficiency in leave applications for judicial review. The court made clear that applicants cannot rely on media reports or hearsay affidavits to establish the factual foundation for leave, and that affidavits must comply with the personal-knowledge requirement in Order 41 rule 5(1). That approach reinforces the gatekeeping function of leave and prevents speculative public-law claims from proceeding on untested allegations. (Paras 9-12)

The judgment is also important for its treatment of prosecutorial discretion and immunity. The court reaffirmed that the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial discretion is constitutionally protected under Article 35(8), and that the court cannot compel the executive to grant immunity where there is no legal duty to do so. It further rejected the notion that the court itself could create an immunity order in the absence of legal foundation. (Paras 13-14)

Finally, the decision illustrates the court’s unwillingness to infer unfairness or intimidation from a routine reservation of rights by opposing counsel. The court treated the statement at the pre-trial conference as a standard legal communication rather than a threat, and declined to expand Article 9 into a basis for relief on the facts presented. (Paras 3-5)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) — Article 9; Article 35(8) (Paras 3, 5, 13)
• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) — Order 15 rule 16; Order 41 rule 5(1) and 5(2); Order 53 (Paras 3, 7, 10)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) — section 7; section 5(1)(a) (Para 1) [CDN] [SSO]
• Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) — section 134 (Para 14)
• Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) — Fifth Schedule (Para 10)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment (PDF) — Singapore Law Watch
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2020] SGHC 31 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.