Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGHC 291
- Title: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph & Anor v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson & 2 Ors
- Court: High Court (General Division)
- Case Number: Suit No 833 of 2020
- Summonses: Summonses Nos 2331 and 2424 of 2023
- Judgment Date: 13 October 2023
- Judgment Reserved: 4 October 2023
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (Administrator of the Estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) & Tan Kin Tee
- Defendant/Respondent: Lee Boon Chuan Nelson; Gomathinayagam Kandasami; Institute of Mental Health
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure – Costs
- Key Topic: Quantum of costs to be awarded to successful litigants-in-person; principles governing costs for dismissed summonses
- Judgment Length: 7 pages; 1,762 words
- Prior Related Judgment: [2023] SGHC 230 (judgment of 25 August 2023 dealing with the dismissal of the two summonses)
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the fixing of costs arising from two dismissed summonses filed by Arbiters Inc Law Corporation (“Arbiters”) in the context of Suit No 833 of 2020. The court had earlier dismissed both summonses and ordered Arbiters to pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants. The present judgment addresses only the quantum of those costs, following the parties’ inability to agree on the amounts.
The court rejected Arbiters’ attempt to shift liability for costs back onto the plaintiffs. It held that the summonses “failed utterly” and that the parties compelled to attend court were entitled to costs. However, the court also declined to award Arbiters any costs against any party, emphasising that Arbiters had no entitlement to recover costs after filing applications lacking merit and, in one instance, after being discharged without proper authority.
Most significantly for practitioners, the court provided guidance on how costs should be quantified for litigants-in-person under Singapore’s Rules of Court. While referencing the UK approach of capping litigant-in-person costs at two-thirds, the court declined to adopt a strict formula. Instead, it treated quantum as discretionary and fact-sensitive, fixing a modest sum for each successful litigant-in-person based on the nature of the issues, the time spent, and the practical circumstances of the parties.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying litigation, Suit No 833 of 2020, involved multiple parties, including two plaintiffs (one of whom was an administrator of an estate) and three defendants, one of whom was the Institute of Mental Health. Within that suit, Arbiters filed two summonses—SUM 2331 and SUM 2424 of 2023—which were subsequently dismissed by the court in an earlier decision dated 25 August 2023: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters [2023] SGHC 230.
After the dismissal, the court had ordered Arbiters to pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants. The parties were unable to agree on the quantum of costs, prompting the present proceedings. The dispute was therefore not about whether costs should be awarded, but about how much should be awarded to each side in relation to the two dismissed summonses.
Arbiters’ position was that the plaintiffs should bear costs to Arbiters, and that the plaintiffs and the 1st and 3rd defendants should be held liable for Arbiters’ costs in respect of the summonses. This submission was inconsistent with the court’s earlier orders, which were described as “clear and unambiguous” in requiring Arbiters to pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants.
In addition, the court highlighted procedural and authority-related defects in Arbiters’ applications. SUM 2331 was filed after Arbiters had been discharged. The court explained that Arbiters therefore lacked authority to make the applications. The proper procedure would have been for Arbiters and the replacement solicitors (Red Lion Circle Advocates & Solicitors, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs respectively) to apply for leave of court for the discharge of solicitors. That step was not taken. When Arbiters realised the authority problem, it filed SUM 2424 as an attempt to rectify the defect by seeking to join Arbiters as a party and continue with the earlier application. Both summonses were nonetheless dismissed.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The primary legal issue was the quantum of costs to be awarded following the dismissal of SUM 2331 and SUM 2424. The court had already determined that Arbiters should pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants. The remaining question was how much those parties should receive, and whether any costs should be awarded to Arbiters at all.
A second, more nuanced issue concerned the principles for awarding costs to litigants-in-person. The plaintiffs, having become litigants-in-person, claimed costs of $4,000 in total for the two summonses. The court had to determine the appropriate approach to quantifying costs where the successful party is unrepresented, particularly in light of Singapore’s Rules of Court and the absence of a statutory cap on quantum.
Finally, the court had to address Arbiters’ attempt to reallocate costs liability. Arbiters argued that the plaintiffs should pay Arbiters’ costs, and alternatively that if costs were not awarded to Arbiters, only nominal sums should be awarded to the 1st and 3rd defendants. This raised the issue of whether any equitable or procedural basis existed to justify such a reversal of the earlier costs orders.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by dealing with the solicitors’ submissions, describing them as more straightforward. It emphasised that both summonses filed by Arbiters could not be “graced by even an iota of merit” and had failed utterly. In such circumstances, the parties who were compelled to attend court because they were served with the summonses were entitled to costs. Conversely, Arbiters were not entitled to costs against any party because the applications were dismissed and lacked merit.
On the authority and procedural defects, the court reiterated that SUM 2331 was filed after Arbiters had been discharged. This meant Arbiters had no authority to make the application. The court also noted that Arbiters did not follow the correct procedure of applying for leave of court for the discharge of solicitors. While Arbiters later filed SUM 2424 to attempt to cure the authority problem by joining itself as a party, the court had already dismissed both summonses in the earlier judgment. Accordingly, the costs consequences followed from that dismissal.
In quantifying costs for the represented defendants, the court assessed the complexity and the time spent. It observed that the two summonses were heard in about two hours in total and that the issues were not complicated. It therefore fixed costs for the 1st defendant at $8,000 inclusive of disbursements, to be paid by Arbiters. For the 3rd defendant, the court ordered $10,000 all in, again payable by Arbiters, noting that the main thrust of submissions in both applications had been advanced by counsel for the 3rd defendant.
Turning to costs for the plaintiffs as litigants-in-person, the court acknowledged that traditionally costs were not awarded to litigants-in-person because costs are party-and-party costs intended to defray solicitor-and-client expenses. However, in modern practice, the Rules of Court allow costs to be awarded even to litigants-in-person. The court noted that in rare cases where such costs had been awarded, they were typically much lower than what would have been awarded if the litigant had been represented by solicitors or counsel.
The court then considered comparative guidance from the UK. In the UK, Civil Procedure Rules cap costs to litigants-in-person at two-thirds of what would have been ordered if represented. The court referenced Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 52, where a similar approach had been adopted. While the judge expressed no disagreement with the decision in Mah Kiat Seng, he cautioned against laying down strict formulae for litigant-in-person costs in Singapore.
The reasoning was grounded in the structure of Singapore’s Rules of Court. Unlike the UK rules, Singapore’s Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A) and Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7) do not provide for any cap on quantum. Therefore, the UK’s two-thirds cap could at most serve as a useful guide, not a binding rule. The court stressed that quantum is inherently discretionary and fact-sensitive. Costs are not meant as punishment for the losing party; nor are they meant to provide full compensation, since money is rarely adequate compensation even in successful litigation.
Importantly, the court also explained why litigant-in-person costs should not be “taxed separately” in a mechanical way. The trial judge is best placed to adjust costs to the litigant-in-person based on knowledge of the facts and merits. The court further recognised that litigants-in-person may sometimes labour excessively due to anxiety or lack of legal knowledge, while in other cases they may perform well. This variability makes rigid formulae potentially unjust.
Applying these principles to the case, the court found that the issues in the two summonses were legal issues that the plaintiffs, unassisted by counsel, were unable to help with effectively. The plaintiffs were more concerned about the fees claimed by Arbiters and Red Lion Circle, which the court treated as a separate matter. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were compelled to attend court for two or three occasions regarding the summonses and produced affidavit evidence that assisted the court.
The court also took into account the plaintiffs’ personal circumstances. Both plaintiffs were not employed, so there was no loss of income to claim as disbursements. Balancing these factors, the court fixed costs at $500 to each plaintiff, payable by Arbiters, for the two summonses. This reflected the court’s view that litigant-in-person costs should be meaningful but appropriately modest where the litigant’s contribution is limited and the issues are legal in nature.
What Was the Outcome?
The court ordered that Arbiters pay costs to the 1st defendant in the sum of $8,000 inclusive of disbursements, and pay costs to the 3rd defendant in the sum of $10,000 all in. These amounts were fixed having regard to the lack of merit in the summonses, the time spent hearing them, and the extent of counsel’s submissions.
For the plaintiffs as litigants-in-person, the court ordered Arbiters to pay $500 to each plaintiff (ie, $1,000 total) for the two summonses. The court did not award Arbiters any costs, and it rejected Arbiters’ submissions seeking to shift costs liability back onto the plaintiffs and other parties.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is a useful authority on the practical application of costs principles in Singapore civil procedure, particularly where dismissed interlocutory applications have compelled parties to attend court. It reinforces that costs follow the event and that parties should not be required to bear the expense of attending court for summonses that lack merit. It also underscores that procedural defects—such as filing applications without authority after discharge—can have direct cost consequences.
From a litigant-in-person perspective, the case provides clear guidance on quantification. The court’s discussion is particularly valuable because it addresses the tension between adopting a “rule of thumb” (such as the UK two-thirds cap) and respecting the discretionary, fact-sensitive nature of costs in Singapore. By emphasising that Singapore’s Rules of Court do not impose a cap on quantum, the court leaves room for trial judges to calibrate amounts based on the circumstances of each case.
For practitioners, the decision also highlights the importance of ensuring proper authority and compliance with procedural requirements when acting for parties. Where counsel or law firms are discharged, any subsequent applications must be made with the correct procedural steps. Otherwise, not only may the applications fail, but the firm may be ordered to pay costs, potentially at levels that do not reflect the firm’s claimed fees.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A)
- Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7)
Cases Cited
- Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 52
- Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters [2023] SGHC 230
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHC 291 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.