Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters [2023] SGHC 291

Case Details

• Citation: [2023] SGHC 291
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 13 October 2023
• Coram: Choo Han Teck J
• Case Number: Suit No 833 of 2020; Summonses Nos 2331 and 2424 of 2023
• Hearing Date(s): 4 October 2023
• Plaintiffs: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased); Tan Kin Tee
• Defendants: Lee Boon Chuan Nelson (1st Defendant); Gomathinayagam Kandasami (2nd Defendant); Institute of Mental Health (3rd Defendant)
• Other Parties: Arbiters Inc Law Corporation
• Practice Areas: Civil Procedure; Costs; Litigants-in-person

Summary

The judgment in Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters [2023] SGHC 291 serves as a definitive clarification on the principles governing the award of costs to successful litigants-in-person (LIPs) in the Singapore courts. The dispute arose from the dismissal of two summonses (SUM 2331 and SUM 2424) filed by Arbiters Inc Law Corporation ("Arbiters"), the former solicitors for the plaintiffs. Following the substantive dismissal of these applications in a prior judgment dated 25 August 2023 ([2023] SGHC 230), the court was tasked with determining the appropriate quantum of costs to be paid by Arbiters to the successful parties, which included the 1st and 3rd defendants and the plaintiffs, who appeared in person.

The core doctrinal contribution of this case lies in Choo Han Teck J’s rejection of rigid, formulaic approaches to LIP costs. While jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom have implemented statutory caps—specifically limiting LIP costs to two-thirds of the amount that would have been awarded had the party been represented—Choo J held that the Singapore position remains one of broad judicial discretion. The court emphasized that the trial judge, having the most intimate knowledge of the facts, the merits of the case, and the actual labor expended by the LIP, is the appropriate authority to fix costs. This approach prioritizes flexibility over the administrative convenience of a fixed cap, recognizing that LIPs may, in some instances, perform work that matches or exceeds the quality of professional counsel, while in others, they may incur unnecessary labor due to a lack of legal training.

The High Court ultimately ordered Arbiters to pay substantial costs to the represented defendants ($8,000 to the 1st defendant and $10,000 to the 3rd defendant) while awarding a nominal sum of $500 to each of the two plaintiffs. This disparity in quantum reflects the court's assessment of the LIPs' contribution to the proceedings. Although the plaintiffs provided affidavit evidence that assisted the court, a significant portion of their efforts was directed toward irrelevant disputes regarding fees claimed by third parties. Consequently, the judgment reinforces the principle that while LIPs are entitled to costs for their time and effort, such awards will be strictly calibrated against the actual utility of their work to the court’s decision-making process.

Beyond the immediate parties, this decision signals to the legal profession that the "indemnity principle"—traditionally used to justify denying costs to LIPs on the basis that they incurred no legal fees—has been superseded by modern procedural rules. Under both the Rules of Court 2014 and the Rules of Court 2021, the court possesses the statutory power to compensate LIPs for the time they lose in defending or pursuing unmeritorious applications. However, the "nominal" nature of the award in this specific instance serves as a cautionary note that LIPs must remain focused on relevant legal issues to justify a substantial cost award.

Timeline of Events

1. 2020: The plaintiffs commence Suit No 833 of 2020 against the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd defendants.
2. Prior to August 2023: Arbiters Inc Law Corporation, representing the plaintiffs, is discharged. A settlement is reached between the plaintiffs and the 1st and 3rd defendants.
3. 2023 (Specific date not recorded): Arbiters files Summons No 2331 of 2023 (SUM 2331), seeking orders to secure settlement money paid by the 1st and 3rd defendants until Arbiters' legal fees are paid.
4. 2023 (Specific date not recorded): Arbiters files Summons No 2424 of 2023 (SUM 2424), seeking to be joined as a party to the suit to pursue the reliefs in SUM 2331.
5. 25 August 2023: The High Court delivers judgment in [2023] SGHC 230, dismissing both SUM 2331 and SUM 2424. The court rules that Arbiters must pay costs to the plaintiffs and the 1st and 3rd defendants.
6. 4 October 2023: A substantive hearing is held to determine the quantum of costs arising from the dismissed summonses.
7. 13 October 2023: Choo Han Teck J delivers the judgment in [2023] SGHC 291, fixing the quantum of costs.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The litigation originated from Suit No 833 of 2020, a matter involving the estate of the late Salvin Foster Steven. The 1st plaintiff, Arokiasamy Steven Joseph, acted as the administrator of the estate, joined by the 2nd plaintiff, Tan Kin Tee. The defendants included Lee Boon Chuan Nelson (1st defendant), Gomathinayagam Kandasami (2nd defendant), and the Institute of Mental Health (3rd defendant). During the course of the litigation, the plaintiffs were represented by Arbiters Inc Law Corporation ("Arbiters"). However, the relationship between the plaintiffs and Arbiters eventually broke down, leading to the firm’s discharge. Subsequently, the plaintiffs and the 1st and 3rd defendants reached a settlement agreement to resolve the underlying suit.

The specific dispute addressed in this judgment arose when Arbiters attempted to intervene in the settlement process to protect its claim for unpaid legal fees. Arbiters filed Summons No 2331 of 2023 (SUM 2331), seeking various orders aimed at ensuring that the settlement funds paid by the 1st and 3rd defendants to the plaintiffs were secured or held in escrow until Arbiters' fees were settled. The procedural difficulty for Arbiters was that, having been discharged as the plaintiffs' solicitors, they no longer had any standing in the suit to move such an application on behalf of the plaintiffs. Recognizing this jurisdictional hurdle, Arbiters filed a subsequent application, Summons No 2424 of 2023 (SUM 2424), seeking to be officially joined as a party to Suit No 833 of 2020. This was a strategic move intended to provide them with the necessary locus standi to pursue the reliefs sought in SUM 2331.

The High Court, in its judgment of 25 August 2023 ([2023] SGHC 230), dismissed both summonses. The court found that SUM 2331 was fundamentally flawed because a discharged law firm cannot use the originating process of its former clients to litigate its own fee disputes. Furthermore, the court saw no merit in joining Arbiters as a party to the main suit under SUM 2424, as the firm’s claim for fees was a separate contractual matter between solicitor and client that did not require intervention in the primary litigation between the plaintiffs and defendants. Having dismissed the applications, the court ordered that Arbiters pay the costs of the summonses to the 1st and 3rd defendants, as well as to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs appeared as litigants-in-person during the cost proceedings. The 1st defendant was represented by counsel, as was the 3rd defendant. The 1st defendant sought costs of $13,000 (later adjusted to $16,000 in certain submissions, though the court noted the initial request was $13,000), while the 3rd defendant sought $10,000. The plaintiffs, as LIPs, sought costs for the time and effort they expended in resisting Arbiters' applications. They provided affidavit evidence that the court found useful in clarifying the timeline of the settlement and the nature of their dispute with Arbiters. However, the plaintiffs also introduced significant amounts of evidence and argument regarding a separate entity, Red Lion Circle, and the fees claimed by that entity. The court noted that these matters were largely irrelevant to the specific legal questions raised by SUM 2331 and SUM 2424. The central factual inquiry for the court was thus how to quantify the value of the LIPs' relevant contributions versus the time wasted on extraneous issues.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The court was required to resolve two primary legal issues concerning the quantification of costs following the dismissal of the summonses:

• Entitlement and Quantum for Represented Parties: Whether the costs claimed by the 1st and 3rd defendants ($13,000 and $10,000 respectively) were reasonable and proportionate to the work required to resist the two unmeritorious summonses filed by Arbiters.
• Principles for Litigant-in-Person Costs: Whether the Singapore courts should adopt a rigid formula or cap (such as the UK's two-thirds rule) when awarding costs to LIPs, or whether such costs should be fixed at the discretion of the trial judge based on the specific merits and facts of the case.

The second issue was of particular doctrinal importance. Historically, costs were viewed through the lens of the "indemnity principle," which suggested that since an LIP did not incur solicitor's fees, there was nothing to indemnify. The court had to determine how modern procedural rules—specifically Order 59 Rule 18A of the Rules of Court 2014 and Order 21 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2021—should be applied to compensate LIPs for their time and labor without creating a windfall or encouraging inefficient litigation.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

Choo Han Teck J began his analysis by addressing the claims made by the represented defendants. The 1st defendant had initially sought $13,000, while the 3rd defendant sought $10,000. The court observed that the 1st defendant’s counsel later suggested a higher figure of $16,000, but the court reverted to the original $13,000 request as the baseline. In evaluating these amounts, the court considered the nature of the work performed. The summonses filed by Arbiters were not merely procedural; they involved substantive attempts to freeze settlement funds and join a law firm as a party to a suit. This required counsel for the defendants to review the history of the suit, the settlement terms, and the legal basis for a solicitor's lien or joinder. Choo J found that while the 3rd defendant’s request for $10,000 was reasonable, the 1st defendant’s request was slightly high. Consequently, the court adjusted the 1st defendant's costs to $8,000 (inclusive of disbursements) and awarded the 3rd defendant the full $10,000 "all-in."

The most significant portion of the court's reasoning focused on the costs for the plaintiffs as litigants-in-person. Choo J acknowledged the historical evolution of this issue, noting that at common law, LIPs were generally not awarded costs because costs were intended to indemnify a party for legal fees actually incurred. However, the judge pointed out that this position has been modified by statute and procedural rules. He specifically referenced the Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A) and the Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7), both of which provide the court with the power to award costs to LIPs.

The court then engaged in a comparative analysis with the United Kingdom's approach. Under the UK Civil Procedure Rules, there is a "two-thirds cap," which stipulates that an LIP cannot be awarded more than two-thirds of the amount that would have been awarded to a represented party. Choo J explicitly declined to adopt such a rigid formula for Singapore. He reasoned at [11]:

"The point therefore, is that costs of a litigant-in-person should not be taxed separately, but fixed by the trial judge because he is the person who knows the facts and merits required to adjust the discretionary quantification of costs to a litigant-in-person."

The court identified several reasons why a fixed cap is inappropriate. First, an LIP may lack legal knowledge and thus "labor excessively" to achieve the same result as a trained lawyer. In such cases, awarding two-thirds of a lawyer's fee might be too much if the work was inefficient, or too little if the LIP was exceptionally diligent. Second, some LIPs may actually outperform counsel, making a cap unjust. Third, the court emphasized that the "indemnity principle" is not the sole guiding light in modern litigation; the court's discretionary power to award costs is intended to achieve a fair result between the parties based on their conduct and the merits of the applications.

In applying these principles to the plaintiffs, Choo J looked at the specific work they performed. He noted that the plaintiffs had filed affidavits that were "useful to the court" in understanding the background of the settlement and the discharge of Arbiters. This work had value and saved the court time. However, the judge also observed that the plaintiffs spent a significant amount of time on matters that were "not relevant to the two summonses," specifically their grievances regarding fees claimed by Red Lion Circle. The court noted that while the plaintiffs were successful in resisting Arbiters' summonses, their lack of focus meant that much of their "labor" did not assist the court in resolving the specific legal issues at hand.

The court also considered the decision in Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 52, where the court had previously dealt with LIP costs. Choo J noted that in that case, the court at [7]-[9] appeared to have adopted a formulaic approach. However, Choo J maintained that the better approach is for the trial judge to fix a "fair amount" rather than relying on a taxing master to apply a formula after the fact. He concluded that because the trial judge has seen the parties in action and read their submissions, they are best positioned to determine the "discretionary quantification."

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court ordered Arbiters Inc Law Corporation to pay costs to the 1st defendant, the 3rd defendant, and both plaintiffs. The specific orders were as follows:

• To the 1st Defendant: Costs fixed at $8,000, inclusive of disbursements.
• To the 3rd Defendant: Costs fixed at $10,000 (all-in).
• To the Plaintiffs: Costs fixed at $500 to each plaintiff.

The court’s decision to award only $500 to each plaintiff, despite their success in resisting the summonses, was a direct application of the principle that LIP costs must be proportionate to the useful work performed. The court explained its reasoning in the operative paragraph:

"In the circumstances, I am of the view that a sum of $500 to each of them to be paid by Arbiters would be a fair amount and I so order." (at [12])

The court clarified that this nominal amount was chosen because, while the plaintiffs had been "compelled to attend court" and had provided some helpful evidence, they were primarily preoccupied with irrelevant fee disputes involving third parties. The award of $500 was intended to acknowledge their effort and the time they lost, without validating the inefficient or irrelevant portions of their submissions.

Regarding the defendants, the court distinguished between the $8,000 and $10,000 awards based on the initial requests and the court's assessment of the proportionality of the work done by their respective counsel. The court did not award costs to the 2nd defendant, as the primary resistance to the summonses came from the 1st and 3rd defendants who were parties to the settlement agreement that Arbiters sought to disrupt. All costs were ordered to be paid by Arbiters personally, as they were the losing party in the interlocutory applications they had initiated for their own benefit.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This judgment is a landmark for the treatment of litigants-in-person in Singapore’s civil procedure landscape. Its significance can be analyzed across three main dimensions: the rejection of foreign formulaic models, the empowerment of trial judges, and the practical implications for access to justice.

First, by explicitly rejecting the UK’s "two-thirds cap," Choo Han Teck J has affirmed the independence of Singapore’s procedural law. The court recognized that while the UK model offers administrative certainty, it can lead to substantive injustice. By refusing to cap LIP costs, the Singapore High Court allows for the possibility that an exceptionally skilled or diligent LIP could receive costs comparable to a lawyer, provided their work justifies it. This moves the focus from the status of the person performing the work (lawyer vs. LIP) to the quality and utility of the work itself. This is a more meritocratic approach that aligns with the broader goals of the Rules of Court 2021 to ensure "fairness" and "proportionality."

Second, the case clarifies the division of labor between trial judges and taxing masters. Choo J’s insistence that LIP costs should be fixed by the trial judge rather than taxed later is a significant procedural directive. It recognizes that the value of an LIP’s work is often intangible and highly context-dependent. A taxing master, looking only at a bill of costs and a file, cannot easily discern how much of an LIP’s labor was "excessive" due to lack of knowledge versus how much was truly helpful. The trial judge, having presided over the hearings and read the affidavits, is the only one with the necessary "facts and merits" to make a discretionary adjustment. This likely sets a precedent that LIPs should seek to have their costs fixed at the end of a hearing rather than waiting for a separate taxation process.

Third, for practitioners, the case serves as a warning when dealing with LIPs. It is no longer safe to assume that an LIP will not be awarded costs. If a law firm or a represented party files unmeritorious applications against an LIP, they face the real risk of being ordered to pay for the LIP’s time. However, the "nominal" award of $500 in this case also provides a reality check for LIPs. It demonstrates that the court will not award substantial costs just for "showing up" or for filing voluminous but irrelevant documents. To get more than a nominal sum, an LIP must demonstrate that their work directly contributed to the court’s understanding of the legal and factual issues.

Finally, the case reinforces the court's dim view of solicitors using their clients' originating processes to resolve their own fee disputes. Arbiters' attempt to join the suit was characterized as unmeritorious, and the resulting cost orders against the firm personally underscore the court's commitment to preventing the abuse of process. This protects the integrity of settlements and ensures that the court's time is not wasted on the internal commercial disputes of law firms.

Practice Pointers

• For Solicitors Dealing with LIPs: Do not assume that the "indemnity principle" will shield your client from paying costs if you lose an application against a litigant-in-person. Be prepared to argue that the LIP’s work was inefficient or irrelevant to minimize any potential cost award.
• For Litigants-in-Person: Focus your affidavits and submissions strictly on the legal issues at hand. As seen in this case, spending time on irrelevant grievances (like the Red Lion Circle fee dispute) will lead the court to categorize your labor as non-contributory, resulting in only nominal costs.
• Fixing vs. Taxation: Successful LIPs should request the trial judge to fix costs immediately following the judgment. Relying on a subsequent taxation process is less favorable, as the taxing master lacks the trial judge's intimate knowledge of the merits of your labor.
• Solicitor-Client Fee Disputes: Law firms must avoid using their clients' active suits to litigate fee claims. The proper avenue is a separate contractual claim or taxation of the bill of costs. Attempting to join a suit as a party for fee protection is likely to be viewed as unmeritorious and may result in personal cost orders against the firm.
• Evidence of Labor: LIPs should keep a record of the time spent on specific tasks (e.g., researching specific points of law, drafting affidavits) to provide the judge with a basis for a discretionary cost award that exceeds a nominal sum.
• Proportionality: When claiming costs, whether as a represented party or an LIP, ensure the amount is proportionate to the complexity of the application. The court in this case reduced the 1st defendant's request from $13,000 to $8,000 because it deemed the former slightly high for the nature of the summonses.

Subsequent Treatment

As of the date of this analysis, [2023] SGHC 291 stands as a contemporary authority on LIP costs. It builds upon the foundation laid in Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 52, but refines the approach by moving away from formulaic calculations toward a purely discretionary, judge-led fixing of costs. It is frequently cited in interlocutory cost hearings involving self-represented parties to justify the court's power to award costs for time and effort spent.

Legislation Referenced

• Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A): The provision governing the award of costs to litigants-in-person under the previous procedural regime.
• Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7): The current provision affirming the court's discretionary power to award costs to litigants-in-person, emphasizing the move away from the strict indemnity principle.

Cases Cited

• Considered: Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 52
• Referred to: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters [2023] SGHC 230

Source Documents

• Original judgment PDF: Download (PDF, hosted on Legal Wires CDN)
• Official eLitigation record: View on elitigation.sg