Can a Tenant Compel Specific Performance of a Notarised Lease Deed?

Consider a tenant who signs a residential lease deed, has it notarised, and pays the security deposit — only for the landlords to declare the lease cancelled within days, before possession is handed over. Must the tenant settle for a refund and damages, or can a civil court compel the landlords to honour the lease itself? Since the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018, the answer has shifted decisively in the tenant's favour: specific performance is now the statutory rule rather than a discretionary indulgence. This article maps what such a plaintiff must plead and prove, the ancillary reliefs available, and how the suit is valued and placed before the right court.

The 2018 Amendment: Specific Performance as the Default Remedy

Before 1 October 2018, when the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018 came into force, specific performance under the Specific Relief Act 1963 was an exceptional, discretionary remedy. The amendment rewrote Section 10, replacing "may, in the discretion of the court, be enforced" with a mandate:

"The specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 11, section 14 and section 16."

The Supreme Court has confirmed the effect of the change: once the factors in Sections 11(2), 14 and 16 are met, it is obligatory upon courts to order specific performance — a restriction on judicial discretion and an increase in certainty of contractual performance. The burden has inverted. A plaintiff holding a valid, concluded contract no longer pleads for the court's indulgence; it is the defendant who must bring the case within a statutory exception.

The Three Statutory Escape Routes

Only three gateways remain for a defendant resisting specific performance:

• Section 11(2) — contracts made by a trustee in excess of powers or in breach of trust. This has no application to an ordinary residential lease between private parties.
• Section 14 — contracts not specifically enforceable, most significantly a contract "which is in its nature determinable" (Section 14(c)), one whose performance involves a continuous duty the court cannot supervise, or one whose performance would breach law or public policy.
• Section 16(c) — the personal bar: specific performance cannot be enforced in favour of a plaintiff "who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him".

For an executed lease deed conferring a present right to possession, the determinability exception is usually the only serious battleground. A fixed-term residential lease that neither party can terminate at will without cause generally avoids Section 14(c) — but recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on what makes a contract "determinable" has created some uncertainty, and a lease containing a clause allowing either party to exit without cause may fall within the exception. The exact language of the termination clause must therefore be reviewed before suing.

One drafting point deserves emphasis: a repudiation cannot retroactively undo an executed deed. A landlord's unilateral declaration of cancellation, days after execution, is a breach to be justified — not an erasure of the contract.

Readiness and Willingness: The Plaintiff's Continuous Burden

Section 16(c) is a condition precedent, not a formality. The Supreme Court reiterated in a 2024 decision that the plaintiff "must aver and prove that he has performed his part of the contract and has always been ready and willing to perform the terms of the contract which are to be performed by him" (judgment of 10 July 2024). The Court drew the classic distinction:

"'Readiness' is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration. 'Willingness' is the conduct of the party."

And the requirement is continuous — from the agreement through to the decree. Readiness at the date of the contract or the date of the suit is not enough; long unexplained silence and inaction can be fatal. In the case before the Court, the plaintiff's total inaction for two and a half years defeated the claim.

What proof suffices? The plaintiff need not carry cash throughout the litigation. In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 200, the Supreme Court held that attending the Sub-Registrar's office and waiting for the other side to appear was itself positive evidence of having the funds; it is sufficient to establish the capacity to pay, not to have the money physically at hand from suit to decree. For a repudiated lease, readiness and willingness is typically shown by:

• payment or tender of the security deposit, with documentary proof;
• bank statements or an affidavit of income demonstrating capacity to pay the rent;
• conduct after the repudiation — communications seeking possession, a legal notice demanding compliance, and a suit filed promptly;
• a stated readiness to attend the sub-registrar's office for registration of the formal deed.

Timing matters enormously. Where the landlord repudiates almost immediately after execution and the tenant sues without delay, the "unexplained silence" concern simply has no room to operate. Delay, by contrast, corrodes both the Section 16(c) case and the prospects of interim relief.

What the Decree Can Contain: Execution, Registration, Possession

Courts have long granted specific performance of agreements to lease. In Vora Sirajudin Kalimuddin v. Safkathassein Badruddin, (1966) 7 GLR 512, the Gujarat High Court upheld a decree directing the defendants to execute a lease deed in favour of the plaintiffs and have it registered within two months, on the terms of the underlying agreement — treating the agreement as creating an immediate and present demise in the property (judgment). A notarised but repudiated lease deed thus supports a decree compelling execution and registration of the formal instrument under the Registration Act 1908.

Two ancillary provisions complete the relief:

Possession under Section 22. Section 22(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act allows a plaintiff suing for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property to ask, in an appropriate case, for possession in addition to performance. A lease is a transfer of possessory rights — use and enjoyment rather than ownership — and the provision supports a claim for delivery of possession. Consequential reliefs must be specifically claimed in the plaint: damages under Section 21 cannot be awarded unless pleaded (though amendment may be permitted), and an alternative prayer for refund of the deposit under Section 22(1)(b) should be included in case specific performance is refused.

Mandatory injunction under Section 39. Section 39 empowers the court, where necessary to prevent the breach of an obligation, "to compel performance of the requisite acts". A mandatory injunction directing the landlords to execute the deed and deliver possession operates as the enforcement arm of the specific performance decree. But the two remedies are not interchangeable: the Supreme Court has held (see Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 311) that where a plaintiff seeks to enforce a contractual obligation to execute a deed, the proper suit is one for specific performance — not a standalone suit for mandatory injunction. The injunction is ancillary relief within the specific performance suit, and the decree should fix a timeframe for execution (commonly 30 to 60 days), identify the form of the deed by reference to the executed instrument, and provide for enforcement if the defendants do not comply.

The Part-Performance Analogy

The protective logic of part performance reinforces the tenant's position. The Supreme Court has observed (see Ghanshayam v. Yogendra Rathi, (2023) 7 SCC 361) that a prospective purchaser who has performed his part of the contract and is lawfully in possession acquires a possessory title protected by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, which the transferor cannot invade. By analogy, a lessee under a binding, executed lease who has tendered the security deposit has acquired an interest that the lessor cannot unilaterally revoke by an unjustified repudiation. The analogy is strongest where possession has passed; where it has not, it underscores why courts compel performance rather than leave the tenant to damages.

Holding the Property Still: Interim Injunction Pending Suit

A decree is worthless if the landlords sell the property mid-suit. The tenant should therefore file, contemporaneously with the plaint, an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from alienating, encumbering, mortgaging or creating third-party interests in the property pending the suit. The familiar three-limb test applies — prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable harm — and each limb has a natural shape in this scenario:

1. Prima facie case: an executed and notarised deed is strong documentary evidence of a concluded contract; the repudiation is documented; the deposit has been paid; the suit is prompt.
2. Balance of convenience: the defendants retain possession and lose nothing from the status quo, while alienation to a third party would destroy the plaintiff's remedy altogether.
3. Irreparable harm: immovable property is treated as unique, and if it is transferred to third parties, specific performance becomes impossible — damages are an inadequate substitute for the agreed home.

Interim relief is not automatic. The Supreme Court has cautioned that a temporary injunction in a specific performance suit is not proper where there are doubts about the existence of a concluded contract or where the suit was filed late — which is precisely why the notarised deed and prompt filing matter. Courts have, conversely, sustained status quo orders where an owner attempted to sell the suit property to a third party mid-litigation, sometimes on conditions such as deposit of the balance consideration. The application must be supported by an affidavit detailing the deed, the repudiation, the plaintiff's readiness, any indications that the defendants may sell, and why damages are inadequate; the court may impose conditions, such as payment of rent into escrow pending decree. Even after the 2018 amendment made specific performance mandatory, the interim jurisdiction remains discretionary — exercised judicially, not arbitrarily.

Valuation, Court Fees and the Right Court

Suits for specific performance of a lease are valued under a specific statutory rule. Section 7(x)(c) of the Court Fees Act 1870 provides that court fees in a suit for specific performance of a contract of lease are computed:

"according to the aggregate amount of the fine or premium (if any) and of the rent agreed to be paid during the first year of the term."

The suit value is therefore any upfront premium or fine plus the first year's rent. The security deposit is not part of this value — it is a deposit, not consideration. Getting this right matters: undershooting invites rejection of the plaint or a demand for deficit fees, and consequential claims (damages, injunction applications) should be specified at filing to avoid complications later. An interim injunction application under Order XXXIX is incidental to the suit and does not attract separate ad valorem fees. The memo underlying this article found no state-specific modification in Haryana displacing the Section 7(x)(c) computation for lease suits, though local amendments should always be checked.

Forum follows value and geography. Section 15 CPC requires suits to be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try them; Sections 16 and 20 fix territorial jurisdiction where the property is situate, where the defendants reside, or where the cause of action arises. In Haryana, under the Punjab Courts Act 1918 as applied to the state, the Civil Judge (Senior Division) exercises unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction in original civil suits, while the Civil Judge (Junior Division) is confined to smaller claims as notified by the High Court. A specific performance suit over residential property is therefore ordinarily filed before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) of the district where the property lies, with a jurisdictional averment covering the property's location, the suit value, the defendants' residence and where the cause of action arose.

Practical Takeaways

• Plead the executed, notarised lease deed as the foundational exhibit, with its material terms, the chronology of execution, deposit payment and repudiation set out with dates.
• Aver continuous readiness and willingness in terms — financial capacity to pay rent, conduct evidencing commitment, readiness to attend registration — and back it with bank statements and proof of the deposit.
• Frame the prayer comprehensively: specific performance of the lease deed; mandatory injunction to execute the deed and deliver possession; temporary injunction against alienation; consequential damages (specifically quantified and pleaded); and an alternative prayer for refund of the deposit.
• File the Order XXXIX application with the plaint, not after — delay weighs against interim relief.
• Compute court fees on premium plus first-year rent under Section 7(x)(c), excluding the security deposit, and verify the lease's actual terms before fixing the valuation.
• Anticipate the defences: determinability under Section 14(c) (check the termination clause), want of readiness and willingness, and title objections where fewer than all co-owners signed. Where the lessors are co-owners, join all of them as defendants.

Two caveats from the underlying research: the analysis assumes a properly drafted, validly executed deed — latent defects, ambiguity or a termination-at-will clause change the picture — and post-2018 jurisprudence is still settling the finer points of determinability and the readiness-and-willingness standard.

Key Authorities

1. Specific Relief Act 1963, Sections 10, 11(2), 14, 16(c), 21, 22 and 39 (as amended in 2018) — specific performance mandatory subject to narrow exceptions. Source
2. Supreme Court judgment of 10 July 2024 (Aravind Kumar, J.) — readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) is a continuous condition precedent; readiness is capacity, willingness is conduct. Source
3. Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 200 — plaintiff need only prove capacity to pay, not cash in hand throughout.
4. Vora Sirajudin Kalimuddin v. Safkathassein Badruddin, (1966) 7 GLR 512 (Gujarat HC) — decree directing execution and registration of a lease deed on the agreement's terms. Source
5. Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 311 — where the contract is to be enforced, the remedy is a suit for specific performance, not a standalone mandatory injunction.
6. Ghanshayam v. Yogendra Rathi, (2023) 7 SCC 361 — possessory title of a performing transferee is protected under Section 53-A, Transfer of Property Act 1882.
7. Court Fees Act 1870, Section 7(x)(c) — lease specific performance suits valued at premium plus first year's rent. Source
8. Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Sections 15, 16, 20 and Order XXXIX Rules 1-2; Punjab Courts Act 1918 (as applied in Haryana) — forum, territorial jurisdiction and interim injunctions. Source

This analysis reflects the law as at June 2026. It is published for general information and does not constitute legal advice.