The Supreme Court in Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa (2025) held that judicial officers with seven years of prior advocacy are eligible for direct recruitment as District Judges under Article 233(2), overruling Dheeraj Mor and affirming equality in eligibility.
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“Judicial Officers Eligible for Direct Recruitment as District Judges”
Citation: Civil Appeal No. 3947 of 2020 (2025 INSC 1208)
Date of Judgment: 12th August, 2025
Court: Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench)
Bench: B.R. Gavai (C.J.I.), M.M. Sundresh (J), Aravind Kumar (J), Satish Chandra Sharma (J), K. Vinod Chandran (J).
Facts
- A writ petition was originally filed challenging the interpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution concerning eligibility for direct recruitment to the post of District Judge.
- Earlier, in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi[1], a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court had held that only a person practising as an advocate on the date of application and appointment, and not already in judicial service, was eligible to be considered under Article 233(2).
- Following that ruling, several judicial officers who had previously practised as advocates for more than seven years before entering service were declared ineligible for direct recruitment as District Judges. They filed multiple writ petitions before different High Courts and the Supreme Court, including Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa & Ors.[2], and connected matters.
- On 12th August 2025, a three-Judge Bench referred the controversy to a Constitution Bench to settle the questions of law regarding eligibility. The Bench formulated, among others, the following issues:
- Whether a judicial officer who had completed seven years’ practice before joining service could be eligible under Article 233(2);
- Whether eligibility should be seen at the time of application or appointment; and
- Whether Article 233(2) bars persons already in service.
- The Constitution Bench thereafter heard extensive arguments from senior counsel representing both judicial officers (petitioners) and members of the Bar (respondents). The petitioners contended that Dheeraj Mor misread Article 233(2) by excluding judicial officers with prior advocacy experience, while the respondents argued that the constitutional intent was to keep service and Bar as distinct streams of recruitment.
Decision of Lower Court / Earlier View
Earlier, the three-Judge Bench in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi[3] had held that a person must be a practising advocate on both the date of application and appointment and must not be in judicial service. That view effectively excluded judicial officers with prior advocacy experience from the direct recruitment process.
The Constitution Bench, while acknowledging that Dheeraj Mor had followed long-standing precedent, found that such interpretation rendered the words “has been” and “not already in service” redundant, and failed to recognize the constitutional balance between merit, equality, and experience. The Court thus restored a broader and more purposive interpretation of Article 233(2).
Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 12th August 2025 and partly overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi. The Court held that judicial officers who had completed seven years as advocates before joining judicial service are eligible for direct recruitment as District Judges under Article 233(2) of the Constitution. It clarified that the phrase “has been an advocate for not less than seven years” is in the present perfect tense and therefore includes those who have been advocates in the past.
The Court observed that Article 233(1) provides for appointment of persons to be District Judges in consultation with the High Court, while Article 233(2) prescribes eligibility for candidates not already in service. However, the phrase “a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State” was interpreted not as a bar but as a description of a second source of recruitment, namely, from the Bar. Thus, a judicial officer possessing the requisite advocacy experience before entering service cannot be excluded merely because he or she is presently in service.
In overruling the restrictive interpretation of Dheeraj Mor, the Bench emphasized that excluding judicial officers with prior advocacy experience would violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by denying them equality of opportunity and merit-based competition. The Court further held that eligibility must be determined as on the last date of application, not at the date of appointment.
Key Legal Issues Discussed
1. Whether a judicial officer who has completed seven years of practice before joining service is eligible for direct recruitment as District Judge under Article 233(2) of the Constitution?
Yes
The Constitution Bench answered in the affirmative, holding that a judicial officer who has been an advocate for at least seven years before joining judicial service is eligible for direct recruitment as a District Judge under Article 233(2). The Court observed (para 68) that the expression “…..has been an advocate or pleader for not less than seven years” uses the present perfect tense, signifying that the candidate must have been an advocate for a continuous period of seven years at any point before the date of application. It does not require the person to be in active practice at the time of application or appointment.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified that Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi had taken an overly restrictive view by holding that only a person practicing as an advocate on the date of application was eligible. The Bench found such interpretation inconsistent with the constitutional text and history. Referring to Chandra Mohan v. State of U. P[4], the Court reiterated that Article 233 contemplates two distinct sources for appointment, judicial service and the Bar and that neither category should be read in a manner that defeats the other.
The Court emphasized (para 72) that the purpose of Article 233 is to ensure that both experienced judicial officers and members of the Bar can contribute to the higher judiciary. Therefore, a judicial officer’s earlier advocacy experience cannot be treated as extinguished upon entering service.[5] The Bench concluded that denying such eligibility would subvert the constitutional design of inclusivity and experience envisioned for the District Judiciary.
2. Whether Article 233(2) excludes persons already in judicial service from applying for direct recruitment as District Judges?
No
The Bench held No, Article 233(2) does not exclude judicial officers from applying under the Bar quota if they fulfill the advocacy requirement. The Court explained (para 88) that the phrase “…a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State” cannot be interpreted as a prohibition. Rather, it defines the source of recruitment i.e., candidates drawn from outside the existing service structure.
In support, the Court relied on Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab[6], and Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad[7], both of which recognized that judicial service and Bar recruitment are complementary, not mutually exclusive, streams. The Constitution Bench observed (para 88) that Article 233(1) governs appointments from within the service, while Article 233(2) governs those from the Bar; but neither provision expressly bars a person from being considered under the other if they satisfy the constitutional condition.
Furthermore, the Court stated (para 124) that interpreting Article 233(2) as an exclusionary clause would amount to adding words that the Constitution itself does not contain. The intention of the framers was to broaden, not narrow, the pool of eligible candidates for District Judgeship. Judicial officers, having previously practiced as advocates, remain constitutionally competent to apply under the Bar quota.
3. Whether eligibility under Article 233(2) should be determined at the time of application or at the time of appointment?
No
The Court clarified (para 172(ii)) that eligibility is to be determined as on the last date of submission of the application, not at the date of appointment. This principle, drawn from administrative certainty and fairness, ensures that all candidates are assessed by uniform standards at the same procedural stage. Once a candidate meets the eligibility requirement at the time of applying, later developments such as joining service do not invalidate their candidacy.
The Court observed (para 83) that to require a candidate to maintain the status of “advocate” until appointment would lead to absurdity and unequal treatment, as the selection process may extend for months or years. Referring to Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik[8], the Bench reaffirmed that eligibility criteria are always pegged to the stage of application unless the recruitment rules expressly provide otherwise.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that judicial officers having seven years’ prior practice as advocates are eligible for direct recruitment to the post of District Judge under Article 233(2). The decision harmonizes the constitutional scheme with the principles of equality and meritocracy, ensuring that experience and competence not current designation determine eligibility.
[1] (2020) 7 SCC 401
[2] W.P. (C) No. 759 of 2017
[3] (2020) 7 SCC 401
[4] AIR 1966 SC 1987
[5] (1985) 1 SCC 225
[6] AIR 1961 SC 816
[7] (1985) 1 SCC 225
[8] (2013) 5 SCC 277
