This order addresses the Defendant’s attempt to challenge a Small Claims Tribunal (SCT) judgment concerning an expired tenancy, clarifying the narrow scope of appellate intervention in the DIFC.
What was the nature of the dispute between Orry and Ofelja regarding the AED 500,000 counterclaim?
The dispute originated from a residential tenancy agreement concerning a unit within the DIFC jurisdiction. The parties entered into a contract on 20 July 2024, which expired on 19 July 2025. Following the expiration of the lease, the Claimant sought recovery of the unit and payment for overstay rent, leading to a judgment by H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser on 28 January 2026. The Defendant, dissatisfied with the outcome, sought to challenge the findings, which included an award of AED 140,548.32 in overstay rent and a requirement to vacate the premises.
The Defendant’s resistance was multifaceted, involving both a defense against the rent claims and an aggressive counterclaim. As noted in the court records:
By Counterclaim, the Defendant sought dismissal of the Claimant’s Claim and an order for compensation in the sum of AED 500,000.
The underlying factual matrix involved allegations of poor habitability, including mould and ventilation issues, which the Defendant claimed impacted her health. These issues formed the basis of her initial counterclaim, which was subsequently dismissed by the SCT, prompting the current application for permission to appeal.
Which judge presided over the hearing for the extension of time and permission to appeal in Orry v Ofelja?
The application for permission to appeal and the associated stay of enforcement were heard by H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere. The hearing took place on 9 March 2026, with the final order issued on 11 March 2026. The proceedings were conducted within the Small Claims Tribunal division of the DIFC Courts, following the initial judgment rendered by H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser.
What arguments did the Defendant advance regarding the alleged AED 285,000 payment and the SCT’s failure to consider it?
The Defendant argued that the SCT’s calculation of overstay rent was fundamentally flawed due to the omission of a significant financial transaction. She contended that a payment of AED 285,000 had been made on 19 August 2025, which should have been accounted for in the final monetary award. The Defendant’s position was that the tribunal’s failure to address this payment constituted a material error that necessitated an appeal. As stated in the court's summary:
The Defendant contends that the SCT failed to consider, or to explain its treatment of, a payment of AED 285,000 allegedly made on 19 August 2025, and that this affected the calculation of overstay rent.
Conversely, the Claimant opposed the application, maintaining that the original judgment was sound and that the Defendant was attempting to re-litigate issues that had already been adjudicated. The Claimant also highlighted that the Defendant had failed to provide proper access to the unit for maintenance, citing breaches of the Leasing Law, which further complicated the Defendant's claims regarding habitability and health impacts.
What was the precise legal question the court had to answer regarding the scope of the appeal?
The court was tasked with determining whether the Defendant had met the threshold for permission to appeal under the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC). Specifically, the court had to decide if the Defendant’s allegations—ranging from procedural irregularities and health-related habitability claims to the specific financial discrepancy regarding the AED 285,000 payment—constituted grounds that had a real prospect of success or some other compelling reason for an appeal. The doctrinal issue was whether the SCT had committed a reviewable error by failing to address a potentially material piece of evidence, and whether such an error justified reopening the judgment.
How did H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere apply the test for granting permission to appeal?
Justice Le Miere adopted a restrictive approach, emphasizing that the appellate process is not a venue for a full rehearing of the facts. The court scrutinized each ground of appeal, distinguishing between substantive legal or factual errors and attempts to re-argue the case. The court found that while most of the Defendant’s claims—such as those regarding mould, health impacts, and procedural irregularity—lacked merit, the potential omission of the AED 285,000 payment required further examination.
The court’s reasoning focused on the materiality of the alleged payment to the final calculation of the overstay rent. The court held:
The PTA Application is granted only on the following limited ground: (i) Whether the Small Claims Tribunal erred in failing to consider, or to explain its treatment of, the alleged payment of AED 285,000 said to have been made by the Defendant on or about 19 August 2025, and whether that alleged payment was material to the calculation of overstay rent ordered in the Judgment.
By limiting the scope of the appeal to this single, quantifiable issue, the court upheld the finality of the SCT’s other findings, including the order to vacate the unit.
Which DIFC statutes and RDC rules were central to the court's decision?
The court’s decision was governed by the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), specifically those pertaining to appeals and the management of small claims. The court referenced RDC 53.107, RDC 4.2, and RDC 53.89 in the context of procedural compliance and the management of the appeal application. Furthermore, the substantive dispute regarding the tenancy was governed by DIFC Law No. 1 of 2020, with specific reference to Articles 12 and 14 regarding the nature of the tenancy, and Articles 42, 45, and 46 concerning maintenance obligations and access to the unit.
How did the court use the cited authorities to frame the limits of the appeal?
The court utilized the cited legislation to reinforce the strict boundaries of the SCT's jurisdiction and the limited nature of appellate review. By citing Articles 42, 45, and 46 of the Leasing Law, the court underscored that the Defendant’s failure to provide access for maintenance was a significant factor that the SCT had correctly considered. The court used these provisions to dismiss the Defendant’s habitability claims, noting that the Defendant could not rely on her own failure to grant access as a basis for challenging the judgment. The court’s refusal to grant permission on grounds of procedural irregularity was consistent with the high threshold required under the RDC to overturn an SCT decision.
What was the final disposition and the specific relief granted to the Defendant?
The court granted a limited extension of time for filing the appeal, but only to the extent necessary to address the specific ground regarding the AED 285,000 payment. Permission to appeal was refused on all other grounds, including habitability, counterclaim dismissal, and procedural irregularity. A limited stay of enforcement was granted solely for the monetary orders related to the overstay rent (AED 140,548.32) and the continuing daily rent, pending the outcome of the appeal. Crucially, the court denied a stay for the order requiring the Defendant to vacate the unit, the payment of utilities, and the award of court fees. The court clarified:
For the avoidance of doubt: (a) This Order does not confer any continuing tenancy or right of occupation on the Defendant
What are the wider implications of this ruling for DIFC practitioners?
This case serves as a reminder that the DIFC Courts maintain a strict policy regarding the finality of SCT judgments. Practitioners must ensure that all evidence, particularly financial evidence such as proof of payment, is clearly presented and addressed during the initial SCT hearing. The court’s refusal to allow a "re-run" of the case on different evidential grounds highlights that appellate permission is reserved for specific, arguable errors of law or material fact. Litigants should anticipate that even when permission to appeal is granted, it will likely be confined to a narrow, specific ground, and that a stay of enforcement will rarely be granted for non-monetary orders, such as the obligation to vacate a property.
Where can I read the full judgment in Orry v Ofelja [2025] DIFC SCT 593?
The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/small-claims-tribunal/orry-v-ofelja-2025-difc-sct-593. A copy is also available via the CDN: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/small-claims-tribunal/DIFC_SCT-593-2025_20260311.txt.
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | N/A |
Legislation referenced:
- DIFC Law No. 1 of 2020 (Leasing Law), Articles 12, 14, 42, 45, and 46
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), Rules 4.2, 53.89, and 53.107