What was the specific nature of the employment dispute between Nayan and Nandika that led to the AED 40,800 claim?
The dispute originated from an employment contract dated 4 March 2024 between the Claimant, Nayan, and the Respondent, Nandika. Nayan initiated proceedings in the Small Claims Tribunal (SCT) seeking a total of AED 40,800, comprising unpaid commission, salary for August 2024, salary for 17 days in September 2024, and remuneration for eight days of annual leave.
As noted in the court records:
In the proceedings in the Court below, the Respondent sought payment of three amounts from the Appellant which he said he was entitled to under an employment contract between him and the Appellant dated 4 March 2024.
The Primary Judge, H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser, ultimately dismissed the claim for commission but found in favor of the Claimant regarding the salary and leave entitlements.
Which judge presided over the appeal of the SCT judgment in Nayan v Nandika [2024] DIFC SCT 485?
The appeal was heard by H.E. Justice Thomas Bathurst in the DIFC Court of First Instance. The order with reasons was issued on 26 June 2025, following a review of the initial judgment rendered by H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser on 23 January 2025 and the Appellant’s subsequent Notice of Appeal filed on 21 February 2025.
What specific legal arguments did Nandika advance in its appeal against the SCT’s award of AED 34,706.35?
Nandika, acting as the Appellant, raised three primary grounds for appeal. First, it contended that Nayan had unauthorized absences during the disputed salary period and requested the court to order the production of an official Entry and Exit Report to verify Nayan’s travel history. Second, it introduced a document—a DIFCA Employment Permit Cancellation—purportedly signed by Nayan on 17 September 2024, which allegedly certified that Nayan had received all financial dues and waived future claims. Third, the Appellant argued that a salary reduction to AED 9,000 plus 50% commission had been communicated via email on 1 September 2024, asserting that Nayan’s continued work constituted implied acceptance of these new terms.
What was the jurisdictional and procedural question the Court had to address regarding the admission of new evidence on appeal?
The Court had to determine whether it could admit evidence on appeal that was not presented during the original SCT trial. Specifically, the Court addressed whether the Appellant, having failed to seek permission to appeal as required by RDC Rule 53.89, could rely on "new crucial evidence" to challenge the findings of the Primary Judge. The legal issue centered on whether the Court should exercise its discretion to allow evidence that could have been adduced with reasonable diligence during the initial proceedings.
How did Justice Bathurst apply the doctrine of "reasonable diligence" to the Appellant’s attempt to introduce new evidence?
Justice Bathurst applied the established appellate principle that new evidence is only admissible if it could not have been produced at the original trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence and if it would have a material impact on the outcome. The Court found that the Appellant failed to meet this threshold, particularly regarding the alleged waiver document and the travel records.
Regarding the procedural framework, the Court noted:
So far as Ground 2 is concerned, although the provisions dealing with appeals to the Court of First Instance in RDC Rule 53 do not deal with the admission of new evidence on appeal the general principles relating to the adducing of such evidence on appeal, in my view, should apply. The principles state that as a matter of discretion, new evidence on an appeal will only be permitted when the evidence could not have been adduced with reasonable diligence at the trial and where the Court concludes that it would have an important influence on the outcome of the case
Which specific DIFC Employment Law provisions and RDC rules were central to the Court’s reasoning?
The Court relied heavily on Article 20 of the DIFC Employment Law, which governs the variation of salary. The Primary Judge had previously determined that the Appellant failed to provide evidence of a written agreement to reduce the salary, a requirement mandated by the statute. Furthermore, the Court referenced RDC Rule 53, which governs the procedure for appeals to the Court of First Instance, noting that the Appellant failed to comply with the requirement to seek permission to appeal under RDC Rule 53.89.
How did the Court interpret the requirement for written consent under Article 20 of the DIFC Employment Law in the context of the alleged salary reduction?
The Court rejected the Appellant’s argument that an email communication regarding a salary reduction, followed by continued performance of duties, constituted a valid variation of the employment contract. Justice Bathurst affirmed the Primary Judge’s reliance on the statutory requirement for written consent.
As stated in the judgment:
So far as Ground 3 is concerned, although the Respondent concedes he received the email he stated he did not assent to its terms. As the Primary Judge correctly pointed out (judgment (16)) Article 20 of the DIFC Employment Law requires the written agreement of the employee to any agreement to vary or reduce the employee's salary.
The Court emphasized that the Appellant’s failure to mention any such agreement during the initial SCT proceedings further undermined the credibility of the claim.
What was the final disposition of the appeal and the status of the monetary award?
The Court refused the appeal in its entirety. The original order made by the Primary Judge, which awarded Nayan the sum of AED 34,706.35, remained undisturbed. The Court made no order as to costs, meaning each party bore their own legal expenses for the appeal process.
What are the wider implications for DIFC practitioners regarding the introduction of new evidence and employment contract variations?
This case serves as a strict reminder that the DIFC Courts will not permit parties to "retry" their case on appeal by introducing evidence that was available but not presented at the trial stage. Practitioners must ensure that all relevant documentation—including travel records and signed waivers—is submitted during the initial SCT hearing. Furthermore, the ruling reinforces that any attempt to vary an employment contract, particularly regarding salary, must strictly adhere to the written consent requirements of Article 20 of the DIFC Employment Law. Implied acceptance through continued work is insufficient to override the statutory protection afforded to employees in the DIFC.
Where can I read the full judgment in Nayan v Nandika [2024] DIFC SCT 485?
The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/small-claims-tribunal/nayan-v-nandika-2024-difc-sct-485. The text is also available via the CDN: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/small-claims-tribunal/DIFC_SCT-485-2024_20250626.txt
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| Nayan v Nandika (Primary Judgment) | [2025] DIFC SCT (23 Jan 2025) | The order under appeal; rejected commission claim but awarded AED 34,706.35. |
Legislation referenced:
- DIFC Employment Law, Article 20
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), Rule 53
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), Rule 53.89